On October 11, 2024, at approximately 11:55 AM, inside of 199 Chambers Street, New York, New York, defendant, Tramain Payne, repeatedly struck the complaining witness in the face and head with a closed fist, causing him redness swelling, and substantial pain. Defendant's actions further caused him to fall the ground, where he hit his forehead, causing a bump and substantial pain to his forehead. The complaining witness was treated at the scene by Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and subsequently transported to a local area hospital for further treatment. Thereafter, on October 18, 2024, defendant was held in the Borough of Manhattan Community College (BMCC) public safety office by BMCC's public safety public safety officers, where defendant was subsequently placed under arrest by officers from the New York City Police Department (NYPD).

For these acts, defendant was arrested and charged with one count each of Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law [PL] §§ 120.00[1], [2]), one count of Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.30[4]), one count of Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (PL §110/120.00[1]), and one count of Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26[1]) in New York County Criminal Court.

On October 18, 2024, an accusatory instrument was filed, and defendant was arraigned the same day before the Honorable Michael E. Ryan. The case was adjourned to December 6, [*2]2024, in Part B, for conversion.

On December 6, 2024, the People were not ready for trial but defendant and defense counsel both failed to appear, and a bench warrant was stayed as to defendant. The case was adjourned to December 11, 2024, in Part B-W, for defendant to appear.

On December 11, 2024, the People were not ready for trial, but the People filed a supporting deposition, and the misdemeanor complaint was deemed a misdemeanor information. The case was adjourned to January 14, 2025, in Part B, for trial and for the People to file a Certificate of Compliance (COC) and Statement of Readiness (SOR).

In the interim, on January 13, 2025, the People filed a COC and SOR off calendar with the court and defense counsel, after sharing discovery with defense counsel, bringing the case into the post-readiness context.

On January 14, 2025, the People were ready for trial, but defense counsel was not ready and requested an adjournment. The case was adjourned for trial in Part B on February 18, 2025.

On February 7, 2025, defense counsel filed a motion off calendar challenging the People's COC as invalid on the ground that certain materials were belatedly disclosed or not disclosed to him.

On February 18, 2025, a motion schedule was subsequently ordered by the Honorable Michael E. Ryan, with the People's answering papers due on March 4, 2025, and the case was adjourned for decision on defendant's motion on April 30, 2025, which the court subsequently adjourned to June 17, 2025, as it needed more time.

In a written decision and order, dated June 17, 2025, the court denied defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC, finding that the People's COC was made in good faith after exercising due diligence, but ordered the People to produce video surveillance footage from BMCC's public safety office from the date of defendant's arrest and disclose it to defendant as soon as practicable on the ground that they were acting in a law enforcement capacity (Ryan, J). The court additionally found that the People's initial nondisclosure of this item was reasonable under the circumstances as the People relied on the fact that BMCC public safety officers are peace officers and believed that they do not constitute law enforcement.

At the June 17, 2025 calendar call, the court noted that a decision had been rendered, and the court adjourned the case for August 5, 2025 for trial.

On August 5, 2025, the People maintained their readiness for trial but informed the court that while they had requested the BMCC footage, that they were still not in receipt of it. The case was adjourned for trial on September 16, 2025.

On August 8, 2025, the People filed a Supplemental Certificate of Compliance (SCOC) and SOR off calendar with the court and defendant, after receiving and disclosing the BMCC footage with defense counsel.

Now, in papers dated September 16, 2025, defendant, through counsel, filed the instant motion, and a motion schedule was subsequently ordered by this Court. Defendant moves this Court for an Order dismissing the misdemeanor information on the ground that he has been denied a speedy trial, claiming that the People have exceeded their statutory speedy trial allowances under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 30.30. He argues that the People are attributable with 138 chargeable days, well over their 90-day limit. Defendant specifically takes issue with the belatedly disclosed BMCC video surveillance footage, contending that because the court ordered the production of the footage in its June 17, 2025 Decision and Order, that the People's failure to file a new SCOC/SOR at the subsequent court date of August 5, 2025, [*3]rendered the time period from August 5, 2025 to September 16, 2025 chargeable to the People for a total of 50 includable days. Defendant also contends that the People are attributable with 2 chargeable days for the time period between August 5, 2025 to August 8, 2025, the date of the People's SCOC/SOR. Defendant solely relies on the court's June 17, 2025 Decision and Order to support his claims (Defendant's Motion).

The People oppose, in response papers dated contending that they have not exceeded their statutory allowances and are within their 90-day window, with only 82 chargeable days, from the commencement of the criminal action to the present. Specifically, the People argue that because the court found the People's initial COC/SOR valid in its June 17, 2025 Decision and Order, that the People cannot be charged with any post-readiness time periods as they maintained their readiness for trial from the filing of their January 13, 2025 SOR to the present. The People additionally point out that following receipt of the court's June 17, 2025 Decision and Order, the People subpoenaed BMCC for the video footage the same day and disclosed it to defendant on August 8, 2025, the same date that they received it, along with their SCOC/SOR (People's Response). Defendant also filed a reply on November 9, 2025.

To prevail on a motion to dismiss under CPL §30.30 (1)(a), a defendant must present sworn allegations of fact establishing an unexcused delay that exceeds the statutory limit. People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 (2016); People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 (1992); People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986); People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 357 (1980). At a minimum, the defendant must claim that the People failed to announce their readiness for trial within the statutorily prescribed period to meet their initial burden. People v Beasley, 16 NY3d 289, 292 (2011); People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 41 (2016); People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71 (1995). Once the defendant has asserted that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of a criminal action without a valid declaration of readiness from the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay. People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980).

Pursuant to CPL §30.30(1)(b), the People must be ready for trial within "ninety days of the commencement of the criminal action" where a defendant is charged with "a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months " See CPL §30.30(1)(b). Here, the criminal action commenced, on a misdemeanor with a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, on October 18, 2024, where the accusatory instrument was filed and defendant arraigned the same day, so speedy trial began to run the same day with an allowable ninety-days.

At all times until the People announce that they are ready for trial, the People are chargeable with the time that elapses unless they can show that the specific delay is not chargeable to them pursuant to an exception enumerated in the statute. CPL §§ 30.30(1), (4); People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525-26 (1st Dept 2022). Moreover, under the newly enacted discovery laws defined in CPL Article 245, the People's compliance with their discovery obligations is now a prerequisite to asserting trial readiness. See CPL §§ 245.50(3); 30.30(5). Specifically, CPL §245.50(3) states that "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of §30.30 of this chapter until it has filed a valid certificate pursuant to subdivision one of this section." CPL §30.30(5) provides that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20."

Once the People have met this statutory predicate by filing a valid COC, an [*4]accompanying statement of readiness is "presumed truthful and accurate and that a defendant who challenges such a statement must demonstrate that it is illusory" People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392 (2016). Thus, "[i]n the absence of proof that [a] readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People's position ..., the People [have] discharged their duty under CPL 30.30" People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795 (1998)).

The law distinguishes between delays occurring before the People have announced their readiness for trial from those that occur after the People have announced ready. People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 534 (1985). While pre-readiness delays are excludable only if the People can establish that they fit within a category specifically excludable by statute, post-readiness delays are charged to the People only if they actually cause the People to become not ready for trial and are not specifically excludable by statute. People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 210 (1992); Anderson, 66 NY2d at 534. And once in the post-readiness context of the case, the People will only be charged with delays that are attributable to their inaction and that directly implicate their ability to proceed to trial. People v Nielsen, 306 AD2d 500 (2d Dept 2003).

With respect to the post-readiness posture, the burden shifts to defendant to show that delays occurred under circumstances that should be charged to the People. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 215-16; Anderson, 66 NY2d at 541; People v Collins, 82 NY2d 177 (1993); see also CPL § 210.45(7). However, it is the prosecution's burden, in the first instance, to ensure the that the record of the proceedings with respect to adjournments is clear as to who is attributable with any delay to allow courts to make an informed decision on a 30.30 motion. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 215-16; People v Collins, 82 NY2d 177 (1993). In addition, the People are not required to declare their readiness repeatedly through the pendency of a criminal action. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 214.

Cognizant of all the relevant and applicable standards of law, and after reviewing the parties' submissions and their annexed exhibits, along with the court minutes, the Court's speedy trial computation and analysis is as follows:

The criminal action was commenced on October 18, 2024, upon the filing of the accusatory instrument, and defendant was arraigned on the same day. The People were not ready for trial and the case was adjourned for conversion in Part B on December 6, 2024. The date of reckoning is excluded from the computations. People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 (1987). (49 days charged, 49 days total).

On December 6, 2024, the People were not ready for trial but defendant and defense counsel both failed to appear, and a bench warrant was stayed. The case was adjourned to December 11, 2024, in Part B-W, for defendant to appear. This period is excluded because the court stayed a bench warrant. CPL §30.30(4)(b) and (c); People v Espinosa, 170 AD2d 309 (lst Dept 1991); People v Cruz, 236 AD2d 322, 323 (1st Dept 1997) ("We note specifically that periods during which the court stayed a bench warrant are excludable"). This period is separately excluded because defense counsel did not appear. See CPL § 30.30(4)(f); People v Huger, 167 AD3d 1042, 1043-44 (2d Dept 2018); People v Bahadur, 41 AD3d 239, 240 (1st Dept 2007); People v Mannino, 306 AD2d 157, 158 (1st Dept 2003); People v Aubin, 245 AD2d 805 (3d Dept 1997). (0 days charged, 49 days total).

On December 11, 2024, the People filed a supporting deposition, and the complaint was deemed an information. The People were not ready for trial and the case was adjourned to January 14, 2025, for trial and for the People to file a COC/SOR. In the interim, on January 13, 2025, the People filed a COC and SOR off calendar with the court and defense counsel, after sharing discovery with defense counsel, bringing the case into the post-readiness context. See [*5]People v Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434 (1998). (33 days charged, 82 days total).

At the January 14, 2025, calendar call, the People were ready for trial, but defense counsel was not ready and requested an adjournment. The case was adjourned for trial on February 18, 2025. This period is excluded as an adjournment granted at the request of, or with the consent of, defense counsel. See CPL §30.30(4)(b). People v Meierdiercks, 68 NY2d 613, 614 (1986); People v Barnes, 160 AD3d 890 (2d Dept 2018); People v Morris, 94 AD3d 912, 913 (2d Dept 2012). (0 days charged, 82 days total).

On February 7, 2025, defense counsel filed a motion off calendar challenging the People's COC. A motion schedule was subsequently ordered, at the February 18, 2025 calendar call. The case was adjourned for decision on defendant's motion on April 30, 2025, which the court subsequently adjourned to June 17, 2025, as it needed more time. The time period between February 7, 2025 to June 17, 2025 is excluded as an adjournment for defendant to file motions. See CPL § 30.30(4)(a). People v Brown, 99 NY2d 488, 491-92 (2003); People v Oliver, 87 AD3d 1035, 1036 (2d Dept 2011); People v Newborn, 42 AD3d 506, 507 (2d Dept 2007); People v Inswood, 180 AD2d 649 (2d Dept 1992); People v Brown, 136 AD2d 715 (2d Dept 1988). (0 days charged, 82 days total).

In a written decision and order, dated June 17, 2025, the court denied defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC, finding that the People's COC was made in good faith after exercising due diligence, but ordered the People to produce video surveillance footage from BMCC's public safety office from the date of defendant's arrest and disclose it to defendant as soon as practicable on the ground that they were acting in a law enforcement capacity (Ryan, J). At the June 17, 2025 calendar call, the court noted that a decision had been rendered, and the court adjourned the case for August 5, 2025, for trial. This period is excluded as a reasonable period of time for the People to prepare for trial after the court decided the motion. See CPL § 30.30(4)(a); People v Kastner, 132 AD3d 420 (1st Dept 2015); People v Davis, 80 AD3d 494 (1st Dept 2011) (excluding reasonable time to prepare after decision on motions); People v Hernandez, 268 AD2d 344 (1st Dept 2000) (period following denial of defendant's suppression motion was properly excluded as reasonable time to prepare for trial); People v Solano, 206 AD3d 432 (1st Dept 2022). (0 days charged, 82 days total).

On August 5, 2025, the People maintained their readiness for trial, but informed the court that while they had requested the BMCC footage, they were still not in receipt of it. The case was adjourned for trial on September 16, 2025. On August 8, 2025, the People filed a SCOC and SOR off calendar with the court and defendant, after receiving and disclosing the BMCC footage with defense counsel.

Here, contrary to defendant's instant claim, this period is not chargeable to the People for several reasons. Firstly, the record reflects that the People were ready for trial on that date. Secondly, the court found the People's initial COC to be valid, made in good faith after exercising due diligence. Once the People have filed a valid COC, violations of their discovery obligations do not implicate their trial readiness. People v Radford, 237 AD3d 1511, 1513 (4th Dept 2025), lv denied, 43 NY3d 1048 (2025). In Radford, the Appellate Division held that the People's "failure ... to comply with their continuing discovery obligations under CPL 245.60 ... does not ... implicate speedy trial considerations under CPL 30.30" (id.). Rather, the People's readiness "is directly tied, and only directly tied, to the People's failure to comply with their initial discovery obligations" (id. [internal modifications omitted]). Likewise, CPL § 30.30 (5)(a) expressly provides that, "[t]he court may deem the people not ready for trial based on the [*6]people's failure to comply with the provisions of [Article 245] only if it finds that the people's [COC] ... was invalid." See CPL § 30.30 (5)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the belatedly disclosed video surveillance footage cannot implicate speedy trial, and the People cannot be charged for it. Moreover, it should be noted that nowhere in the court's June 17, 2025 Decision and Order did the court order the People to produce the video footage by the subsequent court date of August 5, 2025. Instead, the court expressly ordered the People to produce the video footage, "as soon as practicable," which the People did, as they issued a subpoena to BMCC on the same date as the court order and disclosed the video footage on the date of receipt. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the time period between August 5, 2025 to September 16, 2025 is excluded. (0 days charged, 82 days total).

On September 16, 2025, defendant filed the instant motion and the case was adjourned for decision on defendant's motion pursuant to the instant motion schedule. The time period from September 16, 2025, to the present is excluded for defendant's motion practice. See CPL § 30.30(4)(a); People v Brown, 99 NY2d 488, 491-92 (2003); People v Oliver, 87 AD3d 1035, 1036 (2d Dept 2011); People v Newborn, 42 AD3d 506, 507 (2d Dept 2007); People v Inswood, 180 AD2d 649 (2d Dept 1992); People v Brown, 136 AD2d 715 (2d Dept 1988). (0 days charged, 82 days total).

In sum, the People are attributable with 82 days, well within their 90-day statutory allowances, and defendant's CPL § 30.30 motion is denied without a hearing. And given that only 82 days are chargeable to the People, this Court declines to address the parties' remaining contentions. Defendant's other motions are also denied for the foregoing reasons.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.