APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
| THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, -against- DECIDED JOHN VELASQUEZ, AKA JOHN VELA ACERO, Appellant. |
On the court's own motion, the decision and order of this court entered April 1, 2004 in the above entitled matter is recalled and vacated and the following decision and the order hereon is substituted therefor.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Criminal Court, Queens County
(W. Erlbaum, J. - Judgment; M. Aloise, J. - Order), rendered January 7, 2002, which convicted him of promoting prostitution in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 230.20) and imposing sentence.
Judgment of conviction unanimously reversed on the law and information dismissed.
The defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint which was later replaced on August 1, 2000 by a prosecutor's information. Under CPL 30.30 (5) (c), the People had 90 days to declare readiness for trial from the filing of the new accusatory instrument. On November 6, 2000, the People declared readiness for trial. It is the adjournment from October 20th until November 6th which is the subject of the instant appeal. A review of the minutes of the October 20, 2000 hearing establishes that the People were not ready to proceed to trial on that day with respect to the case at bar as well as on another case in which the defendant was being charged. The People stated that they "can be ready" for trial on the instant case on October 25th and could be ready for trial on the other case on November 1st. For its own convenience and scheduling purposes, the court stated that it would adjourn both matters to the same date. Defense counsel indicated that November 1st was inconvenient for him and requested an adjourned date of November 6th.
Since the People did not make a present declaration of readiness on October 20th, but merely made a "prediction or expectation of future readiness" (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985]), and the court's adjournment of the case due to scheduling purposes and for its own convenience did not prevent the People from either declaring readiness or filing a statement of readiness (see People v Smith, 82 NY2d 676, 678 [1993]; People v Brothers, 50 NY2d 413 [1980]), we are of the opinion that the People are chargeable with the time period from October 20th through October 30th, the 90th day. Therefore, Judge Aloise should have granted defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 and dismissed the information.
In light of the foregoing, this court does not reach defendant's remaining contention on appeal.
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
| ADVANTA BUSINESS SERVICES CORP, as assignor of ADVANTA LEASING SERVICES, a program of ADVANTA BANK CORP., Appellant, -against- INES M. COLON d/b/a UNISEX BEAUTY SALON and INES M. COLON, Respondents. |
DECISION
Motion by plaintiff-appellant for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division denied.
APPELLATE TERM: 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
| KENNETH JOHNSON and PAULETTE JOHNSON, Appellants, -against- NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Respondent. |
DECISION
That branch of the motion by plaintiffs-appellants for consolidation of case No. 2002-1318 K C and case No. 2003-945 K C granted, to the extent that the heretofore consolidated appeals are deemed consolidated under case No. 2003-945 K C.
That branch of the motion seeking to deem the record filed in case No. 2002-1318 K C as the record in case No. 2003-945 K C granted.
That branch of the motion seeking to deem the briefs filed in case No. 2002-1318 K C as the briefs filed in case No. 2003-945 K C denied.
That branch of the motion seeking an enlargement of time to perfect the consolidated appeal granted, and a new appellants' brief and note of issue shall be filed and served within 21 days of the date of the order hereon. Respondent, if duly advised, may serve and file a new respondent's brief within 14 days of the date of filing of the appellants' brief.