Pending before the Court is the defense's counseled omnibus motion. It is resolved as follows. As the parties are the primary audience for this order, familiarity with the facts is assumed.

The branch seeking invalidation of the People's certificate of compliance (COC) and dismissal under C.P.L. § 30.30 is denied. While the defense points to the nondisclosure of certain police-generated discovery, the main dispute is over the complainant's medical records, which the People did not seek until after declaring ready and did not disclose until pre-motion conferral was ongoing. The defense's initial motion papers are dedicated primarily to the People's failure to timely obtain and disclose those records. See Defense's Mot. at 10—13.

The People defend their diligence regarding those records on the merits, addressing their difficulty contacting the complainant, the complainant's initial inability to remember details of treatment, and the eventual disclosure of the records to the defense. The People also argue that the defense has not demonstrated prejudice in connection with the records, which the defense itself could have obtained. People's Resp. Aff. ¶¶ 10, 13—14; People's Resp. Mem. at 18—19.

In reply, the defense challenges the People's lack of urgency, because they did not try to obtain the records until long after declaring ready despite obtaining a HIPAA release from the complainant in early December. The defense also argues, among other things, that delay is its own prejudice. Defense's Reply at 3—5.

As an initial matter, were the dispute limited to the police-generated discovery, the challenge to the COC would fail. The People disclosed copious discovery after making reasonable inquiries—all laid out in their motion response—despite apparently facing a lack of responsiveness from their contact. While the failure to provide activity logs is worrisome, there appears to be no argument that the officers involved were central to the case—their roles are not immediately apparent—and the body-camera footage otherwise linked to those officers could [*2]diminish some of the impact of the nondisclosure. So while the People should ideally have obtained those records by now, the failure to do so does not, under consideration of the relevant factors, require invalidation of their COC against the broader record of the People's reasonable efforts and outreach. See C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a).

That leaves the medical records—which, as the parties are aware, present a threshold issue. Because there was no argument that the records were in the People's constructive possession, the parties were requested to address, via supplement briefs, the impact of decisions out of the Third and Fourth Departments that appear to limit the relevance of materials outside of the People's possession and control to a COC challenge.

In the view of the Third and Fourth Departments, the validity of a COC is tied to the People's initial discovery obligations—obligations that do not, in those courts' view, extend to material outside of the People's actual or constructive possession. See People v. Branton, 238 AD3d 1429, 1431 (3d Dept. 2025); People v. Radford, 237 AD3d 1511, 1512 (4th Dept. 2025); People v. Walker, 232 AD3d 1214, 1217 (4th Dept. 2024). As one of the decisions explains, initial discovery obligations are defined by a relevancy prong (defined by C.P.L. § 245.20(1)) and a possessory prong (mentioned in § 245.20(1) but defined by C.P.L. § 245.20(2)), and discovery must satisfy both prongs to be relevant to initial discovery obligations and, by extension, to a COC. Walker, 232 AD3d at 1215—17.

In its supplemental submission, the defense confirms that its reading of those cases tracks the undersigned's, at least in part. The defense argues, however, that they are "internally inconsistent in [their] analysis of the statutes and concerning from a policy perspective," would serve to partially read C.P.L. § 245.20(2) out of the discovery framework, and would create a "policy concern" by "defang[ing]" the Legislature's decision to tether § 30.30 to discovery compliance. Defense's Supp. at 1—3. The defense also contends that, in any event, those decisions are distinguishable, as they generally address DOCCS records, not medical records—the latter of which fall under a different prong of § 245.20(1) and have "real implications for the People's statutory obligations." Id. at 4.

The problem, though, is that regardless of how narrow, crabbed, and internally inconsistent those decisions may be—and the undersigned is not weighing in one way or the other—they are binding absent contrary authority from the Court of Appeals, other Departments, or the Appellate Term of the First Department. See People v. Brisotti, 169 Misc 2d 672, 673 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 1996). Thus, they govern the treatment of discovery material not within the People's actual or constructive possession. Under the rule they appear to establish, discovery not within the People's actual or constructive possession falls outside of the initial discovery obligations defined by § 245.20(1), and does not bear on the validity of a COC. See Walker, 232 AD3d at 1215—17. And while it is true that the material here consists of medical records, not DOCCS records, this distinction does not appear to make a difference, as the shortcomings in the "possessory" prong are the same.

Thus, under Radford, Walker, and Branton, any delay in actually disclosing the medical records would not matter for the validity of the COC, because those records were not within the People's possession or control.^[FN2] And while the defense is correct, see Defense's Supp. at 3, that [*3]those decisions do not clearly address the relevance of the People's efforts to obtain that discovery material under C.P.L. § 245.20(2), those efforts are not themselves part of the People's initial discovery obligations, and would not appear to matter either.

Regardless, were it otherwise—were Radford, Walker, and Branton not binding, were the ambiguity in the relevance of the People's efforts under § 245.20(2) to be resolved in the other direction, and were the defense truly not able to obtain those records by subpoena—the People would still prevail here, albeit far more narrowly. While the People had not obtained the complainant's medical records before declaring ready, they were able to obtain and disclose them before the conferral period came to a close. Conferral yielding acquisition of missing material satisfies a "number of the due diligence factors" under the revised § 245.50(5)(a). People v. Whitney, — Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op. 25248, at *5 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (David, J.). The People's reaction to the defense's objections should have been swifter, but the People's post-readiness efforts narrowly make up for the lack of pre-readiness urgency.

Accordingly, with or without the line of cases from the Third and Fourth Department, the People's COC withstands the defense's challenge. The COC is deemed valid. And as there is no argument that over 90 days had otherwise elapsed, the branch of the omnibus motion seeking dismissal is denied. The People are nevertheless ordered to disclose the police-generated discovery within 30 days of this order; if they are unable to do so, they must file a status update with the court explaining their efforts to obtain and disclose that material.

The request for a Wade hearing is granted. Any Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia/preclusion issues are referred to the trial court. Any request for relief not specifically mentioned is denied.