Plaintiff Massachusetts Educational Financing Authority seeks a default judgment, pursuant to CPLR 3215, against defendants Ella Driscoll and Matthew Driscoll for failure to make payments on a student loan agreement and failure to answer or otherwise appear in this action.

The following papers were read and considered in connection with plaintiff's motion:

Plaintiff commenced the instant breach of contract action by filing of a summons and complaint on August 12, 2024, based upon defendant's failure to make payments on a student loan agreement (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that $30,000.00 plus interest in the sum of $1,196.58 through 04/30/23, for a total of $31,196.58, is due and owing by defendants. Defendant Ella Driscoll was served with the summons and complaint by substitute service on August 15, 2024, followed by a mailing on August 16, 2024. Defendant Matthew Driscoll was personally served on August 15, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 5-7). Defendants did not appear or file an answer.

Plaintiff filed the instant motion for default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 on October 30, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 11) and served same upon defendants by mail on the same date (NYSCEF Doc. No. 21).

Defendants did not file opposition papers to the motion.

Both in the affirmation in support of the within motion (NYSCEF Doc. No. 13, ¶ 12) and the accompanying memorandum of law (NYSCEF Doc. No. 14, ¶ 10), plaintiff acknowledges that the instant application is made more than one year from defendants' default.

Nonetheless, plaintiff posits that they are entitled to a default judgment because their service of an additional copy of the summons and complaint on defendants pursuant to CPLR 3215 (g) (3) (i) within one year after defendants' default "in connection with an ongoing demand for the ultimate relief sought in the complaint constitutes 'proceedings for entry of judgment' within the meaning of CPLR 3215 (c)" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 14, ¶ 10). Plaintiff also maintains that this "manifested an intent not to abandon the case" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 14, ¶ 11).

Further, plaintiff argues that "plaintiff made continual good faith efforts to settle this matter with the defendant and has multiple attempts [sic] at settlement since the commencement of this action" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 14, ¶ 15). Notably, plaintiff does not explain what good faith efforts they have made, or when and how they made them. Nor is there any evidence in the record that the plaintiff filed a request for judicial intervention to request a settlement conference or sought other court intervention prior to the filing of the within motion.

To enter a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 upon a defendant's failure to appear, a plaintiff must submit the "requisite proof" which includes proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the claim, the default and the amount due. (CPLR 3215 (f); see also Rosenzweig v Gubner, 194 AD3d 1086 [2d Dept 2021].) "Given that in default proceedings the defendant has failed to appear, and the plaintiff does not have the benefit of discovery, the affidavit or verified complaint need only allege enough facts to enable a court to determine that a viable cause of action exists" (Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp, 100 NY2d 62, 70-71 [2003]). "Where a verified complaint has been served, it may be used as the affidavit of the facts constituting the claim and the amount due; in such case, an affidavit as to the default shall be made by the party or the party's attorney." (CPLR 3215 (f); see also Woodson, 100 NY2d at 70.)

"Pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) '[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after [a defendant's] default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned ... unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.' The language of the statute is strictly construed, as the language of CPLR 3215 (c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory inasmuch as courts 'shall' dismiss claims (CPLR 3215 [c]) for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned." (Doe v Garfinkel, 234 AD3d 929, 930 [2d Dept 2025] [internal citations omitted].)

Here, plaintiff, by their own admission, failed to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the defendants' default. The summons and complaint were filed on August 12, 2024. Plaintiff filed the instant motion on October 30, 2025.

"Failure to take proceedings for entry of judgment may be excused, however, upon a showing of sufficient cause. To establish 'sufficient cause,' the party opposing dismissal must demonstrate that it had a reasonable excuse for the delay in taking proceedings for entry of a default judgment and that it has a potentially meritorious action. The determination of whether an excuse is reasonable in any given instance is committed to the sound discretion of the motion court." (Shields v Cohen, 222 AD3d 1019, 1021 [2d Dept 2023] [internal citations omitted].)

Instead of attempting to demonstrate that it had a reasonable excuse for the delay in taking proceedings within the allotted one-year period, plaintiff argues that it took proceedings by mailing defendants an additional copy of the summons and complaint, as required by CPLR 3215 (g) (3) (i), within the one-year period. Plaintiff argues that the instant action is analogous to [*2]Citimortgage Inc. v Zaibak, 188 AD3d 982 (2d Dept 2020), wherein the Second Department ruled that plaintiff's filing of a request for judicial intervention requesting a foreclosure settlement conference constituted proceedings for entry of judgment within the meaning of CPLR 3215 (c).

This Court disagrees. In Zaibak, the Second Department found that, "[a] formal judicial request for such a conference in connection with an ongoing demand for the ultimate relief sought in the complaint constitutes 'proceedings for entry of judgment' within the meaning of CPLR 3215 (c)" (id. at 983). In the instant action, plaintiff simply mailed the defendants an additional copy of the pleadings, as required by CPLR 3215 (g) (3) (i). This mailing did not initiate anything with the Court, nor did it seek relief from the Court. "[A] plaintiff may send the additional mailing without providing the court with contemporaneous notice or proof of mailing. This additional mailing, although necessary to obtain default judgment, is not made in aid of the default-judgment request - indeed, the mailing can be made simultaneously with the initial service of the summons, prior to any default. The mailing is instead intended to maximize the likelihood that a defendant will get notice of the action pending against them so that they can timely appear (or at least timely move to vacate their default)." (Am. Express Nat'l Bank v Deltaware Data Sols. Inc., 78 Misc 3d 1202[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50142[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2023].)

Further, plaintiff argues that their motion is timely because they made good faith efforts toward a settlement prior to the expiration of the one-year period. This Court finds this argument to be similarly unpersuasive. Plaintiff has failed to provide any explanation detailing their purported good faith efforts at a settlement and they did not file a request for judicial intervention to request a settlement conference. As such, plaintiff's alleged efforts toward a settlement did not involve the Court and do not constitute taking proceedings for the entry of judgment within the meaning of CPLR 3215 (c), as was found in Zaibak.

In short, plaintiff has not provided any explanation, much less a reasonable excuse, for their delay in filing the instant motion for a default judgment. In light of the Court's finding, there is no need to address the issue of whether plaintiff has a meritorious cause of action. Thus, pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c), dismissal of the complaint as abandoned, without costs, is warranted.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion for a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 is DENIED, with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED, that pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c), the complaint is dismissed as abandoned, without costs.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.