In this action under the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act ("NYFCRA"), defendant National Credit Systems, Inc. ("National") has moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) for lack of capacity to sue or, alternatively, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 6-8). Plaintiff Ana Gabriela Venture Cruz ("Plaintiff") opposes the motion (NYSCEF Doc. No. 12). National submitted a reply thereon (NYSCEF Doc. No. 15). After a review of all papers filed on the motion and upon due deliberation, National's motion to dismiss is granted because the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims against National are preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").

This action was commenced with the filing of a Summons and Complaint (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1) on October 6, 2025. Plaintiff brings claims against defendants Equifax Information Services LLC, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and Trans Union LLC a/k/a Transunion, the three major consumer credit reporting agencies, as well as National, which furnishes information to these agencies (id.).^[FN1] Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the NYFCRA (Article 25 of the New York General Business Law, GBL § 380 et seq.) (id.). With respect to National, Plaintiff alleges that it improperly reported an account related to unpaid rent as valid and in collection, which has lowered Plaintiff's credit scores and harmed her reputation (id.).

National filed the instant motion seeking dismissal of the Complaint on three grounds: (1) that Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) for failure to allege an [*2]injury in fact; (2) that Plaintiff's claims fail to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) because her NYFCRA claims are preempted by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.; and (3) that Plaintiff's claims fail to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) because she failed to sufficiently allege that National furnished factually inaccurate or materially misleading information (NYSCEF Doc. No. 7).

Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the lowering of her credit scores constitutes an injury sufficient to confer capacity to sue under New York law, that her claims are not preempted by the FCRA based on National's alleged willful misconduct, and that her allegations of a breach of the warranty of habitability with respect to the rental property were a sufficient basis to require National to refrain from reporting, or remove, the reported information regarding delinquency of payment (NYSCEF Doc. No. 12).

The FCRA (15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) contains a general preemption provision, which states in relevant part:

No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies . . . .

Federal law thus preempts state law claims against persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies with respect to subject matter regulated under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2, which addresses the duties of those persons when providing such information. The first such duty is to "provide accurate information" to consumer reporting agencies (15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)). The statute further provides that, after receiving notice from a consumer reporting agency that a consumer is disputing the completeness or accuracy of information provided to the consumer reporting agency, the reporter must investigate the dispute (15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)).

Here, Plaintiff's three causes of action against National allege that National failed to conduct a prompt and reasonable investigation of the disputed account and failed to verify the accuracy of information it reported in violation of sections 380-f, 380-m, and 380-l of the New York General Business Law (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 35-44, 50-53, 54-58). Because each of these claims falls squarely within the subject matter regulated by 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2, and therefore the preemption provision of 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F), each of Plaintiff's causes of action against National is barred (see Hines v. MicroBilt Corporation, 237 AD3d 1070, 1071 [2d Dept. 2025]; Fernandez v. GM Financial, 85 Misc 3d 139(A) [App. Term, 1st Dept. 2025]); Ritchie v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., No. 12-cv-4992 (KBF), 2016 WL 1241531, at *17-21 [S.D.NY 2016]).

Plaintiff argues that 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) applies to prevent preemption in this case. The Court disagrees. Section § 1681h(e), titled "Limitation of liability," provides in pertinent part,

[N]o consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting of information against . . . any person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency,. . . except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.

15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). Plaintiff argues that § 1681h(e) saves its claims against National, at least [*3]to the extent they allege willful misconduct (NYSCEF Doc. No. 12 at 11). This argument has been rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which persuasively explained that the later-enacted 15 U.S.C. § 1681t expanded preemption under the FCRA, and the earlier-enacted § 1681h(e) therefore does not limit preemption under § 1681t (Macpherson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 665 F.3d 45, 47-48 [2d Cir. 2011]). The Second Circuit's decision in Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (802 F.3d 437 [2d Cir. 2015]) is not to the contrary. In that case, the Court held that not all of the plaintiff's NYFCRA claims were preempted because the plaintiff alleged that the defendant bank's employees aided and abetted an identity theft scheme, conduct which falls outside the scope of responsibilities of persons furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies under the FCRA (id. at 441-442). Plaintiff's claims here relate directly to National's responsibilities under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2, are preempted by the FCRA, and must therefore be dismissed.^[FN2]

For all the reasons stated above, and based upon all the papers submitted, and upon due deliberation it is hereby:

ORDERED that National's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) is GRANTED and each of Plaintiff's claims against National are hereby DISMISSED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.