

**Trapasso v Louis**

2019 NY Slip Op 34696(U)

October 1, 2019

Supreme Court, Suffolk County

Docket Number: Index No. 605098/2019

Judge: William G. Ford

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**SHORT FORM ORDER**

**INDEX NO.: 605098/2019**

**SUPREME COURT - STATE OF NEW YORK  
I.A.S. PART 38 - SUFFOLK COUNTY**

PRESENT:

**HON. WILLIAM G. FORD  
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT**

**STEPHEN TRAPASSO & PAULA  
TRAPASSAO,**

**Plaintiff,**

**-against-**

**HOI LOUIS,**

**Defendant.**

**Motion Submit Date: 10/31/19  
Mot Seq 001 MG; RTC**

**PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL:  
Michael J. Brown PC  
320 Carleton Ave., Ste 2000  
Central Islip, New York 11722**

**DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL:  
Gentile & Tambasco  
115 Broadhollow Rd., Ste 300  
Melville, New York 11747**

In plaintiff's electronically filed personal injury negligence action, on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability pursuant to CPLR 3212, this Court considered the following: NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 4 - 17; and upon due deliberation and full consideration of all of the above, it is

**ORDERED** that plaintiff's motion seeking partial summary judgment as to liability pursuant to CPLR 3212 against defendant is **granted** as follows; and it is further

**ORDERED** that plaintiff's counsel is hereby directed to serve a copy of this decision and order with notice of entry on defense counsel electronically and via email; and it is further

**ORDERED** that plaintiff is further hereby **directed** to place this matter on the preliminary conference calendar to hold a preliminary conference before the Differentiated Case Management Part **on or before November 21, 2019** to commence discovery as to plaintiff's damages in this action; and it is further

**ORDERED** that, if applicable, within 30 days of the entry of this decision and order, that defendant's counsel is also hereby directed to give notice to the Suffolk County Clerk as required by CPLR 8019(c) with a copy of this decision and order and pay any fees should any be required.

**BACKGROUND & POSTURE**

On March 15, 2019, plaintiffs electronically commenced this personal injury negligence action against defendants arising out of a motor vehicle collision which occurred on November 15, 2018. By the pleadings filed, plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury premised on

defendants negligence as a proximate cause of the underlying motor vehicle collision and attendant alleged serious injuries. Defendant joined issue filing an answer on May 8, 2019. A review of the electronic court file kept and maintained by NYSCEF indicates that formal pretrial disclosure in this matter has yet to commence as neither party has requested a preliminary conference. Nevertheless, now before the Court is plaintiff's opposed motion for partial summary judgment on liability against the defendants, which is resolved as follows.

In support of the application, plaintiff submits a copy of the pleadings, plaintiffs' affidavits in support and an uncertified copy of the police accident investigation report.

Testifying by affidavit in support of the application for judgment as a matter of law on liability, plaintiffs state in sum and substance that plaintiff Stephen Trapasso operated a 2018 Lexus vehicle, with his wife plaintiff Paula Trapasso as a passenger, travelling southbound which came to a stop at the intersection of Thorne Drive and Central Avenue in Oyster Bay, Nassau County, New York. While stopped for at least 30 seconds, plaintiffs state that the rear of their vehicle was struck by a 2005 Honda vehicle operated by defendant travelling westbound on Central Avenue.

### STANDARD OF REVIEW

The motion court's role on review of a motion for summary judgment is issue finding, not issue determination (*Trio Asbestos Removal Corp. v Gabriel & Sciacca Certified Pub. Accountants, LLP*, 164 AD3d 864, 865, 82 NYS3d 127, 129 [2d Dept 2018]). The court should refrain from making credibility determinations (*Gniewek v Consol. Edison Co.*, 271 AD2d 643, 643, 707 NYS2d 871 [2d Dept 2000]).

It is well settled that summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should not be granted when there is doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of fact. Where, however, one seeking summary judgment tenders evidentiary proof in admissible form establishing its defense sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in its favor, the burden falls upon the opposing party to show, also by evidentiary proof in admissible form, that there is a material issue of fact requiring a trial of the matter (*see Zuckerman v. City of New York*, 49 NY2d 557, 562, 427 NYS2d 595 [1980]). The evidence presented on a motion for summary judgment must be scrutinized in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion (*see Goldstein v. Monroe County*, 77 AD2d 232, 236, 432 NYS2d 966 [1980]).

The proponent on a motion of summary judgment must make a *prima facie* showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (*Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.*, 68 NY2d 320, 508 NYS2d 923 [1986]; *Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.*, 64 NY2d 851, 487 NYS2d 316 [1985]; *Zuckerman v City of New York*, 49 NY2d 557, 427 NYS2d 595 [1980]).

If the moving party fails in meeting this burden, the motion must be denied. If, however, this burden is satisfied, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish the existence of material issues of fact requiring a trial (*see Zuckerman, supra*). The function of the court in determining a motion for summary judgment is issue finding, not issue determination (*Pantote Big Alpha Foods, Inc. v Schefman*, 121 AD2d 295, 503 NYS2d 58 [1st Dept. 1986]).

The burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion which must produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of the material issues of fact (*Roth v Barreto*, 289AD2d 557, 735 NYS2d 197 [2d Dept. 2001]; *Rebecchi v Whitmore*, 172 AD2d 600, 568 NYS2d 423 [2d Dept. 1991]; *O'Neill v Fishkill*, 134 AD2d 487, 521 NYS2d 272 [2d Dept. 1987]). The law is well-established that summary judgment is a drastic remedy to be granted only when there is clearly no genuine issue of fact to be presented at trial (see *Andre v Pomeroy*, 35 NY2d 361, 362 NYS2d 131 [1974]; *Benincasa v Garrubo*, 141 AD2d 636, 529 NYS2d 797 [2d Dept. 1988]).

### DISCUSSION

The plaintiff in a negligence action moving for summary judgment on the issue of liability must establish, *prima facie*, that the defendants breached a duty owed to the plaintiff and that the defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of the alleged injuries (*Montalvo v Cedeno*, 170 AD3d 1166 [2d Dept 2019]; accord *Buchanan v Keller*, 169 AD3d 989, 991, 95 NYS3d 252, 254 [2d Dept 2019][holding that plaintiff-movant seeking summary judgment on liability is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault in order to establish *prima facie* entitlement to judgment as a matter of law]; quoting *Rodriguez v. City of New York*, 31 NY3d 312 [2018]).

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a *prima facie* case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on the operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision” (*Mulhern v Gregory*, 161 AD3d 881, 883, 75 NYS3d 592, 594 [2d Dept 2018]; *Comas-Bourne v City of New York*, 146 AD3d 855, 856, 45 NYS3d 182, 183 [2d Dept 2017]; *Whelan v Sutherland*, 128 AD3d 1055, 1056, 9 NYS3d 639, 640 [2d Dept 2015]; *Tutrani v. County of Suffolk*, 10 NY3d 906, 908; *Gutierrez v. Trillium USA, LLC*, 111 AD3d 669, 670–671, 974 NYS2d 563; *Pollard v. Independent Beauty & Barber Supply Co.*, 94 AD3d 845, 846, 942 NYS2d 360; *Perez v Roberts*, 91 AD3d 620, 621, 936 NYS2d 259, 260 [2d Dept 2012]; *Le Grand v Silberstein*, 123 AD3d 773, 774, 999 NYS2d 96, 97 [2d Dept 2014]).

The claim that the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the following vehicle (see *Zdenek v Safety Consultants, Inc.*, 63 AD3d 918, 918, 883 NYS2d 57, 58 [2d Dept 2009]; *Kastritsios v. Marcello*, 84 AD3d 1174, 923 NYS2d 863; *Franco v. Breceus*, 70 AD3d 767, 895 NYS2d 152; *Mallen v. Su*, 67 AD3d 974, 890 NYS2d 79; *Rainford v. Han*, 18 AD3d 638, 795 NYS2d 645; *Russ v. Investech Secs.*, 6 AD3d 602, 775 NYS2d 867; *Xian Hong Pan v Buglione*, 101 AD3d 706, 707, 955 NYS2d 375, 377 [2d Dept 2012]). However, “[i]f the operator cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the plaintiff may properly be awarded judgment as a matter of law” (*Barile v. Lazzarini*, 222 AD2d 635, 636, 635 NYS2d 694; *D'Agostino v YRC, Inc.*, 120 AD3d 1291, 1292, 992 NYS2d 358, 359 [2d Dept 2014]).

“When the driver of an automobile approaches another automobile from the rear, he or she is bound to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed and control over his vehicle, and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the other vehicle” (*Comas-Bourne v City of New York*, 146 AD3d 855, 856, 45 NYS3d 182, 183 [2d Dept 2017]). Drivers have a duty to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident (*Williams v Spencer-Hall*, 113 AD3d 759, 760, 979 NYS2d 157, 159 [2d Dept 2014]).

a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operator of the rearmost vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (*Sayed v Murray*, 109 AD3d 464, 464, 970 NYS2d 279, 281 [2d Dept 2013]).

A possible non-negligent explanation for a rear-end collision could be the sudden stop of the lead vehicle,” however, it is equally true that “vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows, since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her car and the car ahead” (*Tumminello v City of New York*, 148 AD3d 1084, 1085, 49 NYS3d 739, 741 [2d Dept 2017]; *Shamah v. Richmond County Ambulance Serv.*, 279 A.D.2d 564, 565, 719 N.Y.S.2d 287; see *Gutierrez v Trillium USA, LLC*, 111 AD3d 669, 671, 974 NYS2d 563, 566 [2d Dept 2013]; *Robayo v. Aghaabdul*, 109 A.D.3d 892, 893, 971 N.Y.S.2d 317). Even assuming that a lead vehicle stopped short or suddenly, following vehicles should not escape liability for an assumed failure to maintain a proper or safe following distance under the presented circumstances, where the record presents a scenario with triable questions of fact ripe for jury determination, rather than summary determination on the law ( see e.g. *Romero v Al Haag & Son Plumbing & Heating, Inc.*, 113 AD3d 746, 747, 978 NYS2d 895, 896 [2d Dept 2014][even assuming that the defendant driver failed to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed while traveling behind the plaintiff’s vehicle under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a], defendant’s deposition testimony relied upon by plaintiff, itself raised a triable issue of fact on whether the plaintiff contributed to the accident by driving in an erratic manner]; accord *Fernandez v Babylon Mun. Solid Waste*, 117 AD3d 678, 679, 985 NYS2d 289, 290 [2d Dept 2014][under circumstances where plaintiff came to an abrupt stop for no apparent reason resulting in a collision, a triable issue of fact exists]; *Sokolowska v Song*, 123 AD3d 1004, 1004, 999 NYS2d 847, 848 [2d Dept 2014]).

Thus, the burden is placed on the driver of the offending vehicle, as he or she is in the best position to explain whether the collision was due to a mechanical failure, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, or some other reasonable cause (see *Abbott v Picture Cars E., Inc.*, 78 A.D.3d 869, 911 N.Y.S.2d 449 [2d Dept 2010]; *DeLouise v S.K.I. Wholesale Beer Corp.*, 75 A.D.3d 489, 904 N.Y.S.2d 761 [2d Dept 2010]; *Moran v Singh*, 10 A.D.3d 707, 782 N.Y.S.2d 284 [2d Dept 2004]).

Here, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ submission of an uncertified police accident investigation report, which for reasons stated below, having reviewed his moving papers, the Court finds that plaintiff has met his *prima facie* burden for entitlement to summary judgment on liability based on the submission of her sworn testimony which demonstrates a *prima facie* case of negligence against the defendant. Thus, the burden has shifted to defendants to come forward with a non-negligent explanation for the incident.

Arguing in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion by counsel’s affirmation, defendant first contends that the application is premature and results in substantial and unfair prejudice under CPLR 3212(f) since now pretrial discovery has yet been conducted. This line of argument is unavailing and here is insufficient to preclude entry of summary judgment. Recent caselaw within the Second Department clearly holds that under similar circumstances as regards non-movant’s claim of outstanding discovery as an impediment to the consideration of summary judgment “[w]here outstanding discovery identified by the non-movant seeks production solely

of evidence pertaining to plaintiff's comparative fault, such a motion is not premature in light of the fact that plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault in order to establish a *prima facie* case of the defendants' liability (*Francois v Tang*, 2018-03447, 2019 WL 1782208, at \*1 [2d Dept Apr. 24, 2019]). Thus, to the extent that defendant seeks to conduct discovery regarding liability, and really the extent or scope of plaintiff's comparative fault for the underlying incident, that no longer is relevant in the post *Rodriguez* landscape. More importantly, the Second Department is clear that defendant's mere hope or speculation that additional discovery might lead to or create a triable fact issue is insufficient to preclude the entry of summary judgment on liability in this negligence motor vehicle action (*see e.g. Rodriguez v Farrell*, 115 AD3d 929, 931, 983 NYS2d 68, 70 [2d Dept 2014][appellate court determining that summary judgment not premature where defendant failed to demonstrate that discovery would lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motions were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiffs]; *Medina v Rodriguez*, 92 AD3d 850, 851, 939 NYS2d 514, 515 [2d Dept 2012]; *Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp.*, 45 AD3d 736, 737, 846 NYS2d 309, 310–11 [2d Dept 2007]; *Hill v Ackall*, 71 AD3d 829, 829–30, 895 NYS2d 837, 838 [2d Dept 2010]). Defendant's arguments simply do not meet this standard and thus they are unsuccessful in invoking CPLR 3212(f) to prevent this Court from weighing the issuance of summary judgment on liability in plaintiffs' favor.

Next, defendants challenge submission and consideration of an uncertified copy of the police accident investigation report. They are correct to do so as the caselaw is legion that holds for the proposition that it constitutes inadmissible hearsay as an uncertified document, not satisfying the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

The Second Department has previously stated as much holding that “[p]ursuant to CPLR 4518(a), a police accident report is admissible as a business record so long as the report is made based upon the officer's personal observations and while carrying out police duties. If information contained in a police accident report was not based upon the police officer's personal observations, it may nevertheless be admissible as a business record “if the person giving the police officer the information contained in the report was under a business duty to relate the facts to him [or her]” (*Memenza v Cole*, 131 AD3d 1020, 1021–22, 16 NYS3d 287, 289 [2d Dept 2015]; *accord Shehab v Powers*, 150 AD3d 918, 919, 54 NYS3d 104, 106 [2d Dept 2017][information in a police accident report is “admissible as a business record so long as the report is made based upon the officer's personal observations and while carrying out police duties”, however also holding that information in a police accident report is inadmissible where the information came from witnesses not engaged in the police business in the course of which the memorandum was made, and the information does not qualify under any other hearsay exception ]).

Here, plaintiffs' counsel's mere conclusory assertion that the report is admissible under CPLR 4518 and 4520 does is not a sufficient basis for this Court to ignore its inadmissibility. Thus, because it is not in admissible form, this Court will not consider it as competent proof in support of plaintiffs' application.

Nevertheless, even without the report, the balance of plaintiff's affidavit testimony suffices permitting plaintiff has to meet the *prima facie* burden for entitlement to summary judgment on liability for a case of negligence against defendant. Defendant opposes plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment arguing the existence of triable questions of fact. However, this


opposition exists solely in the form of counsel’s affirmation, argument which in and of itself does not constitute competent or admissible evidence. Nowhere in defendant’s opposition is any affidavit from defendants or any other tangible piece of evidence supplied. Thus, defendants fail to carry their shifted burden of rebutting plaintiff’s *prima facie* case of negligence against them by competent or admissible proof raising a triable question of fact meriting a liability trial and precluding judgment as a matter of law on liability for the plaintiff.

The law in this regard is settled. Defendants’ reliance on their attorney’s affirmation, without further submission of sworn testimony by any competent witness with direct personal or firsthand knowledge of the facts and circumstances underlying the subject accident, is insufficient to establish triable issues of fact warranting denial of summary judgment. The Second Department has repeatedly cautioned counsel on this point (*Huerta v Longo*, 63 AD3d 684, 685, 881 NYS2d 132, 133 [2d Dept 2009]; *Collins v Laro Serv. Sys. of New York, Inc.*, 36 AD3d 746, 746–47, 829 NYS2d 168, 169 [2d Dept 2007][attorney’s affirmation, together with inadmissible hearsay documents insufficient to warrant denial of the motion]; *Cordova v Vinueza*, 20 AD3d 445, 446, 798 NYS2d 519, 521 [2d Dept 2005][attorney’s affirmation offering speculation unsupported by any evidence insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact]).

Because defendant has failed to come forward with competent and admissible proof demonstrating triable issues of fact or non-negligent explanations for the collision here, necessitating a trial on his liability, this Court **grants** plaintiffs partial summary judgment on liability against defendant under CPLR 3212.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court.

Dated: October 1, 2019  
Riverhead, New York

  
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WILLIAM G. FORD, J.S.C.

\_\_\_\_\_ FINAL DISPOSITION                        X   NON-FINAL DISPOSITION