The following documents were considered in connection with the order to show cause of the Plaintiff, dated February 5, 2026, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 3"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Directing the Defendant to comply with the Judgment of Divorce, dated September 8, 2025, and entered on September 9, 2025 and incorporating by reference the Stipulation of Settlement, dated July 17, 2025 and "So Ordered" on July 22, 2025;

2. Enforcing the Judgment of Divorce, including but not limited to the Defendant's obligations to pay: the monthly mortgage, utilities and maintenance for the former marital home through the date of sale and closing of title; the 2024 tax obligations; one-half (1/2) of the equitable distribution regarding two cases and the sale of a boat; child support and child support add-on expenses;

3. Requesting proof that the Defendant has fulfilled his life insurance obligations;

4. Directing immediate payment of all arrears within a time certain;

5. Awarding Plaintiff a money judgment in the amount of $150,340.43 for arrears;

6. Holding the Defendant in contempt; and,

7. Granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Order to Show Cause/Affirmation in Support/Part 130 Certification/Exhibits 1-18 1-21

On April 9, 2025, this matrimonial action was commenced with the filing of a summons and complaint (hereinafter "Complaint"),^[FN1] which asserted that the parties were married in June of 2017, and thereafter had three children of the marriage being: (1) [Redacted] (D.O.B.: [Redacted]); (2) [Redacted] (D.O.B.: [Redacted]); and (3) [Redacted] (D.O.B.: [Redacted]) (hereinafter collectively "Children"); which annexed a notice of automatic orders pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 236 (hereinafter "Automatic Orders");^[FN2] and a request for judicial intervention ^[FN3] was filed after which the undersigned was assigned to preside over this action.

Simultaneously with the filing of pleadings, Plaintiff filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 1"),^[FN4] seeking immediate relief including temporary custody of the Children; exclusive occupancy of the marital domicile; and entry of a temporary order of protection benefiting Plaintiff against Defendant and the Children. In support of her then application, Plaintiff submitted text messages between she and Defendant wherein he referred to her as "a powerless human being", "a stupid fucking woman", "a fucking piece of shit", "a joke of a person" (hereinafter "Defendant Text Messages"); which further included financial threats including threatening the housing of she and the Children, "Also Armonk. Say good bye I will [*2]not pay the mortgage You will be foreclosed on bitch So start packing You fucked up NJ here you go."

Motion Sequence No. 1 was conformed the morning it was received directing the parties to appear that afternoon,^[FN5] and a conference was held before the undersigned, a transcript for which was filed (hereinafter "4/9/2025 Transcript"),^[FN6] wherein appearances were made by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's then counsel and Defendant as a self-represented litigant wherein he identified himself as an attorney and requested an adjournment to retain counsel, asserting that he did not practice in the field of matrimonial or family law:

"THE COURT: *** As you are representing yourself, I believe that you are a New York State licensed attorney; is that correct?

C.B.: Yes, Judge, this is my point, I am here to request counsel. I have made a few phone calls this afternoon in the timeframe of receiving the Order to Show Cause from attorney Sexton at 12:30 p.m. on the dot. In that timeframe, I have been able to glance over and read the Order to Show Cause at least once and I do not practice matrimonial law. Out of my wheelhouse, Judge, I am a labor and plaintiff's attorney so I don't necessarily feel comfortable representing myself. I will, of course, take an oath and solemnly swear to tell you the truth. In these proceedings, I am seeking, the first thing I would be seeking is an adjournment, Judge, and I would like to have counsel respond to these arguments. I personally, I have heard the old adage before, right, you don't want to be your own lawyer, something like that. I am not going to play a fool's errand here, Judge. I respectfully request an adjournment and right to counsel. We would promptly — I have been in contact with at least one attorney who practices regularly before this court and is aware of this proceeding. I have not transmitted the Order to Show Cause to that attorney. I have not entered into a retainer with that attorney. But I can affirm, Judge, I have made a phone call and I was advised by my attorney — potentially my attorney to make this request to the court."^[FN7]

This Court then confirmed that Defendant was not indigent and therefore not eligible for the appointment of assigned counsel, advised Defendant of his right to apply to the 9th Judicial District Supervising Matrimonial Judge for the appointment of pro bono counsel, and marked two documents customarily provided to self-represented litigants before this Court with the directive that Plaintiff's counsel serve same upon Defendant via e-mail as Defendant had appeared virtually:

"THE COURT: *** Now, turning to your other issue regarding counsel. Sir, are you making the representation to this Court that you are indigent?

C.B.: No, Judge. I am not making that representation.

THE COURT: Very good. So the right to 18-B counsel does not apply. I am letting you know that you also have the right to request pro bono counsel to be appointed by the Honorable Victor G. Grossman. He is the supervising matrimonial judge for the Ninth [*3]Judicial District. You can simply make a motion to him. He is in the Putnam County Courthouse. To the extent that he feels it is appropriate, he can appoint you pro bono counsel. Otherwise, at this point, you will be representing yourself. I am going to upload to NYSCEF two documents that we are going to mark as court exhibits now. The first one is Court Exhibit Number 1, that's a self-represented litigant information sheet that provides folks that are representing themselves in my court with certain information that is available to them, including but not limited to the Ninth Judicial District's Law Library which is located on 9th floor of this building as well as the Office of the Self-Represented which is also located on the 9th floor of this building. It is not all of the information and resources that are available, but it does provide folks with some information so that they can utilize them if they wish. Court Exhibit Number 2 is a copy of my part rules. The judges [in] the trial courts in the State of New York have the ability, if they wish, to promulgate part rules. These are mine. They work in concert with two other sets of rules. The rules for trial courts of the State of New York as well as with the Westchester Matrimonial Rules. If there is a conflict, mine prevail. So I will be uploading both of these to NYSCEF. I will ask that Mr. Sexton that you serve these on the defendant by the end of business today so he has them available in the event he wants to represent himself, if he elects to not have counsel represent him. Plaintiff's counsel, did you receive a copy of those two documents?

MR. SEXTON: I do have those documents, Your Honor, and I would just inquire, if I can also serve those by electronic mail. I did file per Your Honor's direction an affirmation of service and I did receive a response correspondence from C.B. and we have e-mailed actually just a few times regarding the scheduling. So he is receiving my e-mails. So if I can serve that on the defendant by the end of day via e-mail.

THE COURT: E-mail is fine. Madam Court Reporter, can you mark those now and I will ask that they be no speaking while she is doing her work because she can't do two things at once. (Whereupon, Court Exhibit 1 and 2 were marked.)

THE COURT: Those are being handed to my court clerk Kimberly Kirkland. She is going to be file those on NYSCEF as we speak."^[FN8]

During the conference, this Court entered a decision and order ^[FN9] pertaining to the interim relief sought by Plaintiff granting such relief, entering a temporary order of protection against Defendant for the benefit of Plaintiff and the Children,^[FN10] setting a briefing schedule for Motion Sequence No. 1 and hearing dates for the interim relief sought to commence on April 11, 2025. Following the conference, Plaintiff's then counsel filed proof of service upon Defendant via e-[*4]mail of the self-represented litigant information sheet and part rules.^[FN11]

On April 10, 2025, despite the concerns he himself had raised during the conference held a day earlier, Defendant filed a letter ^[FN12] advising this Court that he would be proceeding as a self-represented litigant informing that, "[t]he undersigned attorney admitted to the Bar of the State of New York, C.B. (hereinafter "C.B."), as Defendant in this action, hereby writes to inform this esteemed Court that C.B. will proceed as a self-represented litigant in this action . . . ," and further, "[t]he undersigned can represent to your Honor, that C.B. has fully complied with you Honor's orders, and will continue to comply."

On April 12, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel filed a stipulation pertaining to the custody of the Children ^[FN13] with a request that this Court so-order same, such request being granted that day by this Court (hereinafter "Custody Stipulation").^[FN14]

On April 14, 2025, a preliminary conference was held wherein the parties entered into a stipulation to proceed with the grounds for the dissolution of the parties' marriage pursuant to DRL § 170(7), after which a so-ordered court transcript was filed (hereinafter "4/14/2025 Transcript").^[FN15] During the conference Defendant received hard copies of the self-represented litigant information sheet and part rules.^[FN16] The 4/14/2025 Transcript reflects that the parties agreed that their relationship had been irretrievably broken for a period in excess of six months prior to the date of commencement of this litigation, that Plaintiff would be granted a judgment of divorce following a resolution of all ancillary issues arising out of the requested dissolution of the parties' marriage by stipulation or by decision following trial, and that Defendant would withdraw and not file any further counterclaims seeking the dissolution of the parties' marriage.^[FN17]

The 4/14/2025 Transcript further reflects that following the Custody Stipulation being marked as Court Exhibit C and reviewed by the parties in the presence of this Court, both parties were subject to an allocution pertaining to the Custody Stipulation wherein both ratified their agreement to the terms set forth therein.^[FN18] During the conference both parties executed the preliminary conference stipulation and order, further evidencing their agreement with respect to [*5]the resolution of grounds for the dissolution of their marriage and custody of the Children.^[FN19]

The 4/14/2025 Transcript confirms that this Court directed that both parties comply with the Automatic Orders:

"Number one, by the end of business today, Mr. Sexton, you will review with your client the notice of automatic orders and, sir, you will review it as well. I want to make sure the parties have a pathway for success here. I know this is new to you. So, you should really review that very closely to understand what obligations and duties you have so that you don't inadvertently make a mistake."^[FN20]

"J. AUTOMATIC STATUTORY RESTRAINS (D.R.L. §236[B][2]) Each party acknowledges that he/she has received a copy of the Automatic Statutory Restrains/Automatic Orders (D.R.L. § 236[B][2]). Each party acknowledges that he/she understands that he/she is bound by those Restrains/Orders during the pendency of this action, unless terminated, modified, or amended by order of the Court upon motion of either party or upon written agreement between the parties duly executed and acknowledged."

On May 9, 2025, Plaintiff's then counsel filed a letter ^[FN22] requesting a pre-motion conference to address Plaintiff's allegations of Defendant's non-compliance with discovery deadlines and possible dissipation of marital assets during the pendency of this litigation:

"As your Honor will recall my office represents the Plaintiff/Wife in connection with the above referenced matrimonial matter which is next scheduled for Compliance Conference on June 11, 2025. This letter is sent in compliance with the dictates of your Honor's Part Rules — specifically Section (E)(d) on Pages 7-8. The Defendant/Husband, Pro Se is copied on this letter by NYSCEF and electronic mail. Plaintiff respectfully asserts that the Defendant has failed to conduct discovery in compliance with the dictates of the Preliminary Conference Order (NYSCEF Document #27). Specifically — the Defendant has failed to file the Defendant's sworn Statement of Net Worth on or before April 25, 2025 as required under Section (A)(5)(a) of the aforesaid Preliminary Conference Order.

As was repeatedly noted by the Defendant/Husband Pro Se during both of the parties' two (2) Conferences before the Court — the Defendant is an attorney who manages a law firm that (previously) employed both the Defendant and Plaintiff. The Defendant is, upon information and belief, the individual who both manages the firm and the parties' [*6]business/personal finances. The Plaintiff/Wife served comprehensive discovery demands on April 27, 2025 — three (3) days prior to April 30, 2025 - the required 'deadline' for service of demands under Section (G)(2)(b) of the aforesaid Preliminary Conference Order. The Defendant did not serve any demands and indicated, in electronic mail correspondence, that he does not intend to serve any demands. Although pursuant to Section (G)(2)(c) of the Preliminary Conference Order the Defendant's responses to the Plaintiff's discovery demands are not due until May 30, 2025— without any financial documents or the Defendant's Statement of Net Worth the Defendant is unable to address issues of temporary spousal support, temporary child support, interim counsel fees or Defendant's compliance (or non-compliance) with the 'automatic orders' attendant to matrimonial actions under DRL § 236(B)(2)(b).

The Plaintiff has serious concerns that the Defendant may be actively dissipating marital assets based on statements made by the Defendant on publicly accessible social media (specifically the Defendant's TikTok 'live streams' as recently as this week). The Plaintiff advises that she has limited information on the amount and location of funds maintained by the Defendant — both personally and/or related to the Defendant's law firm. The undersigned has attempted to resolve these issues by direct communication with the Defendant Pro Se. The Plaintiff reminded the Defendant, by electronic mail correspondence, both before and after the aforesaid 'deadline' for filing of the Statement of Net Worth of the importance of timely filing that document. The Plaintiff also requested, in electronic mail correspondence to the Defendant approximately two (2) weeks ago, that the Defendant promptly produce any financial information responsive to the Plaintiff's discovery demands that might provide Plaintiff some basic insight into the parties' respective and collective financial situation(s). To date the Defendant has neither filed the required Statement of Net Worth nor produced any of the requested financial information or documents.

While the Defendant has essentially claimed to be 'too busy' with the Defendant's law practice to comply with Court Ordered deadlines — the Defendant's postings on social media suggest that the Defendant is 'busy' spending significant portion of time on his boat consuming copious amounts of cannabis. The Plaintiff requests the Court's intervention on these issues in the form of: (A) the prompt scheduling of a 'motion avoidance conference' with appearances required by both parties and counsel; and/or (B) the Court's issue of a sanction against the Defendant for failure to timely file Defendant's Statement of Net Worth as directed in the Preliminary Conference Order; and/or (C) such other action as the Court may deem appropriate."

On May 10, 2025, this Court entered an order ^[FN23] wherein it directed a pre-motion conference to be held on May 14, 2025, at 9:00 a.m., wherein all parties and counsel were directed to appear in person.

On May 14, 2025, a conference was held before the undersigned, a so-ordered transcript [*7]for which was filed (hereinafter "5/14/2025 Transcript").^[FN24] During the conference Defendant indicated, "I'm pleased to tell your Honor that yesterday, I was able to retain counsel," but then indicated that he had not provided payment to that counsel, nor had he signed an engagement agreement with said counsel.^[FN25] The conference proceeded with Defendant acting as a self-represented litigant wherein Plaintiff's then counsel expressed concern that Defendant was expending significant sums of marital funds on TikTok while Plaintiff received no interim support or counsel fees,^[FN26] after which Defendant advised this Court that he had expended approximately $300,000.00 on TikTok of which approximately $275,000.00 had been spent following the commencement of this litigation advising that despite the Automatic Orders being in place these expenditures were appropriate as business expenses for an entity referred to as [Redacted] (hereinafter "[Redacted]").^[FN27] This Court then determined Defendant to be an impaired person and pursuant to New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules (hereinafter "CPLR") § 1202 appointed John C. Guttridge, Esq. (hereinafter "GAL Guttridge") as the guardian ad litem for Defendant, who appeared during the conference, confirmed no conflicts of interest existed preventing his proceeding in that role and that he would accept the appointment.^[FN28]

On May 16, 2025, Defendant's then counsel filed a notice of appearance,^[FN29] followed by a retainer agreement ^[FN30] delineating a scope of representation that included the pending matrimonial litigation and excluded post judgment litigation:

"This writing confirms that you have retained the Firm to act as your attorneys and to represent you in negotiating an Agreement with your spouse if it is reasonably possible, or, if not reasonably possible, to represent you in a matrimonial action. This retainer does not include Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDRO), post judgment divorce proceedings, appeals, hearings, fact findings or trials [emphasis added]."

On May 19, 2025, a conference was held wherein all parties and then counsel appeared, along with GAL Guttridge, a so-ordered transcript for which was filed (hereinafter 5/19/2025 Transcript"),^[FN31] wherein GAL Guttridge provided his position that Defendant was not incapacitated and understood this litigation, but that he would continue to assist him as guardian ad litem:

"MR. GUTTRIDGE: *** He definitely understands everything he is doing, and all the proceedings. *** And we had a long conversation today with counsel present, and without counsel. He seems — not seems. He understands everything that's going on. So hopefully, Judge, with the conversations we have had with the plaintiff's counsel this case can move along now.

THE COURT: So you are making the representation to this Court that you do not feel that there is an incapacity that would require the commencement of an Article 81 proceeding out of the New York City Mental Hygiene Law?

MR. GUTTRIDGE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So C.B. has decision-making capacity and he is going to be assisted by you, not as a decision maker, but to assist him; is that correct?

MR. GUTTRIDGE: That's fine, Judge. Yes, I will continue in that role if you would like me to."^[FN32]

Defendant's then counsel consented to GAL Guttridge remaining appointed, while Plaintiff's then counsel did not object.^[FN33] This Court then reminded the parties that in addition to being litigants in this action they also remained officers of the Court required to comport themselves with the ethical obligations attendant thereto and requested confirmation that their respective counsel had reviewed the severity of this obligation with the parties:

"THE COURT: *** Mr. Sexton, you discussed all of this with the plaintiff, right?

MR. SEXTON: I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And you will continue to advise her to the extent that she has any questions or concerns, correct?

MR. SEXTON: I will, Judge.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Spinner and Mr. Guttridge, have you talked to [Redacted] about all of this?

MR. GUTTRIDGE: Yes, your Honor.

MR. SPINNER: I have, your Honor, and I am pleased to say that once we started talking about it he put his lawyer hat on, and I don't think I have to go any further than that."^[FN34]

On May 23, 2025, Plaintiff's then counsel filed a request for pre-motion conference,^[FN35] asserting Defendant had continued to provide no required discovery disclosure and to expend funds on TikTok and himself, while failing to provide support for his family:

"Plaintiff respectfully requests that this case be scheduled for a motion avoidance conference at the Court's earliest convenience. While at the last Conference your Honor was clear with both parties and counsel regarding the changes needed to prevent a contempt application — the Defendant has demonstrated he is unwilling or unable to follow the advice of the Court or counsel.

In the FOUR (4) DAYS since our last Conference before the Court the Defendant has:

1) Continued to post (daily) TikTok posts threatening violence, brandishing weapons, 'tagging' counsel and making harassing comments towards the Plaintiff in violation of the Order(s) of Protection currently in effect and the recommendations regarding attorney decorum specifically provided by your Honor.

2) Continued to 'give away' or 'gift' money to third parties on TikTok in the form of multiple 'universes' ($500 gifts) and 'lions' ($400 gifts) in direct defiance of both the 'automatic orders' attendant to matrimonial actions under DRL § 236(B)(2)(b) and your Honor's 'So Ordered' specific direction during the parties' May 14, 2025 Conference not to 'expend any funds of any kind on TikTok'.

3) Failed to provide even one page of discovery. Not one bank statement. Not one credit card statement. None of the documents specifically referenced during the Conference earlier this week — any of which could have easily been obtained online in less time than it takes to create and post the 12 TikTok videos the Defendant has posted since we left the Courthouse on Monday.

4) Booked a vacation to Las Vegas for himself (which he has been discussing on TikTok quite often) while failing (to date) to pay any direct child support and claiming he does not possess adequate funds to make any substantial contribution to Plaintiff's counsel fees.

I have written to both the Guardian ad litem and counsel for the Defendant/Husband daily and provided recordings of all of the aforesaid issues/violations and although the Defendant's Guardian ad litem (Mr. Guttridge) has been very responsive to me — it is clear he has little control over the Defendant's conduct. The Defendant's counsel has failed to provide any substantive response to any of my many inquiries (all attempting to prevent the necessity of this request).

At this point the Plaintiff is gravely concerned that the Defendant feels he is 'above the law' and will continue to ignore the Order(s) of the Court absent some actual repercussions / penalties. When your Honor views the TikTok posts the Defendant posted after your Honor's most recent statements to the parties (on Monday) regarding maintaining decorum (as Officers of the Court) I have every confidence your Honor will be appalled."

On June 2, 2025, Defendant's then counsel filed Defendant's statement of net worth (hereinafter "Defendant's SNW"),^[FN37] which despite sworn statements by Defendant of the existence of [Redacted] for which expenditures on TikTok were made in possible excess of $300,000.00, no reference to such company was made or any other business interests with the exception of Defendant's law firm, [Redacted] (hereinafter "Defendant's Firm"). Defendant's SNW further listed limited assets including the marital residence (no value provided), Defendant's Firm (no value provided), two vehicles (no value provided) and the parties' wedding rings valued at $6,000.00, no retirement accounts, and non-retirement accounts with cumulative total current value of $932.44; annual expenses of $165,802.92; and liabilities totaling $910,440.94. While no income was directly set forth within Defendant's SNW as required by the instructions in that section of the document, this Court was directed to the annexed income tax return filed for the parties in 2023 which provided total income of $97,015.00, a shortfall of $68,787.92 from the stated annual expenses.

On July 21, 2025, the parties filed a stipulation of settlement resolving all of the remaining issues arising out of the requested dissolution of the parties' marriage,^[FN38] which was so-ordered by this Court on July 22, 2025 (hereinafter "Stipulation of Settlement"),^[FN39] the preamble for which confirmed the parties' intent to both incorporate by reference the terms of the Custody Stipulation and resolve all remaining issues existing between the parties:

"WHEREAS, the parties' respective rights and obligations related to the custody and care of the parties' Children were previously resolved by the Court's entry of a written STIPULATION (Custody/Parenting) duly executed and acknowledged by both parties are April 11, 2025 and duly executed by the Court (Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C.) and entered with the Clerk of the Court on April 12, 2025 (NYSCEF Document #24); and

WHEREAS, a true and accurate copy of the aforesaid STIPULATION (Custody/Parenting) is appended to this Stipulation as Schedule "A" and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein; and

WHEREAS it is now the desire of the parties to enter into a further written Stipulation under which their respective financial and property rights and all other respective rights, remedies, privileges and obligations to each other, arising out of the marriage of the parties or otherwise shall be fully proscribed and bounded thereby; and

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the covenants and [*8]promises contained herein, the parties hereto mutually agree as follows:"^[FN40]

Article II of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Non-Disparagement Provision"), provides a clear understanding of the parties that neither is to interfere or disparage the other, for reasons including preventing reputational harm of the parties:

"A. Neither party shall in any way molest, disturb or trouble the other or interfere with the peace and comfort of the other or compel or seek to compel the other to associate, cohabit or dwell with him or her by any action or proceeding for restoration of conjugal rights or by any means whatsoever.

B. Each party specifically agrees not to make any false statements whatsoever to any third parties, including the children of the parties, that will, or will tend to, deprecate, harm or injure the other party in her or his personal and/or professional reputation.

C. Neither party shall in any way molest, disturb, annoy, harass, threaten or malign the other party or members of the other party's household in any manner whatsoever or interfere with the peace and comfort of the other party or members of his or her household. Neither party shall seek to compel the other to associate, cohabit or dwell with him or her by any means whatsoever.

D. Neither party shall at any time make statements to each other or to third persons which are derogatory of the other party or which shall reflect disparagingly on the character reputation or personal habits of the other party or members of his or her household."

Article III of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Incorporation Provision"), reflects the desire of the parties that the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement be incorporated by reference and not merged into any judgment of divorce thereafter entered:

"Subject to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation, the parties consent to this matter being placed on the uncontested matrimonial calendar of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Westchester for the purpose of obtaining a divorce and incorporating by reference, but not merging, this Stipulation into the terms of any Judgment of Divorce.

This Stipulation shall not be invalidated or otherwise affected by the entry of a Judgment of Divorce. The obligations and covenants of this Stipulation shall be incorporated in any such Judgment of Divorce and shall not merge therein. This Stipulation may be enforced independently of any such decree or judgment."^[FN41]

Article VII of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Implementation Provision"), provides a clear understanding that both parties shall cooperate in the implementation of the agreements reached between them:

"The HUSBAND and WIFE shall, at any and all times, upon request by the other party or [*9]his or her legal representative, make, execute and deliver any and all such other and further instruments as may be necessary or desirable for the purpose of giving full force and effect to the provisions of this Stipulation, without charge therefore."^[FN42]

Article IX of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Child Support Provision"), sets forth the following pertaining to basic child support to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff pertaining to the Children and as to the parties' pro rata obligations as to other expenses of the Children:

"A. Commencing the first day of the month following the execution of this Stipulation, and continuing on the first of the month thereafter until the emancipation of the last Child to emancipate, the Father shall pay to the Mother, as and for the support and maintenance of the unemancipated Children, the sum of THREE THOUSALD FIVE HUNDRED AND 00/100 ($3,500.00) DOLLARS per month. Emancipation shall be defined as hereinafter set forth in this Stipulation. Said payments shall be made by no-fee electronic deposit (ACH or Zelle) to such account as the MOTHER may designate to the FATHER in writing. In the event the FATHER elects to utilize a electronic payment method that charges a fee the FATHER shall be responsible to ensure that the payment amount is modified to provide that the MOTHER shall receive a total of $3,500.00 net of fees.

As an additional element of child support, the parties shall proportionately share the expenses set forth herein below. The FATHER'S pro rata share is SEVENTY-FIVE (75%) PERCENT and the MOTHER'S pro rata share is TWENTY-FIVE (25%) PERCENT:

(1) All reasonable and necessary uninsured medical or health-related expenses for the Children. The term "medical or health-related expenses" shall include in-network medical care, hospitalization, specialists, dental care, optical care, pharmaceutical prescription expense, psychological and psychiatric treatment; and

(2) All reasonable and necessary child care expenses incurred by the MOTHER. The term "child care expenses" shall be defined as the unreimbursed child care expenses incurred by the MOTHER necessary to permit the MOTHER to work or to attend mandatory Continuing Legal Education (CLE) to maintain her employment and shall not include any sums charged by family members of either party nor any child care necessary for a parent to attend social or other non-employment related activities; and

(3) The cost of each Child to attend summer camp, the cost of which shall not exceed the cost of a North Castle Parks and Recreation Town Camp (unless otherwise agreed to in writing) — the parties specifically acknowledge and agree that the FATHER's contributions to Summer camp expenses set forth herein shall be paid in lieu of any unreimbursed child care expense for which the MOTHER might otherwise seek reimbursement during the period where one or more of the Children would otherwise be in child care as the term "child care" is defined in (2) above; and

(4) Educational expenses for the Children including: (A) pre-school (Pre-K) tuition for the Children not to exceed a total annual (for all children combined) tuition obligation for [*10]the FATHER of $9,000 unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties in writing; and (B) tutoring and test-preparation fees recommended or deemed necessary by the Children's educational providers; and

(5) The cost of mutually agreed upon extra-curricular activities for the Children."^[FN43]

Article X of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Life Insurance Provision"), provides an agreement wherein Defendant is required to promptly obtain life insurance designating the Children as irrevocable beneficiaries and Plaintiff as trustee:

"The FATHER shall maintain in full force and effect a term life insurance policy or combination of policies for the benefit of the children of the marriage, with an initial total death benefit in the amount of $500,000, which shall be sufficient to secure the FATHER's total basic monthly child support obligation and child support 'add-on' expenses through the emancipation of the last child to emancipate. Said children shall be irrevocable beneficiaries of such life insurance policies and coverage until emancipation. The FATHER shall designate the MOTHER as Trustee for the Children under said policies.

The FATHER shall be permitted to reduce the face amount of the policy(ies) on an annual basis by an amount equal to the total child support (basic and add-on) actually paid by him during the preceding calendar year, provided that at all times the remaining death benefit is sufficient to cover the total future child support and add-on obligations through the emancipation of the last child to emancipate.

Promptly after the execution of this Agreement, the HUSBAND shall deliver to the WIFE such insurance policies or certificates or instruments evidencing such irrevocable designation of the children as beneficiary under said insurance policies, and the HUSBAND further agrees that he will, at any time upon request, execute and deliver to the WIFE whatever instruments or documents or letters of authorization may be required to enable the WIFE to document that the HUSBAND has complied with all of the provisions hereof."^[FN44]

Article XII of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Marital Domicile Provision"), includes a provision that sets forth Defendant's obligations to provide payment of the expenses of the marital domicile until such time of the sale of the property:

"The parties acknowledge that they presently own and hold title to real property located at [Redacted], Armonk, New York 10504 (hereinafter 'the residence' and/or 'the marital residence').

The marital residence has been listed for sale by the parties and currently has an accepted offer and agreed upon contract of sale circulated between the parties and the anticipated buyer with closing likely to occur in or about August of 2025. Both parties have [*11]previously approved the written Contract of Sale required to facilitate the sale and closing of title to the marital residence and shall promptly execute, upon presentation, such other documents as may be required to facilitate the timely closing of title. Pursuant to the terms of the parties' prior STIPULATION (Custody/Parenting) the HUSBAND is solely responsible for the payment of the monthly mortgage payment (interest and principal) real estate taxes, homeowner's insurance, utilities and routine maintenance for the residence through the date of sale and closing of title.

The HUSBAND and WIFE represent and warrant that except for a first mortgage obligation with SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICES (Approximate Principal Balance $486,000.00) title to the residence is free and clear; that there are no other liens, encumbrances, or other mortgages on the residence."^[FN45]

Article III of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Litigation Award Provision"), sets forth the parties' agreement that Defendant would receive sole interest in his law firm while Defendant shall receive half of the net proceeds of two pending litigations:

"Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties acknowledge and agree that the WIFE shall be entitled to retain ONE-HALF (1/2) of any and all payments/fees received by the HUSBAND and/or [Redacted] for the following TWO (2) matters previously resolved in the New York State Division of Human Rights: (1) [Redacted] (Case No: [Redacted]); and [Redacted] (Case No. [Redacted]). The HUSBAND and/or his designated representative shall ensure that upon receipt of all or any portion of the aforesaid outstanding payments/fees the WIFE (or the WIFE's duly appointed designee in writing) shall be paid ONE-HALF (1/2) of any funds — including interest and/or penalties added to the aforesaid recoveries. Each party shall be solely responsible for any and all taxes on his or her ONE-HALF (1/2) share of such payments/fees."

Article XIV of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Debt Provision"), sets forth the following agreement of the parties pertaining to the allocation of responsibility for any debts:

"The HUSBAND and WIFE agree that the HUSBAND shall be solely responsible for the following liabilities and shall, now and forever, hold harmless and indemnify WIFE from any obligation(s) associated with such liabilities:

(1) All outstanding/unpaid tax obligations of the parties (individually and/or jointly) for the tax years 2023 and 2024 — including anticipated taxes for the 2024 filing which has not yet been finalized. The parties acknowledge that the precise total of these tax obligations is unknown to both parties but could exceed $75,000; and"^[FN46]

Article XVII of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Vehicle Provision"), sets forth the parties agreement as to the sale and distribution of net proceeds of a 2004 Crownline watercraft (hereinafter "Boat Provision"):

"The WIFE shall simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement transfer all her rights, title and interest in a certain 2006 HUMMER 112 automobile, a NISSAN FRONTIER and a 2004 CROWNLINE watercraft to the HUSBAND at no cost. As these vehicles will hereinafter be the sole and separate property of the HUSBAND free from any right or claim by the WIFE the HUSBAND shall be solely responsible for any and all costs and expenses associated with that vehicle including specifically, but not limited to: lease/loan payments, maintenance, repairs, excess-mileage or wear-and-tear charged, insurance and other similar costs and expenses. Notwithstanding the foregoing the parties agree that in the event the HUSBAND sells the 2004 CROWNLINE watercraft which is currently listed for sale on boattrader.com (list price $40,000.00) the WIFE shall be entitled to receive ONE-HALF (1/2) of the net sale proceeds. For the purposes of this provision the term 'net sale proceeds' shall be defined as the remaining proceeds after payment of required commissions, fees, transfer charges and applicable taxes."^[FN47]

Article XX of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Default Provision"), the parties set forth their understanding that in the event of an alleged breach by either the non-defaulting party would serve the defaulting party with a notice of default and demand for cure prior to seeking court intervention:

"In the event that either party fails to perform, violates the terms of this Agreement, defaults in the performance or breaches the terms of this Agreement (hereinafter the 'Defaulting Party'), then the other party (hereinafter the "Aggrieved Party") shall notify the defaulting party in writing stating the nature of the default and the corresponding applicable provisions of this Agreement. Such writing shall be sent to the Defaulting Party in accordance with the notice provisions of this Agreement and the Defaulting Party shall have fourteen (14) days after receipt of written notice to cure. In the event that the Defaulting Party fails to cure after the expiration of such fourteen (14) day period, the Aggrieved Party, or his or her successors, may commence such proceeding to enforce his/her rights with respect to the Agreement. If the Aggrieved Party shall substantially prevail in any such court proceedings and/or the matter is resolved in favor of the Aggrieved Party, then the Defaulting Party shall pay the Aggrieved Party the necessary and reasonable costs and expenses incurred, including but not limited to, all reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable expense of litigation actually incurred. The provisions of this article shall be in addition, and without prejudice to any of the rights and remedies to which the Aggrieved Party may be entitled."^[FN48]

Article XXII of the Stipulation of Settlement (hereinafter "Modification Provision"), sets forth the manner in which the parties agreed that modifications of the document would be made:

"Neither this Stipulation nor any provision herein shall be amended or modified or deemed amended or modified except by an agreement in writing duly subscribed and acknowledged with the same formality as this Stipulation. Any waiver by either party of [*12]any provision of this Stipulation, or any right or option hereunder, shall not be deemed a continuing waiver and shall not prevent or stop such party from thereafter enforcing such provision, right or option, and the failure of either party to insist in any one or more instances upon the strict performance of any of the terms or provisions of this Stipulation by the other party, shall not be construed as a waiver or relinquishment for the future of any such term or provision, but the same shall continue in full force and effect."^[FN49]

The signature page of the Stipulation of Settlement contains, in bold and all capital letters, the following recitals confirming the parties having read and understood the entirety of the agreement acknowledging the terms therein will be binding upon them:

"EACH OF THE PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGES:

I. THAT HE OR SHE HAS READ THIS STIPULATION;

II. THAT HE OR SHE UNDERSTANDS THE TERMS OF THIS STIPULATION;

III. THAT HE OR SHE UNDERSTANDS THT THIS STIPULATION WILL BE BINDING ON HIM OR HER IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING A DIVORCE OR THE DEATH OF THE PARTIES; AND THAT HE OR SHE HAS HAD A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT OF ITH COUNSEL OF HIS OR HER OWN SELECTION WITH RESPECT THERETO"^[FN50]

On July 29, 2025, a conference was held wherein the parties appeared with their then counsel during which the parties were subject to an allocution of the Stipulation of Settlement wherein both ratified their agreement to the terms therein as reflected by the so-ordered transcript of that conference (hereinafter "7/29/2025 Transcript").^[FN51]

On August 29, 2025, on consent of Plaintiff's then counsel, Defendant's then counsel filed a proposed judgment of divorce,^[FN52] which was later entered (hereinafter "Judgment of Divorce");^[FN53] and proposed qualified medical support order;^[FN54] which was later entered.^[FN55] Thereafter, neither party has asserted that either the Stipulation of Settlement or Judgment of Divorce have been modified, vacated or otherwise altered in any manner.

On December 29, 2025, acting as a self-represented litigant, Plaintiff filed a motion by [*13]order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 2"),^[FN56] seeking relief almost identical to that sought in Motion Sequence No. 3, which was conformed,^[FN57] directing service upon Defendant and GAL Guttridge, and requiring all parties to appear for oral argument at which time a briefing schedule would be set if needed.

On January 13, 2026, a conference was held before the undersigned wherein both parties appeared as self-represented litigants, along with GAL Guttridge, after which an order ^[FN58] was entered denying without prejudice the relief sought in Motion Sequence No. 2 and reappointing as guardian ad litem for Defendant GAL Guttridge.

On February 5, 2026, Motion Sequence No. 3 ^[FN59] was filed by order to show cause seeking the above-referenced relief, supported by Plaintiff's affirmation (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Affirmation"), which was conformed ^[FN60] on February 6, 2026 directing: (1) by February 18, 2026, Plaintiff serve Defendant personally with Motion Sequence No. 3; (2) by March 4, 2026, Defendant serve and file any answering submissions and/or cross motions; and, (3) by March 18, 2026, Plaintiff serving any answering submissions to any cross motions filed, with no reply submissions accepted, and this date serving as the return date for Motion Sequence No. 3 and any cross motions filed.

On February 5, 2026, pursuant to CPLR § 1202(c), GAL Guttridge filed as one submission a completed guardian ad litem consent to appointment and financial disclosure affirmation.^[FN61]

On February 24, 2026, acting as a self-represented litigant, Defendant filed an acknowledgement of service and waiver of personal service ^[FN62] providing the following statement:

"C.B., an attorney duly admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of New York, makes the following Acknowledgement of Service and Waiver of Personal Service under penalty of perjury pursuant to Rule 2106 of the CPLR.

1. I affirm this 24th day of February 2026, under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment, that the foregoing is true, except to matters alleged on information and belief and as to those matters I believe it to be true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law.

2. I am the Defendant in the above-captioned matter, am fully familiar with the facts recited herein and make this Acknowledgment of Service and Waiver of Personal [*14]Service.

3. I am an attorney duly admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of New York.

4. I am not in military service.

5. I acknowledge that on February 5 and 16, 2026, I received via NYSCEF and email a true and complete copy of the Order to Show Cause and all supporting papers (Motion Sequence No. 3; NYSCEF Doc No. 158 - 178, 180) to my email address [Redacted] and I acknowledge that I am registered to receive NYSCEF notifications for the above-captioned matter.

6. I acknowledge that the Order to Show Cause contains the statutory warning language advising that my failure to appear in Court may result in my immediate arrest and imprisonment for contempt of Court and the purpose of this proceeding is to punish me for contempt of Court, and that such punishment may consist of fines, imprisonment or both, according to law.

7. I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to review these papers and to discuss this Acknowledgment of Service and Waiver of Personal Service with my duly appointed Guardian Ad Litem John Guttridge, Esq. prior to my signing of this document.

8. I hereby waive personal service of the Order to Show Cause and all supporting papers.

9. Pursuant to CPLR 312-a and/or CPLR 2103, I hereby acknowledge receipt of the above referenced papers; I hereby waive personal service of the above-referenced papers; and I hereby consent to the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over me.

10. I understand that the Court has ordered that I have until March 4, 2026 to file any answering submissions and/or cross-motions in response to the Order to Show Cause.

11. I make this Acknowledgement of Service and Waiver of Personal Service under penalty of perjury.

12. I execute this Acknowledgment of Service and Waiver of Personal Service knowingly, voluntarily, and with full understanding of its legal effect."

Despite Defendant having presented this confirmation of service of Motion Sequence No. 3, Defendant has thereafter failed to file any answering submissions pertaining to this application, failed to request an adjournment to do so, and this Court has received no further filings pertaining to this application.

A party may be denied certain relief if the parties to a stipulation had required the service of a notice of default with a cure period prior to the commencement of litigation and such notice was not filed (see Carroll v. Carroll, 244 AD2d 311 [2d Dept 1997]). Plaintiff's Affirmation sets forth the good faith efforts Plaintiff engaged in seeking to obtain Defendant's compliance with his obligations pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement and Judgment of Divorce which exceeded the service of a notice of default referenced in the Default Provision:

"I have made repeated good faith efforts to obtain compliance without Court intervention, including demands made on or about September 18, October 16, November 21 and November 24, 2025 by my counsel from the divorce proceedings (James J. [*15]Sexton, Esq.) by emails and phone calls, copies of which are annexed hereto as Exhibit '8'. On January 13, 2026, I sent Defendant and Defendant's Guardian Ad Litem (John Guttridge, Esq.) ('GAL') a Notice to Cure letter pursuant to Article XX of the Stipulation (See, Exhibit '2', page 40) notifying Defendant of the fourteen (14) day period to cure the default. The Notice to Cure letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit '9'. On January 20, 2026, I sent Defendant and the GAL a follow up letter with updated arrears calculations and additional supporting documents, as well as notifying Defendant that if payment was not received by February 4, 2026 then I would proceed with filing an Order to Show Cause. The follow up letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit '10'. These good faith efforts were unsuccessful, and Defendant has failed to make any payment."^[FN63]

To the extent that the Default Provision within the Stipulation of Settlement constitutes a condition precedent to the commencement of post-judgment litigation asserting either party had engaged in a default of the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement, it is determined that Plaintiff has met the requirements affording Defendant ample opportunity to address Plaintiff's concerns raised in the instant application without the necessity of seeking the intervention of this Court.

As Defendant has appeared in the initial litigation both as a self-represented party and with counsel, and thereafter in this post-judgment litigation solely as a self-represented litigant, this Court turns to the ramifications of Defendant acting as his own counsel. CPLR § 321(a) affords litigants the right to appear in person (pro se) or with counsel. When appearing with counsel, the Court of Appeals has noted, "[a]n individual's right to select an attorney who he believes is most capable of providing competent representation implicates both the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of association and the Sixth Amendment right of counsel and will not yield unless confronted with some overriding competing public interest" (see Matter of Abrams, 62 NY2d 183 [1984] [internal citations omitted]). This right is no different for those who practice law as, "[a]n attorney, like any other litigant, has the right both constitutional and statutory" to select their own legal counsel (see Herczi v. Finsilver, 153 AD3d 1336 [2d Dept 2017] [internal citations omitted]).

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that while an attorney-litigant may have the right to represent themselves, it may not always be the best course of action:

"Even a skilled lawyer who represents himself is at a disadvantage in contested litigation. Ethical considerations may make it inappropriate for him to appear as a witness. He is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making sure that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen developments in the courtroom. The *438 adage that "a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client" [*16]is the product of years of experience by seasoned litigators." (Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 [1991]).

Even as a self-represented litigant, the attorney remains an "assistant to the court in search of a just solution to disputes" (see Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48 [2013]), and as noted by the Court of Appeals when discussing an attorney's ethics duties to the Court:

"'Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.' *** The appellant was received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an officer of *471 the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His co-operation with the court was due, whenever justice would be imperiled if co-operation was withheld" (People ex. Rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 NY 465 [1928], quoting In re Rouss, 221 NY 81 [1917]).

This high burden may be difficult for certain self-represented attorneys as they seek to proceed as a litigant understandably laden with emotion and an attorney bound to act ethically (see Klein ex rel. Klein v. Seenauth, 180 Misc 2d 213 [Civ. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1999] ["If deemed necessary, financial sanctions will suffice. Instead, the court is compelled to admonish members of the Bar that the mere avoidance of monetary sanctions is not the standard to be fostered. It is our collective duty to always remember that 'A lawyer should maintain high standards of proper conduct and should encourage other lawyers to do likewise' (Code, EC 1-5)"]).

Notably, attorneys appearing for clients or as self-represented litigants, are chargeable with knowledge of the law and may not seek refuge in the lack thereof (see People v. Johnson, 252 387 [1930]; see also Poucher v. Blanchard, 41 Sickels 256 [1881] quoting Foster v. Wiley, 27 Mich. 244 [1873] ["When one puts his case against another into the hands of an attorney for suit, it is a reasonable presumption that the authority he intends to confirm upon the attorney includes such action, as the latter, in his superior knowledge of the law, may decide to be legal, proper and necessary in the prosecution of the demand; and consequently, whatever adverse proceedings may be taken by the attorney are to be considered, so far as they affect the defendant in the suit, as approved by the client in advance, and, therefore, as his act even though they prove unwarranted by the law"]). Thus, an attorney acting as a self-represented litigant will be the beneficiary of their own legal counsel which may either advance their objectives or ultimately be to their detriment.

With the above in mind, this Court is troubled by Defendant's conduct throughout this litigation. Beyond falling short of the professional expectations of officers of the Court, Defendant's actions constitute an unmistakable pattern of domestic violence against Plaintiff which, in part, are economic in nature seeking to cause her financial and professional reputational harm. Discussing economic abuse in the context of domestic violence, attorney Susan L. Pollet noted:

"Domestic violence has been defined as 'a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.' Domestic violence can be any 'physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of actions that influence another person.' The economic abuse component of domestic violence has been defined as '[m]aking or attempting to make an individual financially dependent by maintaining total control over financial resources, withholding one's access to money, or forbidding one's attendance at school or [*17]employment.' Economic abuse is specifically listed on what is known as the Power and Control Wheel, *41 a model that is used 'extensively in women's shelters and support groups.' While domestic violence in general and economic abuse in particular are perpetrated and suffered by both men and women, the sad truth is that the most of such victims are women.

* * *

Why does economic abuse matter? According to the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, *** [d]omestic violence can create serious obstacles that prevent victims from achieving economic security and self-sufficiency. By controlling and limiting the victim's access to financial resources, a batterer ensures that the victim will be financially limited if he/she chooses to leave the relationship. As a result, victims of domestic violence are often forced to choose between staying in an abusive relationship and facing economic hardship, which could possibly result in extreme poverty and homelessness.18" (see Economic Abuse: The Unseen Side of Domestic Violence, 83-Feb NYSBJ 40)

In a recent decision entered in a matrimonial action, being strikingly similar to this action, wherein the defendant husband engaged in violation of the automatic orders by unlawfully spending marital funds during the litigation, the court determined that he had engaged in economic abuse of his spouse requiring court action:

"Even accepting, en arguendo, the Husband's narrow interpretation that harm akin to domestic violence is a pre-requisite to the award of an advance — that standard is met in this case. The Husband's conduct in purchasing the neighboring properties surrounding the shared vacation home deceitfully designed to interfere and annoy the Wife was an act of domestic violence as it was a clear example of financial coercive control. (See S.L. v D.E., 2024 NY Misc. LEXIS 2618, at *10 [Sup Ct, NY Cnty June 26, 2024][Chesler, J.]["Financial abuse of a spouse is domestic violence; even without a bruise the harm is still potent, and this Court must not turn a blind eye to such conduct."]; Estate of Aisha R., 2023 NYLJ LEXIS 1389, at *9-10 [Fam Ct, Kings Cnty June 5, 2023]["Courts have begun to recognize the non-physical aspects of domestic violence and to provide relief for survivors of coercive and controlling relationships just as if they had experienced physical injury."]). This tactic is made more concerning because of the immense power imbalance between the Wife and the Husband. Whereas the Wife is dependent on the Husband's compliance with court orders (which he has shown to be lacking), the Husband has, in effect, unlimited resources. He used these resources to essentially confine and control the Wife even when she is supposed to be afforded separate use and occupancy. The Husband's superior position with regards to the resources of the marital estate was the means for his abuse and "this Court must not turn a blind eye to such conduct" and "provide relief [...] as if [the Wife] had experienced physical injury." Thus, the Husband's erroneous interpretation of Havell equally commands this conclusion." (Anonymous v. Anonymous, 83 Misc 3d 1283 (A) (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty. 2024]).

Here, the undisputed facts of this case reflect a clear pattern of coercive control of Plaintiff by Defendant in that he has utilized his control of the parties' finances to wield power over Plaintiff while jeopardizing the well-being of the Children who remained in the custodial [*18]care of Plaintiff. Discussing the danger of coercive control on children even after the physical separation of parents, one recent decision noted:

"The impact is not limited to children who witness physical violence. 'As one court quoted an expert, '[the domestic violence] isn't necessarily physical but may be more dangerous because it's emotional and much harder to detect.' ' Lisa Tucker, Domestic Violence as a Factor in Child Custody Determinations: Considering Coercive Control, 90 Fordham L. Rev. 2673, 2677 (quoting G.I. v J.S., CK16-03072, 2017 WL 4792366, at *4 [Del Fam Ct May 18, 2017]). The effect can be serious and long term. 'Children who witness domestic violence can suffer serious emotional symptoms including internalizing symptoms (e.g., anxiety, depression, fear, shame, social withdrawal, somatic complaints, bedwetting, poor concentration) and externalizing symptoms (e.g., aggression, impulsivity, bullying, criminal behaviors).' Debra Pogrund Stark et. al., Properly Accounting for Domestic Violence in Child Custody Cases: An Evidence-Based Analysis and Reform, 26 Mich J Gender & L 1, 22 [2019]. And the physical separation of the parents does not mean the end of risk of harm, as 'post-separation, perpetrators/fathers can continue to target coercive control at children as well as at their ex-partners .... Like adult victims/survivors, many of the children and young people were living under conditions of constraint and entrapment, and coercive control could severely harm their emotional/psychological, social and physical wellbeing and their educational achievement.' Emma Katz, Anna Nikupeteri & Merja Laitinen, When Coercive Control Continues to Harm Children: Post-Separation Fathering, Stalking and Domestic Violence, 29 Child Abuse Rev. 310, 322 (2020) (internal citation omitted)." (K.E. v. A.E., 87 Misc 3d 1213(A)(Fam. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2025]).

As the parties worked together in Defendant's law firm prior to commencement, Defendant controlled Plaintiff's employment and access to her earnings. Defendant's Text Messages sent to Plaintiff prior to her commencement of this action were without question a wholesale attack on Plaintiff's person both individually and as a professional working for Defendant, compelling her to seek emergency relief from this Court. Following commencement, Defendant acknowledged expending nearly $300,000.00 on TikTok asserting the use of these funds as business expenses for [Redacted]. During this time and while making these "gifts" on TikTok, Defendant failed to provide support for Plaintiff and the Children. The severity of Plaintiff's financial situation during this period is underscored upon review of Defendant's SNW, reflecting less than one thousand dollars of available liquid funds as of the date of commencement for the payment of the family living expenses, with a shortfall of nearly seventy thousand dollars between the stated income of the parties and their annual expenses. Notably, despite Defendant's representations to this Court that his TikTok expenditures were business expenses for [Redacted], Defendant's SNW listed no such entity or business interests held by Defendant aside from his law firm.

During the course of this litigation, this Court has admonished Defendant directing that he comport himself as required by an officer of the Court, due to his conduct which included a lack of decorum during court appearances and a failure to comply with orders of this Court. These warnings appear to have been to no avail, due to the unrefuted conduct of Defendant post-judgment. In a continuation of domestic violence, economic abuse and coercive control against Plaintiff by Defendant, he has failed to comply with his financial obligations to support Plaintiff [*19]and the Children post-judgement while making TikTok posts cavalierly referring to the funds that he expends as noted in exhibit 18 ^[FN64] to the instant application:

"Tiktok 8.22.25 cash.mp4

(1:08) "My money ain't never gone. Watch this. Now we do this shit. [Defendant hold up stacks of $100 bills cash]. One time we threw it in the pool. Remember I threw it in the pool to you. [Defendant laughs] I did throw it. We were. I was like here's a hundred bucks player. [Defendant hold up stacks of $100 bills cash] . . .

(1:40) I give it to charity guys. I'll give this shit to a bum. [Defendant holds up stacks of $100 bills cash]. We'll go up to a bum. Thank you guys.

(1:49) I just got this in my pocket. (Defendant holds up stacks of $100 bills cash]. Got a rack. Just threw a rack in the pocket.

Tiktok 11.28.25 thirty grand.mp4

(1:50) Who cares? It's my money. If I wanted to blow forty grand in a night. I've blown thirty grand in a night on TikTok. Literally I've blown thirty thousand dollars with all of my accounts [Redacted], [Redacted] and the [Redacted]. I've dropped ten like a million coins each. If I want to do that every night. First of all that's unsustainable. But secondly if I wanted to, who cares? Who cares?

Tiktok 12.1.25 cash, universe.mp4

Defendant holds up stacks of $100 bills cash, sends TikTok universe gift to a TikTok user. This is but one sample as Defendant has posted numerous TikTok videos showing the TikTok gifts he sends to TikTok users.

Tiktok 2.4.26 twenty grand.mp4

I've spent a lot of money, too. I probably spent like twenty thousand dollars out of my own pocket. You know I spend money, right? You know twenty thousand that's nothing. That's two million coins."

While Defendant has been posting these messages online, Plaintiff asserts that she and the Children have suffered, as their housing has been placed in jeopardy due to Defendant's failure to make the required mortgage payments for the former marital domicile for over six months, with arrears of $31,962.37 as of January 13, 2026, as evidenced by the mortgage statement she filed as exhibit 4.^[FN65] Further threat to Plaintiff and the Children's housing is confirmed by Plaintiff having received a delinquency notice from the lender, threatening foreclosure, which she submitted as exhibit 11.^[FN66] During this period, Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant failed to pay the Con Edison payments for the former marital domicile causing the gas to be turned off in November of 2025, pointing to a statement annexed as exhibit 5 with [*20]$1,463.97 due from Defendant.^[FN67] Finally, Plaintiff claims Defendant has failed to pay his obligations towards expenses associated with the maintenance of the former marital domicile totaling $4,108 directing the Court to exhibit 7.^[FN68]

Beyond Plaintiff's claims that Defendant has failed to comply with his obligations pertaining to the former marital domicile, Plaintiff asserts that he has failed to pay $1,630.66 arising out of her 2024 tax obligations, owes $28,279.65 in child support arrears, failed to provide proof of his obtaining life insurance collateralizing his financial obligations set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement, failed to provide her with the status of the sale of Defendant's boat for which she is entitled to a portion of the net proceeds, and failed to provide her with payment of $54,586.89 arising out of two legal cases she worked on while employed in Defendant's law firm directing the Court's attention to exhibits 6, 12-15.^[FN69]

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has violated the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement by publicly making derogatory statements about her on TikTok which are set forth in exhibit 17 (hereinafter "Defendant's Derogatory Statements")^[FN70] :

"Tiktok live 11.22.25 Jersey.mp4

(0:00)"They were in a bougie nice area until she freaked the fuck out. Dumb bitch. [Defendant holds up middle fingers] Like who the fuck goes to Jersey?... You wanna know what really made her freak out? You wanna know what really made everybody freak out? Like truly. It was this sort of shit [Defendant shows images of sending TikTok "universe" gifts] . . . This was the final straw for C.B. Once I started doing this shit it was all game over. Game over . . . Whatever . . . [Defendant holds up middle fingers] Clip that you dumb bitch . . . In your fucking face bruh. You could've had a conversation [changes voice to mock Plaintiff] 'But I'm so afraid, I can't speak to C.B.' Eat your fucking heart out. [Defendant holds up middle fingers and throws punches]."

Plaintiff requests that this Court grant her relief due to the prejudice she has suffered due to the conduct of Defendant:

"Defendant's non-compliance has caused me prejudice, including but not limited to undue financial hardship, inability to meet ordinary living expenses, and risk of foreclosure. As a result of Defendant's non-compliance, I have suffered financial hardship and have been forced to cover expenses that the Defendant was ordered to pay, negatively affecting the stability and welfare of the children and myself. A potential foreclosure proceeding would be highly prejudicial to me as the former marital residence is the primary asset that I retained in the divorce proceedings, and Defendant's failure to comply with payment obligations will negatively impact and prejudice my rights. Pursuant to the "So Ordered" Stipulation, I "shall retain, as the sole and separate property [*21]of the [Plaintiff], free from any right or claim by the [Defendant], the full net sale proceeds from the sale of the marital residence." (Exhibit "2", page 31, paragraph 4). It should also be noted that, on July 22, 2025, American Express brought an action in Westchester County Supreme Court against the Defendant and his law firm [Redacted] for the unpaid charges of $229,584.68 and $38,503.47 ([Redacted]; Index No. [Redacted]). Due to Defendant's failure to pay the mortgage, utilities and maintenance expenses, my net sale proceeds from the sale of the former marital residence will be significantly diminished. Due to the Defendant's continued non-compliance, court intervention is necessary to enforce the Order and protect the financial stability and welfare of the children and myself.

I respectfully request that the Court grant the relief sought in the accompanying Order to Show Cause, together with such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper."^[FN71]

Acting as his own counsel, chargeable with knowledge of the applicable law to this application, this Court is perplexed by Defendant's conduct as a litigant and officer of this Court. Despite Defendant having filed an acknowledgement of service of the instant application, confirming the possibility of incarceration if held in contempt and the deadline to file responsive submissions, Defendant has neither filed any responsive submissions or requested an adjournment to do so. Instead, this Court is left with all allegations against Defendant by Plaintiff being unrefuted, with Defendant having produced no proof that these claims are false or that he has taken any steps to cure the defaults following Plaintiff's service of e-mails, notices to cure and the filing of this motion. This is troubling, as Defendant is an attorney who has also been appointed GAL Guttridge as his guardian ad litem, being an attorney who focuses his practice in the fields of matrimonial and family law, ably suited to assist Defendant.

CPLR § 5011 provides, "[a] judgment is the determination of the rights of the parties in an action or special proceeding and may be either interlocutory or final." The Court of Appeals has held, "[a] judgment is the law's last word in a judicial controversy, it being the final determination by a court of the rights of the parties upon matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding" (Towley v. King Arthur Rings, Inc., 40 NY2d 129 [1976]). A party seeking relief from a judgment may seek such relief by motion, stipulation of application to an administrative judge pursuant to CPLR § 5015 or by appeal pursuant to CPLR § 5512, including seeking a stay from an appellate court pursuant to CPLR § 5519 (see Bhandary v. Bhandary, 50 AD3d 612 [2d Dept 2008]). To the extent that a party is seeking to attack a stipulation, the terms of which are incorporated by reference but not merged into a judgment of divorce, they may do so by commencement of a plenary proceeding (see Jagassar v. Deonarine, 191 AD3d 650 [2d Dept 2021]).

Here, the procedural history reflects that the Judgment of Divorce was entered by this Court approximately six months prior to this decision and during that time no party has sought [*22]any relief from the judgment under CPLR § 5015, 5512, 5519 or otherwise. Therefore, the Judgment of Divorce remains in effect and both parties are bound to comply with the directives set forth therein, including the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which are incorporated by reference therein.

"Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2214(a) provides that '[a] notice of motion shall specify ... the relief demanded and the grounds therefor.' " However, the court "may grant relief that is warranted by the facts plainly appearing on the papers on both sides, if the relief granted is not too dramatically unlike the relief sought, the proof offered supports it, and there is no prejudice to any party" (Evans v. Argent Mort. Co., LLC, 120 AD3d 618 [2d Dept 2014], quoting Frankel v. Stavsky, 40 AD3d 918 [2d Dept 2007]).

In a recent case decided by the Hon. Ariel D. Chesler, J.S.C., the decision set forth the challenges faced in high conflict matrimonial actions and when prior restraints on speech may be made:

"One common and frequent direction given by Courts dealing with high conflict custody cases is that neither parent disparage the other in the presence of the children and that they not discuss the litigation with the children (see e.g. Matter of Brown v Simon, 195 AD3d 806 [2d Dept 2021]["the parties are specifically prohibited from making derogatory or denigrating statements concerning each other in the child's presence or in the presence of 'those who have contact with the child' "]). This is because, as was once remarked, Courts are often concerned that "one of the problems in open matrimonial proceedings is the effect it would have on children of the marriage. While adult parties in today's media-conscious world may be found to have no valid objection to having their dirty linen aired, the same cannot be said of the children who are the innocent victims of both their parents and the media." (Lisa C.-R v William R, 166 Misc 2d 817, 822 [Sup Ct, NY Cnty 1995]).

Critically, an order imposing a prior restraint on speech "must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case" (Karantinidis v Karantinidis, 186 AD3d 1502, 1503 [2d Dept 2020]).

Another recent impression on this issue comes from the Second Department's decision in Kassenoff v Kasennoff (213 AD3d 822 [2d Dep't 2023]). Notable from this decision is that the Second Department upheld an order preventing both parents from "criticizing, denigrating or disparaging the other on any form of social media." Even with reference to the language Kassenoff found impermissible, it becomes clear the restraints here are of no constitutional concern. Outside of the upheld social media restrictions, the Court was confronted with a restraint that "prohibit[ed] the defendant from discussing the children with any employee of the plaintiff's employer[.]" (Id. at 824). The Second Department held such restriction unconstitutional because it was " 'not tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of this case.' " (Id. citing Karantinidis v Karantinidis, 186 AD3d 1502, 1503 [2d Dep't 2020]). Kassenoff reasoned against upholding that restraint on speech because, "specifically, the restriction prohibiting the defendant from discussing the children with any employee of the plaintiff's employer ... was not [*23]necessary to prevent professional reputational harm to the plaintiff or financial or emotional harm to the children." (Id. at 824).

The well-settled standard for issuing a restraint on speech in matrimonial matters is that, "[a]n injunctive order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order. The Order must be tailored to the exact needs of the case." (Karantinidis v Karantinidis, 186 AD3d 1502, 1503 [2d Dept 2020])." (M.D.S. v. E.W., 83 Misc 3d 1249(A) [Sup Ct NY Cty 2024]).

Here, as the parties set forth their agreement regarding limitations on their future speech pertaining to each other within the Stipulation of Settlement, this Court turns to a recent decision entered by the Appellate Division Second Department pertaining to the manner within which such agreements may be enforced:

""The terms of a separation agreement incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce operate as contractual obligations binding on the parties" (Matter of Gravlin v. Ruppert, 98 NY2d 1, 5, 743 N.Y.S.2d 773, 770 N.E.2d 561; see DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 104 AD3d 901, 902, 962 N.Y.S.2d 328). " 'A matrimonial settlement is a contract subject to principles of contract interpretation, and a court should interpret the contract in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning' " (Matter of Glick v. Ruland, 185 AD3d 926, 928, 128 N.Y.S.3d 652, quoting Matter of Filosa v. Donnelly, 94 AD3d 760, 760, 941 N.Y.S.2d 671). " 'Where such an agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face, the parties' intent must be construed from the four corners of the agreement, and not from extrinsic evidence' " (Schonfeld v. Saucedo, 159 AD3d 756, 758, 73 N.Y.S.3d 208, quoting Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 50 AD3d 851, 851—852, 857 N.Y.S.2d 170). " 'A court may not write into a contract conditions the parties did not insert by adding or excising terms under the guise of construction, nor may it construe the language in such a way as would distort the contract's apparent meaning' " (Matter of Bokor v. Markel, 104 AD3d 683, 683, 960 N.Y.S.2d 202, quoting Matter of Tillim v. Fuks, 221 AD2d 642, 643, 634 N.Y.S.2d 508). " 'The words and phrases used in an agreement must be given their plain meaning so as to define the rights of the parties' " (id.). (Karakash v. Karakash, 2023 WL 603228 [2d Dept 2026]).

The terms of the Non-Disparagement Provision of the Stipulation of Settlement are clear and unambiguous on their face as both parties agreed not to "disturb or trouble the other or interfere with the peace and comforted of the other", "in any way molest, disturb, annoy, harass, threaten or malign the other party *** in any manner whatsoever or interfere with the peace and comfort of the other party", or "at any time make statements to each other or third persons which are derogatory of the other or which shall reflect disparagingly on the character, reputation or personal habits of the other party." While Defendant's Derogatory Statements do not reference Plaintiff by name, Plaintiff asserts that they are a reference to her and this allegation has gone unrefuted by Defendant. This Court therefore determines that the Defendant's Derogatory Statements are a violation of the Non-Disparagement Provision of the Stipulation of Settlement, as they were made by Defendant pertaining to Plaintiff, which reflected disparagingly on her character, reputation and personal habits, having maligned the Plaintiff causing interference with [*24]her peace and comfort, which are likely to result in her reputational harm.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's requested relief is granted to the extent that both parties are required by law to comply with the directives set forth within the Judgment of Divorce; and by March 31, 2026, Defendant shall delete Defendant's Derogatory Statements from all locations including but not limited to online internet sites such as TikTok, and file an affirmation confirming that this directive has been effectuated; and that Defendant comply with the ethical responsibilities as an attorney and officer of the Court. This Court finds that to the extent this directive constitutes a further restraint on Defendant's freedom of speech beyond what the parties agreed to within the Stipulation of Settlement, such restriction is narrowly tailored to the exact needs of this case to prevent professional reputational harm to Plaintiff, and any resulting financial harm to Plaintiff and the Children arising therefrom. This Court further finds that the relief granted is not too dramatically unlike the relief sought by Plaintiff in this instant application, the proof offered supports it, and there is no prejudice to any party as it merely enforces the contractual terms previously agreed to by the parties in the Stipulation of Settlement.

To the extent that a former spouse has been determined to have engaged in a default of a monetary obligation set forth in a judgment of divorce, a money judgment may be entered (see Maitland v. Maitland, 220 AD3d 762 [2d Dept 2023] ["Also, since the defendant defaulted on her obligation to pay the plaintiff the sums of $210 and $44,093.28 as required by the judgment of divorce, pursuant to the terms of the judgment of divorce, the plaintiff is entitled to a money judgment against the defendant reflecting these amounts."]).

Pursuant to clear and unambiguous terms of the Marital Domicile Provision of the Stipulation of Settlement, Defendant was required to provide payment of the carrying costs of the former marital domicile. Plaintiff has asserted that Defendant has failed to pay $31,962.37 in mortgage payments, $870.08 for Consolidated Edison payments, and $30,279.18 in home maintenance payments, totaling $63,111.63. As Defendant has failed to refute these factual assertions or even file a responsive submission with respect to this application, the Court determines that Defendant has defaulted in his obligations to Plaintiff as set forth in the Marital Domicile Provision, in the payment of carrying costs associated with the marital domicile totaling $63,111.63.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded a money judgment against Defendant in the sum of $63,111.63. In order to effectuate this determination and award, by March 31, 2026, Plaintiff shall submit to this Court, with notice of settlement served upon Defendant via certified mail and e-mail, a proposed money judgment.

Pursuant to clear and unambiguous terms of the Debt Provision of the Stipulation of [*25]Settlement, Defendant was required to provide payment of the Plaintiff's 2024 tax obligations.

Plaintiff has asserted that Defendant has failed to pay $1,630.66 for Plaintiff's 2024 tax obligation. As Defendant has failed to refute these factual assertions or even file a responsive submission with respect to this application, the Court determines that Defendant has defaulted in his obligations to Plaintiff as set forth in the Debt Provision, in the payment of Plaintiff's 2024 tax obligations totaling $1,630.66.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded a money judgment against Defendant in the sum of $1,630.66. In order to effectuate this determination and award, by March 31, 2026, Plaintiff shall submit to this Court, with notice of settlement served upon Defendant via certified mail and e-mail, a proposed money judgment.

Pursuant to clear and unambiguous terms of the Litigation Award Provision of the Stipulation of Settlement, Defendant was required to provide payment to Plaintiff equivalent of half of the net proceeds of the two subject litigations.

Plaintiff has asserted that Defendant has failed to pay $56,774.49 for Plaintiff's obligation, however in her own submissions indicates that this amount is "estimated" thereby conceding that she is unaware of the exact amount that she is to receive from the subject litigations and does not assert that any funds were even received by Defendant triggering such payment to Plaintiff. Accordingly, this Court cannot determine that Defendant has violated the Litigation Award Provision and award Plaintiff the money judgment she is seeking for the "estimated" amount she claims is due her. Instead, this Court shall require Defendant to file an affirmation providing the status of any efforts made to obtain payment to his firm on the subject litigations.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's request for the entry of a money judgment of $56,774.49 arising out of the Litigation Award Provision of the Stipulation of Settlement is denied. However, by April 15, 2026, Defendant shall file an affirmation providing the status of the payment to Plaintiff's firm of funds arising out of the subject litigations and if the funds have been received, shall file proof of payment to Plaintiff in compliance with the Litigation Award Provision by filing a copy of a bank check payable to Plaintiff equal to half the net proceeds of the subject litigations.

Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous terms of the Vehicle Provision and Implementation Provision, Defendant is required to provide half of the net proceeds of the sale of the subject boat to Plaintiff and the parties were to cooperate with all efforts needed to effectuate the provisions of the agreement.

Based upon the foregoing, by April 15, 2026, Defendant shall file an affirmation providing the status of the sale of the boat and if sold, shall file proof of payment to Plaintiff in compliance with the Vehicle Provision by filing a copy of a bank check payable to Plaintiff equal to half the net proceeds of the subject boat.

Pursuant to clear and unambiguous terms of the Child Support Provision of the Stipulation of Settlement, Defendant was required to provide child support payments to Plaintiff for both basic child support and child support add-ons.

Plaintiff has asserted that Defendant has failed to pay $28,279.65 for Plaintiff's child support obligations. As Defendant has failed to refute these factual assertions or even file a responsive submission with respect to this application, the Court determines that Defendant has defaulted in his obligations to Plaintiff as set forth in the Child Support Provision in the payment of $28,279.65.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is awarded a money judgment against Defendant in the sum of $28,279.65. In order to effectuate this determination and award, by March 31, 2026, Plaintiff shall submit to this Court, with notice of settlement served upon Defendant via certified mail and e-mail, a proposed money judgment.

Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous terms of the Life Insurance Provision of the Stipulation of Settlement, Defendant was required to promptly following the execution of the agreement provide Plaintiff with proof of life insurance on the life of Defendant as required within the Life Insurance Provision.

Plaintiff has asserted that Defendant has failed to provide such proof of Defendant's life insurance as required in the Life Insurance Provision. As Defendant has failed to refute these factual assertions or even file a responsive submission with respect to this application, the Court determines that Defendant has defaulted in his obligations to Plaintiff as set forth in the Life Insurance Provision in the failure to provide proof of insurance.

Based upon the foregoing, by April 15, 2026, Defendant shall file proof of compliance with the Life Insurance Provision in the form of a certificate of insurance/insurance declarations page confirming the agreed-upon face amount, designated beneficiaries, and designated trustee; and proof of payment of premium.

When presented with an application seeking to adjudicate a party in contempt, the reviewing court must hold a hearing if issues of fact are raised, but may dispense with the need for a hearing if no factual dispute exists as to the responding party's conduct as alleged in the motion submissions (see Gomes v. Gomes, 106 AD3d 868 [2d Dept 2013]; see also Department of Environmental Protection of City of New York v. Department of Environmental Conservation of the State of New York, 70 NY2d 233 [1987]).

As Defendant failed to file any answering submissions to the instant application, and thereby has not refuted any of the factual allegations set forth in Motion Sequence No. 3, this Court determines that all such factual allegations are not in dispute and therefore, no hearing is required for this Court to proceed with a determination as to the request to hold Defendant in contempt.

When a request is made to adjudicate a party in contempt, it is necessary for the reviewing court to clearly indicate if its review pertains to either or both civil and criminal contempt (see Matter of Drimmer, 97 AD2d 792 [2d Dept 1983]; see also Powell v. Clauss, 93 AD2d 883 [2d Dept 1983 ["The record before this court fails to indicate whether defendant was adjudged guilty of civil or criminal contempt, and at the hearing which must be conducted, the course being pursued must be made clear."]).

"In matrimonial actions, Domestic Relations Law § 245 grants the court authority to punish a party for civil contempt pursuant to Judiciary Law § 756 where the party defaults 'in paying any sum of money' required by a judgment or order,' 'and it appears presumptively, to the satisfaction of the court, that payment cannot be enforced' pursuant to the enforcement mechanisms provided in Domestic Relations Law §§ 243 and 244 and CPLR 5241 and 5242" (Rhodes v. Rhodes, 137 AD3d 890 [2d dept 2016]). The Appellate Division Second Department has set forth the manner within which a trial court should evaluate an application to adjudicate a party in civil contempt instructing:

"The goal of civil contempt is to vindicate the rights of a private party to the litigation. Accordingly, '[a]ny penalty imposed is designed not to punish but, rather, to compensate the injured private party or to coerce compliance with the court's mandate or both'. In contrast, criminal contempt 'involves an offense against judicial authority and is utilized to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to compel respect for its mandates.' A motion to punish a party for civil contempt is addressed to the sound discretion of the motion court. 'To prevail on a motion to punish for civil contempt, the movant must establish by clear and convincing evidence: '(1) that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect, (2) that the party against whom contempt is sought disobeyed the order, (3) that the party who disobeyed the order had knowledge of its terms, and (4) that the movant was prejudiced by the offending conduct' ' The movant has the burden of proving contempt by clear and convincing evidence. Since the goal of civil contempt is to vindicate the rights of a private party, the element of prejudice is essential. The movant can show prejudice where the actions of the alleged contemnor 'were calculated to or actually did defeat, impair, impede, or prejudice the rights or remedies of a party' " (Madigan v. Berkeley Capital, LLC, 205 AD3d 900 [2d Dept 2022] [internal citations omitted]).

In reversing a trial court decision to hold an individual in contempt for alleged violations of a parties' stipulation of settlement arising out of a matrimonial action, the Appellate Division Second Department noted that the subject provisions of the stipulation provided no timeframe for which payment of the particular financial obligations were to be made and therefore did not constitute a clear and unequivocal mandate:

"The Supreme Court should not have held the plaintiff in contempt. Where a provision of an order or judgment sought to be enforced creates an obligation to pay a sum of money, but does not provide a time within which payment is to be made, it does not constitute a clear and unequivocal mandate. Here, although a time frame for payment was provided, the stipulation also expressly permitted the defendant *797 to extend that deadline. Moreover, the defendant acknowledged that he assured the plaintiff that he would wait to receive the remainder of the payment he claims remains due, extending the deadline indefinitely. Under these circumstances, the defendant did not meet his burden of [*26]showing that the plaintiff's delay in payment constituted a failure to comply with a clear and unequivocal mandate which would support holding her in contempt." (Dahan v. Dahan, 237 AD3d 794 [2d Dept 2025]).

(a) Defendant's Obligations Pertaining to Marital Domicile

The Judgment of Divorce constituted a lawful order of the court which incorporated by reference, but did not merge, the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which was in effect including the Marital Domicile Provision which includes in paragraph 3 that, "Pursuant to the terms of the parties' prior STIPULATION (Custody/Parenting) the HUSBAND is solely responsible for the payment of the monthly mortgage payment (interest and principal) real estate taxes, homeowner's insurance, utilities and routine maintenance through the date of closing." As the plain language of this provision sets forth an obligation of Plaintiff with no specific timeframe within which to pay it, as in Dahan, Id., it cannot be determined to have clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application to adjudicate Defendant in civil contempt for his asserted failure to comply with the Marital Domicile Provision set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement the terms of which are incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce is hereby denied.

(b) Defendant's Obligations Pertaining to 2024 Taxes

The Judgment of Divorce constituted a lawful order of the court which incorporated by reference, but did not merge, the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which was in effect including the Debt Provision which includes in section (B)(1), "The HUSBAND and WIFE agree that the HUSBAND shall be solely responsible for the following liabilities and shall, now and forever, hold harmless and indemnify the WIFE from any obligation(s) associated with such liabilities: (1) All outstanding/unpaid tax obligations of the parties (individually and/or jointly) for the tax years 2023 and 2024 — including anticipated taxes for the 2024 filing which has not yet been finalized." As the plain language of this provision sets forth an obligation of Plaintiff with no specific timeframe within which to pay it, as in Dahan, Id., it cannot be determined to have clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application to adjudicate Defendant in civil contempt for his asserted failure to comply with the Debt Provision set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement the terms of which are incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce is hereby denied.

(c) Defendant's Obligations Pertaining to Life Insurance

The Judgment of Divorce constituted a lawful order of the court which incorporated by reference, but did not merge, the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which was in effect including the Life Insurance Provision which includes in section (c), "Promptly after the execution of this Agreement, the HUSBAND shall deliver to the WIFE such insurance policies or certificates or instruments evidencing such irrevocable designation of the children as beneficiary under said insurance policies . . . " As the plain language of this provision sets forth an obligation of Plaintiff with no specific timeframe within which to complete the agreed upon act, as in Dahan, Id., it cannot be determined to have clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application to adjudicate Defendant in civil contempt for [*27]his asserted failure to comply with the Life Insurance Provision set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement the terms of which are incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce is hereby denied.

(d) Defendant's Obligations Pertaining to Child Support Add-Ons

The Judgment of Divorce constituted a lawful order of the court which incorporated by reference, but did not merge, the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which was in effect including the Child Support Provision includes in paragraph (D) that, "as an additional element of child support, the parties shall proportionately share the expenses set forth herein below. The Father's pro rata share is SEVENTY-FIVE (75%) PERCENT and the MOTHER'S pr-rata share is TWENTY-FIVE (25%) PERCENT," and while thereafter enumerating the agreed-upon add-ons does not set forth a timeframe within which are to be paid and/or reimbursed by the parties. As the plain language of this provision sets forth an obligation of Plaintiff with no specific timeframe within which to pay the agreed upon obligations, as in Dahan, Id., it cannot be determined to have clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application to adjudicate Defendant in civil contempt for his asserted failure to comply with the Child Support Provision, sections pertaining to child support add-ons, set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement the terms of which are incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce is hereby denied.

(e) Defendant's Obligations Pertaining to Equitable Distribution of Case Proceeds

The Judgment of Divorce constituted a lawful order of the court which incorporated by reference, but did not merge, the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which was in effect including the Litigation Award Provision includes in paragraph (C) that, "The HUSBAND and/or his designated representative shall ensure that upon receipt of all or any portion of the aforesaid outstanding payments/fees the WIFE (or the WIFE'S duly appointed designee in writing) shall be paid ONE-HALF (1/2) of any funds—including interest and/or penalties added to the aforesaid recoveries," clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate which was in effect. However, this Court has been presented with no proof that Defendant disobeyed this provision of the order by failing to disburse any funds collected pertaining to the subject litigations to Plaintiff who in her own submission refers to "estimated" amounts owed to her.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application to adjudicate Defendant in civil contempt for his asserted failure to comply with the Litigation Award Provision set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement the terms of which are incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce is hereby denied.

(f) Defendant Obligations Pertaining to the Boat

The Judgment of Divorce constituted a lawful order of the court which incorporated by reference, but did not merge, the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which was in effect including the Vehicle Provision includes in paragraph (C) that, "Notwithstanding the foregoing the parties agree that in the event the HUSBAND sells the 2004 CROWNLINE watercraft which is currently listed for sale on boattrader.com (list price $40,000.00) the WIFE shall be entitled to receive ONE-HALF (1/2) of the net sale proceeds." However, this Court has been presented with no proof that Defendant disobeyed this provision of the order by failing to disburse any funds collected pertaining to the sale of the subject boat as nothing within the provision requires Defendant to sell the boat and instead merely indicates that in the event Defendant does sell the boat Plaintiff is entitled to half of the proceeds without indicating when such payment is to be [*28]made or that Defendant is even required to provide Plaintiff with information regarding any future efforts to sell the boat.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application to adjudicate Defendant in civil contempt for his asserted failure to comply with the Vehicle Provision set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement the terms of which are incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce is hereby denied.

(g) Defendant Obligations Pertaining to Basic Child Support

The Judgment of Divorce constituted a lawful order of the court which incorporated by reference, but did not merge, the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which was in effect including the Child Support Provision includes in paragraph (A) that, "Commencing the first day of the month following the execution of this Stipulation, and continuing on the first of the month thereafter until the emancipation of the last Child to emancipate, the FATHER shall pay to the MOTHER, as and for the support and maintenance of the unemancipated Children, the sum of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND 00/100 ($3,500.00) DOLLARS per month," clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate that was in effect which was disobeyed by Defendant due to the unrefuted allegations made by Plaintiff and Plaintiff was prejudiced by the offending conduct.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application to adjudicate Defendant in civil contempt for his asserted failure to comply with the Child Support Provision, sections pertaining to basic child support, set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement the terms of which are incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce is hereby granted.

(h) Defendant's Obligations Pertaining to Non-Disparagement

The Judgment of Divorce constituted a lawful order of the court which incorporated by reference, but did not merge, the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which was in effect including the Non-Disparagement Provision includes in paragraph (A) that, "Neither party shall at any time make statements to each other or to third persons which are derogatory of the other party or which shall reflect disparagingly on the character, reputation or personal habits of the other party or members of his or her household," clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate that was in effect which was disobeyed by Defendant due to the unrefuted allegations made by Plaintiff and Plaintiff was prejudiced by the offending conduct. A party may be held in contempt for the violation of a non-disparagement provision set forth in a stipulation of settlement, the terms of which are incorporated by reference into a judgment of divorce in the event it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that a party disobeyed such provision with prejudice being found through the former spouse suffered personal and professional reputational harm (see Bellavia v. King, 239 AD3d 1243 [4th Dept 2025]).

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application to adjudicate Defendant in civil contempt for his asserted failure to comply with the Non-Disparagement Provision set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement the terms of which are incorporated by reference, but not merged, into the Judgment of Divorce is hereby granted.

[3] Application for Criminal Contempt

The Appellate Division Second Department has set forth the manner within which a trial court should evaluate an application to adjudicate a party in criminal contempt instructing:

"In contrast to civil contempt, because the purpose of criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of the court, no showing *906 of prejudice is required. Instead, '[a]llegations of willful disobedience of a proper judicial order strike at the core of the [*29]judicial process and implicate weighty public and institutional concerns regarding the integrity of and respect for judicial orders.' The proponent of a finding of criminal contempt must demonstrate willfulness. 'Knowingly failing to comply with a court order gives rise to an inference of willfulness which may be rebutted with evidence of good cause for noncompliance.' To warrant a finding of criminal contempt, the contemnor's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Madigan v. Berkeley Capital, LLC, Id. [internal citations omitted]).

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application to adjudicate Defendant in criminal contempt is granted as to Defendant's violations of the Judgment of Divorce including provisions of the Stipulation of Settlement including the Child Support Provision (sections pertaining to basic child support) and Non-Disparagement Provision. In making this determination, this Court considered all factual allegations made by Plaintiff true as they were unrefuted by Defendant, and that Defendant's conduct was willful due in part to his knowledge of this application and failure to file any responsive submissions.

[4] Punishment And Possible Purging Of Contempt

Having determined Defendant to be found in both civil and criminal contempt pursuant to New York State Judiciary Law (hereinafter "Judiciary Law"), this Court must determine appropriate action to be taken due to Defendant's conduct. This Court must also address the possibility, if any, of Defendant's ability to purge himself of the contemptuous behavior engaged in as set forth herein. Consequently, a sentencing hearing will be scheduled as set forth herein-below to address what punishment shall be assessed to the Defendant for his contempt.

Judiciary Law § 753(A) sets forth statutory punishments for civil contempt as follows:

"A. A court of record has power to punish, by fine and imprisonment, or either, a neglect or violation of duty, or other misconduct, by which a right or remedy of a party to a civil action or special proceeding, pending in the court may be defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced . . . " [emphasis added].

Judiciary Law § 773 sets forth the "amount" of the fine associated with a finding of both civil and criminal contempt, authorizing imposition of a fine in whatever amount is required to indemnify the moving party, to the extent there is actual loss or injury to the aggrieved party:

"If an actual loss or injury has been caused to a party to an action or special proceeding, by reason of the misconduct proved against the offender, and the case is not one where it is specially prescribed by law, that an action may be maintained to recover damages for the loss or injury, a fine, sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party, must be imposed upon the offender, and collected, and paid over to the aggrieved party, under the direction of the court. The payment and acceptance of such a fine constitute a bar to an action by the aggrieved party, to recover damages for the loss or injury."

Moreover, Judiciary Law § 774(1) sets forth six months as a maximum length of imprisonment, to the extent such imprisonment is granted by way of a determination of civil contempt, specifically stating as follows:

1. Where the misconduct proved consists of an omission to perform an act or duty, which is yet in the power of the offender to perform, he shall be imprisoned only until he has [*30]performed it, and paid the fine imposed, but if he shall perform the act or duty required to be performed, he shall not be imprisoned for the fine imposed more than three months if the fine is less than five hundred dollars, or more than six months if the fine is five hundred dollars or more. In such case, the order, and the warrant of commitment, if one is issued, must specify the act or duty to be performed, and the sum to be paid. In every other case, where special provision is not otherwise made by law, the offender may be imprisoned for a reasonable time, not exceeding six months, and until the fine, if any, is paid; and the order, and the warrant of commitment, if any, must specify the amount of the fine, and the duration of the imprisonment. If the term of imprisonment is not specified in the order, the offender shall be imprisoned for the fine imposed three months if the fine is less than five hundred dollars, and six months if the fine imposed is five hundred dollars or more. If the offender is required to serve a specified term of imprisonment, and in addition to pay a fine, he shall not be imprisoned for the nonpayment of such fine for more than three months if such fine is less than five hundred dollars or more than six months if the fine imposed is five hundred dollars or more in addition to the specified time of imprisonment.

Judiciary Law § 751 sets forth statutory punishments for criminal contempt, including a limitation on fines as a punishment, rather than fines issued to "indemnify the aggrieved party" as set forth in Judiciary Law § 773, substantially providing as follows:

"1. Except as provided in subdivisions (2), (3) and (4), punishment for a contempt, specified in section seven hundred fifty, may be by fine, not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, not exceeding thirty days, in the jail of the county where the court is sitting, or both, in the discretion of the court" [emphasis added].

The Judiciary Law makes certain that trial Courts are limited in the type of punishment issued following a finding of contempt, to fines (associated with indemnifying the aggrieved party and associated with punishing the party found in contempt) and imprisonment, or both; and, any other remedy not contemplated by the Judiciary Law has been found to be exceeding the subject trial court's authority (see Pitterson v. Watson, 299 AD2d 467 [2d Dept 2002] ["While a court may properly strike a defendant's answer for a discovery violation (see CPLR 3126), a court generally has power to punish for contempt only by fines or imprisonment, or both [internal citations omitted] Here, the Supreme Court exceeded its authority when it fashioned a remedy not contemplated by the Judiciary Law" (striking of pleadings)]. [emphasis added]).

Therefore, this Court must determine if it will impose a fine, imprisonment, or both to Defendant based on its finding of both civil and criminal contempt as outlined herein-above. The Appellate Courts within the State of New York have provided a plethora of case law which outlines examples and types of potential ramifications for a party following a determination that a party has been found in civil and criminal contempt.

For example, in finding respondent's conduct constituted criminal contempt, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department chose a totality of the circumstances approach when it took into consideration the respondent's record of community service and the fact that he was responsible for the care of a family member with special needs, when assessing to fine him $1,000, and not sentence him to imprisonment (In re Dale, 87 AD3d 198 [4th Dept 2011]).

Moreover, fines associated with both civil and criminal contempt, may be assessed separately, as separate acts of criminal and civil contempt (see People v. Metropolitan Police Conference of NY, Inc., 231 AD2d 445 [1st Dept 1996] ["Although the IAS court found defendants in criminal contempt for multiple acts of disobedience of the consent judgment, consisting of 44 fraudulent telephone solicitations over a span of three years, it determined, citing Deka Realty, supra, 208 AD2d at 45, 620 N.Y.S.2d 837, that the maximum fine permitted under Judiciary Law § 751(1) for criminal contempt is $1,000 per defendant. '[T]he gravamen of criminal contempt is the willful disobedience of the court's lawful mandate. It is the act of disobedience, not the multiple manifestations or consequences of that act, which constitutes a contempt.' (Id.) The Attorney General here seeks a $1,000 fine for each fraudulent telephone solicitation. This is not a case where there are 'multiple manifestations or consequences' of a single act of disobedience as in Deka Realty, but rather 'multiple act[s] of disobedience,' for which separate fines may be imposed."].

With respect to imprisonment, the Appellate Division, First Department in Matter of Crescenzi, 146 AD2d 86 [1st Dept 1989] found that a respondent's continuation of running a legal practice, after suspension and disbarment for misconduct, warranted a fine for civil contempt, a separate fine for criminal contempt, and imprisonment for 30 days (Id. at 88). Additionally, the Appellate Division, Third Department in Nadeau v. Sullivan, 204 AD2d 913 [3d Dept 1994] confirmed that the trial Court's determination that an 18-year-old be found in criminal contempt,^[FN72] and serve 30 days in county jail, was not an excessive penalty for violating a temporary order of protection by willfully engaging in disorderly conduct directed toward his stepfather by throwing string of fire crackers from window over his stepfather's head.

Furthermore, the Appellate Division, First Department in Kathleen v. John J. C., 182 AD3d 411 [1st Dept 2020] found that the Family Court had providently exercised its discretion in finding a respondent had willfully violated a prior order of support and sentenced him to six-month term of weekend incarceration with purge amount of $30,000.00. In Tamborello v. Tamborello, 181 AD3d 609 [2d Dept 2020] the Appellate Division, Second Department found that the Family Court had providently exercised its discretion finding a father had willfully violated an order of support, and committed him to custody of Nassau County Jail for period of 180 days unless he paid purge of $220,560.57. Similarly, the Appellate Division in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 181 AD3d 590 [2d Dept 2020] held that the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in finding a father willfully violated a prior order of support, directing that he be committed to custody of Orange County Jail for period of 30 days unless he paid purge amount of $78,703.24.

Therefore, this Court has the ability to fine Defendant up to $1,000 for each and every "act of disobedience" as found referenced herein-above, fine the Defendant in order to indemnify the Plaintiff to the extent Plaintiff has been harmed from the contemptuous behavior, and may further sentence the Defendant to imprisonment for a period up to 30 days for criminal contempt; and up to 180 days for civil contempt, with such imprisonment running consecutively or in staggered from by weekend imprisonment. Again, in order to make such determinations, this Court has directed that all parties and counsel appear for a sentencing hearing as scheduled [*31]and set forth herein-below. However, it is important to note that the Defendant does have the ability to purge his contempt, such purge being taken into account at the upcoming sentencing hearing.

It is well established that "[t]he Supreme Court of the State of New York has the power to punish a person in contempt of its order by lodging him in jail and under its powers it may permit the contumacious person to purge himself of contempt either by the posting of a bond or by an agreement to comply with the order made by it, or as may seem proper and deemed advisable by the Court" (see Greenzang v. Greenzang, 169 Misc. 516 [Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1938]). More recently, the Appellate Division, Second Department has confirmed that "the law is settled that a contemnor will be allowed to purge the contempt by performing the act required, or by undoing or reversing the acts constituting the contempt" (see Silverstein v. Aldrich, 76 AD2d 911 [2d Dept 1980] quoting Matter of Ferrara v. Hynes, 63 AD2d 675 [2d Dept 1978]).

Like civil contempt, a party may purge themselves of criminal contempt, so long as it is adjudicated pursuant to Judiciary Law, rather than pursuant to New York State Penal Law ["Unlike a conviction for criminal contempt pursuant to Section 215.50 of the Penal Law, which may not be purged . . . an adjudication of criminal contempt pursuant to . . . the Judiciary Law may be purged and the defendant 'holds the key to his freedom' (Trice v. Ciuros, 127 Misc 2d 289 [Sup. Ct. Onondaga Cnty 1985]). Moreover, as set forth herein-above, it is clear that an order of commitment, directing the imprisonment of a party held in contempt, is normally accompanied by a directive that the party may purge such contempt, with specific guidelines by which to do so.

Consequently, this Court will take into consideration Defendant's ability to purge both his civil and criminal contempt at the time of the sentencing hearing set forth herein-below.

To the extent any relief requested has not been granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the relief requested in Motion Sequence No. 3 is granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED that by March 27, 2026, Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry on Defendant and GAL Guttridge by NYSCEF filing and e-mail; and by March 27, 2026 shall file a copy of the Notice of Entry and Affidavit of Service; and it is further

ORDERED that all parties and GAL Guttridge shall appear on April 2, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. for a sentencing hearing, at which time this Court will make determinations regarding the punishment to be imposed on Defendant for civil and criminal contempt.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.