The defendant, Jaime Delgado, submitted an omnibus motion, dated September 11, 2025, seeking: inspection of the Grand Jury minutes and dismissal or reduction of the indictment; an order invalidating the People's certificate of compliance; dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL §30.30; dismissal of indictment based on excessive delay; confirming the lower court's suppression decision; pre-trial voluntariness hearings, preclusion of evidence, several discovery related orders; Brady/Vilardi material; Sandoval Relief and leave to file further motions. The People's response, dated September 29, 2025, consents to some of the relief sought and opposes other relief. The court decides the motion as follows:

Defendant's motion to inspect the grand jury minutes is granted. The minutes reveal that [*2]a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence and at the time the prosecutor instructed the grand jurors on the law. The indictment substantially conforms to the requirements set forth in CPL § 200.50. The instructions were not defective as a matter of law and the proceedings were proper. Upon inspection of the grand jury minutes and exhibits, this court found the evidence to be legally sufficient to support all counts of the indictment. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss or reduce the counts of the indictment is denied.

The defendant argues that the integrity of the grand jury proceedings was impaired under CPL § 210.35(5) due to improper witness testimony. Dismissal under this section is an "exceptional remedy" that requires a showing of potential prejudice (People v Huston, 88 NY2d 400, 409 [1996]).

First, the defendant contends Detective Abrams, the arresting officer, improperly instructed the Grand Jury on the law by testifying that a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test indicated that the defendant was over the ".08 legal limit". It is well settled that an officer may testify to their observations and provide a lay opinion on intoxication, but they may not testify to a specific BAC percentage in the absence of a chemical test. However, this court finds that Detective Abrams's reference to the legal limit, while technically improper, did not impair the integrity of the proceedings. Detective Abrams's subsequent testimony — that based on his training and experience, the defendant was intoxicated — provided a sufficient and competent basis for the charges, rendering the ".08" comment a minor irregularity rather than a fundamental defect (People v Cruz, 48 NY2d 419 [1979] [opinion of police officer as to driver's intoxication proper]).

Second, Detective Abrams's testimony regarding a conversation with an unidentified female — specifically, her statement that the defendant called her to pick up their daughter and that he had two flat tires — constitutes hearsay. Generally, hearsay is inadmissible before a Grand Jury. However, the presence of hearsay does not require dismissal if there is sufficient other competent evidence to support the indictment (People v Miles, 76 AD3d 645 [2010]). Here, the defendant's presence at the scene with a disabled car and his own admission that his daughter was in the vehicle provided independent proof of the child's presence. The hearsay was largely cumulative and used to explain the officer's presence and narrative.

Detective Abrams's age estimation of the child's age was permissible lay opinion based on personal observation (People v Patterson, 149 AD2d 966 [4th Dept 1989]). Given that the defendant confirmed the child was twelve, there is no risk that the Grand Jury was misled by Detective Abrams's visual estimation.

Defendant contends that the Grand Jury proceedings were also impaired by the use of body-worn camera footage and other evidence from the first dismissed indictment impaired the integrity of the Grand Jury because the evidence was purportedly sealed under CPL § 160.50. This court disagrees.

CPL § 160.50(1) requires the sealing of records only upon "termination of a criminal action or proceeding against a person in favor of such person." CPL § 160.50(3) provides a comprehensive and exhaustive list of dispositions that constitute a "termination of a criminal action in favor of the accused," thereby triggering a sealing order. The most relevant of the 17 dispositions to this discussion include:

• An order dismissing the entire accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL Article 170, 180, or 210, where no appeal is pending and no leave to re-present was granted. (CPL § 160.50([3][b]);

• A verdict of complete acquittal (CPL § 160.50[3][c]);

• The entry of a no true bill by a Grand Jury (CPL § 160.50[3][h]);

• The expiration of an Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal (ACD) (CPL § 160.50[3][l]).

Importantly, a dismissal with leave to re-present is notably absent from the list of favorable dispositions found in CPL 160.50(3). Under CPL § 160.50(3)(b), a dismissal of an accusatory instrument is only "favorable" if the court has not granted the People leave to resubmit the charges. Because this court expressly authorized the People to re-present the case to another grand jury, the criminal action was never terminated in the defendant's favor within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the evidence was not subject to sealing, and the People's use of the footage and other evidence did not impair the integrity of the Grand Jury.

The court finds that the Grand Jury was presented with sufficient competent evidence to establish every element of the crimes charged. While the proceedings contained minor evidentiary irregularities, they did not rise to the level of a fundamental defect that potentially prejudiced the defendant or impaired the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for legal insufficiency and impairment of the Grand Jury proceedings is denied.

The defendant is charged with Aggravated Driving While Intoxicated (VTL § 1192[2-a] [b]) and Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol as an unclassified misdemeanor (VTL § 1192[3]).

In papers dated September 11, 2025, the defendant moves for an order invalidating the People's certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness (SOR) filed on July 17, 2025, arguing they were not effectively filed until August 1, 2025, and are further invalid due to the missing grand jury transcript that was filed with the court and disclosed to the defense on September 2, 2025.

The defendant was initially charged with misdemeanor Driving While Intoxicated (DWI). A suppression hearing was held in the lower court, resulting in suppression of all evidence obtained after the defendant's arrest. This first case was later indicted and then dismissed by this court with leave granted to the People to re-present the case to a new grand jury.

On July 16, 2025, the People finished the presentation of evidence to the grand jury. The grand jury returned an indictment for Aggravated DWI (VTL § 1192.2[-a][b], a felony) and Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (VTL § 1192[3], an unclassified misdemeanor). On July 16, 2025, the prosecutor requested an expedited transcript of the grand jury proceedings from the reporter. The next day, July 17, 2025, People followed up on the request for the grand jury transcript by requesting the QDA's Discovery Compliance Unit check on the request. Thereafter, on August 5, 2025, the prosecutor called and left a message with the supervisor of the grand jury reporters requesting a status update. Not having heard back from the supervisor, the prosecutor made successive follow-up calls on August 12th, 18th and 19th. On August 19th, the prosecutor was informed that a necessary reporter had been on vacation and was expected back the following Monday. On August 21st, the prosecutor was informed the transcript would be available on August 30th. On August 29th, the prosecutor received the grand jury transcript and disclosed it to the defense on September 2, 2025. (Affirmation of prosecutor at 7-9, ¶¶ 18-22; Memorandum of Law at 41, 44-47)

On July 17, 2025, the People attempted to file a Certificate of Compliance (COC) and a Statement of Readiness (SOR) via the court's EDDS system but filed it under the wrong indictment number. The COC noted that the grand jury transcript was not yet available. A copy of the COC, SOR and a discovery package was mailed to the defense postmarked on July 18, 2025, and received on August 4, 2025.

At the defendant's arraignment on July 28, 2025, the prosecutor informed the court that although she had an EDDS receipt, a court clerk had informed her of a "clerical issue" with the filing. The court noted that it had no record of a COC or SOR in the EDDS system for this case and declined to deem the People ready. (Arraignment Tr. at 4-5, People v Delgado, No. 72391/25 [Sup Ct Queens County][July 28, 2025])

On a subsequent court date, August 5, 2025, the record was clarified: the "clerical issue" in question was that the People had filed the COC and SOR under the wrong indictment number. The People indicated they had re-filed the documents under the correct indictment number on August 1, 2025. Furthermore, the COC filed noted that the grand jury transcript was unavailable. In their opposition papers, the People submitted an affidavit from the Grand Jury supervisor of reporters citing systemic staffing shortage and increased caseloads for the delay in the production of grand jury transcripts. (Conf. Tr.at 1-8, People v Delgado, [August 5, 2025])

This court finds the People failed to satisfy the strict statutory prerequisites for trial readiness under CPL Article 245 and the communication requirements under the rule established in People v Kendzia, (64 NY2d 331 [1985]).

Under CPL § 245.50(3), the filing of a proper Certificate of Compliance is an absolute statutory precondition to a valid Statement of Readiness. The statue mandates that "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial until it has filed a proper certificate [of compliance]."

As of the July 28, 2025, arraignment, this court had no record of a COC having been filed. The People's July 17, 2025, attempt was a nullity because it was filed under the wrong indictment number, effectively failing to enter the record of this case. Under CPL § 245.50(1), the People must "file with the court and serve upon the defendant" the COC. By misfiling the COC, the People failed to satisfy the mandatory statutory prerequisite to stating ready.

Furthermore, the People's SOR was ineffective. Under People v Kendzia, a statement of readiness is valid only when it is a communication of "present readiness" that appears on the trial court's record (Id. at 337). For an off-calendar SOR to be effective, it must be sent to both the defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk to be placed in the original record.

Because the People's filing was directed to the wrong indictment number, the People's SOR was never communicated to the appropriate court record. The "clerical issue" acknowledged by the prosecutor on July 28, 2025, and clarified on August 5, 2025, confirms that the People's SOR and COC were not properly placed on the record for this indictment until August 1, 2025.

The People oppose the defendant's motion to invalidate their COC on two procedural grounds: first, that the motion is untimely under CPL § 245.50(4)(c); and second, that the [*4]defendant failed to include an affirmation of good faith conferral. For the following reasons, the People's application to dismiss the motion on these procedural grounds is denied.

The People assert that the defendant's motion, filed on September 11, 2025, is untimely as it falls more than 35 days after the initial COC filing on July 17, 2025. This argument fails to account for the specific transitional provisions of the 2025 amendments to CPL § 245.50(4)(c).

Effective August 7, 2025, the Legislature enacted a 35 day window for challenging the validity of a COC. Importantly, the statute explicitly provides that for criminal actions pending on the effective date (August 7, 2025), the 35 day window runs from that effective date, regardless of when the COC was originally filed. Under this statutory mandate, the 35 day window for this pending case commenced on August 7, 2025, and was set to expire on September 11, 2025.

The defendant filed and served the instant motion on September 11, 2025. Because the motion was filed on the final day of the statutorily prescribed deadline for pending cases, it is timely. Furthermore, as established supra, the People's initial COC and SOR filing on July 17, 2025, was a nullity due to filing under the wrong indictment number. The specific impact of this error on the overall statutory speedy trial clock is analyzed infra in this opinion.

The record establishes that the defendant satisfied the spirit and intent of the good faith conferral requirement through repeated inquiries in open court and via email correspondence with the prosecutor. The fundamental nature of the missing discovery, the grand jury transcript, and the People's delay in providing it, demonstrates that no further accommodation could have been reached. These documented efforts constitute a sufficient effort to confer before seeking judicial intervention requested here, and in the motion discussed infra.

The defendant challenges the validity of the August 1, 2025, COC due to the missing grand jury transcript. To determine the validity of the People's COC, the court must evaluate whether the People exercised due diligence by considering the ten factors listed in CPL § 245.50(1): (1) efforts made by the People to comply; (2) the volume of discovery material provided and the volume of discovery material outstanding; (3) the complexity of the case; (4) whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; (5) the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; (6) the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; (7) whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; (8) whether the omission was corrected; (9) whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; (10) and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.(CPL § 245.50[5][a]; see also People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 212).

In this case, the People demonstrated proactive diligence by requesting the transcript on July 16th and immediately engaging their internal discovery compliance unit on July 17th to expedite the process. This affirmative step, taken prior to filing the COC, satisfied the "reasonable diligence requirement of CPL § 245.20(1)(b), which grants a 30 day stay for unavailable transcripts.

The People's continued persistence — documented through follow-ups on August 5th , 12th, 18th and 19th — further confirmed a consistent effort to comply with their mandates. The delay [*5]caused by a reporter's vacation was an external factor beyond the People's control. Once received, the People disclosed the transcript on September 2, 2025, which this court finds to be a prompt and diligent disclosure. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC and render the People's SOR illusory is denied.

In the indictment, the defendant is charged with Aggravated Driving While Intoxicated as an E felony (VTL § 1192.2[-a][b]) and Operating a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated as an unclassified misdemeanor (VTL § 1192[3]). The defendant now moves, pursuant to CPL § 30.30, to dismiss the indictment. The People oppose the defendant's motion in its entirety.

As a threshold matter, because the highest offense charged in the current indictment is a felony, the People are required to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action ( CPL § 30.30[1][a]). It is well settled, and it is undisputed by the defendant, that when a case begins as a misdemeanor and is subsequently elevated to a felony, the six-month period relates back to June 11, 2023, the date the first accusatory instrument was filed (People v Cooper, 98 NY2d 541 [ 2002]). In this case, the six month period is equivalent to 183 days.

The parties agree that 67 days were charged to the People during the initial misdemeanor proceedings. In the current proceedings, the People are charged with the period from the April 23, 2025, dismissal until the filing of a valid COC and SOR on August 1, 2025. This total interval comprises 100 days.

The People seek to exclude the period from April 23, 2025, to June 24, 2025, on the basis that their sole witness, Detective Abrams, was unavailable due to spinal surgery. (Prosecutor's Memorandum of Law at 49-51) Under CPL § 30.30(4)(g)(i) delay resulting from the unavailability of a material witness constitutes an "exceptional circumstance" if the People exercised due diligence to secure the witness's presence. (see People v Alcequier, 15 AD3d 162, 163 [1st Dept 2005]).

Upon review of the People's unrefuted affirmation and exhibit 5 thereto and the medical necessity of the procedure, this court finds that the 62 day period of Detective Abrams's unavailability and recovery constitutes an exceptional circumstance. (Affirmation of prosecutor at 4, ¶ 10) The People have demonstrated that the witness was material and that they monitored his recovery to restore readiness at the earliest practicable date (see People v Blacks, 153 AD3d 720, 723 [2d Dept 2017] [quoting People v Smietana, 9 NY2d 336, 341 [2002]). Accordingly, the period of time from April 23, 2025, to June 24, 2025 is excluded. The People are charged from June 25, 2025, to August 1, 2025, a period of 37 days. The total time charged, including the previously charged 67 days, is 104 days.

The total amount of chargeable time to the People is 104 days, a period that is less than the 183 days speedy trial limitation determined pursuant to CPL § 30.30 (1)(a). Therefore, the defendant's motion for dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial ground is denied.

The procedural history of this case is central to the resolution of defendant's claim of unreasonable delay pursuant to CPL § 210.20, CPL § 30.20 and the New York State Constitution. The relevant period of inquiry spans from the initial misdemeanor arraignment on June 11, 2023 to the filing of the instant motion on September 11, 2025.

The prosecution of the defendant commenced on June 11, 2023, with the filing of a misdemeanor DWI complaint. Following a suppression hearing, the lower court suppressed on February 9, 2024, all evidence following the defendant's arrest. The People subsequently served CPL § 170.20 notice on July 15, 2024, leading to the first indictment filed on October 3, 2024.

That indictment was dismissed by this court by written decision issued on April 23, 2025, and entered into the court's record on May 19, 2025. The court granted the People leave to re-present, due to a procedural defect in the Grand Jury vote. The current indictment, charging felony DWI under Leandra's Law (VTL § 1192[2-a][b]) was filed on July 17, 2025.

The court notes the People have failed to submit a response to this branch of the defense motion. While factual allegations in a motion that are not denied are typically deemed to be conceded under CPL § 210.45(4), the court's own record provides "unquestionable documentary proof" that allows for a determination based on the objective history of the case. (CPL § 210.45)(c).

The court record documents the following categories of delay during the 27 month period:

A. Defendants failures to Appear (subtotal 28 days)

The court record documents several instances where the defendant failed to appear, necessitating adjournments:

• August 15, 2023 — September 8, 2023: (24 days) Following multiple failures to appear.

• October 16, 2023 — October 19, 2023: (4 Days) Defendant failed to appear after the People announced ready for hearings.

B. Defense Unreadiness and Adjournments (Subtotal: 125 days)

• October 20, 2023 — November 30, 2023 (Subtotal: 41 days) Hearing rescheduled due to defendat's prior absence

• April 22, 2024 — June 3, 2024: (42 days) Defendant not ready for trial.

• June 3, 2024 -July 15, 2024: (42 days) Trial preliminaries halted mid-day due to defendant's childcare issues.

C. Motion Tolling and Court Deliberation (211 Days): Periods excludable for the court to consider defense motions:

• November 21, 2024 — February 24, 2025: (95 Days) Defense motion schedule set for submission on January 6, 2025; defendant filed late on February 24, 2025.

• February 25, 2025 — May 19, 2025: (83 days) People filed response on April 1, 2025; court deliberation and decision on April 23, 2025

• August 5, 2025 — September 11, 2025: (33 Days) Current motion schedule until filing.

D. Exceptional Circumstances (Witness Unavailability) (Subtotal: 97 days)

• Natural Disaster : 35 days (August 20, 2024 — September 23, 2024: Detective Abrams's family home flooded)

• Medical Emergency: 62 days (April 23, 2025 — June 24, 2025; Detective Abrams's spinal surgery)

The defendant now moves to dismiss the indictment, pursuant to People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975), alleging an unconstitutional pre-trial delay of approximately 27 months from the date of arrest to the filing of the instant motion on September 11, 2025.

The Court of Appeals in People v Taranovich, id. at 445, directed that courts, when [*6]considering a claim of unreasonable delay, engage in a "sensitive weighing process" of five factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay.

While the 27 month interval is significant, "there is no specific temporal duration after which a defendant automatically becomes entitled to release for denial of a speedy trial" (id. at 445) Much of the delay here is attributable to standard litigation, involving an initial prosecution for a misdemeanor DWI charge, including a suppression hearing, a presentation to a grand jury of a felony charge and subsequent dismissal of that indictment, a re-presentation of the case to a second grand jury and litigation of several omnibus motions, including a challenge to the People's discovery obligations. Furthermore, this court previously excluded 35 days when Detective Abrams was unavailable due to a family emergency (August 20, 2024 to September 23, 2024) and 62 days (April 23, 2025, to June 24, 2025) when he was also unavailable due to surgery. As the Court of Appeals noted in People v Decker, 13 NY3d 12, at 13 (2009), "a good faith determination to defer prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process of law though there is some prejudice to defendant." Here, the delay was necessitated by legitimate procedural steps and exceptional family and medical circumstances. Moreover, the People's subsequent decision to indict the defendant in September 2024, was not an abuse of discretion and there is no indication that the decision was made in anything other than good faith.

Of the 27 month period, the defendant was directly responsible for 248 days of delay while People are responsible for only 104 days. This minimal period does not constitute "unreasonable" delay (People v Staley, 41 NY2d 789 [1977]).

The defendant is charged with Aggravated DWI, a class E felony involving the safety of a child. Leandra's Law was enacted in 2009. The 2009 amendments to the Vehicle and Traffic Law specifically created a felony offense of aggravated driving while intoxicated with a child less than 16 in the vehicle. This change in the law elevated the seriousness of the crime from a misdemeanor to a felony. The legislative intent behind Leandra's Law was to protect children from the dangers of impaired driving. Nevertheless, while the offense is serious, the prosecution of the case itself is not complex, as it involves the testimony of a single witness, Detective Abrams. Critically, the defendant has remained at liberty throughout the pendency of this case. This lack of pre-trial incarceration heavily weighs against dismissal (People v Mack, 209 AD3d 1114 [3rd Dept 2022]).

The defendant has remained at liberty during the pendency of this case. Importantly, the defendant concedes there were no specific impairments of his defense. (see Affirmation of defendant's attorney at 35, ¶¶ 105-106) In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as a loss of a witness or evidence, a due process claim cannot be sustained (People v Fuller, 57 NY2d [*7]152).

The documentary record establishes not only that the defendant was responsible for 248 days of delay and also conclusively refutes the claim of a constitutional violation. Indeed, none of the factors enunciated by the Court of Appeals in evaluating a pre-trial delay weighs in favor of the defendant's contention that the interval at issue here was unreasonable. The delay was consistent with good faith and reasonable, and the underlying charges are serious. In short, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that there was any unreasonable pre-trial delay in this case or that he suffered any prejudice as a result. The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on this basis is, therefore, denied.

Before this court is the defendant's motion seeking, inter alia, an order confirming that a prior suppression ruling issued in Criminal Court remains the law of the case and is binding upon the People under the current indictment. The People oppose this branch of the motion and request a de novo suppression hearing.

This case, as previously discussed, commenced as a misdemeanor DWI in Criminal Court. Following a contested suppression hearing, the Criminal Court issued a decision suppressing all evidence obtained subsequent to the defendant's arrest. The People thereafter sought and obtained an indictment (the "First Indictment").

During the pendency of the First Indictment, the defendant moved for an order confirming the lower court's suppression ruling. This court, in a written decision dated April 23, 2025, held the lower court's ruling was binding and that the People were not entitled to a new hearing. Simultaneously, this court dismissed the First Indictment due to the People's failure to obtain court permission before asking the Grand Jury to reconsider its initial vote, but granted leave to re-present.

The People re-presented the case, and a second indictment was returned. The defendant now moves to confirm the suppression ruling for a second time, noting that a Notice of Entry has been filed regarding this court's prior decision. The People again request a new hearing, effectively seeking to re-litigate the issue.

The People's request for a new suppression hearing is denied. Under the law of the case doctrine, a court should not reconsider a legal issue already decided by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction in the same litigation (People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499 [2000]).

The People argue dismissal of the First Indictment resets the procedural clock, allowing for a second bite at the apple. This court disagrees. A suppression ruling is a determination on the merits regarding the legality of the People's evidence. Once such a ruling has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction — including a lower court — it is binding on the parties in all subsequent proceedings arising from the same criminal transaction (People ex rel Dowdy v Smith, 48 NY2d 477 [1979]; People v Carroll, 200 AD2d 630 [2d Dept 1994]).

Moreover, the People are collaterally estopped from re-litigating this issue. The People had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the suppression in Criminal Court and had the statutory right to appeal that ruling pursuant to CPL § 450.20(8). Having failed to appeal and having already been told by this court under the First Indictment that the ruling is binding, the People cannot ignore these finality principles simply by re-indicting the defendant. (see People v Goodman, 69 NY2d 32 [1986] [Doctrine of collateral estoppel may not apply in a criminal case unless the same parties were involved in a prior proceeding at which, after a full and fair hearing, the issue upon which preclusion is sought was necessarily decided against the party who opposed [*8]the estoppel.]; People v Acevedo, 69 NY2d 478 [1987])

The defendant's motion to confirm the prior suppression ruling is granted for the second time. The People's request for a new suppression hearing is denied for the second and last time. The prior ruling of the Criminal Court, as previously confirmed by this court, remains the law of the case and binding on all parties.

The defendant's motion for a pretrial hearing to determine the voluntariness of any unnoticed statements he may have made to police officers or civilians that the People intend to introduce at trial is denied as premature. If it becomes clear that any such statements exist, the defendant has leave to move for such a hearing at that time.

The defendant's motion to preclude any unnoticed statements or identification evidence pursuant to CPL§§60.45, 710.20(3) and 710.43(3) is denied. The determination of whether such evidence has been properly noticed is referred to the discretion of the hearing and trial courts before which any such evidence comes to light.

In his motion, the defendant has moved for a number of orders relating to discovery. First, the defendant has requested the preservation and production of all radio and other recorded police communications relating to this case. This motion is denied as moot, because the People certified in their Certificate of Compliance dated July 17, 2025, that they disclosed all 911 calls, police body-worn camera recordings and radio runs to the defense. Should the People become aware of any additional recorded police communications, they are directed to preserve and disclose such evidence to the defense in a timely fashion in accordance with their obligations pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1)(g).

Second, the defendant's motion requiring the People to request from all New York State and local law enforcement agencies a complete copy of all records related to the prosecution of this case is denied, as the People have certified that they satisfied their automatic discovery obligations pursuant to CPL§ 245.20(1) in their certificate of compliance and supplemental certificate of compliance.

Third, the defendant's motion for an order requiring an additional certificate of compliance is denied, as the People have already certified their compliance with their obligation to provide exculpatory and impeachment material. The People are, however, reminded of their ongoing duty to discovery obligations.

As to the defendant's demand for Brady/Vilardi material, the People are reminded of their continuing duty to provide evidence or information that is favorable to the defendant and is referred to the court's standing Brady order, which appears below.

The People are directed to preserve all case related police body worn camera footage, 911 calls, radio runs, Sprint Reports, and other communication related materials.

The defendant's request for a Sandoval hearing and, ultimately, the preclusion of evidence of prior bad acts is referred to the trial court. The People are reminded that the disclosure of Sandoval evidence that they intend to introduce at trial shall be made in accordance with the time frame set forth in CPL § 245.10(1)(b) and 245.20(3).

This court issues this order as both a reminder and a directive that counsel uphold their constitutional, statutory and ethical responsibilities in the above-captioned proceeding:

To the Prosecutor:

The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case, or, if the matter is not being prosecuted by the District Attorney, the prosecuting agency and its assigned representative, is directed to make timely disclosures of information favorable to the defense as required by Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), Giglio v United States, 405 US 150 (1972), People v Geaslen, 54 NY2d 510 (1981), and their progeny under the United States and New York State constitutions, and pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245 and Rule 3.8(b) of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct, as described hereafter.

•The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case have a duty to learn of such favorable information that is known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police, and should therefore confer with investigative and prosecutorial personnel who acted in this case and review their and their agencies' files directly related to the prosecution or investigation of this case.

• Favorable information could include, but is not limited to:

a) Information that impeaches the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness, including (i) benefits, promises, rewards or inducements, express or tacit, made to a witness by a law enforcement official or law enforcement victim services agency in connection with giving testimony or cooperating in the case; (ii) a witness's prior inconsistent statements, written or oral; (iii) a witness's prior convictions and uncharged criminal conduct; (iv) information that tends to show that a witness has a motive to lie to inculpate the defendant, or a bias against the defendant or in favor of the complainant or the prosecution; and (v) information that tends to show impairment of a witness's ability to perceive, recall, or recount relevant events, including impairment of that ability resulting from mental or physical illness or substance abuse.

b) Information that tends to exculpate, reduce the degree of an offense, or support a potential defense to a charged offense.

c) Information that tends to mitigate the degree of the defendant's culpability as to a charged offense, or to mitigate punishment.

d) Information that tends to undermine evidence of the defendant's identity as a perpetrator of a charged crime, such as a non-identification of the defendant by a witness to a charged crime or an identification or other evidence implicating another person in a manner that tends to cast doubt on the defendant's guilt.

e) Information that could affect in the defendant's favor the ultimate decision on a suppression motion.

• Favorable information shall be disclosed whether or not it is recorded in tangible form, [*9]and irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information.

• Favorable information must be timely disclosed in accordance with the United States and New York State constitutional standards, and in accordance with the timing provisions of CPL article 245. The prosecutor is reminded that the obligation to disclose is a continuing one. Prosecutors should strive to determine if favorable information exists. The prosecutor shall disclose the information expeditiously upon its receipt and shall not delay disclosure if it is obtained earlier than the time period for disclosure in CPL 245.10(1).

• A protective order may be issued for good cause pursuant to CPL 245.70 with respect to disclosures required under this order.

• Failures to provide disclosure in accordance with CPL Article 245 are subject to the available remedies and sanctions for nondisclosures pursuant to CPL 245.80.

• Only willful and deliberate conduct will constitute a violation of this order or be eligible to result in personal sanctions against a prosecutor.

To Defense Counsel:

Defense counsel, having filed a notice of appearance in the above captioned case, is obligated under both the New York State and the United States Constitution to provide effective representation of defendant. Although the following list is not meant to be exhaustive, counsel shall remain cognizant of the obligation to:

a) Confer with the client about the case and keep the client informed about all significant developments in the case;

b) Timely communicate to the client any and all guilty plea offers, and provide reasonable advice about the advantages and disadvantages of such guilty plea offers and about the potential sentencing ranges that would apply in the case;

c) When applicable based upon the client's immigration status, ensure that the client receives competent advice regarding the immigration consequences in the case as required under Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US 356 (2010);

d) Perform a reasonable investigation of both the facts and the law pertinent to the case (including as applicable, e.g., visiting the scene, interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing pertinent materials, consulting experts, inspecting exhibits, reviewing all discovery materials obtained from the prosecution, researching legal issues, etc.), or, if appropriate, make a reasonable professional judgment not to investigate a particular matter;

e) Comply with the requirements of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct regarding conflicts of interest, and when appropriate, timely notify the court of a possible conflict so that an inquiry may be undertaken or a ruling made;

f) Possess or acquire a reasonable knowledge and familiarity with criminal substantive, procedural and evidentiary law to ensure constitutionally effective representation in the case; and

g) When the statutory requirements necessary to trigger required notice from the defense are met (e.g., a demand, intent to introduce particular evidence, etc.), comply with the statutory notice obligations for the defense as specified in CPL 250.10, 250.20, and 250.30.

The branch of the motion requesting leave to file additional motions is granted to the extent recognized by CPL 255.20(3).

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

The Clerk of the court is directed to distribute copies of this decision and order to the attorney for the defendant and to the District Attorney.