NYSCEF doc nos. 264-275, 277-279, 284, 288, 289, 292-307, and 309-317 were read on this motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs, Jeffrey Pollizzotto, deceased, and Luann Pollizzotto, commenced this New York City Asbestos Litigation (NYCAL) personal injury action on September 22, 2022. The action concerns Mr. Pollizzotto's alleged asbestos exposure from various defendants' products which plaintiffs claim caused Mr. Pollizzotto's lung cancer. On October 21, 2024, plaintiffs filed the note of issue and the certificate of readiness and certified that all discovery proceedings known to be necessary were complete (NYSCEF doc no. 128). December 6, 2024, was the [*2]deadline to file summary judgment motions.^[FN1] Defendant Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., individually, and as successor to Norton Company (collectively Norton), filed its motion for summary judgment on June 26, 2025, 202 days late (NYSCEF doc no. 264).

Norton states that "[o]n April 29, 2025, Plaintiffs and Norton stipulated to extend the deadline for Norton's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, this motion is timely." (Norton's mem in support at 2.) The referenced stipulation states that "the filing date for Norton's Motion for Summary Judgment is extended to June 26, 2025" (Affirmation in support, exhibit E). This stipulation was not so ordered by the court nor was it submitted to the court for so ordering.

Plaintiffs argue that the motion is untimely as the April 29, 2025 stipulation, which was not so ordered by the court, was ineffective in extending Norton's summary judgment filing deadline. In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite this court's decision and order in Bernert v Amchem Prods. Inc. et al., 2025 WL 1207896 (Sup Ct, NY County 2025, Schumacher, J., index no. 190239/2022), which denied a summary judgment motion as untimely. The court found that a stipulation between the parties which was not so ordered by the court did not extend summary judgment deadlines and did not constitute good cause for the delay (id. *1).

Norton argues in reply that there is good cause for the delay and that this case is distinguishable from Bernert. Norton asserts that, unlike in Bernert, there were not one, but multiple stipulations stating that Norton's filing deadline was extended (see NYSCEF doc no. 310, movant's mem in reply at 3; NYSCEF doc nos. 148 [stipulation dated November 14, 2024], 198 [stipulation dated January 14, 2025], 207 [stipulation dated February 14, 2025], 233 [stipulation dated March 18, 2025], and affirmation in support, exhibit E [stipulation dated April 29, 2025] [collectively the stipulations]). None of the stipulations were so ordered by the court nor were they submitted to the court for so ordering.

Norton further claims that an absence of a causation opinion as to Norton when the note of issue was filed catalyzed settlement discussions between plaintiffs and Norton (see Norton's mem in reply at 3). Norton states that the stipulations were executed to facilitate these discussions (id.). Norton indicated that under these circumstances, it was not required to move for summary judgment by December 6, 2024 (id.).

Norton further argues that, in April 2025 ^[FN2] , "a very large settlement demand" compelled it to shift its strategy, and it found that the case would remain unresolved, despite the continued absence of a causation opinion, "without a defense expert work-up" (id.). Consequently, Norton filed the motion on June 26, 2025 (id.).

Last, Norton states that there is good cause as the court extended the return date of the motion (Norton's mem in reply at 3). Plaintiffs and Norton twice stipulated to extend the return date of the motion in the submissions part (NYSCEF doc nos. 279, and 284). The court so ordered the third stipulation between plaintiffs and Norton that extended the return date of the [*3]motion beyond 60 days from the original return date (see NYSCEF doc no. 264 [notice of motion]; NYSCEF doc no. 288 [stipulation requesting so ordering]; NYSCEF doc no. 289 [so ordered stipulation]).

CPLR 3212(a) requires that motions for summary judgment be filed by a date set by the court, unless none is set, "except with leave on good cause shown." "'[G]ood cause' in CPLR 3212(a) requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion—a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness—rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy" (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; see also Jarama v Liberty Ave. Hous. Dev., Fund Corp., 161 AD3d 691, 692 [1st Dept 2018]).

The court finds that the stipulations did not in fact extend Norton's time to move for summary judgment, as they were not so ordered, and as such they do not excuse the delay. "The Court of Appeals has made it clear that 'statutory time frames—like court-ordered time frames—are not options, they are requirements, to be taken seriously by the parties'" (Appleyard v Tigges, 171 AD3d 534, 536 [1st Dept 2019] [internal citations omitted]). A unilateral stipulation purporting to extend the time to move for summary judgment that is not so ordered by the court "does not excuse the delay" (see Coty v County of Clinton, 42 AD3d 612, 614 [3d Dept 2007]). Here, none of the stipulations were so ordered by the court nor were they ever requested to be so ordered. The November 14, 2024 stipulation, which was filed before the December 6, 2024 summary judgment deadline is also of no moment. Regardless of when such a stipulation is filed, it is never effective unless the court so orders it. As such, the stipulations did not extend the summary judgment filing deadline and do not excuse the delay.

Nor do the settlement hopes or efforts of a party relieve it of its obligation to timely move for summary judgment. In State Farm Fire & Cas. v Parking Sys. Valet Serv., 48 AD3d 550 (2d Dept 2008), the plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion six months after the deadline without leave of the court, citing settlement talks with defense counsel as an excuse for the delay. The Appellate Division, Second Department denied the motion, holding that the Supreme Court erred in reaching the merits of the motion as the "vague and conclusory assertions made by . . . counsel regarding 'settlement talks' . . . were insufficient to constitute good cause for the six-month delay" (id. at 550). Norton's argument seems to be that a party can move for summary judgment whenever it wants if it is trying to settle the case. That is not the law. As such, the court finds that Norton's submissions as to its settlement strategy do not constitute good cause.

Similarly, Norton's delay in preparing to move for summary judgment based on its alleged settlement efforts is also without merit. A self-created delay with no satisfactory explanation offered to justify it does not constitute good cause (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. Ams. v Banu, 205 AD3d 887, 889 [2d Dept 2022]; Lyebyedyev v Hoffman, 84 AD3d 751, 752 [2d Dept 2011]). Here, apart from citing ongoing settlement discussions, Norton offers no other explanation or states any difficulties that caused its delay in procuring relevant materials from its corporate representative and experts for the motion (see Hernandez-Ortiz v 2 Gold, LLC, 170 AD3d 465, 446 [1st Dept 2019] [affirming the motion court's excusal of a two-day delay in filing a summary judgment motion where the defendants "showed good cause for the delay based, inter alia, on the difficulties in obtaining an executed copy of their expert's affidavit"]). These resources were within Norton's control, and Norton admits that it did not attempt to procure the relevant materials until April 2025. Any alleged absence of a causation [*4]opinion as to Norton that catalyzed the settlement discussions similarly did not prevent Norton from preparing to timely move for summary judgment. This is evident because in April 2025, when Norton began preparing for the motion, the alleged absence of a causation opinion remained. As such, Norton's self-created delay in moving for summary judgment for purposes of settlement does not constitute good cause.

The court so ordering a stipulation that extended the return date of a motion did not constitute as a determination on its timeliness. The parties had twice extended the return date of the motion through stipulations filed in the submissions part. The third stipulation extended the return date beyond 60 days of the original return date and hence required court permission (see 22 NYCRR § 202.8[e][1]). This procedure is in place to ensure that motions are fully submitted within a specific amount of time, and to prevent parties from unilaterally extending return dates in perpetuity. The court so ordered the third stipulation. This did not involve an ongoing review of the filed motion papers. It has long been the "practice of this court to read motion papers once the motion has been fully submitted" (People v Roberts, 76 Misc 3d 448, 454 [Crim Ct, New York County 2022, Schumacher, J.]). "This serves numerous purposes, the most salient of which is perhaps avoiding prejudice by an initial reading of one-sided moving papers, only, to be followed weeks or months later by opposition papers" (id. at 453). As such, the so-ordered stipulation merely provided a new schedule for the filing of the remaining motion papers and nothing more. Accordingly, the court so ordering the third stipulation did not render the motion timely nor did it ratify the delay.

Under the circumstances, there has been no showing of good cause, and Norton's motion for summary judgment is denied as untimely.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that motion seq. 005 by defendant Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., individually, and as successor to Norton Company pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment is denied as untimely; and it is further

ORDERED that the oral argument scheduled on motion seq. 005 on March 4, 2026, is cancelled; and it is further

ORDERED that within five days of entry, plaintiffs shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry on movant.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.