Liota v Soil Solutions, Inc.
2022 NY Slip Op 35002(U)
December 13, 2022
Supreme Court, Kings County
Docket Number: Index No. 510517/2020
Judge: Carl J. Landicino
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At an IAS Term, Part 81 of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, held in and for the County of Kings, at the Courthouse, at 360 Adams Street, Brooklyn, New York, on the 13th day of December 2022.

PRESENT:
HON. CARL J. LANDICINO,
Justice.

---X

PETER M. LIOTA,

Plaintiff,

-against-

SOIL SOLUTIONS, INC. and THOMAS V. STARIA,

Defendants.

---X

Index No.: 510517/2020

DECISION AND ORDER

Motions Sequence #2

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:

Papers Numbered (NYSCEF)

Notice of Motion/Cross Motion and
Affidavits (Affirmations) Annexed 19-25,
Opposing Affidavits (Affirmations)... 27-30,
Reply Affidavits (Affirmations) 32

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After a review of the papers and oral argument, the Court finds as follows:

The instant action concerns a claim for personal injuries allegedly arising from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on April 17, 2020. Plaintiff Peter M. Liota (hereinafter the "Plaintiff") alleges that he was injured when his vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle owned by Defendant Soil Solutions, Inc. and operated by Defendant Thomas V. Staria (hereinafter the "Defendant Staria") (hereinafter collectively the "Defendants"). The incident allegedly occurred on the Verrazano Narrows Bridge in Brooklyn, New York.

The Plaintiff now moves (motion sequence #3) for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting him summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the Defendants' second and seventh affirmative defenses of culpable conduct and statute of limitations, respectively. The Plaintiff contends that summary judgment should be granted because the Defendants' vehicle was negligent and the sole proximate cause of the collision. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that summary judgment should be granted given that there is *prima facie* evidence that Plaintiff's vehicle was hit in the rear by the Defendants' vehicle. The Defendants oppose the motion and contend that Plaintiff's application for summary judgment should be denied as there is an issue of fact regarding the comparative negligence of the Plaintiff. Specifically, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiff made a short and sudden stop. The Defendants also contend that the motion is premature as discovery has not been completed.

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that deprives a litigant of his or her day in court, and it "should only be employed when there is no doubt as to the absence of triable issues of material fact." *Kolivas v. Kirchoff*, 14 AD3d 493, 787 N.Y.S.2d 392 [2d Dept 2005], citing *Andre v. Pomeroy*, 35 NY2d 361, 364, 362 N.Y.S.2d 1341 [1974]. The proponent for summary judgment must make a *prima facie* showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact. *See Sheppard-Mobley v. King*, 10 AD3d 70, 74, 778 N.Y.S.2d 98 [2d Dept 2004], citing *Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital*, 68 NY2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923 [1986], *Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr.*, 64 NY2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316 [1985]. "In determining a motion for summary judgment, evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inference must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party." *Adams v. Bruno*, 124 AD3d 566, 566, 1

N.Y.S.3d 280, 281 [2d Dept 2015] citing *Valentin v. Parisio*, 119 AD3d 854, 989 N.Y.S.2d 621 [2d Dept 2014]; *Escobar v. Velez*, 116 AD3d 735, 983 N.Y.S.2d 612 [2d Dept 2014].

Once a moving party has made a *prima facie* showing of its entitlement to summary judgment, "the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action" *Garnham & Han Real Estate Brokers v. Oppenheimer*, 148 AD2d 493, 538 N.Y.S.2d 837 [2d Dept 1989]. Failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers. *See Demshick v. Cmty. Hous. Mgmt. Corp.*, 34 AD3d 518, 520, 824 N.Y.S.2d 166, 168 [2d Dept 2006]; *see Menzel v. Plotnick*, 202 AD2d 558, 558–559, 610 N.Y.S.2d 50 [2d Dept 1994]. However, "[a] plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault in establishing his or her *prima facie* case..." if they can show "...that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the alleged injuries." *Tsyganash v. Auto Mall Fleet Mgmt., Inc.*, 163 AD3d 1033, 1034, 83 N.Y.S.3d 74, 75 [2d Dept 2018]; *Rodriguez v. City of New York*, 31 NY3d 312, 320, 101 N.E.3d 366, 371 [2018].

Turning to the merits of the instant motion, the Court finds that sufficient evidence has been presented by the Plaintiff to establish, *prima facie*, that the Defendants' vehicle hit the Plaintiff's vehicle in the rear. In support of his application, the Plaintiff relies upon Plaintiff's Affidavit and the certified police accident report. As an initial matter, the certified police accident report is admissible and the statement by Defendant driver that he was "unable to stop in time," is admissible. The statement constitutes an admission. *See Yassin v. Blackman*, 188 AD3d 62, 64, 131 N.Y.S.3d 53, 55 [2d Dept 2020]. In his affidavit, Plaintiff states that "[b]efore the collision occurred, I was traveling straight in the right lane at the aforementioned location. I had gradually began to slow down my vehicle for the traffic ahead of me when the defendants' vehicle which

was owned by defendant Soil Solutions, Inc. and operated by defendant Thomas V. Staria, rear ended my vehicle, which then caused my vehicle to lose control and strike a jersey barrier." (*See* Plaintiff's motion, Plaintiff's Affidavit, Paragraph 3-4). This statement is sufficient for the Plaintiff to establish a *prima facie* showing. *See Martinez v. Allen*, 163 AD3d 951, 82 N.Y.S.3d 130 [2d Dept 2018]. This is because "[a] rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a *prima facie* case of negligence against the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision." *Klopchin v. Masri*, 45 AD3d 737, 737, 846 N.Y.S.2d 311, 311 [2d Dept 2007]. Further, "[w]hen the driver of an automobile approaches another automobile from the rear, he or she is bound to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed and control over his [or her] vehicle, and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the other vehicle." *Gaeta v. Carter,* 6 AD3d 576, 576, 775 N.Y.S.2d 86 [2d Dept. 2004]; *see* Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]; *Williams v. Spencer–Hall,* 113 AD3d 759, 759-760, 979 N.Y.S.2d 157 [2d Dept 2014]; *Taing v. Drewery,* 100 AD3d 740, 741, 954 N.Y.S.2d 175 [2d Dept 2012].

In opposition, the Defendants rely primarily on Defendant Staria's affidavit. First, it should be noted that the "motion was not premature since the defendant[s] failed to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff." *Turner v. Butler*, 139 AD3d 715, 716, 32 N.Y.S.3d 174, 175 [2d Dept 2016]. In his affidavit, Defendant Staria states that "[t]his incident occurred at approximately 2:00 PM. Eastbound traffic on the upper level of the Verrazano Bridge was light at this time. As I was approaching the highest point of the upper level of the Verrazano Bridge, the vehicle travelling immediately in front of my vehicle braked suddenly. The vehicle in front of my vehicle braked suddenly due to other vehicles ahead of us that were stopped

on the roadway. These vehicles had all stopped suddenly because a motorist travelling on the Westbound lane parked his vehicle on the bridge and leapt from bridge to take his own life. Due to the emergency condition that existed at the scene of the accident, I was unable to stop my vehicle in time and could not avoid this accident." (*See* Defendants' motion, Thomas Staria's Affidavit, Paragraph 3-7).

The Defendants allege that the Plaintiff abruptly stopped and that the emergency doctrine applies. However, Defendants do not indicate why the Plaintiff's stop was unexpected, in that Defendant states that Plaintiff stopped due to other vehicles that had stopped on the bridge. Defendant also fails to state his distance from the Plaintiff's vehicle when he first saw Plaintiff's vehicle stop. Plaintiff was apparently able to come to a complete stop while Defendant Staria failed to keep a reasonable distance between the vehicles and failed to react "to a common traffic occurrence." *Lowhar-Lewis v. Metropolitan Trasp. Auth.*, 97 AD3d 728, 948 N.Y.S.2d 667 [2d Dept 2012]; *Capuozzo v. Miller*, 188 AD3d 1137, 136 N.Y.S.3d 416 [2d Dept 2020]. "Conclusory assertions of a sudden and unexpected stop are insufficient to rebut the inference of negligence." *Shamah v. Richmond County Ambulance Serv.*, 279 AD2d 564, 719 N.Y.S.2d 287 [2d Dept 2001]; *see Levine v. Taylor,* 268 AD2d 566, 702 N.Y.S.2d 107 [2d Dept 2000]; *Corbly v. Butler,* 226 AD2d 418, 641 N.Y.S.2d 71 [2d Dept 1996]; *Benyarko v. Avis Rent A Car Sys.,* 162 AD2d 572, 556 N.Y.S.2d 761 [2d Dept 1990]; *Young v. City of New York,* 113 AD2d 833, 493 N.Y.S.2d 585 [2d Dept 1985]. Defendants' claim of a sudden stop is insufficient to establish a non-negligent defense or raise an issue of comparative negligence. Moreover, Defendant's assertion of the emergency doctrine is without merit. Accordingly, the Defendant driver was negligent and the sole proximate cause of the accident. *See Tumminello v. City of New York*, 148 AD3d 1084, 49

N.Y.S.3d 739 [2d Dept 2017]; *Cajas-Romero v. Ward*, 106 AD3d 850, 965 N.Y.S.2d 559 [2d Dept 2013]; *Waide v. ARI Fleet, LT*, 143 AD3d 975, 39 N.Y.S.3d 512 [2d Dept 2016].

Insofar as the Defendants have not raised an issue of fact as to Plaintiff's comparative negligence and the Plaintiff has moved for the dismissal of Plaintiff's affirmative defense in relation to Plaintiff's culpable conduct, the Defendants' affirmative defense number two alleging culpable conduct on the part of the Plaintiff is dismissed. *See Sapienza v. Harrison*, 191 AD3d 1028, 142 N.Y.S.3d 584, 588 [2d Dept 2021]; *Kwok King Ng v. West*, 195 AD3d 1006, 146 N.Y.S.3d 811, 812 [2d Dept 2021].

Additionally, Defendants did not oppose Plaintiff's application for dismissal the seventh affirmative defense alleging statute of limitations. This action was commenced within the three-year statute of limitations. *See* CPLR 214. Therefore, the portion of the application seeking dismissal of the Defendants' seventh affirmative defense is granted.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

The Plaintiff's motion (motion sequence #2) for summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted to the extent that the Defendant driver was negligent and the proximate cause of the accident, and the Defendants' affirmative defenses of culpable conduct and statute of limitations are dismissed. The matter shall proceed on the issue of damages.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

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

Carl J. Landicino, J.S.C.

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