Upon the foregoing papers, the motion is determined in accordance with this Decision, Order and Judgment as follows:

This action was commenced on January 13, 2023, seeking to foreclose a mortgage ("mortgage") executed by Garfield Brown and Sherain Brown (the "defendants") encumbering the property known as 267 Sumpter Street, Brooklyn, NY 11233 (the "property").

The following defendants were served on the dates indicated:

On March 23, 2023, plaintiff filed a specialized request for judicial intervention (the "RJI") seeking the scheduling of settlement conferences.

Settlement conferences were held on May 2, 2023, and May 17, 2023, after which the matter was released from the settlement conference part.

On December 7, 2023, plaintiff and defendant stipulated to discontinue the action as against defendant HSBC Bank USA, NA, as Trustee and to amend the caption to drop said defendant from caption. The stipulation was so-ordered on May 22, 2025.

On January 27, 2025, defendant Sherain Brown filed a bankruptcy petition thereby staying the action as against her. On April 10, 2025, the bankruptcy was dismissed.

On July 10, 2025, plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking a default judgment and order to reference. The motion is supported by Katherine Mary Oravec ("Ms. Oravec" or Oravec Affidavit") a purported "Authorized Signer" of plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that the subject action is not subject to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215[c] because it allegedly took proceedings for entry of a default judgment by filing the RJI on March 23, 2023 and separately that it has shown good cause why the action should not be dismissed due to defendant Sherain Brown's bankruptcy petition and its litigation with co-defendant with defendant HSBC Bank.

This Case presents this Court with an opportunity to address two straight forward issues, which although simple, unfortunately repeatedly occurs before this Court and implicates the Court's obligations in deciding default judgment applications and dismissing actions for neglect to timely prosecute same. Each will be addressed in turn.

This motion turns on a settled principle of New York law: the entry of a default judgment is not automatic and is never ministerial. CPLR 3215[f] conditions the granting of a default judgment upon the movant's submission of competent, admissible proof establishing the facts constituting the claim and the default. A defendant's failure to appear docs not relieve the court of its independent obligation to determine whether those statutory requirements have been satisfied.

Default judgments are not to be "rubber-stamped" upon a showing of jurisdiction and nonappearance. Rather, courts retain a continuing adjudicatory duty to assess whether the movant has demonstrated a viable cause of action through nonhearsay evidence. The absence of opposition does not diminish that duty, nor does it permit the court to overlook evidentiary deficiencies in the movant's submissions.

Where a default judgment motion is supported by affidavits lacking personal knowledge, conclusory assertions, references to unproduced business records, or records for which a foundation fix admissibility has not been laid, the proof is legally insufficient under CPLR 3215[f]. Such submissions do not constitute competent evidence and cannot support the entry of judgment. Courts not only possess the inherent authority, but has the obligation,to deny default judgment motions where the movant has failed to provide admissible proof, including sua sponte, because the statute does not authorize judgment in the absence of a proper evidentiary showing.

In sum, CPLR 3215[f] imposes substantive proof requirements that must be satisfied before a judgment may be entered. Default does not cure inadmissible proof nor does it divest [*2]the court of its obligation to ensure that a viable cause of action has been established through competent evidence. Where that showing has not been made, denial of the motion is required.

CPLR 3215[f] expressly conditions the entry of a default judgment upon the movant's submission of competent proof. The statute requires, proof of service of the summons and complaint, the default and "proof of the facts constituting the claim... by affidavit made by the party" CPLR 3215[f]. This statutory language is not precatory. It reflects a deliberate legislative judgment that default judgments may be entered only upon a proper evidentiary showing, not merely upon a defendant's failure to appear or answer.

"Hence a trio of affidavits is the ideal composition of a default application: the server's affidavit of service, the plaintiff's affidavit of merits, and the lawyer's affidavit of the default." Siegel, NY Prac. § 295 (6th ed.)

Each of the elements must be established. See e.g. Levi v Oberlander, 144 AD2d 546, 547 [2d Dept 1988]["A review of the record indicates that plaintiff failed to show that the defendants were properly before the court by virtue of the plaintiffs effecting valid service of a summons and complaint upon them."]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Simpson, 216 AD3d 1043, 1045 [2d Dept 2023]["Laxner's factual assertions based upon those records constituted inadmissible hearsay, and her affidavit was insufficient to demonstrate proof of the facts constituting the claim"];

"Additionally, a motion for leave to enter a default judgment must be supported by what has been colloquially termed a "non-military affidavit." This requirement is not mandated by the CPLR but rather is derived from federal law." Tri-Rail Designers & Builders, Inc. v Concrete Superstructures, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 06209, 2 [2d Dept Nov. 12, 2025]

The entry of a default judgment is not a mechanical or ministerial act. The Appellate Division has made clear that "the granting of a default judgment docs not become a 'mandatory ministerial duty' upon a defendant's default" Gagen v Kipany Prods. Ltd., 289 AD2d 844 [3d Dept 2001], quoting Matter of Dyno v Rose, 260 AD2d 694 [3d Dept 1999].

Rather, courts have the obligation and duty to determine whether the movant has established a viable cause of action through admissible proof. Indeed, the "Supreme Court must determine whether the motion [for leave to enter a default judgment] was supported with enough facts to enable the court to determine that a viable cause of action exists...as [t]here is no mandatory ministerial duty to enter a default judgment against a defaulting party" Superior Dental Care. P.C. v Hoffman, 81 AD3d 632 [2d Dept 2011][internal quotations marks omitted and emphasis added]; See also McGee v Dunn, 75 AD3d 624 [2d Dept 2010]["the court mustdetermine whether the motion was supported with "enough facts to enable [the] court to determine that a viable cause of action exists"][emphasis added]; Levi v Oberlander, 144 AD2d 546, 547 [2d Dept 1988]["Absent such proof, nodefault judgment may be entered."][emphasis added] Nemetsky v Banque Dev. De La Republique Du Niger, 59 AD2d 527, 527 [2d Dept 1977] ["Nodefault judgment may be entered absent proof of service of a summons and [*3]complaint."][emphasis added] affd sub nom. at 48 NY2d 962 [1979]

The Second Department has reaffirmed this principle in recent decisions, holding that courts "do not have a mandatory, ministerial duty to grant default judgment motions, as they retain the obligation to determine whether the moving party has established a viable claim'' Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v St. Louis. 229 AD3d 116 [2d Dept 2024][emphasis added].

CPLR 3215 does not contemplate that default judgments are to be "rubberstamped once jurisdiction and a failure to appear have been shown" Feffer v Malpeso, 210 AD2d 60 [1st Dept 1994]

Thus, a default does not divest the court of its adjudicatory function and the lack of opposition to a default judgment motion does not relieve the court of its obligation to scrutinize the movant's proof. As the Appellate Division has held, "[t]he lack of opposition does not negate this judicial function" of assessing the sufficiency of the movant's proof in support of a motion for default judgment. See Matter Dyna v Rose. 260 AD2d 694 [3d Dept 1999]. Otherwise, there would be no adjudicatory function for this Court to exercise.^[FN1]

Indeed, even the existence of opposition on grounds other than the sufficiency of the proof constituting the claim does not negate this essential judicial function. See Joosten v Gale, 129 AD2d 531, 535 [1st Dept 1987]["That defendant chose to oppose the motion on the ground of lack of jurisdiction should not be deemed a waiver of proof of the facts constituting the claim. Defendant should not be put in a worse position for having chosen to oppose the motion than she would have been in had she not opposed it."]

Where, as here, the court cannot determine from the submissions whether a viable cause of action exists, denial of the motion is not only permissible, but required. See First Franklin Fin. Corp. v Alfau, 157 AD3d 863, 865 [2d Dept 2018].

The Appellate Division is unanimous that the entry of a default judgment is not a ministerial act; rather, the court retains an independent obligation to determine whether the moving party has established a viable cause of action.

Accordingly, a court must deny an unopposed default judgment motion where the proof submitted is deficient, inadmissible, or fails to demonstrate a viable cause of action.

Because courts retain an independent adjudicatory obligation under CPLR 3215[f] they must deny default judgment motions sua sponte where the movant fails to provide adequate admissible proof. The statute does not authorize courts to enter judgment blindly, nor does a defendant's default waive the statutory evidentiary prerequisites imposed upon the movant.

Courts must be satisfied that movants have provided "nonhearsay confirmation of the factual basis constituting a prima facie case" before granting default judgment. State v Williams, 44 AD3d 1149 [3d Dept 2007][Emphasis Added]; See 333 Cherry LLC v N Resorts, Inc., 66 AD3d 1176, 1179 [3d Dept 2009][movant bears burden of submitting "nonhearsay proof [*4]confirming the factual basis for their claim in support of their motion for a default judgment"][emphasis added]; State v Williams, 73 AD3d 1401, 1403 [3d Dept 2010][rnovant must "present sufficient nonhearsay facts to demonstrate the existence of a viable cause of action''][emphasis added].

Indeed, courts routinely deny default judgment motions where the movant fails to submit affidavits based on personal knowledge or otherwise fails to provide nonhearsay confirmation of the claim. See, Martinez v Reiner, 104 AD3d 477, 478 [1st Dept 2013.][default judgment denied where proof was "purely hearsay, devoid of evidentiary value, and thus insufficient to support entry of a judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215"]; Feffer v Malpeso, 210 AD2d 60 [1st Dept 1994]; Joosten v Gale, 129 AD2d 531 [1st Dept l987][same].

An affidavit that merely recites conclusions, relies on unproduced business records, or fails to lay a proper foundation under CPLR 4518[a] does not satisfy CPLR 3215[f]. See HSBC Bank USA. NA. as Tr. for ACE Sec. Corp., Home Equity Loan Tr., Series 2007-HE4 v Greene, 190 AD3d 417, 418 [1st Dept 2021][default judgment against the non-appearing defendants denied where affiant "did not say that he was familiar with plaintiffs record-keeping practices and procedures [and] [t]hus, his affidavit did not constitute a proper foundation for the admission of the records [and] "[affidavit] was hearsay, since the records were not submitted with the affidavit"]; Cary v Cimino, 128 AD3d 1460, 1460-61 [4th Dept 2015][hearsay affidavit made by affiant without personal knowledge does not constitute "adequate 'proof of the facts constituting the claim', quoting CPLR 3215[f]; motion for default judgment denied]; see also Knudsen v Green Mach. Landscaping, Inc., 223 AD3d 792, 793 [2d Dept 2024][attorney-verified pleading constituted hearsay and hence did not satisfy CPLR 3215[f]].

The well-settled rule that an attorney-verified pleading is insufficient to support a default judgment provides an apt and controlling analogy. Courts have repeatedly held that a complaint verified by counsel, who lacks personal knowledge, is "pure hearsay, utterly devoid of evidentiary value" Feffer v Malpeso, 210 AD2d at 61; Joosten v Gale, 129 AD2d 531 [1st Dept 1987]; A1artinez v Reiner, 104 AD3cl 477 [1st Dept 2013].

The Second Department has likewise held that, while a verified complaint may serve as the affidavit of facts under CPLR 3215[f], it must contain "evidentiary facts from a person with personal knowledge", and a pleading verified by an attorney pursuant to CPLR 3020(d)(3) is insufficient to establish its merits. Triangle Props. #2, LLC v Narang, 73 AD3d 1030 [2d Dept 2010]; DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v United Gen. Tit. 1ns. Co. 128 AD3d 760 [2d Dept 2015]; See also U.S. Bank N.A. v Simpson, 216 AD3d 1043, 1045 [2d Dept 2023]["Laxner's factual assertions based upon those records constituted inadmissible hearsay, and her affidavit was insufficient to demonstrate proof of the facts constituting the claim"]; 799 Crown St., LLC v Leblanc, 203 AD3d 1117 [2d Dept 2022]["Thus, his factual assertions based upon those records constituted inadmissible hearsay, and his affidavit was insufficient to demonstrate proof of the facts constituting the claim"]

Even where the complaint is verified by a lender's servicer relying on the business records exception to the hearsay rule, sufficient foundation is required to satisfy an evidentiary burden. Sec Toorak Capital Partners, LLC v 15 Dewey Place Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 06746 [2d Dept Dec. 3, 2025]["the verified pleading has evidentiary value only if the verifier has personal knowledge of the facts In this action, the complaint was verified by Christopher Redburn, an asset manager for Cohen Financial, the plaintiffs "special servicer and authorized agent." However, Redburn did not lay any foundation for his basis of knowledge or for the [*5]admission of the business records annexed to the complaint. Moreover, those records did not evince 15 Dewey's default on the loan."]

There is no principled basis to treat other forms of hearsay more favorably. An affidavit from a party or servicer lacking personal knowledge (See Bank of Am., NA. v Barnett, 241 AD3d 1234, 1238 [2d Dept 2025]), an affidavit that merely references but does not attach business records (See Bank of New York Mellon v Glasgow, 232 AD3d 754, 755 [2d Dept 2024]), or an affidavit that fails to lay a proper CPLR 4518[a] foundation (See Nationstar Mtge.. LLC v Ricks, 241 AD3d 829, 832 [2d Dept 2025]) is no less hearsay than an attorney-verified pleading. Hearsay does not become admissible by virtue of its label.

It is thus well settled across all Departments of the Appellate Division that hearsay evidence is insufficient to sustain a default judgment.^[FN2]

Accordingly, where, as here, a motion for a default judgment is not supported by admissible evidence, there can be only one outcome: ''A failure to submit the proof required by CPLR 3215[f] should lead a court to deny an application for a default judgment". Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v H & A Locksmith, Inc., 21 NY3d 200, 203 [2013][Emphasis Added].

"[T]o establish a foundation for the admission of a business record, the proponent of the record must satisfy the requirements identified in the statute (see CPLR 4518[a]). First, the proponent must establish that the record be made in the regular course of business—essentially, that it reflect a routine, regularly conducted business activity, and that it be needed and relied on in the performance of functions of the business.... Second, the proponent must also demonstrate that it be the regular course of such business to make the record ... essentially, that the record be made pursuant to established procedures for the routine, habitual, systematic making of such a record...Third, the proponent must establish that the record be made at or about the time of the event being recorded-essentially, that recollection be fairly accurate and the habit or routine of making the entries assured." Bank of New York Mellon v Gordon, 171 AD3d 197 [2d Dept 2019][internal citations and quotation marks omitted and emphasis added]

However, "[a] proper foundation for the admission of a business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker's business practices and procedures" U.S. Bank N.A. v 22 S. Madison, LLC, 170 AD3d 772 [2d Dept 2019][emphasis added]; Citibank, N.A. v Cabrera, 130 AD3d 861 [2d Dept 2015]["A proper foundation for the admission of a business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker's business practices and procedures."]

Here, Ms. Oravec does not lay sufficient foundation for the admission of the alleged business records attached to her affidavit. Specifically, Ms. Oravec does not attest to personal knowledge to the record keeping practices and procedures of plaintiff. See San Antonio v 340 Ridge Tenants Corp., 204 AD3d 713, 715 [2d Dept 2022]["However, the basis for [the Trex [*6]Affiant's] knowledge of the tests were documents attached to his affidavit, and he failed to lay the proper foundation for the admission of those documents under the business records exception to the hearsay rule...since he failed to attest that he was personally familiar with Trex's record-keeping practices and procedures."] citing Nationstar HECM Acquisition Tr. 2015-2 v Andrews, 167 AD3d 1025, 1027 [2d Dept 2018]["However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the admissibility of the records relied upon by Craycraft under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a]), since Craycroft did not clearly attest that he was personally familiar with the plaintiffs record-keeping practices and procedures."]; See also Dan Med., P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44, 46 [App Term 2006]["The affidavit submitted by plaintiffs "corporate officer" failed to demonstrate that he possessed sufficient personal knowledge of plaintiffs office practices and procedures so as to lay a foundation for the admission of the annexed documents as business records."].

Therefore, her contentions and records she attempts to introduce are inadmissible hearsay and insufficient sustain plaintiff's burden to demonstrate the facts constituting the claim as required by CPLR 3215[f].

CPLR 3215(c) provides that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed." CPLR 3215(c)[emphasis added]. The Legislature's choice of "shall" rather than "may" is outcome-determinative. The provision is not discretionary, it is compulsory.

The Court of Appeals long ago recognized that judges are not merely authorized but obligated to enforce CPLR 3215(c) sua sponte. In Perricone v. City of New York, 62 NY2d 661, 663 [1984], the Court affirmed a sua sponte dismissal on precisely these grounds, holding that "the Appellate Division exercised its authority under CPLR 3215 (subd. [c]) and dismissed the complaint on its own initiative," and rejecting any due-process objection on the ground that the plaintiff "was aware for more than ten years that the city had not answered yet failed to move for a default judgment." Id. at 663. The statute is therefore self-executing: once the one year has lapsed, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate "sufficient cause"-and if none is shown, dismissal must follow as a matter of law.^[FN3]

As explained infra, dismissal under CPLR 3215[c] is required-not simply "authorized"-where the one-year lapses and no "sufficient cause" is shown. The issue in Perricone was whether the Appellate Division had the authority to dismiss an action sua sponte under CPLR 3215[c], not whether dismissal was discretionary versus mandatory. On this latter question, the law is well-settled: "This statute is strictly construed, as the language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts 'shall' dismiss claims for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned". Greenpoint Mtge. Funding, Inc. v Recinos, 241 AD3d 796, 798 [2d Dept 2025], quoting Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v Buonauro, 233 AD3d 972, 974 [2d Dept 2024]

While there appears to be conflicting holdings from the Appellate Division to enforce the abandonment rule when raised for the first time on appeal (compare e.g. Bank of New York Mellon v Daniels, 180 AD3d 738, 739 [2d Dept 2020] with e.g. Perricon and PHH Mortg. Corp. v Davis, 111 AD3d 1110, 1113 [3d Dept 2013]), such a conflict is not at issue here because this Court must, consistent with CPLR 3215(c) and Perricone, dismiss where, as here, more than one year has elapsed since the default and no showing of "sufficient cause" was made by plaintiff.

This mandatory character was not accidental; it was deliberately written into the CPLR to correct the deficiencies of the prior rule under Civil Practice Act § 181. Under the old statute, dismissal of a stale claim was left to judicial discretion—a discretion that the Legislature found, in practice, was rarely exercised. The legislative history leaves no doubt why the Legislature replaced discretionary power with mandatory command. In explaining the defect CPLR 3215[c] was designed to cure, the drafters stated:

"Section 181 of the Civil Practice Act recognizes plaintiff's duty of diligence, by providing that the court in its discretion may dismiss the action for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff unreasonably neglects to proceed in the action . . . Practical experience shows that the court exercises this power, if at all, only sparingly and with hesitation even in cases of excessive delay. The defect apparent in the present law is a matter of public as well as private concern. The same policy considerations which make it necessary to prevent the plaintiff from unduly delaying the proceedings after issue has been joined apply to undefended actions. The policy of repose underlying the statute of limitations would be defeated if a plaintiff were permitted to postpone action in a default case and thus create an indefinite hiatus in the proceedings."

The drafters expressly recognized that discretionary dismissal was "exercised sparingly", was a "defect" and had failed to prevent "an indefinite hiatus in the proceedings." Bill Jacket Supplement, Laws 1962, chapter 308, CPLR 3215[c]. CPLR 3215[c] was therefore drafted for the deliberate purpose not merely to authorize dismissal but to require it—to prevent stale litigation from lingering merely because the defendant defaulted. The Legislature deliberately converted judicial discretion into judicial obligation.

The mandatory character of CPLR 3215[c] is further confirmed by the well-settled rule that a court does not have a ministerial duty to grant default judgment. Default judgment is never automatic. Even where a defendant fails to appear or answer, the court retains the obligation to determine whether the plaintiff has established the viability of its claim and the right to relief. As the Second Department has repeatedly held, "[a] court does not have a "mandatory, ministerial duty to grant a motion for leave to enter a default judgment". Weaver v Hatem, 241 AD3d 1393 [2d Dept 2025]; B&H Flooring, LLC v Folger, 228 AD3d 809,812 [2d Dept 2024]. Thus, even in the posture of default, the court exercises judicial judgment, not ministerial rubber-stamping.

And because the power to grant a default judgment is discretionary, it necessarily follows that the Legislature may cabin or withdraw that power where policy requires. That is what CPLR 3215[c] does. Once a plaintiff allows more than one year to elapse without taking proceedings for the entry of judgment, the court is not merely permitted to dismiss - it is prohibited from awarding default judgment. The statute is a direct restraint on judicial authority.

CPLR 3215[c] does not merely confer a right on defendants—it imposes a limit on this Court's power. Once one year has elapsed after the default without "proceedings for the entry of judgment," the action "must be deemed abandoned." Santoli v 475 Ninth Ave. Assoc., 38 AD3d 411, 413 n*l [1st Dept 2007], and relief in the form of a default judgment thereafter is "unavailable". A & C Constr., Inc. v NYC Hous. Auth., 32 AD3d 762, 763 [1st Dept 2006]). That mandate is directed to the court, not the litigants: "CPLR 3215(c) requires [the court] to dismiss a complaint as abandoned". Morton v Morton, 136 AD2d 902, 902 [4th Dept 1988], and the statute "is not discretionary, but mandatory". Deutsche Bank Natl. Tr. Co. v Cruz, 173 AD3d 610, 610 [1st Dept 2019]. Accordingly, courts are simply without power to ignore the dictates of the statute; once the statutory year lapses without a timely application for judgment, "courts may not excuse the lateness and 'shall' dismiss the claim". Bazile v Saleh, 190 AD3d 811, 812 [2d Dept 2021]. To do otherwise would constitute an impermissible "ignor[ing of] express limiting [*7]statutory provisions". Ballard v Billings & Spencer Co., 36 AD2d 71, 74-75 [4th Dept 1971][explaining, with respect to CPLR 3215[c], that "the court is not at liberty, in the exercise of its fundamental common-law right to manage its calendars, to ignore express limiting statutory provisions when framing sanctions against litigants who have been dilatory in prosecuting or defending an action"]; See Hoppenfeld v. Hoppenfeld, 220 AD2d 302, 303 [1st Dept 1995]["Where, as here, plaintiffs failed to pursue a default judgment within one year of the default in answering... dismissal of the underlying action as abandoned is required"] [emphasis supplied]

Indeed, the obligation on courts to dismiss accrues upon expiration of the statutory period, not upon a litigant's making of a motion seeking such relief. See, e.g., Gayle v Parker, 300 AD2d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2002]["Plaintiffs failure to take proceedings for entry of judgment for even one year after the decedent's default required that the complaint be dismissed as abandoned"] [emphasis added]; Cirtron v Curiale, 273 AD2d 183, 184 [1st Dept 2000]["if respondent were in default, petitioner's failure to move for judgment within one year thereafter would have required dismissal of the petition (CPLR 3215[c])"][emphasis added]. Thus, the dictates, restrictions, and commands of CPLR 3215(c) are primarily directed to the Court. Caselaw does not frame CPLR 3215[c] necessarily as only a right or entitlement of a defendant, but as a duty of the court. The Court, rather than the litigant, is the actor charged with the burden of taking the initiative and dismissing upon expiration of the statutory period. A court's failure to do so, and its election to instead issue judgment outside of the statutory period, would be an ultra-vires act. See e.g., Ballard, 36 AD2d at 75 [noting that courts are prohibited from "ignor[ing] the express limiting statutory provisions" of CPLR 3215[c]]

It matters not whether the delay past the deadline is one day, thirty days or a year. Furey v Milgrom, 44 AD2d 91, 93 [2d Dept 1974]["the lapse of one day has the same significance as 10 or 20 or 60 days beyond the statute, for otherwise 'carelessness, or worse' would be encouraged."]; See also Conolly v 129 E. 69th St. Corp., 127 AD3d 617 [1st Dept. 2015][barring motion made one day beyond deadline].

The Second Department has consistently and uniformly enforced this mandate exactly as the Legislature intended. In Chase Home Fin., LLC v Fernandez, 175 AD3d 1381, 1383 [2d Dept 2019], the Court held that the Supreme Court "acted within its statutory authority in directing dismissal of the complaint as abandoned." Similarly, in Ibrahim v Nablus Sweets Corp., 161 AD3d 961, 963 [2d Dept 2018], the Court emphasized that "CPLR 3215(c) expressly provides" for dismissal "upon its own initiative or on motion." The same sua sponte dismissal outcome followed in US. Bank, Nat. Ass'n v Dorvelus, 140 AD3d 850, 851 [2d Dept 2016]; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Laulicht, 176 AD3d 892 [2d Dept 2019]; US. Bank NA. v Juliano, 184 AD3d 597, 600 [2d Dept 2020]; and BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v Mazza, 190 AD3d 908, 909 [2d Dept 2021], which reiterated that dismissal is required "upon its own initiative." Most recently, Deutsche Bank Natl. Tr. Co. v Ezagui, 221 AD3d 964, 966 [2d Dept 2023], reaffirmed the same rule. This line of authority is not merely persuasive—it is the direct implementation of the Legislature's express corrective purpose. The uniformity of these holdings reflects not merely precedent but compulsion: the statute itself strips the court of discretion when abandonment is shown.

The Second Department has expressly recognized this limitation: where the one-year period has expired without proceedings to enter judgment, the court lacks authority to entertain or grant a default judgment motion at all. In Noteworthy Foreclosure, LLC v Rodney-Ross, 220 AD3d 676, 677 [2d Dept 2023], the Court held that claims not pursued within one year are "deemed abandoned" and therefore must be dismissed, not adjudicated, precisely because the plaintiffs delay triggered CPLR 3215[c]'s limitation on judicial power. See also Wells Fargo Bank; N.A. v St. Louis, 229 AD3d 116 [2d Dept 2024]["CPLR 3215(c) provides that complaints shall be dismissed on the court's "own initiative" or upon motion if the plaintiff has failed to take proceedings within one year of an adversary party's default. Dismissals pursuant to that subdivision are specifically directedand permissible by the statute itself, though subject to a plaintiff showing sufficient cause as to why the complaint should not be dismissed''][emphasis added]; cf 3215[a]

Indeed, "[t]he statute gives the court discretion onlywhere the plaintiff demonstrates "sufficient cause" as to why the complaint should not be dismissed" Bank of AM., NA. v Shami, 173 AD3d 954, 956 [2d Dept 2019][emphasis added]

Because CPLR 3215(c) does not permit a dormant complaint to linger indefinitely and because sua sponte dismissal is not only authorized but required, this Court is compelled to dismiss the action.^[FN4]

At that point, dismissal is not a matter of grace, but a jurisdictional restraint: the court is stripped of authority to enter judgment.

Here, defendants Garfield Brown and Sherain Brown were served with the summons and complaint on February 20, 2023, by substituted service on accordance with CPLR 308[2]. The affidavits of service were filed on February 27, 2023, and service was deemed complete ten days later on March 9, 2023, and were in default as of April 8, 2023. Accordingly, the time for plaintiff to take proceedings for entry of a default judgment expired on year later on April 8, 2024.

The instant motion was not filed until July 10, 2025, well over a year since the defendants' default in answering or appearing in this action. Therefore, this "complaint" must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3215[c].

Plaintiff's argument that it took proceedings for entry of a default judgment by filing an RJI on March 23, 2023, seeking the scheduling of settlement conferences is without merit.

Where "a settlement conference is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining a default judgment a formal judicial request for such a conference...constitutes 'proceedings for entry of judgment' within the meaning of CPLR 3215(c)." US Bank N.A. v Jerriho-Cadogan, 224 AD3d 788 (2d Dept 2024][emphasis added]

Here, plaintiff filed the RJI on March 23, 2023 which was before defendants' default in appearing or answering the complaint. Therefore, the filing of the RJI could not have been considered the taking of proceedings for the entry of a default judgment. See e.g. Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Bandlm, 239 AD3d 708 [2d Dept 2025]

"The failure to timely seek a default may be excused if sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed, which requires the plaintiff to proffer a reasonable excuse for the delay in timely moving for a default judgment and to demonstrate that the cause of action. is potentially meritorious ...The determination of whether an excuse is reasonable is committed to the sound discretion of the motion court." Chase Home Fin.. LLC v Dasuja, 204 AD3d 638, 639-40 [2d Dept 2022][internal citations and quotation marks omitted]

Contrary to plaintiff's contentions its purported litigation with co-defendant HSBC Bank is not a reasonable excuse for not taking proceedings for entry of a default judgment against defendants Garfield Brown and Sherain Brown. Plaintiff failed to explain how it's purported litigation with HSBC Bank inhibited it from timely seeking a default judgment against defendants Garfield Brown and Sherain Brown. See United States Bank N.A. v Moster, 196 AD3d 663, 665 [2d Dept 2021]["The plaintiffs contention that the delay was due to its continuing litigation against another defendant in the action...does not constitute a reasonable excuse"]; Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc y, FSB v Nifenecker, 236 AD3d 971 [2d Dept 2025]["Limosa failed to show how opposing those motions "hindered [BANA] from timely taking any steps to initiate proceedings for the entry of a default judgment" against Reddy"]; Shields v Cohen, 222 AD3d 1019 [2d Dept 2023]["The plaintiff failed to explain how the ongoing litigation against the answering defendant "hindered [the plaintiff] from timely taking any steps to initiate proceedings for the entry of a default judgment" against the respondents."]; Weiner v Anzaroot, 241 AD3d 1394 [2d Dept 2025]["The plaintiffs contention that the delay was due to his continuing litigation against a nondefaulting defendant in the action, without more, does not constitute a reasonable excuse, as the plaintiff failed to show how motion and discovery practice related to the nondefaulting defendant hindered him from taking any steps to initiate proceedings for the entry of a default judgment against the defendants."]; See also Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Charles, 186 AD3d 454 [2d Dept 2020]

Moreover, contrary to plaintiff's further contention, defendant Sherain Brown's bankruptcy filing on January 27, 2025, is irrelevant as it occurred after the time to move pursuant to CPLR 3215[c] expired. See lxis Real Estate Capital, Inc. v Herbst, 170 AD3d 691, 692 [2d Dept 2019]["The plaintiff offered various excuses for its delay, but the excuses all [*9]involved events which transpired after the one-year statutory deadline had already passed, and were therefore legally insufficient to justify its failure to take proceedings for a default judgment within one year after Herbst's default"]

Accordingly, the "complaint" must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3215[c].

Lastly, the Court is always required and has a duty, on its own, to consider the implications of the absence of a necessary or indispensable party. See e.g. Lezette v Bd. of Ed., Hudson City School Dist., 35 NY2d 272 [1974]; City of New York v Long Is. Airports Limousine Serv. Corp., 48 NY2d 469 [1979]; Jim Ludtka Sporting Goods, Inc. v City of Buffalo School Dist., 48 AD3d 1103 [4th Dept 2008]; Wrobel v La Ware, 229 AD2d 861 [3d Dept 1996]

Here, Garfield Brown and Sherain Brown, who are the owners, are indispensable parties to the action, which cannot proceed in their absence. Therefore, the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. See LaSalle Bank NA. v Benjamin, 164 AD3d 1223 [2d Dept 2018]["Chittra, as a fee owner of the property which was subject to the mortgage, was a necessary and indispensable party to the action...Once the complaint was dismissed against Chittra, the plaintiff could not continue the action against the other defendants"]; Newton v Evers, 215 NY 198 (1915)["Julia E. Ferguson was the owner of the equity of redemption under her deed...She was a necessary party to any action brought to foreclose that mortgage, and without her presence the action could not proceed.'']; see also MTGLQ Inv'rs, L.P. v Shay, 190 AD3d 527 [1st Dept 2021]["Dismissal of the action as against Eaton requires discontinuation of the action as against Meldal as well"]; Green Tree Servicing, LLC v Jean, 2025 NY Slip Op 06997 [2d Dept Dec. 17, 2025]["As a fee owner of the property and mortgagor, [defendant] was an indispensable pa1iy to this foreclosure action... The absence of an indispensable party mandates dismissal of the action, and the plaintiff cannot maintain the action as against the other defendants...Therefore, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, once the complaint was dismissed insofar as asserted against [defendant], the plaintiff could not continue the action against the remaining defendants."][internal citations omitted]

Given the dismissal of the complaint, the notices of pendency filed herein must also be cancelled. See CPLR 6514; See e.g. Nationstar Mtge, LLC v Davis, 240 AD3d 790 [2d Dept 2025]; Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Starr-Klein, 193 AD3d 807 [2d Dept 2021]

A foreclosure action is an action in equity that strips a borrower of what is central to the American Dream: ownership of a home, which for most families is their single most important asset and the foundation of personal and economic stability. Because foreclosure effects the permanent loss of that essential interest, this Court cannot and will not abdicate its mandatory duties to require strict compliance with CPLR 3215[c], CPLR 3215[f] and to ascertain whether the action can proceed in the absence of an indispensable party. Nor will this Court permit foreclosure cases to proceed where a plaintiff fails to timely proceed or demonstrate, through competent evidence, that it is entitled to the equitable relief it seeks.

For all of the above reasons, plaintiff failed take proceedings for entry of a default judgment within a year of defendant's default, has failed to demonstrate good cause why the action should not be dismissed and therefore, the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety as [*10]mandated by CPLR 3215[c], with the notices of pendency being cancelled.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, the complaint is DISMISSED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk is directed to cancel the Notices of Pendency filed on January 13, 2023, and February 8, 2023.

This constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the Court.