Petitioner Camron Goland, apprehended pursuant to an arrest warrant issued after a grand jury handed down an indictment, was remanded without bail in accordance with a securing order issued at his Supreme Court arraignment. By petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks to challenge his detention under that securing order under CPLR 7002 (a) and 7002 (b) (5). For the reasons stated herein, the petition is GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that the matter is remitted to the arraignment court for further proceedings to satisfy the requirements of CPL 510.10 (1). The writ is otherwise dismissed.

On October 28, 2025, petitioner was arraigned in Bronx Supreme Court, Criminal Term, upon indictment No. 74464-25, charging him with murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) under a theory of acting in concert, and related charges. The People requested that petitioner be remanded. Petitioner's counsel, citing his lack of a criminal history, community ties and likelihood of returning to court to contest the charges, requested release under electronic monitoring or reasonable bail. At the end of the arraignment, the presiding justice remanded petitioner without bail.

Respondents challenge petitioner's habeas counsel's appearance as the attorney of record in this collateral civil proceeding, citing both case law and New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) in support of their position. Part 200 of the NYCRR, entitled "Uniform Rules for Courts Exercising Criminal Jurisdiction," sets forth the "rules . . . [that] shall govern procedures in each criminal court of the State (22 NYCRR 200.1 [a]). Rule 200.5, "Appearance of counsel in criminal actions," requires that "[e]ach attorney appearing in a criminal action is required to file a written notice of appearance on or before the time of the attorney's first appearance in court or not later than 10 days after appointment or retainer, whichever is sooner." Julema LaForce, a staff attorney with the Legal Aid Society, did not file a notice of appearance in the underlying criminal action. However, Christina M. Paliogiannis, of the Legal Aid Society's Homicide Defense Task Force, filed a notice of appearance at petitioner's Supreme Court arraignment. Respondents contend that, as Ms. LaForce did not file a notice of appearance in the criminal action, she is disqualified from representing him in the habeas proceedings and that the proceeding should be denied. In addition to 22 NYCRR, respondents cite Barlas v. Johnson Elec. Corp. (44 Misc 2d 918, 919 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1964]), which held that a "litigant may have only one attorney of record."

Petitioner reminds the court and counsel that, as a habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature, 22 NYCRR 200.5 is inapplicable. "Although writs of habeas corpus are commonly sought in criminal cases, the habeas corpus proceeding is a special civil proceeding governed by article 70 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), although other statutes provide for analogous procedures which are tailored to the specific relief sought" (Matter of The Nonhuman Rights Project v Stanley, 49 Misc 3d 746, 754 [Sup Ct, NY County 2015] [internal citations omitted]).

As the statute does not restrict who may bring a writ of habeas corpus, the petition for relief may be brought by "[a] person illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his liberty within the state, or one acting on his behalf . . . ." (CPLR 7002 [a] [emphasis added]). "[A]bsent any authority for the proposition that the statutory phrase 'one acting on his behalf' is modified by a requirement for obtaining standing by a third party, petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating that it has standing" (Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project at 756). Thus, the phrase "one acting on his behalf" is all inclusive and is not restricted to legal counsel. Furthermore, Barlas (single-counsel rule to avoid prejudicing the defendant) does not apply here, as it pertains to a civil proceeding in which there was a difference of opinion between plaintiff's counsel, resulting in complications for the defendant.

As a threshold matter, the arraignment court had legal authority to consider bail or remand in the first instance. Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, a class A-I felony, which is a qualifying offense for which a court is initially authorized to set bail or impose remand (see CPL 510.10 [4] [d] [stating that a principal stands charged with a qualifying offense when charged with a class A felony as defined in the penal law, except for non-class A-I article 220 offenses; see also CPL 510.10 [4] [j] [stating that a principal stands charged with a qualifying offense when charged with "any crime that is alleged to have caused the death of another person"]).

The court that has legal authority to set bail or impose remand must "make an individualized determination as to whether the principal poses a risk of flight to avoid prosecution" and "explain the basis for its determination and its choice of securing order on the record or in writing" (CPL 510.10 [1]). Considering these statutory directives, failure to fully [*2]comply with the procedural requirements of CPL 510.10 (1) constitutes an abuse of discretion (see People ex rel. Kon v Lynelle Maginley-Liddie, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 05785, *2 [2025]). The transcript of petitioner's arraignment reveals that the court did not fully articulate an individualized determination of how petitioner posed a risk of flight or the substantive reasoning behind it. Thus, the arraignment court did not fully comply with the dictates of CPL 510.10 (1).

Petitioner requests that this habeas court release him under CPLR 7010 (a), alleging that his continued detention under the securing order is unlawful. However, it is crucial to differentiate between discretionary error and unlawful detention. A discretionary error, such as a procedural oversight, does not equate to illegal detention. Petitioner's confidence is misplaced, as this court does not have the authority to discharge petitioner (CPLR 7010 [a]) where the detention is not illegal. The arraignment court properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter (CPL 210.10 [3]). The securing order issued by that court was appropriate for the qualifying offenses set forth in the indictment (CPL 510.10 [4] [d], [j]). Although the court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of CPL 510.10 (1), this does not render petitioner's detention illegal.

"The action of [a] bail-fixing court is nonappealable, but may be reviewed in a habeas proceeding 'if it appears that the constitutional or statutory standards inhibiting excessive bail or the arbitrary refusal of bail are violated' " (People ex rel. Rosenthal v Wolfson, 48 NY2d 230, 232 [1979], quoting People ex rel. Klein v Kluger, 25 NY2d 497, 499 [1969]). When reviewing a bail determination, "it is not the function of the habeas court to undertake a de novo review of the determination made by the nisi prius court" (People ex rel. Hunt v Warden of Rikers Island Corr. Facility, 161 AD2d 475, 476 [1st Dept 1990]), and the scope of review is limited to whether the court "abused its discretion by denying bail without reason or for reasons insufficient in law" (People ex rel. v Shapiro v Keeper of City Prison, 290 NY 393, 399 [1943]). Here, although the bail-setting court did not provide a reason on the record for the securing order, the court did not violate the law in imposing remand status for the qualifying offenses. As the arraignment court's error was an abuse of discretion rather than an illegal act, this court lacks the authority to alter the securing order. When the court possesses statutory authority to impose remand but fails to comply with statutory mandates, such remand is not illegal (see People ex rel. Kon, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 05785, *2 [holding that the "court's failure to comply with the procedural requirements thus did not render the defendant's detention 'illegal[]' for purposes of CPLR 7010 (a)"]). As petitioner's detention was not illegal, he is not entitled to release (see CPLR 7010 [a] ["If the person is illegally detained a final judgment shall be directed discharging him forthwith. No person detained shall be discharged for a defect in the form of the commitment, or because the person detaining him is not entitled to do so if another person is so entitled."]). Thus, the remedy for this procedural defect is not to release petitioner but to remit the matter to the previous court for issuance of a new securing order.

Since the arraignment court possessed statutory authority to set bail, given that petitioner stood charged with a qualifying offense, the matter must be remitted for proceedings that fully comply with CPL 510.10 (1) (see People ex rel. Kon v Lynelle Maginley-Liddie, 243 AD3d 848, 2025 NY Slip Op 06532, *1 [2d Dept 2025] [following reversal by the Court of Appeals, remitting the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings to comply with the statute]). As for petitioner's custody status, this court orders neither discharge nor bail; instead, petitioner is remanded, and the writ is otherwise dismissed (see CPLR 7010 [c] ["If the person detained is not ordered discharged and not admitted to bail, a final judgment shall be directed dismissing the [*3]proceeding . . . ."]).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition is GRANTED, and the writ is SUSTAINED TO THE EXTENT that the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Part SCA, for further proceedings to satisfy the requirements of CPL 510.10 (1), to be concluded with all convenient and deliberate speed, and the writ is otherwise dismissed.