On May 28, 2025, at approximately 4:14 PM, at the corner of West 155 Street and Edgecomb Avenue, New York, New York, Police Officer Albert Fernandez, assigned to the 33rd Precinct of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), observed defendant, Blaine Scott, operating a scooter at the above mentioned location, which is a public highway, without proper plates. Officer Fernandez conducted a computer check, which revealed that defendant's license was suspended.

For these acts, defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] § 511[1][a]) and one count of Unlicensed Driving (VTL § 509[1]).

Defendant was arraigned in New York City Criminal Court on June 16, 2025, before the Honorable Julieta Lozano and the case was adjourned to Part E for conversion on August 1, 2025.

In the interim, on July 23, 2025, the People filed a Certificate of Compliance (COC), Statement of Readiness (SOR), and Automatic Discovery Form (ADF) off-calendar with defense counsel and the court after sharing discovery obtained through their Body Worn Camera (BWC), Law Enforcement Disclosure (LED), and Law Enforcement Disclosure (LSU) units. These disclosures consisted of activity logs for all testifying witnesses, NYPD arrest paperwork, [*2]complaint reports, DA paperwork, DMV paperwork, civilian witness contact information, radio runs, BWC videos, vehicle paperwork, law enforcement witness information including IAB and CCRB paperwork, miscellaneous items, and more.

On July 29, 2025, defense counsel notified the prosecutor of purportedly omitted discovery, namely, (1) an arrest report worksheet, (2) defendant's arraignment card, (3) event chronology / sprint report, (4) roll call logs, (5) a pre-arraignment notification report, (6) arrest photos, (7) property vouchers regarding defendant's scooter, (8) NYPD online prisoner arraignment database, also known as the ZOLPA, (9) a vehicle seizure form, and (10) the name. work affiliation, and witness designation for the desk sergeant who processed defendant's desk appearance ticket (DAT). The prosecutor informed defense counsel that same day that a paralegal would follow up with defense counsel with any outstanding items and/or explanations for nondisclosure.

On August 1, 2025, the People were ready for trial and the misdemeanor complaint was converted into a misdemeanor information in Part E. The case was adjourned for trial on September 19, 2025.

On August 20, 2025, defense counsel requested an update as to the purportedly omitted discovery. One day later, the People noted that they were still waiting to hear back from a police officer.

On September 4, 2025, defense counsel sent a follow up email to the prosecutor requesting a status update.

On September 5, 2025, the People notified defense counsel that (1) an arrest report worksheet had been previously disclosed, (2) defendant's arraignment card did not exist, (3) the event chronology / sprint report had previously been disclosed, (4) a pre-arraignment notification report did not exist, (5) the requested vouchers had been ordered, (6) the ZOLPA had been shared as of that date, (7) the requested vehicle seizure form had been ordered, and (8) the name, work affiliation, and witness designation for the desk sergeant who processed defendant's DAT had been ordered. The People also filed a Supplemental Certificate of Compliance (SCOC) to reflect the belatedly disclosed item on that date.

Now, in papers dated, September 15, 2025, defendant, though counsel, now moves this Court for an Order, inter alia, dismissing the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient, deeming the People's COC/SOR invalid and illusory on the ground that certain items of discovery were belatedly disclosed or undisclosed, dismissing the criminal action on speedy trial grounds, for the suppression of evidence, for pre-trial voluntariness hearings, for preclusion, for further motions, and any other relief the Court deem just and proper. The People oppose in papers dated November 21, 2025. Defendant filed a reply on December 5, 2025.

Upon review of the parties' submissions and annexed exhibits therein along with the court file and court minutes, the Court's Decision and Order is as follows.

Defendant moves this Court to dismiss the misdemeanor information on the ground that it is facially insufficient and jurisdictionally defective to support the charges. Specifically, defendant argues that the information fails to provide facts of an evidentiary character to establish the element of "motor vehicle," defined in VTL § 125, which is an essential element of the offenses charged. Defendant also argues that, because the motor vehicle at issue is a scooter, the People have additionally failed to plead that the scooter did not fall under the electric scooter exception to a motor vehicle contained in the same statute and further delineated in VTL §114-e. [*3]Defendant argues that he has consequently been deprived of sufficient notice to defend against the accusations and prevent him from being tried twice for the same offense. The People oppose on the ground that the instrument is facially sufficient to support the charges, and that defendant has been provided with ample notice of the charges.

An information is jurisdictionally sufficient where it states facts of an evidentiary character supporting the charges (Criminal Procedure Law [CPL] § 100.15[3]), and the factual allegations, together with any supporting depositions, provide "reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged." CPL § 100.40(1)(b). In order for the reasonable cause standard to be met, the factual allegations in the instrument must be sufficient to show that it is reasonably likely that a crime was committed, and that the defendant committed it. People v Hightower, 18 NY3d 249, 254 (2011).

In addition, the information and supporting depositions must include "[n]on-hearsay allegations" that "establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof." CPL § 100.40(1)(c); People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000). This is referred to as the "prima facie case requirement." People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229 (2009) (citations omitted). The prima facie case requirement in an accusatory instrument "is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 (2015) (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized, "[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also People v Berrezueta, 31 NY3d 1091, 1092 (2018); Smalls, 26 NY.3d at 1066; People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100 (2010); Kalin, 12 NY3d at 230; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 576 (2004).

In evaluating the adequacy of an accusatory instrument, a reviewing court must do so in the light most favorable to the People, and should consider not only the facts expressly alleged, but also the reasonable inferences and obvious implications that can be drawn from those allegations. See People v Drelich, 32 NY3d 1032 (2018); People v Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 747 (2012); Casey, 95 NY2d at 360.

In this case, defendant is charged with Aggravated Unlicensed Operation in the Third Degree (VTL § 511[1][a]) and Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle (VTL § 509[1]). A person is guilty of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree when such person operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway while knowing or having reason to know that his or her license or privilege of operating such motor vehicle in this state or privilege of obtaining a license to operate such motor vehicle issued by the commissioner is suspended, revoked or otherwise withdrawn by the commissioner (CJI2d[NY] VTL § 511[1][a]). A person is guilty of Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle when he or she operates or drives a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state (CJI2d[NY] VTL § 509[1]).

Thus, the common elements are (1) motor vehicle, (2) operation, (3) knowledge, and (4) public highway.

VTL § 125 defines a motor vehicle as "[e]very vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power," with certain listed exceptions. Subdivision (f) of the same statute notes one such exception as, "electric scooters as defined in section one hundred and fourteen-e of this article." VTL §125(f). VTL §114-e then [*4]goes on to define electric scooter as, "[e]very device weighing less than one hundred pounds that (a) has handlebars, a floorboard or a seat that can be stood or sat upon by the operator, and an electric motor, (b) can be powered by the electric motor and/or human power, and (c) has a maximum speed of no more than twenty miles per hour on a paved level surface when powered solely by the electric motor". VTL §114-e.

In this case, the information sworn by Police Officer Albert Fernandez, specifically alleges that on May 28, 2025, at about 4:14 AM, at the corner of West 155 Street and Edgecomb Avenue, New York, New York,

I observed the defendant operating a motor vehicle (the engine was running and the defendant was behind the wheel) on a public highway, namely, the above location. I conducted a computer check of the records of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles and determined that the defendant's privilege of operating a motor vehicle was suspended and has not been reinstated.

I know that the defendant knew his privilege of operating a motor vehicle was suspended because the computer check revealed that his license was suspended for failure to answer a New York summons and all such summonses have printed on them, "If you do not answer this ticket by mail within fifteen (15) days your license will be suspended." The suspension occurs automatically (by computer) within 4 weeks of the defendant's failure to answer.

The People have filed and served a DMV abstract.

Here, these allegations, if true, sufficiently demonstrate that defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public highway and did so while knowing or having reason to know that his license was suspended. Contrary to defendant's argument, the information sufficiently demonstrates that the vehicle was "propelled by any power other than muscular power," and therefore a "motor vehicle," because the information alleges that the vehicle's engine was running. A vehicle that is equipped with and propelled by an engine is a motor vehicle. See People v Lopez, 144 Misc 2d 325 (Sup Ct NY Co 1989); Dupra v Benoit, 270 AD2d 856, 856 (4th Dept 2000). Accordingly, defendant's claims in this regard are denied.

Defendant's related argument that the People failed to plead facts to negate the electric scooter exception to a motor vehicle as defined in VTL §125 and §114-e fails and is denied. In determining whether certain facts should be pleaded in the accusatory instrument, courts have focused on whether the language in question in a relevant criminal statute is an exception or a proviso. As the Court of Appeals explained "[e]ssential allegations are generally determined by the statute defining the crime. If the defining statute contains an exception, the [accusatory instrument] must allege that the crime is not within the exception. But when the exception is found outside the statute, or a proviso, the exception generally is a matter for the defendant to raise in defense, either under the general issue or by affirmative defense." People v Santana, 7 NY3d 234, 236-7 (2006). Here, the motor vehicle exceptions are not contained in the crimes' defining statutes and are instead contained in VTL § 125 and other statutes. Thus, the electric scooter exception is a proviso, and the People were not required to plead it.

Thus, "given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (Casey, 95 NY2d at 360), the allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes to establish reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that defendant committed each element of the Aggravated Unlicensed [*5]Operation in the Third Degree (VTL § 511[1][a]) and Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle (VTL § 509[1]). And by "stat[ing] the time, date, and location of the[] events," the information was "sufficient to prevent defendant from facing double jeopardy on the same charges." People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 519 (2014). People v Willis, 44 NY3d 14 (2025). Defendant's motion is accordingly denied.

Defendant moves this Court for an Order deeming the People's initial July 23, 2025 COC invalid, and its accompanying SOR illusory, on the ground that certain materials were belatedly disclosed or undisclosed. Specifically, defendant takes issue with belatedly disclosed ZOLPA as well as with undisclosed witness information for the desk sergeant who issued defendant's DAT during arrest processing, property vouchers and a vehicle seizure form for defendant's scooter, and an arrest report worksheet. The People oppose, arguing that their COC was valid, filed in good faith after exercising due diligence, and that the belated disclosures do not vitiate the validity of the initial COC. They additionally argue that many of defendant's claimed belatedly disclosed and undisclosed materials do not constitute automatic discovery and consequently cannot vitiate the validity of the initial COC.

As recently amended, effective August 7, 2025, Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245 requires the People to disclose to a defendant "material and information in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or under the prosecution's direction and control," and provides a non-exhaustive list of materials subject to "automatic" disclosure. CPL § 245.20(1). Under CPL § 245.20(2), the People are required to "make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information discoverable under [CPL § 245.20(1)] and to cause such material or information to be made available for discovery where it exists but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control." The People are not required, however, "to obtain material or information if it may be obtained with the use of a subpoena duces tecum where the defense is able to obtain the same material with the use of a subpoena duces tecum." CPL § 245.20(2).

The People must also certify their discovery compliance in writing by filing a COC. Importantly, the People may file their COC even if they have not yet disclosed all automatically discoverable items provided that they have "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the discovery required by [CPL § 245.20(1)]." CPL§ 245.50(1). The COC must "state that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery, the prosecution has disclosed and made available all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery." CPL § 245.50(1). The COC must also identify "the items provided" and "the items that the prosecution is required to disclose and of which the prosecution is aware but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence as evaluated under this section." CPL § 245.50(1). If the People provide additional discovery in connection with their ongoing obligations outlined in CPL § 245.60, they must file "a supplemental certificate" that "identif[ies] the additional material and information provided." CPL §245.50(1). A SCOC will not impact the validity of the original COC if filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence or when the additional discovery did not exist when the initial COC was filed. CPL §245.50(1-a).

Once the People file a COC, a defendant must notify the People of any potential deficiencies in the COC by making "good faith efforts to confer with the [prosecution] regarding [*6]the specific and particularized matters" regarding the allegedly missing discovery. Then, if "no accommodation can be reached," the defense may file a motion to invalidate the People's COC provided that: (1) they do so within thirty-five days of the service of the People's COC; and (2) they file an accompanying affirmation of conferral stating that the defense "conferred in good faith or timely made good faith efforts to confer with the [prosecution] regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for such challenge, that efforts to obtain the missing discovery from the [prosecution] or otherwise resolve the issues raised were unsuccessful, and that no accommodation could be reached." CPL § 245.50(4)(b)-(c). Significantly, the statute further specifies that "the court may grant a remedy or sanction for a discovery violation as provided in [CPL § 245.80]." CPL § 245.50(1). Any such remedy or sanction must be "appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the party entitled to disclosure." CPL §245.80(1).

To determine the validity of the People's COC, a reviewing court must assess the People's due diligence. As the Court of Appeals held in People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023), due diligence is a "flexible standard that requires the People to make reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives." Bay, 41 NY3d at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Reasonableness, then, is the touchstone—a concept confirmed by the statutory directive to make 'reasonable inquiries.'" Id. at 211-12. Moreover, the Court recognized that, "[a]lthough the relevant factors for assessing due diligence may vary from case to case, courts should generally consider, among other things:" (1) "the efforts made by the prosecution and the prosecutor's office to comply with the statutory requirements;" (2) "the volume of discovery provided and outstanding;" (3) "the complexity of the case;" (4) "how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence;" (5) "the explanation for any discovery lapse;" and (6) "the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery." Id. at 212. These six factors are now part of the statutory due-diligence analysis under CPL § 245.50(5)(a). This section also requires courts to consider whether: (1) "the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied;" (2) "the omission was corrected;" (3) "the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention;" and (4) "whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial." CPL § 245.50(5)(a). A reviewing court must "look at the totality of the party's efforts to comply with the provisions of [article 245], rather than assess the party's efforts item by item." CPL § 245.50(5). The statute further directs that "[t]he court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors listed in [CPL § 245.50(5)(a)] and no one factor shall be determinative." CPL § 245.50(5)(b).

Indeed, the Bay decision made clear that, in assessing the validity of a COC, the reviewing court should engage in a "holistic assessment of the People's efforts to comply with the automatic discovery provisions, rather than a strict item-by-item test that would require [a court] to conclude that a COC is improper if the People miss even one item of discovery." People v Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216, 1220 (4th Dept 2024); see also People v Williams, 224 AD3d 998, 1006-07 (3d Dept 2024) (People's COC was valid even though three discoverable items had not been disclosed where People provided "extensive" discovery before filing COC, identified missing items when they filed the COC, and acknowledged their duty to provide missing items upon receipt). Notably, "[a]rticle 245 is not intended for use as a 'sword,' whereby [ADAs] are expected to run themselves ragged in at times futile or near-futile attempts to [*7]procure material in which defense counsel has no substantive interest beyond exhausting the People's statutory speedy trial time or hoping that the People, in frustration, opt to abandon the prosecution." People v Barrios, 82 Misc 3d 606, 613 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2024); see also People v Thompson, 79 Misc 3d 1220(A), *2 (Crim Ct Kings Co 2023) (article 245 "does not require the impossible; it does not demand that every scrap of discoverable information be turned over before the People may file a [COC]") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, certain delays or discovery issues should not invalidate a COC that was made in good faith, after the exercise of due diligence and efforts made by the prosecution to comply with statutory obligations. Bay at 210-213. If the delay is a result of oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, a good faith position that the material in question was not discoverable, or voluminous files, the Bay decision clearly posits that a court should apply a "holistic assessment" of the efforts made by the People to comply with their discovery obligations when evaluating the validity of a COC. Id. Moreover, several courts have found that certain delays or discovery issues should not invalidate a COC that was made in good faith, after the exercise of due diligence, and where, for example, the delay was a result of oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, voluminous discovery, non-existent items, or material unrelated to the case. People v Cano, 71 Misc 3d 728 (Sup Ct, Queens County 2020); People v Lustig, 68 Misc 3d 234 (Sup Ct, Queens County 2020) (Zayas, J)(court found the People's certificate of compliance to be valid, since it was clearly filed in good faith under CPL § 245.50(1) and, therefore, no adverse consequence to the prosecution should result from the fact that the certificate was filed prior to the disclosure of the database search results).

Here, after a thorough review of the moving papers, court file, COC, the Court applied a "holistic assessment" of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, being mindful that perfection is not required. See Bay, 41 NY3d at 212. Prior to certifying discovery compliance, the People obtained and disclosed numerous pieces of discovery including activity logs for all testifying witnesses, NYPD arrest paperwork, complaint reports, DA paperwork, DMV paperwork, civilian witness contact information, radio runs, BWC videos, vehicle paperwork, law enforcement witness information including IAB and CCRB paperwork, miscellaneous items, and more, demonstrating good faith and due diligence. The People's disclosures were extensive and substantial, especially in comparison to the few items of undisclosed materials that defendant cites (Defendant's Motion). After defense counsel requested additional discovery, the People were responsive to those requests to resolve any potential discovery lapses as they made attempts to provide defense counsel with requested materials and did so, continuing to confer with defense counsel and addressed every line item demand and provided a legal basis for nondisclosure.

In addition, the New York County District Attorney's Office has made considerable and laudable efforts to facilitate discovery compliance, such as a creating BWC, LED, and LSU units and assigning paralegals and support staff to obtain discovery. Contrary to defendant's contention, "[t]he creation of these additional units and allocation of resources to generally address their discovery obligations under CPL Article 245 support a finding of due diligence on the part of the [New York] County District Attorney's Office in fulfillment of their discovery obligation in this case." People v Antunez, 86 Misc 3d 1265(A), *5 (Sup Ct Queens Co 2025) (Yavinsky, J). Taken together, this all demonstrates that the People's initial COC, made in good faith and after exercising due diligence, was valid.

Next, this Court finds that some of defendant's cited belatedly disclosed and undisclosed materials are not subject to automatic discovery under CPL §245.45. Consequently, the failure to provide these materials with the initial COC cannot disturb its validity. In this vein, defendant's argument that the belatedly disclosed ZOLPA vitiated the COC's validity fails. The ZOLPA, otherwise known as the prisoner arraignment database or the arrest to arraignment report, is a police generated document that notes a defendant's location from police custody in the precinct to his release after arraignment. It reflects how long a defendant was in custody and where he was lodged prior to being arraigned. People v JMW 83 Misc 3d 1289(A) (Sup Ct Kings Co 2024). This document is an administrative record and does not contain information related to the subject matter of the case. People v Young, 86 Misc 3d 1201(A) (Crim Ct Kings Co 2025); People v Arbaszewski, 85 Misc 3d 1218(A) (Sup Ct Queens Co 2025). Accordingly, it is not subject to automatic discovery. See also People v Aca, 86 Misc 3d 1228(A) (Crim Ct NY Co 2025).

Secondly, defendant's argument as to undisclosed roll call logs fails. Roll call logs are a list of officers on duty at the precinct on any given date. They show the department personnel's scheduled work time, their rank, and their assignments. "[T]he roll call log is essentially a timesheet for a particular precinct and the information contained therein is not case specific. It does not, for example, provide any information regarding what arrests the officers participated in nor provide any information specific to the defendant or the defendant's arrest." People v JMW. 83 Misc 3d 1289(A) (Sup Ct Kings Co 2024); People v Roman, 85 Misc 3d 1210(A) (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2025); People v Arbaszewski, 85 Misc 3d 1218(A) (Sup Ct Queens Co 2025). Therefore, the roll call log does not provide information related to the subject matter of the case and is not subject to automatic discovery. See also People v Aca, 86 Misc 3d 1228(A) (Crim Ct NY Co 2025).

Defendant's argument that he is entitled to the name, work affiliation, and witness designation for the desk sergeant who processed defendant's DAT at the precinct during his arrest processing is without merit and denied. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the desk sergeant possesses any knowledge about the case. Disclosure is not required absent any showing that an individual had relevant evidence or information of which the People were aware. People v Robbins, 206 AD3d 1069 (4th Dept 2022). The mere fact that an officer is present for an arrest, or in effectuating an arrest, does not establish that the officer possesses evidence or information that is relevant to the charges or a potential defense to those charges. See People v Hutchins, 2022 NY Slip Op 50327[U], *1 (Sup Ct. Kings County April 25, 2022); People v. Bonilla, 229 AD3d 850 (3d Dept 2024) (People not required to disclose names of officers of different law enforcement agency present at defendant's arrest even though they spoke to defendant during the arrest because officers did not have knowledge about the case). Accordingly, it is not subject to discovery.

As to outstanding property vouchers, vehicle seizure form, and arrest report worksheet, the People are ordered to expeditiously disclose those items upon receipt, to the extent that they exist and have not already done so. But this Court will not invalidate the People's COC for these items alone because People's COC was nevertheless filed in good faith after exercising due diligence as evidenced by the extensive documents initially provided. The failure to disclose these few items with the initial COC was also reasonable under the circumstances as inadvertent nondisclosure and/or inadvertent error, and these discovery errors are easily rectified. And, indeed, the fact that the People only missed three items that actually relate to the subject matter [*8]of the charges further supports a finding of due diligence.

Furthermore, there has been no hearing or trial, not a single witness has been sworn, and defendant hasn't received "any evidence or information that he had not received or that he had received too late to use effectively," People v Elmore, 211 AD3d 1536 (4th Dept 2022) and is entirely unprejudiced as a result. For all these reasons, the People's COC, made in good faith and after exercising due diligence, was valid. See also People v Askin, 68 Misc 3d 372 (County Ct Nassau Co 2020) (People validly filed a certificate of compliance and statement of readiness even though not all discoverable materials had been turned over).

This Court assumes that defendant will receive the outstanding materials and as initially outlined above, "belated disclosures should not invalidate a [COC] that was made in good faith after the exercise of due diligence where the delay resulted from, for example, minor oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, or a good faith position that the material in question was not discoverable." People v Perez, 73 Misc 3d 171, 176 (Sup Ct Queens Co 2021). Any belated disclosures are "minimal, insignificant, and voluntarily provided to the defense once the People were made aware of the existence of the undisclosed material," were made in good faith. People v Macaluso, 230 AD3d 1158 (2d Dept 2024) See also People v Williams, 224 AD3d 998, 1006-07 (3d Dept 2024) (COC valid even though three discoverable items had not been disclosed where People provided "extensive" discovery before filing a COC, identified missing items when they filed the COC, and acknowledged their duty to provide missing items upon receipt); People ex rel. Nieves obo Taipe v McGinley-Liddie, 2024 WL 4660126 (2d Dept November 4, 2024) (COC upheld where People disclosed additional materials after filing it); People v Pondexter, 76 Misc 3d 349, 356 (Crim Ct NY Co 2022) ("once alerted to the single missing document—which was of minimal importance—the People immediately sought and disclosed it and provided a reasonable explanation for its belated production").

In sum, after a thorough review of the moving papers, court file, COC, and supplemental COCs filed, the Court applied a "holistic assessment" of the People's efforts to comply with the discovery. The People have demonstrated that they acted in good faith and exercised due diligence by describing the detailed actions they took to comply with discovery obligations prior to filing the COC. They meaningfully addressed and delineated the items listed in the defendant's papers. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that the People have in fact complied with their discovery obligations pursuant to CPL §245, and therefore, the COCs are valid. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC is denied. Defendant's remaining contentions are denied as meritless.

Defendant moves this Court to dismiss this action on the basis that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial, claiming that the People have exceeded their statutory speedy trial allowances under CPL § 30.30. In support of his claim, he argues that the People are attributable with well over their statutory 60-day limit, having failed to validly declare their readiness on July 23, 2025, with 133 chargeable days. The People oppose, contending that they have not exceeded their statutory allowances and are within their 60-ay window, with only 37 chargeable days.

To prevail on a motion to dismiss under CPL §30.30 (1)(a), a defendant must present sworn allegations of fact establishing an unexcused delay that exceeds the statutory limit. People [*9]v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 (2016); People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 (1992); People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986); People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 357 (1980). At a minimum, the defendant must claim that the People failed to announce their readiness for trial within the statutorily prescribed period to meet their initial burden. People v Beasley, 16 NY3d 289, 292 (2011); People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 41 (2016); People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71 (1995). Once the defendant has asserted that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of a criminal action without a valid declaration of readiness from the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay. People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980).

Here, because the top count in this case is Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree, an unclassified misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of imprisonment of three months, the People must be ready for trial within 60 days, absent excludable time. CPL § 30.30(1)(c).

At all times until the People announce that they are ready for trial, the People are chargeable with the time that elapses unless they can show that the specific delay is not chargeable to them pursuant to an exception enumerated in the statute. CPL §§ 30.30(1), (4); People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525-26 (1st Dept 2022). Moreover, under the newly enacted discovery laws defined in CPL Article 245, the People's compliance with their discovery obligations is now a prerequisite to asserting trial readiness. See CPL §§ 245.50(3); 30.30(5). Specifically, CPL §245.50(3) states that "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of §30.30 of this chapter until it has filed a proper certificate pursuant to subdivision one of this section." CPL §30.30(5) provides that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20."

Once the People have met this statutory predicate by filing a valid COC, an accompanying statement of readiness is "presumed truthful and accurate and that a defendant who challenges such a statement must demonstrate that it is illusory" People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392 (2016). Thus, "[i]n the absence of proof that [a] readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People's position ..., the People [have] discharged their duty under CPL 30.30" People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795 (1998)).

The law distinguishes between delays occurring before the People have announced their readiness for trial from those that occur after the People have announced ready. People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 534 (1985). While pre-readiness delays are excludable only if the People can establish that they fit within a category specifically excludable by statute, post-readiness delays are charged to the People only if they actually cause the People to become not ready for trial and are not specifically excludable by statute. People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 210 (1992); Anderson, 66 NY2d at 534. And once in the post-readiness context of the case, the People will only be charged with delays that are attributable to their inaction and that directly implicate their ability to proceed to trial. People v Nielsen, 306 AD2d 500 (2d Dept 2003).

With respect to the post-readiness posture, the burden shifts to defendant to show that delays occurred under circumstances that should be charged to the People. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 215-16; Anderson, 66 NY2d at 541; People v Collins, 82 NY2d 177 (1993); see also CPL § 210.45(7). However, it is the prosecution's burden, in the first instance, to ensure the that the record of the proceedings with respect to adjournments is clear as to who is attributable with any delay to allow courts to make an informed decision on a 30.30 motion. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 215-[*10]16; People v Collins, 82 NY2d 177 (1993). In addition, the People are not required to declare their readiness repeatedly through the pendency of a criminal action. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 214.

Cognizant of all the relevant and applicable standards of law, and after reviewing the parties' submissions and their annexed exhibits, along with the court minutes, the Court's speedy trial computation and analysis is as follows:

Defendant first appeared in court on a DAT on June 16, 2025, where he was arraigned and the case adjourned for conversion in Part E on August 1, 2025, commencing the speedy trial period with sixty allowable days. People v Stirrup, 239 AD2d 109 (1st Dept 1997); People v Velie, 193 AD2d 1107 (4th Dept 1993). In the interim, on July 23, 2025, the People filed a COC and SOR with the court and defense counsel after sharing discovery with defense counsel, bringing the case into the post-readiness context. See People v Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434 (1998). (37 days charged, 37 days total).

On August 1, 2025, the People were ready for trial and the misdemeanor complaint was converted into a misdemeanor information in Part E. The case was adjourned for trial on September 19, 2025. This period is excluded. (0 days charged, 37 days total).

On September 15, 2025, defendant filed the instant motion off- calendar and a motion schedule was ordered in Part E on September 19, 2025, and the case was adjourned for decision on November 21, 2025. An extension request was subsequently granted by this Court with a new decision date of January 9, 2026. This period is excluded for defendant's motion practice. CPL §30.30(4)(a). (0 days charged, 37 days total).

In sum, the People are attributable with 37 days, well within their 60-day statutory allowances, and defendant's CPL §30.30 motion is denied without a hearing. And given that only 37 days are chargeable to the People, this Court similarly declines to address the parties' remaining contentions. Defendant's other motions in this branch are also denied for the foregoing reasons.

Defendant's motion for the suppression of tangible and intangible evidence as the fruit of an illegal arrest made without probable cause, or for a Dunaway/Mapp hearing alternatively, is denied.

A combined Dunaway/Mapp hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether physical evidence, such as contraband or a weapon, should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. A motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, or for a Dunaway hearing alternatively, must be made in accordance with CPL § 710.60. Pursuant to CPL § 710.60, a defendant must state the legal ground for the motion and must also make sworn allegations of fact supporting the motion. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Smythe, 210 AD2d 887 (1997). A motion to suppress evidence as the product of an illegal arrest can be denied without a hearing when the motion lacks factual allegations to support the conclusion that defendant was unlawfully seized. See People v Brunson, 226 AD2d 1093 (4d Dept 1996); People v Purcelle, 282 AD2d 824 (3d Dept 2001). A defendant must also allege a sufficient factual basis to demonstrate there was some material factual dispute that requires resolution by such a hearing. People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993). Here, nothing recovered from defendant would be subject to suppression or a Mapp hearing. Accordingly, defendant's motion is denied.

Defendant's motion for a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing regarding unnoticed statements [*11]sought to be used solely on cross-examination of the defendant pursuant to CPL §60.45; CPL §710.20(3); and CPL §710.40(3), is denied as premature. No such statements have been identified.

Defendant's motion for a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing is denied as premature. Defendant has not asserted that he made any voluntary or involuntarily statements pursuant to CPL §60.45. Accordingly, the defendant's request for a voluntariness hearing is denied.

Defendant's motion to preclude the offering of any unnoticed statement evidence or unnoticed identification evidence pursuant to CPL §710.30, is denied as premature, as the People have not identified any unnoticed evidence.

Defendant seeks the preclusion of using defendant's prior bad acts and/or prior convictions at trial pursuant to People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981), and People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974) on the People's direct case or upon cross-examination.

Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible where it is offered solely to raise an inference that a defendant has a criminal propensity. People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Wright, 288 AD2d 409 (2d Dept 2001). Such evidence may be admitted, however, if it helps to establish a defendant's motive, intent, identity, knowledge, common scheme or plan, lack of mistake or accident, to complete the narrative of the crime, or provide the jury with background information. See People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981); People v Lewis, 69 NY2d 321 (1987); People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 (1979); People v. Davis, 169 AD2d 774 (2d Dept 1991). In order to use this evidence, the People are required to notify the court and defendant, prior to jury selection, of their intent to introduce the evidence as part of the case-in-chief and identify the basis upon which they consider it admissible. People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981). Once a showing is made that the evidence is relevant, a trial court may admit the evidence as long as its probative value outweighs its potential prejudice. People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988); People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241-42 (1987). The permissible scope of such evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. See People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior bad act evidence is deferred to the trial court.

Should he testify, defendant, like any other witness, places his credibility in issue. Although a witness may not be questioned about an arrest per se, it is a provident exercise of the Court's discretion to permit cross-examination concerning any immoral, vicious, dishonest and or criminal act, even if defendant was not formally charged with it. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 373 (1974); People v Rockwell, 18 AD3d 969 (3d Dept 2005); People v Di Bella, 277 AD2d 699 (3d Dept 2000); People v Connolly, 259 AD2d 1039 (4d Dept 1999); People v Maiolo, 122 AD2d 586 (4d Dept 1986); Prince, Richardson on Evidence, 11th Ed., 6-406. A witness may also be impeached by instances of conduct demonstrating a "willingness ... to place his self-interest ahead of principle or the interests of society." People v. Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 461—462 (1994).

The People's disclosure obligation is governed by People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974), which directs the People to notify the defendant, prior to the commencement of jury selection, of the acts which they will seek to use for impeachment purposes. However, it is defendant who must demonstrate that the prejudicial effect of such evidence so far outweighs its probative worth that it must be excluded, as it is the defendant who bears the burden of [*12]persuasion. See People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 378 (1974). The permissible scope of such impeachment evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. People v Gray, 84 NY2d 709, 712 (1995); People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 459 (1994). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior convictions is therefore deferred to the trial court. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974).

Defendant's application for an extension of time to file additional motions is denied subject to rights under CPL § 255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.