I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 006) numbered 8-19; (Motion No. 007) numbered 21-32, 48-49, 98; (Motion No. 008) numbered 33-46, 47; and (Motion No. 009) numbered 99-103 were read on this motion. Oral argument was completed on February 5, 2026. The following papers were considered in connection with Motion Sequence No. 006, Motion Sequence No. 007, Motion Sequence No. 008, and Motion Sequence No. 009:

1. Defendant's pro se Motion Sequence No. 006 by Notice of Motion filed on December 2, 2025, seeking enforcement of the Supplemental Stipulation, dated XX XX, 2011; Defendant's affirmation in support of Motion Sequence No. 006; and Defendant's supporting exhibits A through I.

2. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion Sequence No. 007 by Notice of Cross-Motion filed on December 9, 2025 opposing Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 006 and seeking (a) enforcement of the parties' Judgment of Divorce dated July 13, 2011, Stipulation of Settlement dated XX XX, 2011, and the Supplemental Stipulation dated XX XX, 2011; [*2](b) enforcement of the Order of the Honorable Barbara I. Panepinto dated October 21, 2011; (c) Defendant's immediate vacatur of the former marital residence located at XX XXX Road, Staten Island, New York so that the Property can be sold without interference and obstruction from the Defendant; (d) a finding that Defendant is solely liable from his share of the proceeds of sale for the increased indebtedness on the former marital residence; (e) counsel fees from the Defendant pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 238 in the amount of $7,500.00; and (f) for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

3. The affirmation of Dawn M. Marconi, Esq., dated December 9, 2025; the affirmation of Plaintiff ME, dated December 9, 2025; Plaintiff's exhibits A through H; Defendant's, pro se opposition, dated December 29, 2025; and the affirmation of Dawn M. Marconi, Esq., dated January 6, 2026, in further support of Motion Sequence No. 007.

4. Defendant's pro se Motion Sequence No. 008 by Order to Show Cause filed on January 5, 2026, seeking sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 against Plaintiff; Defendant's affirmation in support of Motion Sequence No. 008, dated January 5, 2026; and Defendant's exhibits A through L.

5. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion Sequence No. 009 by Notice of Cross-Motion filed on January 13, 2026 opposing Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 008 and seeking (a) sanctions against Defendant, RP, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 in the amount of $10,000.00; (b) an award of counsel fees in the amount of $5,000 pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1; and (c) for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

6. The affirmation of Dawn M. Marconi, Esq., dated January 13, 2026; and Plaintiff's exhibits A and B.

7. Oral argument.

Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced pursuant to a Judgment of Divorce, dated XX XX, 2011. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 23). Plaintiff and Defendant settled their divorce pursuant to a Stipulation of Settlement, dated XX XX, 2011 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24), and a Supplemental Stipulation of Settlement dated XX XX, 2011. (see id). Prior to the marriage, the Parties purchased property located at XX XXX Road, Staten Island, New York (hereinafter the "Former Marital Residence"). (see id; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 22).

Article XII of the Parties' Stipulation of Settlement, dated XX XX, 2011, provides as follows:

Subject to the provisions of Article XVI herein, the Husband shall have exclusive use and occupancy of the marital premises until such time as said premises is sold. The Husband to pay 100% of the mortgage, real estate taxes, utilities (gas and electric) and homeowners' insurance, if applicable. All repairs are the Husband's sole responsibility until the house is sold. (See attached written agreement concerning the house and mortgage modification applications of both parties). (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24).

Article XVI of the Parties' Stipulation of Settlement, dated XX XX, 2011, provides as follows:

Regarding the premises at XX XXX Road, Staten Island, New York the Husband is at [*3]least nine (9) months behind on the first mortgage and the Home Equity Loan is in collection (see attached separate agreement regarding Morningstar Road) (see id).

The Parties' Supplemental Stipulation, dated XX XX, 2011, was annexed to and made part of the overall settlement dated XX XX, 2011. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 22). The Supplemental Stipulation provided both Parties with an opportunity to apply for a modification program to get the Former Marital Residence out of foreclosure, providing Parties with 60 days to do so. Paragraph 2 of the Supplemental Stipulation specifically provides:

That the Defendant and the Plaintiff shall both have the opportunity to apply for the modification program or any similar program to get XX XXX Road out of foreclosure. Both parties shall have 60 days from today's date to make a good faith and complete application and obtain a written approval of their application. Provided the parties have made a good faith attempt and complied with all of the lending institutions requirements but the commitment of approval has not been obtained by the 60th day, either party may apply to the other party for a 30-day extension which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24 at page 20, ¶2).

The time to obtain written approval of his application for modification was due on or before May 20, 2011. Plaintiff contends that Defendant did not provide her with a written approval or a written denial for a modification by May 20, 2011, nor did Defendant seek a thirty-day extension from Plaintiff to obtain the same. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 22). The Supplemental Stipulation further provides:

At any time during the process described herein, if the Defendant receives a written denial of his application or defaults on his obligations in any manner at any time the Plaintiff shall be permitted to complete her application and upon approval thereof be given exclusive use and occupancy of XX XXX Road, SI, NY. Defendant shall have not more than 30 days to vacate the premises and leave said premises broom clean and in good condition. Reasonable wear and tear excepted. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24 at page 21, ¶3).

In the event Defendant received approval on the modification plan, he shall have exclusive use and occupancy provided he makes all payments thereunder in a timely manner then he shall indemnify and hold harmless the Plaintiff from any and all obligations related to XX XXX Road including the mortgage, [etc] . Any failure of Defendant to make 3 monthly mortgage payments or cause the premises to go into foreclosure status, Defendant shall forfeit his right to the Premises and Plaintiff shall have the right to use her approval to take over the property. (see id at ¶5).

Defendant must remove the Plaintiff from the 1st mortgage and note within 18 months of this date or the Defendant is deemed in default and the Plaintiff may take over the property as set forth in paragraph 4 hereof. (see id at ¶6).

Plaintiff contends that the Defendant failed to comply with these terms and subsequent Orders of the Court, Hon. Barbara Panepinto, on October 21, 2011 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 25), December 10, 2012 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 26), and on May 31, 2013 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 27). Sustained litigation between the Parties ensued.

Plaintiff alleges that in January of 2020, she discovered that a loan modification for a debt of $320,209 was reflected on her credit report. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 22 at ¶31). Plaintiff disputed the debt with the three credit agencies and contacted Redacted, Inc., who provided with a copy of a loan modification agreement relating to the Former Marital Residence [*4]executed by the Defendant. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 28). The modification increased the principal amount from $213,400.00 to $321,930.42 and extended the mortgage from March 1, 2034 to November 1, 2058 on the Former Marital Residence. (see id).

A. Enforceability of the Stipulation and Supplemental Stipulation

Stipulations of settlement in matrimonial actions are judicially favored and will not be lightly set aside (see Rainbow v Swisher, 72 NY2d 106 [1988]; Sass v Sass, 276 AD2d 42 [2d Dept 2000]; Matter of City of Buffalo v Carr, 242 AD3d 1581 [4th Dept 2025]). Where incorporated but not merged into a judgment, such stipulations retain their contractual vitality and are enforceable under ordinary principles of contract law (see Merl v Merl, 67 NY2d 359 [1986]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295 [2002]; Smith v Smith, 178 AD3d 980 [2d Dept 2019]).

Here, the Stipulation of Settlement, dated XX XX, 2011, and the accompanying Supplemental Stipulation, also dated XX XX, 2011, imposed clear and binding obligations and deadlines upon the Parties. The evidence provided clearly demonstrates that the Defendant failed to comply with the requirements provide in the Stipulation of Settlement and the accompanying Supplemental Stipulation.

Defendant had 60 days from the date of the execution of the Stipulation and Supplemental Stipulation to make a good faith and complete application and obtain a written approval of his application for a modification. That 60-day period expired on May 20, 2011. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24 at page 20, ¶2). No evidence has been provided that Defendant complied with this 60-day deadline nor is the any evidence that he requested a 30-day extension.

Defendant was further required to remove the Plaintiff from the 1st mortgage and note within 18 months of this date or the Defendant is deemed in default and the Plaintiff may take over the property as set forth in paragraph 4 hereof. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24 at page 21, ¶6). The deadline for the Defendant to comply was September 21, 2012. Defendant has not provided any evidence of compliance.

Pursuant to Article XII of the Stipulation of Settlement, the Defendant was "to pay 100% of the mortgage, real estate taxes, utilities (gas and electric) and homeowners' insurance, if applicable. All repairs are the Husband's sole responsibility until the house is sold." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24). Defendant has failed to provide any evidence of compliance.

Defendant alleges in his Affidavit that he has secured a loan modification in his sole name. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 9 at ¶3). He also contends that he "completed multiple good-faith modification applications", yet Defendant seeks the Court to direct the Plaintiff to execute documents to remove Plaintiff from the mortgage and note. The Loan Modification Agreement, provided to the Court indicates both Plaintiff's and Defendant's names. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 28). In addition, the monthly mortgage statement that is addressed to the Former Marital Residence also reflect Plaintiff's name and Defendant's name. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 29).

Article III of the Stipulation of Settlement further provides that

[T]he Husband covenants and represents that he has not heretofore nor will he hereafter, incur or contact any debt, charges or liability whatsoever for which the Wife, her legal representative or her property or estate may become liable and the Husband further [*5]covenants to keep the wife free, harmless and indemnified of and from any and all debts, charges or liabilities hereafter contracted by him or for the account of any other person. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24).

Defendant's actions in incurring this increased debt is in clear violation of Article III of our the Parties' Stipulation of Settlement.

It is very clear from the evidence provided that the Defendant is in clear violation of the Parties' Stipulation of Settlement, dated XX XX, 2011, and the Supplemental Stipulation, dated XX XX, 2011. Defendant is also in violation of the Order of the Court [Hon. Barbara I. Panepinto], dated October 21, 2011, for his refusal to cooperate with the sale of the Former Marital Residence.

Under our terms of the Stipulation of Settlement, Defendant was responsible for the payment of the mortgage, real estate taxes, utilities and homeowners' insurance on the Former Marital Residence. Plaintiff contends that it was Defendant's failure to pay these obligations, that led to the mortgage increase to $321,930.42. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant incurred and contracted this additional debt in violation of Article III of the Stipulation of Settlement. Defendant agreed to indemnify the Plaintiff from any and all debts, charges or liability hereafter contracted by him in Article III of our Stipulation of Settlement.

Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's claims are barred by CPLR § 213 [2]. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion is a post-judgment motion to enforce the terms of the Parties' Stipulation of Settlement and Judgment of Divorce filed in the underlying divorce action. The Parties' Stipulation of Settlement, dated XX XX, 2011, and Supplemental Stipulation, dated XX XX, 2011 were incorporated, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce dated July 13, 2011. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 23). The law is clear, motions to enforce the terms of a Stipulation of Settlement are not subject to statutes of limitation applicable to breach of contract actions. (see Dahan v Dahan, 237 AD3d 794 [2d Dept 2025]; Sangi v Sangi, 196 AD3d 891 [3d Dept 2021]; Brewster v Anthony-Brewster, 174 AD3d 566 [2d Dept 2019]; Holsberger v Holsberger, 154 AD3d 1208 [3d Dept 2017]; Denaro v Denaro, 84 AD3d 1148 [2d Dept 2011]; Bayen v Bayen, 81 AD3d 865 [2d Dept 2011]; Fragin v Fragin, 80 AD3d 725 [2d Dept 2011]).

Defendant contends that Plaintiff abandoned the premises in 2009 and after fourteen years of nonpayment and absence, relief is barred. In New York, under the doctrine of res judicata, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy. (see Ippolito v TJC Dev., LLC, 83 AD3d 57 [2d Dept 2011]; Landau, P.C. v LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross, 11 NY3d 8 [2008]; In re Hunter, 4 NY3d 260 [2005]; Xiao Yang Chen v Fischer, 6 NY3d 94 [2005]; Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343 [1999]).

The doctrine of res judicata is designed to provide finality in the resolution of disputes to assure that parties may not be vexed by further litigation. (see Vehifax Corp. v Georgilis, 205 AD3d 973 [2d Dept 2022]; Mooney v Manhattan Occupational, Physical & Speech Therapies, PLLC, 166 AD3d 957 [2d Dept 2018]; Clerico v Pollack, 148 AD3d 769 [2d Dept 2017]; Shah v 20 E. 64th St., LLC, 198 AD3d 23 [1st Dept 2021]).

The parties' divorce action was commenced by the filing of a Summons and Complaint on November 4, 2009. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 3). The Parties' resolved all the issues in their divorce two years later by entering into a Stipulation of Settlement and Supplemental Stipulation. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24). The Court thereafter granted the Parties' a Judgment of Divorce on July 13, 2011. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc [*6]No. 23). Defendant's claims of abandonment of the premises in 2009 should have, and could have been raised in the parties' divorce action. Instead, Defendant reached a global settlement of all issues relating to their divorce action, including the distribution of the Premises. Defendant is therefore precluded from raising this claim in this post-judgment action. Furthermore, the Parties' Stipulation of Settlement and Supplemental Stipulation specifically provides for each of the Parties obligations for payment of the Premises and rights to occupancy of the Premises since March 2011.

Defendant's invocation of the doctrine of laches, which bars the enforcement of a right where there has been an unreasonable and inexcusable delay that results in prejudice to a party is inapplicable. The mere lapse of time without a showing of prejudice will not sustain a defense of laches. (see Skrodelis v Norbergs, 272 AD2d 316 [2d Dept 2000]; Kverel v Silverman, 172 AD3d 1345 [2d Dept 2019]; GTR Source, LLC v Zomongo.TV USA, Inc., 242 AD3d 714 [2d Dept 2025]). Defendant has further failed to demonstrate any delay on the part of the Plaintiff.

Defendant's further arguments in his opposition to Plaintiff's cross-motion have no basis in law or fact as applied to the matter before the Court.

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion Sequence No. 006 seeking enforcement is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 007 is GRANTED in part as follows; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Defendant comply with all terms of the Parties' Judgment of Divorce, dated July 13, 2011, Stipulation of Settlement, dated XX XX, 2011, and the Supplemental Stipulation, dated XX XX, 2011; and it is further,

ORDERED, that the Defendant comply with the Order of the Court [Honorable Barbara I. Panepinto], dated October 21, 2011; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Defendant is to vacate the Former Marital Residence located at XX XXX Road, Staten Island, New York within thirty [30] days to facilitate the sale of the Property without interference or obstruction from the Defendant; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Defendant is solely liable from his share of the proceeds of sale for the increased indebtedness on the Former Marital Residence.

B. Counsel Fees

"Domestic Relations Law § 238 authorizes a court, in its discretion, to award counsel fees in a proceeding to enforce the provisions of a divorce judgment" (see Yakobowicz v. Yakobowicz, 2023 NY App Div LEXIS 3019 [2d Dept 2023] quoting Tuchman v Tuchman, 201 AD3d 993 [2d Dept 2022] citing Domestic Relations Law § 237 [b], [c]). "[A] court may require . . . [one] party [to] pay counsel fees to enable the other party to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard [for] the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties" (see id citing Maddaloni v Maddaloni, 163 AD3d 794 [2d Dept 2018]).

In exercising its discretion to award fees, the court has considered the financial circumstances of the parties and the circumstances of the case as a whole, including the relative merits of the parties' positions and whether either party has delayed the proceedings or engaged in unnecessary litigation (see id citing Tuchman v. Tuchman, 201 AD3d 993 [2d Dept 2022]).

Defendant's failure to comply with the Parties' Judgment of Divorce, dated July 13, 2011, [*7]Stipulation of Settlement, dated XX XX, 2011, and the Supplemental Stipulation, dated XX XX, 2011, and the Defendants litigious conduct precipitated the filing of Cross-Motion Sequence No. 007 to compel compliance with and enforce the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 007 request for counsel fees is GRANTED and Plaintiff is awarded counsel fees in the sum of $5,000.00 [FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS], and to be paid by Defendant directly to Plaintiff within 10 days.

C. Sanctions and Costs

In Motion Sequence No. 008, Defendant seeks sanctions, costs, and disbursements pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1 alleging frivolous conduct on the part of Plaintiff and her counsel. Plaintiff cross-moved in response to Defendant in Motion Sequence No. 009 seeking sanctions against the Defendant in the amount of $10, 000.00 and counsel fees in the amount of $5,000.00, pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1.1.

"Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, a court in a civil action may award reasonable attorney's fees resulting from frivolous conduct. Conduct is frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, inter alia, where it is 'completely without merit in law' or is 'undertaken primarily . . . to harass or maliciously injure another'" (see Yinuo Yin v Xiao Feng Qiao, 203 AD3d 996 [2d Dept 2022] quoting Stanecky v Stanecky, 200 AD3d 819 [2d Dept 2021] quoting 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [1]).

"In addition to or in lieu of awarding costs, the court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct" (see id quoting Tamburello v Tamburello, 165 AD3d 1006 [2d Dept 2018] quoting 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [a]).

"The decision of whether to award sanctions and the amount or nature of those sanctions is generally entrusted to the trial court's sound discretion" (see id Battinelli v Battinelli, 192 AD3d 957 [2d Dept 2021] quoting Matter of Khan-Soleil v Rashad, 111 AD3d 727 [2d Dept 2013]).

"Conduct is frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 if it is completely without merit and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another" (see Dun-Zheng Yan v Klein, 35 AD3d 729 [2d Dept 2006] citing Greene v Doral Conference Ctr. Assocs., 18 AD3d 429 [2d Dept 2005]; Tyree Bros. Envtl. Servs. v Ferguson Propeller, 247 AD2d 376 [2d Dept 1997]).

The conduct and actions of the Plaintiff and her counsel in this motion practice have been without reproach and in no way fall under the definition of frivolous as defined by 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

The Defendant on the other hand has clearly not complied with the Judgment of Divorce, the Stipulation of Settlement, the Supplemental Stipulation, the Order of the Court [Honorable Barbara I. Panepinto], dated October 21, 2011, and the Order of the Court [Honorable Barbara I. Panepinto], dated December 10, 2012. Defendant initiated this round of motion practice seeking to enforce the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement by compelling the Plaintiff to execute all documents necessary to remove her name from the mortgage, note, and deed to the Former Marital Residence.

Defendant was wrong and his motion was appropriately denied, however, Defendant was not continuing to press the same patently meritless claim. This was the initial movement on this claim and, while found to be invalid, it had not previously been barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (see Dun-Zheng Yan v Klein, 35 AD3d 729 [2d Dept 2006] quoting Tsabbar v Auld, 26 AD3d 233 [1st Dept 2006]).

For claims to be frivolous they must be "completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law" (see Dun-Zheng Yan v Klein, 35 AD3d 729 [2d Dept 2006] quoting 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [1]; citing Kucker v Kaminsky & Rich, 7 AD3d 491 [2d Dept 2004]). While Defendant, pro se, reached the incorrect legal conclusions, the Court does not find that he acted in a frivolous manner as contemplated by 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion Sequence No. 008 is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 009 is DENIED in its entirety.

It is hereby ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion Sequence No. 006 seeking enforcement is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 007 is GRANTED in part as follows; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Defendant comply with all terms of the Parties' Judgment of Divorce, dated July 13, 2011, Stipulation of Settlement, dated XX XX, 2011, and the Supplemental Stipulation, dated XX XX, 2011; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Defendant comply with the Order of the Court [Honorable Barbara I. Panepinto], dated October 21, 2011; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant is to vacate the Former Marital Residence located at XX XXX Road, Staten Island, New York within thirty [30] days to facilitate the sale of the Property without interference or obstruction from the Defendant; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant is solely liable from his share of the proceeds of sale for the increased indebtedness on the Former Marital Residence; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 007 request for counsel fees is GRANTED and Plaintiff is awarded counsel fees in the sum of $5,000.00 [FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS], and to be paid by Defendant directly to Plaintiff within 10 days; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion Sequence No. 008 is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further,

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion Sequence No. 009 is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further,

ORDERED, that any relief not expressly granted herein is DENIED.

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

The foregoing shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.