| Cabrera v C.E.E. Joe Auto Collision, Inc. |
| 2026 NY Slip Op 50178(U) [88 Misc 3d 1223(A)] |
| Decided on January 21, 2026 |
| Supreme Court, Richmond County |
| Castorina, Jr., J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected in part through February 23, 2026; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Angel Cabrera,
Plaintiff,
against C.E.E. Joe Auto Collision, Inc., CHARLES MANISCALCO, and PETER GIAMPORTONE, Defendants. |
I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]
The Court has considered the following papers on defendants' motion to vacate, renew, and reargue the Court's prior Decision and Order granting plaintiff partial summary judgment: the Order to Show Cause, affirmations of Charles Popp, Esq., affidavits of James Kosubinsky, supporting exhibits, and memorandum of law; plaintiff's affirmation in opposition and exhibits; and defendants' reply affirmation in further support.
II. Findings of FactPlaintiff Angel Cabrera is the registered owner of a 2016 Chevrolet Equinox, VIN No.: Redacted. Defendants C.E.E. Joe Auto Collision, Inc. and Charles Maniscalco asserted a garageman's lien against that vehicle. To effectuate the lien process, defendants retained non-party Lien Onit LLC, a lien-processing company engaged in mailing statutory lien notices on behalf of automotive repair facilities.
On March 6, 2025, Lien Onit mailed a Notice of Lien and Sale to plaintiff at Redacted Street, Apartment 1A, Bronx, New York. The mailing records, including the electronic green card and CMSI Form 3877, establish that the Notice was sent by certified mail. However, those same records show that the separate service designated "return receipt requested" was not selected and no return-receipt fee was paid at the time of mailing.
Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action challenging the validity of the lien. In support of his motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiff submitted a sworn affidavit stating, inter alia, that the Notice of Lien and Sale "was never sent to me by certified mail."
At oral argument, this Court noted that defendants had not produced proof of certified mailing with return receipt requested. The Court therefore granted plaintiff partial summary judgment, declared the lien null and void, and directed the return of plaintiff's vehicle.
After entry of that Order, defendants obtained additional documentation from the United States Postal Service, including an electronic delivery confirmation and tracking history for the certified mailing bearing tracking number Redacted. That documentation reflects that the certified mail item was delivered to plaintiff's address on March 18, 2025, and signed for by an individual at that address.
Defendants now move to vacate, renew, and reargue the prior Order, asserting that the USPS documentation establishes statutory compliance and rebuts plaintiff's affidavit. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that defendants' own mailing records conclusively demonstrate that the Notice of Lien and Sale was not sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, as mandated by statute, and that this statutory defect is fatal to the lien.
I. Governing Statutory Standard
Lien Law § 201 provides that where personal service of a Notice of Sale cannot be accomplished, the lienor "shall" serve the notice "by certified mail, return receipt requested." The statute thus prescribes not merely that notice be mailed, but that it be mailed by a specific, enumerated postal method.
The appellate authority cited in the record uniformly recognizes that a garageman's lien is a statutory creation in derogation of the common law, and that its notice provisions therefore require strict compliance. As stated in Matter of Daimler Trust v R&W Auto Body, Inc., (187 AD3d 1468 [3d Dept 2020]), "inasmuch as a garageman's lien is a statutory creation in derogation of common law, the failure to meet the statutory service requirements renders service defective." Likewise, Slattery v Strong's Mar., LLC, (230 AD3d 611 [2d Dept 2024]), holds that after due diligence in attempting personal service, a lienor may resort to service only "by certified mail, return receipt requested". Further, Magomedov v Self Stor. Mgt., LLC, (221 AD3d 682 [2d Dept 2023]), reiterates that failure to strictly adhere to the mandates of the Lien Law renders the notice of sale invalid. (see also, Matter of Anderson v PODS, Inc., 70 AD3d 820 [2010]).
These authorities, compel the conclusion that the statutory mailing requirement is mandatory, not directory, and must be satisfied exactly as written.
II. Application of Strict Compliance to the Mailing Evidence
The undisputed documentary evidence establishes that defendants, through Lien Onit, mailed the Notice of Lien and Sale by certified mail. The same documentary evidence establishes that the separate postal service designated "return receipt requested" was not selected and no fee was paid for that service at the time of mailing.
Lien Law § 201 requires that notice be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested. The statute's conjunctive phrasing is explicit. Certified mail alone does not satisfy the statutory requirement. Because the statutory act required is the sending of notice by a prescribed method, the failure to request and pay for return-receipt service at the time of mailing constitutes noncompliance with a statutory condition precedent to enforcement of a garageman's lien.
Under Matter of Daimler Trust, (187 AD3d 1468 [3d Dept 2020]), such failure renders service defective as a matter of law. As relevant here, a garagekeeper must "mail by certified mail, return receipt requested, a notice ... to every person who has perfected a security interest in such motor vehicle or who is listed as a lienholder upon the certificate of title of such motor vehicle ... within [20] days of the first day of storage" (Lien Law § 184 [5]). Such notice must contain the garagekeeper's name, the amount alleged to be owed, the vehicle's location, the times when the vehicle may be retrieved, a statement that the garagekeeper claims a lien over the vehicle and that the vehicle's release is conditioned on full payment of storage charges up to the date of retrieval (see Lien Law § 184 [5]; Matter of Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. All County Towing, 161 AD3d 1423 [3d Dept 2018]). Because this schema provides a garagekeeper the extrajudicial right to secure an interest over the property of another, a garagekeeper asserting a lien bears the burden of establishing that it strictly complied with each and every requirement of the statute (see Matter of Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Steve Jayz Auto. Inc., 197 AD3d 1407 [3d Dept 2021]; Matter of Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. All County Towing, 161 AD3d 1423 [3d Dept 2018]; Matter of Ally Fin. Inc. v. Oakes Towing Serv., Inc., 130 AD3d 1355 [3d Dept. 2015]).
III. Effect of Subsequent USPS Electronic Delivery Confirmation
Defendants contend that USPS's later generation of an electronic delivery confirmation and tracking history showing that the certified mail item was delivered and signed for establishes compliance with statutory notice requirements.
However, the statute does not ask whether delivery occurred. It asks whether the lienor sent the notice by certified mail, return receipt requested. The statutory defect arises at the moment of mailing if the prescribed method is not used. Subsequent happenstance, including USPS's later provision of electronic delivery data, cannot retroactively convert a certified-mail-only transaction into "certified mail, return receipt requested" service.
To accept defendants' argument would be to replace the statute's explicit procedural command with a post-hoc functional equivalence test. The appellate authority cited in the record rejects such an approach and requires strict adherence to statutory method (see Magomedov v Self Stor. Mgt., LLC, 221 AD3d 682 [2d Dept 2023]; Slattery v Strong's Mar., LLC, 230 AD3d 611 [2d Dept 2024]; Matter of State of New York v Justin R., 187 AD3d 1464 [3d Dept 2020].
Accordingly, the Court concludes that defendants' subsequent acquisition of USPS delivery confirmation does not cure the statutory defect in the manner of service.
IV. Effect on Defendants' Motion to Vacate, Renew, and Reargue
Defendants' motion to vacate, renew, and reargue rests on the newly produced USPS documentation. However, renewal under CPLR § 2221 [e] requires that the new evidence would change the prior determination. Here, even accepting the USPS documentation as authentic, the controlling statutory deficiency remains unchanged: return-receipt service was not requested or paid for at the time of mailing. Thus, the newly produced evidence does not alter the dispositive legal conclusion.
Reargument under CPLR § 2221 [d] is unwarranted because the Court did not overlook or misapprehend controlling law in its prior determination; rather, it applied the strict-compliance doctrine mandated by the appellate authorities cited in the record.
Vacatur under CPLR § 5015 [a] [3] is likewise unwarranted. The prior Order was not procured by fraud or misconduct but by application of the statute to defendants' own mailing records, which demonstrate noncompliance with the statutory service requirement.
V. Defendants' Submissions Fail to Establish Mailing Compliance Through Competent Proof on Personal Knowledge
Even apart from the statutory deficiency in the method of service, defendants' motion suffers from an additional evidentiary infirmity: the absence of competent proof from a witness with personal knowledge of the actual mailing transaction.
Plaintiff's opposition correctly observes that the affidavit of James Kosubinsky, the owner-operator of Lien Onit LLC, does not establish personal knowledge of the specific mailing at issue, but instead recites only Lien Onit's general business practices and recordkeeping procedures. The affidavit does not identify the individual who performed the mailing, does not attest to first-hand observation of the mailing transaction, and does not establish that the documents appended are the precise materials deposited with the United States Postal Service on [*2]March 6, 2025.
The record further reflects plaintiff's reliance on authority holding that an affirmation or affidavit lacking personal knowledge of the date and manner of mailing is without evidentiary value. In Matter of Ally Fin., Inc. v All Cty. Towing & Recovery, (2016 NY Slip Op 32936(U) [Sup Ct Albany County 2016]; see e.g. Hill v Country Club Acres. Inc., 134 AD3d 1267 [3d Dept 2015]), the court rejected an attorney's affirmation purporting to prove statutory lien notice where the affiant did not possess personal knowledge of the mailing and could not attest that the letter attached was in fact the letter sent. The same deficiency exists here.
Where, as here, the statute requires strict compliance with a prescribed method of service, the burden rests on the lienor to demonstrate that compliance through admissible proof. An affidavit that speaks only to customary office practice, without direct personal knowledge of the specific mailing, is insufficient to establish statutory service. This evidentiary failure provides an independent ground for denial of defendants' motion to vacate, renew, or reargue, since defendants have not submitted competent proof capable of altering the legal conclusion that statutory service was not accomplished.
The Lien Law § 201 notice provisions require strict compliance. Defendants mailed the Notice of Lien and Sale by certified mail but failed to request and pay for return-receipt service as required by statute. That omission constitutes defective statutory service and renders the Notice of Sale invalid as a matter of law. Subsequent USPS electronic delivery confirmation cannot cure failure to perform the statutory act required at the time of mailing.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants' motion to vacate, renew, and reargue is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that the Court's prior Decision and Order granting plaintiff partial summary judgment declaring the lien null and void remains in full force and effect; and it is further
ORDERED that such other and further relief is denied.