

**Bank of New York Mellon v Hogan**

2014 NY Slip Op 32215(U)

July 22, 2014

Sup Ct, Suffolk County

Docket Number: 39205-11

Judge: Denise F. Molia

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**ORDERED** that the plaintiff is directed to serve a copy of this Order with notice of entry upon all parties who have appeared herein and not waived further notice pursuant to CPLR 2103(b)(1), (2) or (3) within thirty (30) days of the date herein, and to promptly file the affidavits of service with the Clerk of the Court.

This is an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property known as 4 Garden Place, North Lindenhurst, New York 11757. On March 20, 2007, the defendant Stella Hogan executed a pay option adjustable-rate note in favor of Countrywide Bank, FSB (the lender) in the principal sum of \$210,000.00. To secure said note, the defendants Stella Hogan and Bernard J. Hogan, Jr. (the defendant mortgagors) gave the lender a mortgage also dated March 20, 2007 on the property. The mortgage indicates that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was acting solely as a nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns and that, for the purposes of recording the mortgage, MERS was the mortgagee of record. By way of an undated endorsement, the lender allegedly transferred the note to The Bank of New York Mellon formerly known as The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders of the CWALT, Inc. Alternative Loan Trust 2007-OA8 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-OA8 (the plaintiff) prior to commencement, memorialized by an assignment of the mortgage executed on August 31, 2011. The assignment was subsequently duly recorded in the Suffolk County Clerk's Office on October 5, 2011.

The defendant mortgagors allegedly defaulted on the note and mortgage by failing to make the monthly payment of principal and interest due on or about February 1, 2011, and each month thereafter. After the defendant mortgagors allegedly failed to cure their default, the plaintiff commenced the instant action by the filing of a *lis pendens*, summons and verified complaint on December 28, 2011.

Issue was joined by the interposition of the defendant mortgagors' answer dated January 23, 2012. By their answer, the defendant mortgagors admit some of the allegations in the complaint, and deny the remaining allegations set forth therein. In the answer, the defendant mortgagors also assert eight affirmative defenses, alleging, *inter alia*, the following: the lack of standing; the lack of personal jurisdiction; and failure to: pay the mortgage recording tax; furnish defendant mortgagors with notice prior to commencement; comply with the requirements of: RPAPL §§ 1302, 1303, 1304 and 1306 and 1320; Banking Law §§ 595-a; 6-l and 6-m; RPAPL 3408 (non-existing and, thus, deemed to be an affirmative defense pursuant to CPLR 3408); and the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) (15 USC § 1601, *et seq.*) as well as Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z (Regulation Z) (12 CFR part 226). The remaining defendants have neither appeared nor answered the complaint.

In compliance with CPLR 3408, a settlement conference was scheduled to be held before this court's specialized mortgage foreclosure part on August 9, 2013. On the aforementioned date, this action was dismissed from the conference program and referred as an IAS case because the defendant mortgagors did not attend or otherwise participate. Accordingly, no further conference is required under any statute, law or rule.

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The plaintiff now moves for, inter alia, an order: (1) pursuant to CPLR 3212 awarding summary judgment in its favor and against the defendant mortgagors, striking their answer and dismissing the affirmative defenses therein; (2) pursuant to CPLR 3215 fixing the defaults of the non-answering defendants; (3) pursuant to RPAPL § 1321 appointing a referee to (a) compute amounts due under the subject mortgage; and (b) examine and report whether the subject premises should be sold in one parcel or multiple parcels; and (4) amending the caption. No opposition has been filed in response to this motion.

A plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action establishes a prima facie case for summary judgment by submission of the mortgage, the note, bond or obligation, and evidence of default (*see, Valley Natl. Bank v Deutsch*, 88 AD3d 691, 930 NYS2d 477 [2d Dept 2011]; *Wells Fargo Bank v Das Karla*, 71 AD3d 1006, 896 NYS2d 681 [2d Dept 2010]; *Washington Mut. Bank, F.A. v O'Connor*, 63 AD3d 832, 880 NYS2d 696 [2d Dept 2009]). The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate "the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense to the action, such as waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud, or oppressive or unconscionable conduct on the part of the plaintiff" (*Capstone Bus. Credit, LLC v Imperia Family Realty, LLC*, 70 AD3d 882, 883, 895 NYS2d 199 [2d Dept 2010], quoting *Mahopac Natl. Bank v Baisley*, 244 AD2d 466, 467, 644 NYS2d 345 [2d Dept 1997]).

By its submissions, the plaintiff established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the complaint (*see, CPLR 3212; RPAPL § 1321; Wachovia Bank, N.A. v Carcano*, 106 AD3d 724, 965 NYS2d 515 [2d Dept 2013]; *U.S. Bank, N.A. v Denaro*, 98 AD3d 964, 950 NYS2d 581 [2d Dept 2012]; *Capital One, N.A. v Knollwood Props. II, LLC*, 98 AD3d 707, 950 NYS2d 482 [2d Dept 2012]). In the instant case, the plaintiff produced, inter alia, the endorsed note, the mortgage, the assignment and evidence of nonpayment (*see, Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v Karastathis*, 237 AD2d 558, 655 NYS2d 631 [2d Dept 1997]; *First Trust Natl. Assn. v Meisels*, 234 AD2d 414, 651 NYS2d 121 [2d Dept 1996]). Furthermore, the plaintiff submitted proof of compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL §§ 1303, 1304 and 1320 (*see, Castle Peak 2012-I Trust v Choudhury*, 2013 NY Misc LEXIS 5510, 2013 WL 6229919, 2013 NY Slip Op 32971 [U] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2013]; *M & T Bank v Romero*, 40 Misc3d 1210 [A], 977 NYS2d 667 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2013]; *cf., Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum*, 85 AD3d 95, 923 NYS2d 609 [2d Dept 2011]). Moreover, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from its representative wherein it is alleged that the plaintiff was the holder of the note at the time of commencement, and that it has maintained possession of the same since that time (*see, Kondaur Capital Corp. v McCary*, 115 AD3d 649, 981 NYS2d 547 [2d Dept 2014]; *Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Whalen*, 107 AD3d 931, 969 NYS2d 82 [2d Dept 2013]; *HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Avila*, 2013 NY Misc LEXIS 4521, 2013 WL 5606741, 2013 NY Slip Op 32412 [U] [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2013]). Thus, the plaintiff demonstrated its prima facie burden as to the merits of this foreclosure action and as to its standing.

The plaintiff also submitted sufficient proof to establish, prima facie, that the affirmative defenses set forth in the defendant mortgagors' answer are subject to dismissal due to their unmeritorious nature (*see, Becher v Feller*, 64 AD3d 672, 884 NYS2d 83 [2d Dept 2009]; *Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v Perez*, 41 AD3d 590, 837 NYS2d 877 [2d Dept 2007]; *Coppa v Fabozzi*,

5 AD3d 718, 773 NYS2d 604 [2d Dept 2004] [unsupported affirmative defenses are lacking in merit]; *see also, Bank of America, N.A. v Lucido*, 114 AD3d 714, 981 NYS2d 433 [2d Dept 2014] [plaintiff's refusal to consider a reduction in principal does not establish a failure to negotiate in good faith]; *Washington Mut. Bank v Schenk*, 112 AD3d 615, 975 NYS2d 902 [2d Dept 2013]; *JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Ilardo*, 36 Misc3d 359, 940 NYS2d 829 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2012] [plaintiff not obligated to accept a tender of less than full repayment as demanded]; *Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Scura*, 102 AD3d 714, 961 NYS2d 185 [2d Dept 2013]; *Scarano v Scarano*, 63 AD3d 716, 880 NYS2d 682 [2d Dept 2009] [process server's sworn affidavit of service is prima facie evidence of proper service]; *Grogg v South Rd. Assoc., L.P.*, 74 AD3d 1021, 907 NYS2d 22 [2d Dept 2010] [the mere denial of receipt of the notice of default is insufficient to rebut the presumption of delivery]; *HSBC Bank USA v Picarelli*, 36 Misc3d 1218 [A], 959 NYS2d 89 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2012] [TILA requirements satisfied where the lender provided the required information and forms to the obligor at the closing]). Furthermore, the plaintiff demonstrated compliance with the conference requirements imposed by CPLR 3408, as noted above.

As the plaintiff duly demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden of proof shifted to the defendant mortgagors (*see, HSBC Bank USA v Merrill*, 37 AD3d 899, 830 NYS2d 598 [3d Dept 2007]). Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the defendant mortgagors to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to a bona fide defense to the action (*see, Baron Assoc., LLC v Garcia Group Enters., Inc.*, 96 AD3d 793, 946 NYS2d 611 [2d Dept 2012]; *Washington Mut. Bank v Valencia*, 92 AD3d 774, 939 NYS2d 73 [2d Dept 2012]).

Self-serving and conclusory allegations do not raise issues of fact, and do not require the plaintiff to respond to alleged affirmative defenses which are based on such allegations (*see, Charter One Bank, FSB v Leone*, 45 AD3d 958, 845 NYS2d 513 [2d Dept 2007]; *Rosen Auto Leasing, Inc. v Jacobs*, 9 AD3d 798, 780 NYS2d 438 [3d Dept 2004]). In instances where a defendant fails to oppose a motion for summary judgment, the facts, as alleged in the moving papers, may be deemed admitted and there is, in effect, a concession that no question of fact exists (*see, Kuehne & Nagel v Baiden*, 36 NY2d 539, 369 NYS2d 667 [1975]; *see also, Madeline D'Anthony Enters., Inc. v Sokolowsky*, 101 AD3d 606, 957 NYS2d 88 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2012]; *Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v Mentasana*, 79 AD3d 1079, 915 NYS2d 591 [2d Dept 2010]). Additionally, "uncontradicted facts are deemed admitted" (*Tortorello v Carlin*, 260 AD2d 201, 206, 688 NYS2d 64 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 1999] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

The defendant mortgagors' answer is insufficient, as a matter of law, to defeat the plaintiff's unopposed motion (*see, Flagstar Bank v Bellafigliore*, 94 AD3d 1044, 943 NYS2d 551 [2d Dept 2012]; *Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v Mentasana*, 79 AD3d 1079, *supra*). In this case, the affirmative defenses asserted by the defendant mortgagors are factually unsupported and without apparent merit (*see, Becher v Feller*, 64 AD3d 672, *supra*). In any event, the failure by the defendant mortgagors to raise and/or assert each of their pleaded defenses in opposition to the plaintiff's motion warrants the dismissal of the same as abandoned under the case authorities cited above (*see, Kuehne & Nagel v Baiden*, 36 NY2d 539, *supra*; *see also, Madeline D'Anthony Enters., Inc. v Sokolowsky*, 101 AD3d

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606, *supra*).

Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the defendant mortgagors failed to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment requested by it (*see, Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore*, 94 AD3d 1044, *supra*; *Argent Mtge. Co., LLC v Montesana*, 79 AD3d 1079, *supra*; *Rossrock Fund II, L.P. v Commack Inv. Group, Inc.*, 78 AD3d 920, 912 NYS2d 71 [2d Dept 2010]; *see generally, Hermitage Ins. Co. v Trance Nite Club, Inc.*, 40 AD3d 1032, 834 NYS2d 870 [2d Dept 2007]). The plaintiff, therefore, is awarded summary judgment in its favor against the defendant mortgagors (*see, Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v Karastathis*, 237 AD2d 558, *supra*; *see generally, Zuckerman v City of New York*, 49 NY2d 557, 427 NYS2d 595 [1980]). Accordingly, the defendant mortgagors' answer is stricken, and the affirmative defenses set forth therein are dismissed.

The branch of the instant motion wherein the plaintiff seeks an order pursuant to CPLR 1024 amending the caption by substituting the defendant Steven Hogan for the fictitious defendant "John Doe 1," and by excising the remaining fictitious named defendants "John Doe 2-25" is granted (*see, PHH Mtge. Corp. v Davis*, 111 AD3d 1110, 975 NYS2d 480 [3d Dept 2013]; *Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore*, 94 AD3d 1044, *supra*; *Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, Inc. v Meltzer*, 67 AD3d 872, 889 NYS2d 627 [2d Dept 2009]). By its submissions, the plaintiff established the basis for the above-noted relief. All future proceedings shall be captioned accordingly.

By its moving papers, the plaintiff further established the default in answering on the part of the newly substituted defendant, Steven Hogan (*see, RPAPL § 1321; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Roldan*, 80 AD3d 566, 914 NYS2d 647 [2d Dept 2011]). Accordingly, the default of Steven Hogan is fixed and determined. Since the plaintiff has been awarded summary judgment against the defendant mortgagors, and has established the default in answering by Steven Hogan, the plaintiff is entitled to an order appointing a referee to compute amounts due under the subject note and mortgage (*see, RPAPL § 1321; Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB v Miller*, 18 AD3d 527, 794 NYS2d 650 [2d Dept 2005]; *Vermont Fed. Bank v Chase*, 226 AD2d 1034, 641 NYS2d 440 [3d Dept 1996]; *Bank of E. Asia v Smith*, 201 AD2d 522, 607 NYS2d 431 [2d Dept 1994]).

Accordingly, this motion for, inter alia, summary judgment is determined as set forth above. The proposed long form order appointing a referee to compute pursuant to RPAPL § 1321, as modified by the Court, has been signed concurrently herewith.

Dated: July 22, 2014

  
 Hon. DENISE F. MOLIA, A.J.S.C.

FINAL DISPOSITION     NON-FINAL DISPOSITION