Appellate Advocates (Russ Altman-Merino of counsel), for appellant. Queens County District Attorney (Johnnette Traill, Christopher Blira-Koesssler and Philip Amur of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jeffrey Gershuny, J., at plea; Anthony M. Battisti, J., at sentence), rendered October 14, 2022. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of common- law driving while intoxicated, and imposed sentence. The appeal from the judgment brings up for review an order of that court (Denise N. Johnson, J.) dated May 19, 2022 denying defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in an accusatory instrument with driving while his ability was impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1]) and driving while intoxicated (common law) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]). Thereafter, defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument on facial insufficiency and statutory speedy trial grounds. The People opposed the motion and, by order dated May 19, 2022, the Criminal Court (Denise N. Johnson, J.) denied it. Subsequently, after waiving prosecution by information, the Criminal Court (Jeffrey Gershuny, J.), accepted defendant's guilty plea to common-law driving while intoxicated in satisfaction of the accusatory instrument, and, on October 14, 2022, the court (Anthony M. Battisti, J.) imposed sentence.

"A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution" (People v Case, 42 NY2d 98, 99 [1977]; see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]; People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]). Thus, the facial [*2]insufficiency of an accusatory instrument constitutes a jurisdictional defect which is not forfeited by a defendant's guilty plea (see People v Thiam, 34 NY3d 1040 [2019]; Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 103; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 573 [2004]). Since defendant expressly waived the right to be prosecuted by information, the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument must be evaluated under the standards that govern a misdemeanor complaint, which can be based upon hearsay and which is sufficient on its face when it alleges facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charge (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [4] [a]) and provides reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime charged (see CPL 100.40 [4] [b]; Dumay, 23 NY3d at 524; People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986]). While the law does not require that the accusatory instrument contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charges, the offense and factual bases therefor must be sufficiently alleged (see Konieczny, 2 NY3d at 575). "So long as the factual allegations of an [accusatory instrument] give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]; see Konieczny, 2 NY3d at 575).

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) provides: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." This charge requires the People to allege both that defendant was operating a motor vehicle and that he or she did so while intoxicated (see People v Chaitram, 85 Misc 3d 141[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50631[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2025]; People v Ortega, 75 Misc 3d 139[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50587[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). There is no requirement that the accusatory instrument contain an allegation of improper or erratic driving (see People v Fiumara, 116 AD3d 421 [2014]; Chaitram, 2025 NY Slip Op 50631[U]; People v Green, 59 Misc 3d 134[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50490[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th, & 13th Jud Dists 2018]; People v Williams, 55 Misc 3d 134[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50478[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]). Here, the deponent police officer stated in the accusatory instrument that he was informed by another police officer that she observed defendant driving a 2014 white Ram vehicle. Consequently, the element of operation was sufficiently established (see People v Suber, 19 NY3d 247, 254 [2012]; Chaitram, 2025 NY Slip Op 50631[U]; Green, 2018 NY Slip Op 50490[U]).

While the statute does not provide a definition of "intoxicated," the Court of Appeals has stated that "intoxication is a greater degree of impairment which is reached when the driver has voluntarily consumed alcohol to the extent that he [or she] is incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities which he [or she] is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver" (People v Cruz, 48 NY2d 419, 428 [1979]; see also People v Ardila, 85 NY2d 846 [1995]). A layman, including an officer charged with administering the law, can determine whether a defendant's consumption of alcohol has rendered him or her incapable of operating a motor vehicle (see Cruz, 48 NY2d at 428). For a determination of intoxication, factors to be considered include a defendant's physical condition and appearance, balance and coordination, manner of speech, and the presence of the odor of alcohol (see People v Hohmeyer, 70 NY2d 41, 44 [1987]; Chaitram, 2025 NY Slip Op 50631[U]). Here, the deponent police officer stated in the accusatory instrument that he observed that defendant had [*3]bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and "a moderate odor of alcoholic beverages on his person." These factual allegations support a reasonable inference that defendant was intoxicated (see People v Bryan, 63 Misc 3d 156[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50821[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; Williams, 2017 NY Slip Op 50478[U]; People v Granda-Vintmill, 41 Misc 3d 135[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51879[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). Consequently, as the accusatory instrument alleged facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charge of common-law driving while intoxicated (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [4] [a]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]) and provided reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed this offense (see CPL 100.40 [4] [b]), the charge was facially sufficient (see Chaitram, 2025 NY Slip Op 50631[U]; Williams, 2017 NY Slip Op 50478[U]).

The People did not exceed their statutory speedy trial time under CPL 30.30 (1) (b) as they satisfied the legislature's requirements of filing a CPL 30.30 (5-a) certification and a proper SOR within the allotted speedy trial period (see People v Williams, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 06535 [2025]; People v Robinson, 83 Misc 3d 129[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50798[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.