I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 002) numbered 19-28 [*2]were read on this motion. Upon oral argument completed on Motion Sequence No. 002 on January 22, 2026 and reading of the filing of the Notice of Motion to Vacate Default Judgment dated December 30, 2025; the Affidavit of Defendant Christopher J. Ruisi in support; the Affirmation in Opposition of Jordan A. Weiner, Esq., dated December 31, 2025, together with the exhibits referenced therein; and the Reply Affirmation of Nate Strand, Esq., dated December 31, 2025; and after due deliberation thereon, the motion is determined as follows.

II. Facts

This motion concerns Defendant's application to vacate a default judgment entered against him on December 9, 2025. The Notice of Motion expressly seeks vacatur of that judgment pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [4].

Defendant supports the motion with his sworn affidavit. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 20). He identifies himself as the Defendant in this action and affirms that he submits his affidavit in support of his motion to vacate the default judgment entered against him on December 9, 2025. (see id at ¶1). He states that he "never received personal service of the Summons and Complaint in this action." (see id at ¶2).

Defendant further states that, according to Plaintiff's affidavit of service, service was "purportedly made by 'affixing and mailing' pursuant to CPLR § 308 [4]" at Redacted, Brooklyn, New York 11214, with affixing allegedly on August 5, 2025, and mailing on August 11, 2025. (see id at ¶3). Defendant avers that he does not reside at that Brooklyn address and did not reside there on the dates of alleged service. (see id at ¶4). He asserts that the Brooklyn address was not his dwelling place, usual place of abode, or last known residence, and that he has no regular presence there. (see id at ¶6). Defendant states that his actual residence at the time of the alleged service was Redacted Place, Staten Island, New York. (see id at ¶5).

Defendant concludes that because service was made at an address where he did not reside, service was defective and failed to confer personal jurisdiction over him. (see id at ¶7).

Plaintiff opposes the motion through counsel's affirmation. Plaintiff's counsel, Jordan A. Weiner, Esq., affirms that she is counsel for Plaintiff and is familiar with the facts and circumstances of the matter. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's claim of improper service is factually incorrect.

Plaintiff affirms that Defendant's last known address, according to DMV searches, Lexis Nexis searches, and a leasehold agreement, was Redacted, Brooklyn, New York 11214, and also Redacted Street, Staten Island, New York 10314. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 22). Plaintiff states that due to discrepancies among these searches, process was served at both of these addresses to ensure proper service. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 23).

Plaintiff further affirms that a later Lexis search revealed an associated address at Redacted Place, Staten Island, New York. Plaintiff states that neither the Lexis searches, DMV records, Defendant's New York driver's license, nor the leasehold agreement indicated that this address was Defendant's last known address. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiff affirms that service was made at the Redacted Place address as a courtesy prior to filing the motion for default judgment. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24).

Plaintiff also affirms that the lease agreement specifically provides that notices may be sent to Defendant at the Brooklyn address listed on the lease. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 25). Plaintiff asserts that it exercised due diligence in effectuating service and requests [*3]denial of the motion.

In reply, Defendant's counsel affirms that Plaintiff's opposition fails to rebut Defendant's sworn denial of service. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff concedes that Defendant does not reside at the Brooklyn address but claims service was proper because that address appeared in certain database searches. Defendant argues that service at an address where a defendant does not reside is jurisdictionally defective, citing Feinstein v. Bergner (48 NY2d 234 [1979]). Defendant further asserts that service at the Redacted Place address was made merely as a courtesy, that "courtesy" service is not service under CPLR Article 3, and that database searches and lease notice provisions do not override statutory service requirements.

III. Conclusions of Law

Defendant moves to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [4], asserting that the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to defective service of process. A judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void. The burden rests upon the moving defendant to demonstrate that jurisdiction was lacking.

Defendant's jurisdictional challenge rests exclusively upon his sworn affidavit asserting that he did not reside at the Brooklyn address where service was effected and that his actual residence was at Redacted Place. However, Defendant offers no documentary evidence to corroborate this claimed residence. No lease, governmental record, utility statement, or other objective proof of residence is submitted. His evidentiary showing consists solely of his own self-serving affidavit.

Plaintiff, by contrast, presents sworn affirmations establishing that service was effected at addresses identified through DMV searches, Lexis Nexis searches, and a leasehold agreement listing the Brooklyn address as Defendant's address. Plaintiff further establishes that, in response to discrepancies among address records, service was undertaken at multiple addresses associated with Defendant, including the Brooklyn address, the Redacted Street address, and later the Redacted Place address. Plaintiff's submissions include affidavits of service regular on their face and evidencing repeated efforts to effect service.

Defendant's reply relies on Feinstein v. Bergner, (48 NY2d 234 [1979]), for the proposition that service at an address where a defendant does not reside is defective. However, even under that principle, the burden remains on Defendant to establish that he in fact did not reside at the service address at the time service was made. On this record, Defendant has produced no documentary proof whatsoever substantiating his asserted residence at the Redacted Place address. His affidavit therefore stands uncorroborated.

Where affidavits of service are regular on their face, they create a presumption of proper service. Defendant's conclusory and uncorroborated affidavit of non-residence is insufficient to rebut that presumption. The Court is thus presented with sworn affidavits of service reflecting multiple attempts at service grounded in official and commercial address records, and a single self-serving affidavit denying residence, unsupported by any documentary proof. On this record, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that service was defective or that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction.

Accordingly, Defendant has not established that the default judgment entered on December 9, 2025, is void within the meaning of CPLR § 5015 [a] [4]. Vacatur of the default judgment is therefore unwarranted.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant Christopher J. Ruisi's motion to vacate the default judgment entered on December 9, 2025, pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [4] is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the default judgment remains in full force and effect; and it is further

ORDERED that all other requested relief is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.