The following documents were considered in connection with the motion by order to show cause of the Plaintiff, dated November 28, 2025, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 5"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Precluding Defendant from proffering, offering and entering at the hearing on December 8, 2025 (and continuing day to day) any evidence not relevant to the legal and physical custody of the marital children and/or Plaintiff's visitation (supervised or unsupervised), including bank statements, investment account statements and similar financial documents of the respective parties, in accordance with the Court Orders dated August 11, 2025 (NYSCEF #231) and September 25, 2025 (NYSCEF #306);

2. Precluding Defendant from proffering, offering, or introducing any evidence at the hearing on December 8, 2025 (and continuing day to day) any evidence that is not relevant to the requested modification, if any, of the Final Custody Order of the Westchester Family Court, dated April 3, 2024, by the Honorable Arlene E. Katz, F.C.J., regarding the legal and physical custody of the marital children, A. L. born XX/XX/XXXX and D. L. born XX/XX/XXXX;

3. Limiting the scope of the issues to be heard by the Court at the hearing on December 8, 2025 (and continuing day to day) to (a) legal and physical custody and visitation of the marital children; and (b) any requested modifications of the Final Order of Custody by the Westchester Family Court dated April 3, 2024; and,

4. Granting such other and further relief as may be proper;

and considered in connection with a further motion by order to show cause of the Plaintiff, dated December 1, 2025, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 6"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Pursuant to CPLR § 2304, quashing Defendant's Subpoena Duces Tecum to Spartan Capital Securities, LLC and Marzec Law Firm, P.C.; and

2. Pursuant to CPLR § 3103, issue a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating Defendant's Subpoena Duces Tecum to Spartan Capital Securities, LLC and Marzec Law Firm, P.C. until further order of this Court;

and considered in connection with a motion by order to show cause of the Defendant, dated December 4, 2025, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 7"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Pursuant to CPLR §308(4), permitting the Defendant to serve the subpoena duces tecum issued by Defendant's counsel on November 20, 2025 on the Marzec Law Firm P.C. by affixing a copy of said subpoena to the door of the Marzec Law Firm P.C.'s offices and thereafter mailing a copy of said subpoena to the Marzec Law Firm P.C. via first class mail; and;

2. Granting the Defendant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

On February 20, 2024, this matrimonial action was commenced by Plaintiff with the filing of a summons and verified complaint (hereinafter "Complaint"),^[FN1] seeking judgment against the Defendant dissolving the marriage between the parties to this action pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 170(7) asserting that the parties' relationship had irretrievably broken down for a period in excess of six months and requests [*2]other ancillary relief, along with the following supporting documents: (1) notice of automatic orders;^[FN2] (2) maintenance guidelines worksheet;^[FN3] and, (3) notice concerning continuation of health care coverage.^[FN4] Notably, the Complaint identified two minor children of the marriage, to wit: A. L. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXXX) and D. L. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXXX) (hereinafter the "Children").^[FN5]

On April 15, 2025, the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement resolving all issues arising out of the requested dissolution of the parties' marriage, including but not limited to custody, visitation, spousal maintenance, and child support, which was thereafter so-ordered by the Court (hereinafter "So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement").^[FN6]

On April 24, 2025, the parties' So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement was incorporated by reference but not merged into a judgment of divorce (hereinafter "Judgment of Divorce"),^[FN7] dissolving the parties' marriage pursuant to DRL § 170(7), and ordering the resolution of all ancillary issues that remained from the parties' marriage.

On June 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 1"),^[FN8] seeking the following post-judgment relief:

1. Modifying the Final Custody Order, dated April 25, 2024, by the Honorable Arlene E. Katz, F.C.J. and granting Plaintiff legal and physical custody of the Parties' marital children, A. L. born XX/XX/XXXX and D. L. born XX/XX/XXXX;

2. Modifying the Final Custody Order, dated April 25, 2024, by the Honorable Arlene E. Katz, F.C.J. and granting Plaintiff unsupervised visitation and parenting time with the Parties' marital children, A. L. born XX/XX/XXXX and D. L. born XX/XX/XXXX, every other weekend, Friday 8:00 PM pick up through Sunday 9:00 PM drop off, and every Tuesday and Thursday 5:00 PM through 8:00 PM;

3. Granting Plaintiff on non-visitation days nightly telephonic/Facetime contact with the marital children between 7:00 PM and 8:00 PM, Plaintiff to initiate;

4. Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred for this motion;

5. Preventing Defendant from disparaging Plaintiff before the marital children and causing parental alienation and from discussing these proceedings with the marital children; and,

6. Granting such other and further relief as may be proper.

On July 11, 2025, Defendant filed a cross-motion by notice (hereinafter "Motion [*3]Sequence No. 2"), ^[FN9] seeking affirmative post-judgment relief, as well as opposing Motion Sequence No. 1. The relief sought in Motion Sequence No. 2 was as follows:

1. Dismissing and denying Plaintiff, T. L.'s, Order to Show Cause;

2. Directing the Plaintiff, T. L., to immediately submit to a full CASAC evaluation hair follicle testing, and PEth test for alcohol and drugs, at his sole cost and expense, as scheduled by Eric Spino of The Hudson Center and directing that the Plaintiff fully comply with The Hudson Center's requirements to conduct the assessment;

3. Directing the T. L., to submit to ongoing alcohol and drug testing, at his sole cost and expense, as scheduled by Eric Spino of The Hudson Center, and directing that the Plaintiff fully comply with The Hudson Center's requirements to conduct such tests;

4. Adjudging the Plaintiff, T. L., guilty of, and punishing him for, civil and/or criminal contempt of this Court, pursuant to Judiciary Law §751 and §753, for his violation of the clear and unequivocal terms of the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, dated April 15, 2025, and which was incorporated, without merger, into the parties' Judgment of Divorce issued by the Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C. on April 23, 2025;

5. Enforcing the terms of the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, dated April 15, 2025, and the parties' Judgment of Divorce, dated April 23, 2025, specifically such that the Plaintiff, T. L., shall timely pay his child support obligation to the Defendant, E. K. T., via the Support Collection Unit ("SCU"), and pursuant to an Income Deduction Order;

6. Directing that the Plaintiff pay a per diem late fee set by the Court for each and every day that the Plaintiff's child support obligation is late;

7. Enforcing the terms of the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, dated April 15, 2025, paragraph 7.3, and the parties' Judgment of Divorce, dated April 23, 2025, specifically such that absent emergency situations involving the children, the Plaintiff, T. L., shall limit his communication through only OFW and he shall further utilize OFW to exchange any information to effectuate the settlement terms between the parties including but not limited to exchange of notices, or information pertaining to the children;

8. Directing the Plaintiff to reimburse the Defendant a sum of $3,475.00 as and for the tax liability owed to New York State in tax year 2024 resulting from the Plaintiff's failure to pay interim support and counsel fees;

9. Awarding Defendant the costs of this motion and reasonable counsel fees, and for bringing on and prosecuting this Cross Motion in an amount no less than Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars with leave to amend, at the time of the hearing, pursuant to Judiciary Law §773 and/or 22 NYCRR §130-1.1; and,

10. For such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just and proper.

On August 11, 2025, this Court issued a decision and order (hereinafter "Initial Decision and Order")^[FN10] resolving both Motion Sequence No. 1 and Motion Sequence No. 2. The Initial Decision and Order found issues of fact which prevented the Court from making a determination as to the relief requested in Motion Sequence No. 1 or Motion Sequence No. 2, until after a [*4]hearing wherein both parties will have the opportunity to present evidence pertaining to the requested relief before this Court. The Initial Decision and Order also directed that all parties and counsel appear for a status conference on August 25, 2025 at which point a hearing on these motions would be discussed in more detail.

On August 12, 2025, the Defendant filed a letter ^[FN11] which this Court so-ordered, adjourning that status conference to September 2, 2025.

On September 2, 2025, a status conference was held, wherein an order (hereinafter "September 2, 2025 Order"),^[FN12] was entered directing: (1) a hearing on Motion Sequence No. 1 and Motion Sequence No. 2 shall be held on December 8, 2025, through December 19, 2025, from 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. each day, and each day thereafter until the hearing is completed; and, (2) by November 28, 2025, both parties shall exchange and file pre-hearing disclosure including: (a) Witness List for all witnesses to provide testimony at the hearing with the understanding that if witnesses are not disclosed they will precluded from testifying at the hearing; and (b) Exhibit List with copies of all exhibits to be utilized at the hearing with the understanding that if disclosure is not made pursuant to this directive exhibits will be precluded at hearing. Notably, the September 2, 2025 Order also provided for a deadline for Defendant to file a motion by order to show cause, limited to seeking "counsel fees" from Plaintiff, as well as an opposition deadline and motion return date.

On September 8, 2025, Defendant filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 3"),^[FN13] seeking substantially the same relief as was sought in Motion Sequence No. 2, but including the following additional prongs of relief:

1. Granting an Order of Protection against the Plaintiff, directing the Plaintiff, T. L., to stay away from the Defendant, to stay away from the parties' children (A. L. d.o.b. XX/XX/XXXX, and D. L., d.o.b. XX/XX/XXXX), except for any court ordered visitation, to refrain from communicating with the Defendant and the parties' children through any means or through a third party, to refrain from committing family offenses against the Defendant and the parties' children as enumerated by the Domestic Relations Law, and to surrender any and all firearms in his possession or registered to him to law enforcement;

2. Suspending the Plaintiff's court ordered parenting time with the parties' children, pending the results of a full CASAC evaluation, hair follicle test, and PEth test for alcohol and drugs by Eric Spino of The Hudson Center;

3. Enforcing the terms of the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, dated April 15, 2025, paragraph 1.2, and the parties' Judgment of Divorce, dated April 23, 2025, specifically such that the Plaintiff shall not disturb or molest the Defendant;

4. Enforcing the terms of the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, dated April 15, 2025, paragraph 12.3, and the parties' Judgment of Divorce, dated April 23, 2025, specifically such that the Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any claims arising out of the lease at [*5]11 Billington Court, Rye, New York, against both parties, he shall indemnify and hold harmless the Defendant from same, and within 60 days of the date of the Agreement, secure at own sole cost, and through his own counsel, a written stipulation agreement with the landlord for any claims that the landlord has against the parties arising out of the lease;

5. Directing that the Plaintiff pay 100% of the legal fees, counsel/attorney fees, litigation costs, and expenses incurred by the Defendant or imposed upon the Defendant in connection with the commercial litigation pertaining to the lease at 11 Billington Court, Rye, New York; and,

6. Awarding Defendant the costs of this motion and reasonable counsel fees, and for bringing on and prosecuting this post-judgment action, including any hearing or trial, necessitated by the Plaintiff's frivolous and contemptuous conduct in an amount no less than Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000.00) Dollars with leave to amend, at the time of the hearing, pursuant to Judiciary Law §773 and/or 22 NYCRR §130-1.1

On September 25, 2025, this Court issued a decision and order (hereinafter "Second Decision and Order")^[FN14] resolving Motion Sequence No. 3. The Second Decision and Order similarly found issues of fact which prevented the Court from making a determination as to the relief requested in Motion Sequence No. 3, until after a hearing, to take place from December 8, 2025, through December 19, 2025, from 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. each day, and each day thereafter until the hearing is completed, wherein both parties will have the opportunity to present evidence pertaining to the requested relief before this Court.

On November 28, 2025 Plaintiff filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 5"),^[FN15] seeking the above-referenced relief, which was conformed by this Court on December 1, 2025,^[FN16] directing that Motion Sequence No. 5 be served by e-mail and NYSCEF on Defendant's counsel on or before December 1, 2025; that any answering papers be filed and served by Defendant on or before December 4, 2025, by 12:00 p.m. that day, with no reply submissions permitted by either party; with December 8, 2025 being the return date of Motion Sequence No. 5.

On December 1, 2025 Plaintiff filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 6"),^[FN17] seeking the above-referenced relief, which was conformed by this Court on December 2, 2025,^[FN18] directing that Motion Sequence No. 6 be served by e-mail and NYSCEF on Defendant's counsel on or before December 2, 2025; that any answering papers be filed and served by Defendant on or before December 4, 2025, with no reply submissions [*6]permitted by either party; with December 8, 2025 being the return date of Motion Sequence No. 6.

On December 3, 2025 Defendant filed opposition to both Motion Sequence No. 5,^[FN19] and Motion Sequence No. 6.^[FN20]

On December 4, 2025 this Court entered an order (hereinafter "Scheduling Order"),^[FN21] which reviewed the procedural history of this matter, discussed Motion Sequence Nos. 1-3 and this Court's prior decision that a hearing was required to resolve same, and reviewed Plaintiff's more recent motion filings, being Motion Sequence Nos. 5-6, and determining that such motions require resolution prior to the scheduled hearing. Thereafter, the Scheduling Order cancelled the hearing scheduled to take place from December 8, 2025 through December 19, 2025, and directed that all parties and counsel appear on December 8, 2025 for a status conference.

On December 4, 2025 Defendant filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 7"),^[FN22] seeking the above-referenced relief, which was conformed by this Court on December 8, 2025,^[FN23] directing that Motion Sequence No. 7 be served by e-mail and NYSCEF on Plaintiff on or before December 5, 2025; and, directed that all parties and counsel appear on December 8, 2025 to engage in oral argument regarding the relief sought in Motion Sequence No. 7, where a briefing schedule would be provided if needed; with December 8, 2025 being the return date of Motion Sequence No. 7.

On December 8, 2025, a status conference was held wherein Plaintiff and Defendant appeared, with counsel for Defendant, and Plaintiff proceeding as a self-represented party, whereafter oral argument was received regarding Motion Sequence No. 7, decision was reserved and an Order ^[FN24] was entered providing a briefing schedule for Motion Sequence No. 7 as follows: (1) December 12, 2025 — being the deadline for any answering submissions by Plaintiff and/or the deadline for any cross-motions to be filed; and, (2) December 19, 2025 — being the deadline for Defendant to file any answering submission to any cross-motions filed, with no reply submissions accepted, also being the return date of Motion Sequence No. 7, with no appearances required.

On December 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a letter ^[FN25] with the Court seeking an extension of time to submit answering papers to Motion Sequence No. 7.

On December 15, 2025 this Court issued an Order ^[FN26] providing a new briefing schedule for Motion Sequence No. 7 as follows: (1) December 22, 2025 — being the deadline for any answering submissions by Plaintiff and/or the deadline for any cross-motions to be filed; and, (2) January 2, 2026 — being the deadline for Defendant to file any answering submission to any cross-motions filed, with no reply submissions accepted, also being the return date of Motion Sequence No. 7, with no appearances required.

On December 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed opposition ^[FN27] to Motion Sequence No. 7.

No other submissions were received regarding Motion Sequence Nos. 5-7.

This Court will now address each of the respective motions individually herein-below.

Plaintiff seeks an order of this Court precluding Defendant pursuant to New York State Civil Practice Law & Rules (hereinafter "CPLR") § 3126, from offering any financial evidence, whether documentary or testimony, at the subject hearing regarding Motion Sequence Nos. 1-3. Generally, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant should be precluded from offering any evidence regarding either parties' finances at the subject hearing based on the fact that his application included within Motion Sequence No. 1 relates solely to custody modification, that such financial evidence would be irrelevant to these post-judgment applications, and that the financial issues regarding the parties' marriage were previously addressed by way of executing the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement. For the reasons set forth herein-below, Motion Sequence No. 5 must be denied in its entirety.

The Court of Appeals has consistently held that "[i]n New York, the general rule is that all relevant evidence is admissible unless its admission violates some exclusionary rule . . . Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove the existence of any material fact, i.e., it makes determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence . . . " (see, Richardson, Evidence § 4-101 [Prince 10th ed.] citing to (People v. Scarola, 71 NY2d 769 [1988]; Ando v. Woodberry, 8 NY2d 165 [1960]; see also, Proposed Code of Evidence for State of New York § 401, noting that its definition would ['codify' existing law]). Evidence must do more than provide a basis for speculation, in order to be deemed relevant (See, People v. Hansel, 200 AD3d 1327 [3d Dept 2021]).

Here, the pending hearing will include this Court's review of certain prongs of relief, some being duplicative, included within Defendant's Motion Sequence Nos. 2-3, including requests by Defendant seeking an Order of this Court as follows:

1. Adjudging the Plaintiff, T. L., guilty of, and punishing him for, civil and/or criminal [*7]contempt of this Court, pursuant to Judiciary Law §751 and §753, for his violation of the clear and unequivocal terms of the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, dated April 15, 2025, and which was incorporated, without merger, into the parties' Judgment of Divorce issued by the Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C. on April 23, 2025;^[FN28]

2. Enforcing the terms of the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, dated April 15, 2025, and the parties' Judgment of Divorce, dated April 23, 2025, specifically such that the Plaintiff, T. L., shall timely pay his child support obligation to the Defendant, E. K. T., via the Support Collection Unit ("SCU"), and pursuant to an Income Deduction Order;

3. Directing that the Plaintiff pay a per diem late fee set by the Court for each and every day that the Plaintiff's child support obligation is late;

4. Directing the Plaintiff to reimburse the Defendant a sum of $3,475.00 as and for the tax liability owed to New York State in tax year 2024 resulting from the Plaintiff's failure to pay interim support and counsel fees;

5. Awarding Defendant the costs of this motion and reasonable counsel fees, and for bringing on and prosecuting this Cross Motion [Motion Sequence No. 2] in an amount no less than Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars with leave to amend, at the time of the hearing, pursuant to Judiciary Law §773 and/or 22 NYCRR §130-1.1;

6. Enforcing the terms of the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, dated April 15, 2025, paragraph 12.3, and the parties' Judgment of Divorce, dated April 23, 2025, specifically such that the Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for any claims arising out of the lease at 11 Billington Court, Rye, New York, against both parties, he shall indemnify and hold harmless the Defendant from same, and within 60 days of the date of the Agreement, secure at own sole cost, and through his own counsel, a written stipulation agreement with the landlord for any claims that the landlord has against the parties arising out of the lease;

7. Directing that the Plaintiff pay 100% of the legal fees, counsel/attorney fees, litigation costs, and expenses incurred by the Defendant or imposed upon the Defendant in connection with the commercial litigation pertaining to the lease at 11 Billington Court, Rye, New York; and,

8. Awarding Defendant the costs of this motion [Motion Sequence No. 3] and reasonable counsel fees, and for bringing on and prosecuting this post-judgment action, including any hearing or trial, necessitated by the Plaintiff's frivolous and contemptuous conduct in an amount no less than Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000.00) Dollars with leave to amend, at the time of the hearing, pursuant to Judiciary Law §773 and/or 22 NYCRR §130-1.1.

Plaintiff seeks preclusion of bank statements, investment account statements, and similar financial documents of the respective parties (hereinafter "Financial Documents"), based in part on the relevance of these documents as they relate to the pending hearing and the applications included within Motion Sequence Nos. 1-3. However, it is clear to this Court as shown herein-[*8]above that a substantial portion of the Defendant's post judgment applications involve enforcement and contempt applications related to the financial directives of the parties' Judgment of Divorce, which incorporated by reference financial agreements made within the So-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, as well as fee applications associated with the pending motions.

Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff's post-judgment application included within Motion Sequence No. 1 does not seek relief related to any financial aspect of the parties' prior agreements, Defendant's pending applications certainly do. Moreover, this Court finds that the Financial Documents identified by the Plaintiff, if offered in admissible form at the time of the subject hearing, may be considered relevant and non-speculative with respect to the relief sought by Defendant in Motion Sequence Nos. 2-3. Therefore, at this time this Court cannot preclude the use of these documents based on relevancy alone, and now proceeds further in reviewing any exclusionary basis by which Plaintiff may preclude these potentially relevant documents.

With respect to statutory authority for preclusion, Plaintiff cites only to New York Civil Practice Law & Rules (hereinafter "CPLR") § 3126 in seeking preclusion of the Financial Documents. Specifically, CPLR § 3126(2) sets forth the following regarding precluding admission of information based on a failure to disclose:

"If any party, or a person who at the time a deposition is taken or an examination or inspection is made is an officer, director, member, employee or agent of a party or otherwise under a party's control, refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed pursuant to this article, the court may make such orders with regard to the failure or refusal as are just, among them:

* * * *

2. an order prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, from producing in evidence designated things or items of testimony, or from introducing any evidence of the physical, mental or blood condition sought to be determined, or from using certain witnesses" [emphasis added].

CPLR § 3126 generally involves pre-trial disclosure and sets forth the potential for preclusion at the time of trial based on a refusal or willful failure to disclose information which was directed to be provided by the Court. Here, it does not appear that Plaintiff is making the claim that Defendant, in violation of a prior Court Order, refused or willfully failed to disclose information. Plaintiff appears to conflate the Court's statutory authority pursuant to CPLR § 3126 to preclude a party from offering evidence at trial based on violating a prior Order of disclosure; and, a generic claim of issue preclusion which Plaintiff provides no legal basis for, centered around the argument that the financial issues arising out of the dissolution of the parties' marriage were previously resolved. Simply stated, CPLR § 3126 has no bearing on Plaintiff's claims for relief, or submissions filed in support of Motion Sequence No. 5.

This Court will not provide an analysis of issue preclusion, commonly referred to as collateral estoppel, based on the umbrella doctrine of res judicata as Plaintiff has not made such an application herein. However, for completeness, in the context of post-judgment matrimonial matters, Courts have considered issue preclusion under the umbrella doctrine of res judicata in [*9]determining admissibility of evidence. In D.K. v. M.T.K., 52 Misc 3d 865 [Sup. Ct. Richmond Cnty 2016], the trial Court precluded Defendant's use of financial documents within his post-judgment application seeking a downward modification of a child support obligation, where a prior preclusion Order had been entered in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant during the underlying divorce action for failing to provide financial evidence during discovery (Id. at 868-870). However, the facts of the instant matter are clearly different, as no prior Order of preclusion was entered against either party during the underlying divorce action.

Without this Court being provided an exclusionary rule to preclude, or some basis by which these Financial Documents are irrelevant to the applications pending before the Court, it cannot at this time preclude the attempted use of such documents at the subject hearing. Consequently, Motion Sequence No. 5 is denied in its entirety.

To the extent relief is not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Plaintiff seeks an Order from this Court pursuant to CPLR § 2304 quashing subpoenas served by Defendant on Spartan Capital Securities, LLC (hereinafter "Spartan Subpoena"),^[FN29] and Marzec Law Firm, P.C. (hereinafter "Marzec Subpoena"),^[FN30] and pursuant to §3103 issuing a protective order denying, limiting and/or conditioning the same subpoenas. For the reasons set forth herein-below, Motion Sequence No. 6 is denied in its entirety.

CPLR § 2304, which governs motions to quash, provides as follows:

"A motion to quash, fix conditions or modify a subpoena shall be made promptly in the court in which the subpoena is returnable. If the subpoena is not returnable in a court, a request to withdraw or modify the subpoena shall first be made to the person who issued it and a motion to quash, fix conditions or modify may thereafter be made in the supreme court; except that such motion with respect to a child support subpoena issued pursuant to section one hundred eleven-p of the social services law shall be made to a judge of the family court or the supreme court. Reasonable conditions may be imposed upon the granting or denial of a motion to quash or modify" (CPLR § 2304 [emphasis added]).

This Court notes that CPLR § 2304 does not specify the time within which a motion to quash has to be made, indicating instead that the motion should be made "promptly." This ambiguity has led the relevant case law surrounding motions pursuant to CPLR § 2304 to provide a case-by-case circumstance application to the issue of timeliness of filing a motion to quash. In Santangello v. People, 38 NY2d 536 [1976] the Court of Appeals stated that a "motion to quash... should be made prior to the return date" (Id. at 539; see also Cherfas v. Wolf, 2008 [*10]WL 2746740 [Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty 2008]). Moreover, the Court of Appeals in Brunswick Hosp. Center, Inc. v. Hynes, 52 NY2d 333 [1981] determined that once the subpoena has been complied with, "a motion to quash or vacate no longer is available" (Id., at 339).

"A motion to quash may be made on behalf of a non-party witness by the witness or the witness' lawyer, or by one of the parties or a party's lawyer" (A.S. v. A.B., 84 Misc 3d 692 [Sup. Ct. NY County 2024] citing to McDaid v. Semegran, 16 Misc 3d 1102(A), 2007 WL 1746877 [Sup. Ct. 2007], Connors, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3103:1 at 94; In re MacLeman, 9 Misc 3d 1119(A), 2005 WL 2679677 [Surrogate's Court, Westchester County 2005]).

Here, while Plaintiff as a party to this litigation certainly has standing to file a motion to quash, he chose to wait and file such motion on December 1, 2025, approximately 55 days after the service of the Spartan Subpoena (October 7, 2025). Moreover, while the Defendant has yet to effectuate service of the Marzec Subpoena,^[FN31] Plaintiff again waited 32 days from the date of said subpoena to file the instant application. While Plaintiff claims in his affirmation in support of Motion Sequence No. 6 (hereinafter "Motion 6 Plaintiff Affirmation"),^[FN32] that Defendant did not serve him with a copy of the Spartan Subpoena,^[FN33] and he was only made aware of the Spartan Subpoena when he was contacted by the compliance department of that entity, he admits that such notice came "prior to the Subpoena's return date of October 29, 2025."^[FN34] Additionally, Plaintiff makes no mention within Motion 6 Plaintiff Affirmation as to when he received notice of the existence of the Marzec Subpoena.

Plaintiff admittedly had notice of the Spartan Subpoena prior to the return date, although he fails to identify to this Court exactly what date he was notified, and chose not to file the instant application by order to show cause seeking to quash at that time. Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had notice of the Spartan Subpoena on October 28, 2025, one day prior to the return date, he could have filed such an emergency application on that date and instead chose to wait more than a month, on the eve of the prior scheduled hearing date, to make such an application. Such delay by Plaintiff in making the subject application would seemingly prejudice the Defendant as the issuer of the subject subpoenas, given the need for Defendant to prepare for the scheduled hearing in this matter. As an aside, it is unclear from the submissions received in support of Motion Sequence No. 6, if compliance with the Spartan Subpoena has occurred yet. Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff did not "promptly" file his application to quash the Spartan Subpoena pursuant to CPLR § 2304, and that prong of relief must be denied.

Moreover, it is undisputed by either party that the Marzec Subpoena has not yet been served, as there is an application pending before this Court (Motion Sequence No. 7) that [*11]alternate service be permitted for service of same. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to quash with respect to the Marzec Subpoena, including any procedural defects regarding the service of said subpoena are rendered moot.

Consequently, Plaintiff's application within Motion Sequence No. 6 to quash the Spartan Subpoena and Marzec Subpoena are denied.

Plaintiff seeks the issuance of a protective order of this Court pursuant to CPLR § 3103, limiting the information sought by Defendant within the Spartan Subpoena and the Marzec Subpoena. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks this relief through CPLR § 3103(a), which reads as follows:

"(a) Prevention of abuse. The court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party or of any person from whom or about whom discovery is sought, make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device. Such order shall be designed to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts" (CPLR § 3103[a]).

Pursuant to CPLR § 3103(a), a party may seek such relief "at any time" throughout the course of the litigation. A court's power to limit otherwise proper use of a disclosure device should be exercised only for the purpose of avoiding "unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice" (See, Balsamello v. Structure Tone, Inc., 226 AD3d 580 [1st Dept 2024]).

Here, Plaintiff claims that both the Spartan Subpoena and the Marzec Subpoena are seeking "confidential financial information not relevant to the issues to be heard at the [h]earing." To be clear, the Spartan Subpoena seeks certain financial documents from Plaintiff's employer, to wit: (1) offer letters of employment; (2) contracts and employment agreements; (3) payroll/employment records; (4) income statements; (5) documents related to health insurance, deferred compensation and retirement plans; (6) letters of resignation and/or termination; and, (7) portions of the Plaintiff's personnel file including but not limited to his employment application, resume, performance evaluations, disciplinary records and others. Additionally, the Marzec Subpoena seeks certain financial documents from Plaintiff's prior attorney, to wit: (1) copies of invoices (redacted for privilege); (2) proof of payments including source of funds; (3) payment schedules; (4) statement of account; and, (5) billing statements to date.

However, this Court has already determined herein-above in its review of Motion Sequence No. 5, that there are a plethora of financial issues which will be reviewed during the upcoming hearing as the subject of Defendant's Motion Sequence Nos. 2-3, which require the use of financial documents such as the information sought within the Spartan Subpoena and Marzec Subpoena. While this Court cannot address whether each document contemplated by the subject subpoenas will be presented at the subject hearing in admissible form, it does not find that the items sought are irrelevant, or that they provide unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice to the Plaintiff. To be sure, other than reciting the applicable statute, Plaintiff provides no argument in fact or law explaining how the information sought within the subject subpoenas will cause him unreasonable annoyance, [*12]expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice.

Consequently, Plaintiff's application within Motion Sequence No. 6 for the issuance of a protective order regarding the Spartan Subpoena and Marzec Subpoena are denied.

In opposition to Motion Sequence No. 6, Defendant submits an attorney affirmation (hereinafter "Motion 6 Affirmation in Opposition"),^[FN35] which fails to provide a complete and proper admonition pursuant to CPLR § 2106, such document being the only submission received by Defendant in opposition to the subject application.

It is well-settled in New York State that "moving papers generally consist of three items: (1) a notice of motion or order to show cause; (2) affidavits and affirmations with exhibits; and (3) a memorandum of law" (David D. Siegel, New York Practice § 246 [6th ed 2018]). Failure to include "an affidavit by someone with personal knowledge of the pertinent facts" compels summary denial of the motion (Yaffe v. Shkreli, 187 AD3d 592 [1st Dept 2020]; United Talmudic Academy of Kiryas Joel v. Khal Bais Halevi Religious Corp., 232 AD2d 547 [2d Dept 1996]).

Pursuant to CPLR § 2106, the statement of any person wherever made, subscribed and affirmed by that person to be true under the penalties of perjury, may be used in an action in New York in lieu of and with the same force and effect as an affidavit. Such affirmation shall be in substantially the following form:

"I affirm this ___ day of ______, ____, under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment, that the foregoing is true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law.

(Signature)" (CPLR § 2106).

"Subsequent to January 1, 2024, courts have found that a statement simply affirming the following under the penalties of perjury fails to acknowledge the laws of New York and the possibility of fines or imprisonment and as a result is not in admissible form and cannot be relied upon. Inasmuch as the oath is not something the court is permitted to infer and the purpose of the requirement impresses on the witness the gravity of his factual account, an affirmation lacking the language that CPLR 2106 now requires fails to demonstrate an appreciation for that gravity and is ultimately not a verification at all. It is both well settled that a matter brought pursuant to Article 16 must be commenced with a verified petition and that as a result a defectively verified petition must be dismissed" (Gransard v. Hutchinson, 2024 WL 1957086 [Supreme Court NY County, Latin J.][internal citations and quotation marks omitted] affd for the reasons stated by Latin, J., Gransard v. Hutchinson, 227 AD3d 491 [1st Dept 2024]).

In opposition to Motion Sequence No. 6, Defendant submits Motion 6 Affirmation in Opposition, which begins with the following language: "JESSICA H. RESSLER, an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of the State of New York, hereby affirms the following to be true under the penalties of perjury."^[FN36]

As Motion 6 Affirmation in Opposition fails to contain the language mandated by CPLR § 2106, it cannot be considered "competent evidence" (Pasquaretto v Long Island Univ., 150 AD3d 1129 [2d Dept 2017]) and is not considered by this Court to have been submitted in admissible form (Akhmedova v Akhmedov, 189 AD3d 602 [1st Dept 2020], lv denied 37 NY3d 911 [2021] where counsel's affidavit submitted to support his claim that the court lacked personal jurisdiction, was found to be inadmissible as it did not contain the language required by CPLR §2106; see also, Calliste v. Williams, 32 Misc 3d 1236[A] [Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty 2011]; Daus v. Cassavaugh, 17 AD3d 837 [3rd Dept 2005]; Shinn v. Catanzaro, 1 AD3d 195 [1st Dept 2003]).

As set forth herein-above, relevant case law is clear that submissions included within Defendant's Motion 6 Affirmation in Opposition require either a proper admonition pursuant to CPLR § 2106 or a duly executed affidavit, neither of which were provided herein by Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion 6 Affirmation in Opposition was not considered by this Court.

However, notwithstanding these procedural defects within Defendant's opposition papers, Motion Sequence No. 6 must be denied in its entirety for the reasons set forth herein-above.

To the extent relief is not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Defendant seeks an Order of this Court granting leave for alternate service, to serve the aforementioned Marzec Subpoena pursuant to CPLR § 308(4). However, Defendant fails to submit, in admissible form, an affidavit or affirmation with knowledge in support of the application for relief. For the reasons set forth herein-below, Motion Sequence No. 7 is hereby denied in its entirety.

A. Defective Motion Papers.

In support of Motion Sequence No. 7, Defendant submits an attorney affirmation in support (hereinafter "Motion 7 Affirmation in Support"),^[FN37] which begins with the following language: "JESSICA H. RESSLER, an attorney duly admitted to practice law before the Courts of the State of New York, hereby affirms the following to be true under the penalties of perjury."

As set forth in detail herein-above, relevant case law is clear that the submissions included within Defendant's Motion 7 Affirmation in Support require either a proper admonition pursuant to CPLR § 2106 or a duly executed affidavit, neither of which were provided herein by Defendant. Based upon the foregoing, the Court must strike Defendant's Motion 7 Affirmation in Support, and must further disregard the supporting exhibits annexed to same based on the defects of Defendant's underlying application.

As the submission struck was the only filing made in support of the instant application, Motion Sequence No. 7 is hereby denied in its entirety.

B. Other Relief.

To the extent relief is not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Motion Sequence Nos. 5-7 are denied; and it is further

ORDERED that all parties and counsel shall be present in person, for a Status [*13]Conference which will be held on January 16, 2026 at 2:00 p.m., wherein this Court will discuss the underlying motions and reschedule a hearing to address the relief requested in Motion Sequence Nos. 1-3, and it is further

ORDERED that by January 13, 2026, Defendant's counsel shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry on Plaintiff, via NYSCEF filing and e-mail, and file proof of service with the Court on the same day; and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent any relief requested has not been granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.