

Revella v Bereth

2008 NY Slip Op 33536(U)

December 3, 2008

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: 113996/06

Judge: Paul Wooten

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK — NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: HON. PAUL WOOTEN
Justice

PART 22

TERRANCE A. REVELLA,
Plaintiff,

INDEX NO. 113996/06

- v -

MOTION DATE _____

ALIE BERETH and DOLOR SERVICES COMPANY,
INC.,

MOTION SEQ. NO. 001

Defendants.

MOTION CAL. NO. 97

The following papers, numbered 1 to 3, were read on this motion by defendants for summary judgment on the threshold "serious injury" issue.

Notice of Motion/ Order to Show Cause — Affidavits — Exhibits ...

PAPERS NUMBERED

1

Answering Affidavits — Exhibits (Memo) _____

2

Replying Affidavits (Reply Memo) _____

3

Cross-Motion: Yes No

On October 15, 2004 near the intersection of Battery Place and West Thames Street, in New York County, New York, plaintiff's vehicle was involved in a collision with defendants' vehicle. On or about September 14, 2006, plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for alleged personal injuries suffered as a result of the subject accident. The parties have completed physical examinations and a note of issue has not yet been filed. Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212, alleging that plaintiff has failed to establish that he suffered a "serious injury" pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

SERIOUS INJURY THRESHOLD

Pursuant to the Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparation Act of 1974 (now Insurance Law § 5101, *et seq.* - the "No Fault" statute), a party seeking damages for pain and suffering arising out of a motor vehicle accident must establish that he or she has sustained at least one of the categories of "serious injury" as set forth in Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (*Marquez v New York City Tr. Auth.*, 686 NYS2d 18 [1 Dept 1999]; *DiLeo v Blumberg*, 672 NYS2d 319 [1 Dept 1998]).

Insurance Law § 5102 (d) defines "serious injury" as:

a personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment.

It is indisputable that six of the nine categories of serious physical injuries discussed by Insurance Law 5102 (d) are not applicable herein as there is no allegation of death, dismemberment, fracture, a loss of a fetus, a significant disfigurement or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment. Therefore, the court must determine if the injuries asserted by plaintiff constitute either: (1) a permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function, or system; (2) a significant limitation of use of a body function or system; (3) a permanent consequential limitation of use of a body function or system. (See Notice of Motion, plaintiff's verified bill of particulars, Exhibit C, para. 11, p 3-4. And para. 20¹.)

Serious injury is a threshold issue, and thus, a necessary element of plaintiff's prima facie case (*Licari v Elliott*, 57 NY2d 230 [1982]; *Toure v Harrison*, 775 NYS2d 282 [1 Dept

¹The plaintiff offers boiler plate language in the bill of particulars making a "90/180 claim" pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (d)... a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment. However, plaintiff offers no evidence or does even discuss a 90/180 claim in his application, (see plaintiff's affirmation in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, Exhibit three, plaintiff's affidavit, para. 3-9.)

2004]; Insurance Law § 5104 [a]). This is in accord with the purpose of the "No-Fault" law, which was to "weed out frivolous claims and limit recovery to significant injuries" (*Toure v Avis Rent A Car Systems, Inc.*, 98 NY2d 345 [2002], quoting *Dufel v Green*, 84 NY2d 795, 798 [1995]; *Licari v Elliott*, 57 NY2d 234 [1982]; *Rubenscastro v Alfaro*, 815 NYS2d 514 [1 Dept 2006]).

In order to satisfy the statutory threshold, the plaintiff must submit competent objective medical evidence of his or her injuries, based on the performance of objective tests (*Grossman v Wright*, 707 NYS2d 233 [2 Dept 2000]; *Lopez v Senatore*, 65 NY2d 1017, 1019 [1985]). Subjective complaints alone are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of a serious injury (*Gaddy v Eyley*, 79 NY2d 955, 957 [1992]; *Scheer v Koubek*, 70 NY2d 678, 679 [1987]).

It is well settled that positive MRI results may constitute a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law §5102(d) (*see Pommels v Perez*, 797 NYS2d 380 [2005]; *Nagbe v Mimigreen Hacking Group, Inc.*, 802 NYS2d 416 [1 Dept. 2005]). Furthermore, a CT scan or MRI may constitute objective evidence to support subjective complaints (*see Arjona v Calcano*, 776 NYS2d 49 [1 Dept 2004]; *Lesser v Smart Cab Corp.*, 724 NYS2d 49 [1 Dept 2001]). The plaintiff's medical submissions must show when the tests were performed, the objective nature of the tests, what the normal range of motion should be and whether the plaintiff's limitations were significant (*see Milazzo v Gesner*, 822 NYS2d 49 [1 Dept 2006]; *Vasquez v Reluzco*, 814 NYS2d [1 Dept 2006]).

With respect to the categories of significant limitation of use of a body function or system and permanent consequential limitation of use, "[w]hether a limitation of use or function is "significant" or "consequential" (i.e., important . . .) relates to medical significance and involves a comparative determination of the degree or qualitative nature of an injury based on the normal function, purpose and use of the body part" (*Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.*, *supra* quoting *Dufel v Green*, *supra*).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The issue of whether a claimed injury falls within the statutory definition of "serious injury" is a question of law for the courts which may decide the issue on a motion for summary judgment (*Perez v Rodriguez*, 809 NYS2d 15 [1 Dept 2006]). On a motion for summary judgment based upon a failure to sustain a serious injury, the defendants bear the initial burden of establishing the absence of a serious injury by tendering evidentiary proof in admissible form eliminating any material issues of fact from the case (*Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.*, *supra*; see also *Gaddy v Eyer*, *supra*; *Pirrelli v Long Is. R.R.*, 641 NYS2d 240 [1 Dept 1996]).

Defendant may rely either on the sworn or affirmed statements of their examining physician, plaintiff's deposition testimony and plaintiff's unsworn physician's records (*Fragale v Geiger*, 733 NYS2d 901 [2 Dept 2001]; *Pagano v Kingsbury*, 587 NYS2d 692 [2 Dept 1992]). An affirmed physician's report demonstrating that plaintiff was not suffering from any disability or consequential injury resulting from the accident is sufficient to satisfy a defendant's burden of proof (*see Gaddy v Eyer*, *supra*). In addition, the Courts have unanimously held that a party may not use an unsworn medical report prepared by the parties' own physician on a motion for summary judgment (See *Grasso v Angerami*, 79 NY2d 813 [1991]; *Offman v Singh*, 813 NY2d 56 [1 Dept 2006]). Moreover, CPLR § 2106 requires a physician's statement be affirmed (or sworn) to be true under the penalties of perjury.

Once defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with prima facie evidence, in admissible form, to rebut the presumption that there is no issue of fact as to the threshold question (*see Pommells v Perez*, 797 NYS2d 380 [2005]; *Gaddy v Eyer*, *supra*; *Perez v Rodriguez*, *supra*). A medical affirmation or affidavit based on a physician's own examination, tests, and review of the record, can support the existence and extent of a plaintiff's serious injury (*O'Sullivan v Atrium Bus Co.*, 668 NYS2d 167 [1 Dept 1998]). However, "where a defendant fails to meet his initial burden of establishing a *prima facie* case

that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury, it is not necessary to consider whether the plaintiff's papers in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact" (see *Offman v Singh, supra*; *Winegrad v New York Univ. Med Ctr., supra*).

DISCUSSION

In support of the motion, defendants submit, *inter alia*, a copy of the pleadings, plaintiff's deposition testimony and the affirmed medical reports of Dr. Michael P. Rafiy, a board certified orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Robert S. April, board certified neurologist and Dr. Robert D. Goldstein, a board certified plastic surgeon. Based on the foregoing, defendants have submitted evidence in legally admissible form to meet their *prima facie* burden, entitling them to summary judgment and a finding that plaintiff has not sustained a "serious injury" within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 [d] (see, *Gaddy v Eycler, supra*; *Lowe v Bennett*, 511 NYS2d 603 [1 Dept 1986], *Affd*, 69 NY2d 700 [1 Dept 1986]). Thus, the burden shifts to plaintiff to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form in order to establish the existence of a serious injury (See *Taynisha Baez v Imamally Rahamatali*, 817 NYS2d 204 [2006]; *Franchini v Palmieri*, 775 NYS2d 232 [2003]; *Gaddy v Eycler, supra*; *Shinn v Catanzaro*, 767 NYS2d 88 [1 Dept 2003]; *Zuckerman v City of New York*, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; *Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind*, 765 NYS2d 326 [1 Dept 2003]).

In opposition, plaintiff submits his affidavit, the affirmation and report of Dr. Michael Cushner and various unaffirmed or uncertified medical reports and records. As mentioned above unsworn or uncertified medical reports and records are inadmissible and will not be considered on this motion (see *Grasso v Angerami, supra*; *Offman v Singh, supra*; CPLR § 2106). Accordingly, plaintiff's only admissible medical submission is Dr. Cushner's examination, which was performed on May 13, 2008. However, this examination, performed over three years after the subject accident, does constitute objective medical evidence

performed contemporaneously with the occurrence of the accident to substantiate plaintiff's claims (*Pommells v Perez, supra*). Furthermore, Dr. Cushner states that there was an additional examination of plaintiff, however, no date is listed nor any objective tests are mentioned (*Bent v Jackson, supra; Toure v Avis Rent a Car System, supra*).


Accordingly, the evidence provided by plaintiff fails to demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact as to whether or not he has sustained "serious injuries" as a result of the subject accident pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

For these reasons and upon the foregoing papers, it is,

ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted; and it is further,

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants, dismissing the complaint in its entirety, with costs and disbursements to defendants as taxed by the Clerk.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.


Paul Wooten J.S.C.
Paul Wooten
J.S.C.

Dated: December 3, 2008

Check one: FINAL DISPOSITION NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

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