

Matter of Wooldridge v Evans

2010 NY Slip Op 32351(U)

August 17, 2010

Sup Ct, Albany County

Docket Number: 2254-10

Judge: George B. Ceresia

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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of VAUGHN WOOLDRIDGE, 05-R-5084,

Petitioner,

-against-

ANDREA D. EVANS, CHAIRPERSON, CEO,
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,

Respondent,

For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-10-ST1500 Index No. 2254-10

Appearances: Vaughn Wooldridge
Inmate No. 05-R-5084
Petitioner, Pro Se
Wallkill Correctional Facility
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DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice

The petitioner, an inmate at Wallkill Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated March 24, 2009

to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. He is serving consecutive terms of imprisonment of one and one half to three years and three to six to six years upon convictions of attempted criminal possession of a forged instrument second degree and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. Both involve stolen credit cards.

The petitioner asserts that he has expressed remorse for his crime. He alleges that at the time he was arrested he did not understand the seriousness of his crime. He indicates that since then his mother has been a victim of identity theft; and that he now understands the serious economic and emotional harm that came from his actions. Prior to his incarceration, the petitioner worked as a construction worker for a number of years. He has submitted letters of support from a construction company and a moving company reciting that he will be employed upon his release. The petitioner also indicates that he is interested in pursuing work as a professional counselor. He holds a General Equivalency Diploma (GED) and is married with four children.

The petitioner alleges that while incarcerated he successfully overcame his addiction to heroin and completed alcohol and substance abuse treatment. He indicates he received one merit time certificate and two certificates of earned eligibility. During his incarceration he has worked as a clerk typist in the recreation department, and completed phases I, II, and III of the Transitional Services Program. He also served as a facilitator in all three phases of the Transitional Services Program.

Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner contends that the Parole Board failed to give consideration to his certificate of earned eligibility (see Corrections Law § 805). He alleges a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the United

States Constitution and New York Constitution; and contends that under both Constitutions he has been deprived of due process of law. The petitioner indicates that he has been incarcerated for twenty three months longer than the minimum guideline range (see 9 NYCRR 8001.3) . He asserts that the Parole Board impermissibly ignored the statutory factors set forth in Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c) (A) to determine whether he would live and remain at liberty without violating the law. He claims that the Board's determination is nonfactual and conclusory, in violation of Executive Law § 259-i (1) (a); and that the twenty four month "hold" is excessive.

The reasons for the respondent's determination to deny petitioner release on parole are set forth as follows:

"Despite issuance of an Earned Eligibility Certificate, discretionary release is denied. Following a careful review of your record and interview, this panel concludes that, if released, there is a reasonable probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law. Your release is thus not presently compatible with the public safety and welfare. Your instant offenses in Brooklyn in February of 2005 involved your use of a forged Home Depot Credit Card to access merchandise. Your criminal history includes prior murder, stolen property, and robbery related offenses. Your institutional programming indicates progress and achievement, which is to your credit. Your disciplinary record appears clean and is likewise noted. You have approximately seven felonies. This is your second New York bid. You also served state time in North Carolina for a murder related conviction."

As stated in Executive Law §259-i (2) (c) (A):

"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so

deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans including community resources, employment, education and training and support services available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the federal government against the inmate []; (v) any statement made to the board by the crime victim or the victim's representative []" (Executive Law §259-i [2] [c] [A]).

Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 2004]; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 2001]). If the Parole Board's decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements, the Board's determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, supra). Furthermore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 2002]).

The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such

factors as petitioner's institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law §259-i (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 1994]; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 1993]). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 1994]; Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, *supra*; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 1997]; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 1998]). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Young v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD 3d 1681 [3rd Dept., 2010]; Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 2008]). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 2006]).

In other words, “[w]here appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether

release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law’” (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 2004], quoting Executive Law §259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations omitted).

It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a guarantee of release (Matter of Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 30 AD3d 880 [3rd Dept., 2006]; Matter of Pearl v New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 [3rd Dept., 2006]).

Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a re-sentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State Parole Board, 227 AD2d 751 [3rd Dept., 1996]; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 2001]; Matter of Evans v Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 2006]). The fact that an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1114, 1115 [3rd Dept., 2008]). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 2006] lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 2007]).

With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the

constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [1979]; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that Executive Law § 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169, 171 [2d Cir., 2001]; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 2001]; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 661, 664 [2d Cir., 1979]; Paunetto v Hammock, 516 F Supp 1367, 1367-1368 [SD NY, 1981]; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 75-76, supra, Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 2005]; Matter of Lozada v New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 2007]). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation.

Addressing petitioner's argument with respect to the guideline range, even if he had served time in excess of the guideline range, the guidelines "are intended only as a guide, and are not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each individual case" (9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907, 908 [3rd Dept., 2002]). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a basis to overturn the Board's decision.

In addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604).

The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds them to be without merit.

The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The petition must therefore be dismissed.

The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, is sealing all records submitted for *in camera* review.


Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.

This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

ENTER

Dated: August 17, 2010
Troy, New York



Supreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:

1. Order To Show Cause dated May 12, 2010, Petition, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
2. Respondent's Answer dated July 7, 2010, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
3. Petitioner's Reply dated July 14, 2010