

Laluna v Verrastro

2017 NY Slip Op 32851(U)

January 17, 2017

Supreme Court, Dutchess County

Docket Number: 51381/2015

Judge: James D. Pagonis

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.

To commence the statutory time period for appeals as of right [CPLR 5513(a)], you are advised to serve a copy of this order, with notice of entry upon all parties.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS

-----X
LOUIS LALUNA,

Plaintiff,

DECISION AND ORDER

-against-

Index No. 51381/2015

NICOLE VERRASTRO AND WILLIAM
VERRASTRO,

Defendants.

-----X

PAGONES, J.D., A.J.S.C.

Defendants move for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting them summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.

The following papers were read:	
Notice of Motion-Affirmation-Exhibits A-E-	1-8
Affidavit of Service	
Affirmation in Opposition-Exhibits 1-4-	9-14
Affidavit of Service	
Reply Affirmation-Affidavit of Service	15-16

Upon the foregoing papers, the motion is decided as follows:

By way of background, plaintiff brings this action seeking damages for alleged injuries sustained as a result of a slip-and-fall on ice on February 20, 2014 at the defendants' premises located at 36 Scenic Hills Drive, Poughkeepsie, New York. At the time the accident, plaintiff was employed by LoveEfron, 47

Patrick Lane, Poughkeepsie, New York. Plaintiff was allegedly delivering oil to the defendants' premises when the accident occurred.

On a motion for summary judgment, the test to be applied is whether triable issues of fact exist or whether on the proof submitted judgment can be granted to a party as a matter of law (see *Andre v. Pomeroy*, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]). The movants must set forth a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issue of fact (see *Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital*, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Once the movants set forth a prima facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to the opponent of the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact (see *Zuckerman v. City of New York*, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants initially argue that the complaint must be dismissed as plaintiff has failed to establish that the alleged incident occurred on their premises. In support of this allegation, defendants offer the deposition testimony of the plaintiff. Plaintiff states that the accident occurred in a driveway of a home (see Deposition of Plaintiff at p 15 lines 14-17). Plaintiff testified that he had pulled the hose up from the oil truck around the side of the house, filled the oil tank and was on his way back to the truck

when he stepped off the snow onto ice and fell (see Deposition of Plaintiff at p 16 lines 11-19). He additionally testified, after being shown two pictures of the defendants' home, that one of the pictures looked familiar and that he fell when coming around in front of the door pictured (see Deposition of Plaintiff at p 20-21 lines 18-25, lines 1-18). Further, defendant William Verrastro testified that a receipt was left on his door handle indicating that an oil delivery was made on the 20th of February (see Deposition of Defendant W. Verrastro p 13 lines 18-25).

Accordingly, defendants' allegation that the plaintiff has failed to "corroborate any evidence that the alleged incident actually occurred on Defendants' premises" is without merit in fact.

Next, defendants allege that the plaintiff has failed to establish defendants had notice of the alleged ice/snow condition.

A property owner will be held liable for a slip-and-fall accident involving snow and ice on its property only when it created the dangerous condition which caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice thereof (see *Moore v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc.*, 117 AD3d 695 [2nd Dept 2014]).

Plaintiff testified that the incident occurred after a snowstorm, but then indicated that he couldn't recall and didn't know (see Deposition of Plaintiff at p 17 lines 7-17). He

further stated that the area where he fell was iced over (see Deposition of Plaintiff at p 18-19 line 25, lines 1-2).

Defendant William Verrastro testified that in the winter when it snows, he snowblows and then applies rock salt to his driveway so he can make it up his driveway, which has a pretty steep incline (see Deposition of Defendant W. Verrastro p 10 lines 4-16). Mr. Verrastro stated that his contract with LoveEfron requires him to maintain a clear path to the oil fill (see Deposition of Defendant W. Verrastro p 15 lines 4-6). He ensures compliance by snowblowing the path and putting rock salt down (see Deposition of Defendant W. Verrastro p 15 lines 7-10). However, Mr. Verrastro could not recall the weather conditions on the 20th, he could not recall if he had to snowblow or shovel the driveway and he could not recall if he had to put salt on his driveway (see Deposition of Defendant W. Verrastro p 9 lines 13-16, p 14 lines 6-9, p 14 lines 10-12).

In this instance, the Court is bound by the decision of the Appellate Division Second Department in *Heck v. Regula*, 123 AD3d 665 [2nd Dept 2014]). The Court in *Heck* held "[t]o meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was last cleaned or inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell" (*id. quoting Birnbaum v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc.*, 57 AD3d 598 [2nd Dept 2008]). Defendants offer


absolutely no evidence in this regard. Accordingly, as defendants have tendered no evidence as to when the area in question was last inspected, shoveled or salted before the time when plaintiff allegedly fell, they have failed to meet their initial burden (*id.*).

Based upon the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety. This matter is scheduled for a further Pre-Trial Conference on February 28, 2017 at 9:30 a.m. Adjournments are only granted with leave of the Court.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court. This decision and order has been filed electronically.

Dated: January 17, 2017
Poughkeepsie, New York

ENTER


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