

ARK370 DOE v Archdiocese of New York

2023 NY Slip Op 31337(U)

April 17, 2023

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Index No. 950485/2020

Judge: Alexander M. Tisch

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**SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY**

PRESENT: HON. ALEXANDER M. TISCH PART 18

Justice

-----X

ARK370 DOE,

Plaintiff,

- v -

ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK, THE MARIST
BROTHERS, MOUNT ST. MICHAEL ACADEMY, DOES 1-5
WHOSE IDENTITIES ARE UNKNOWN TO PLAINTIFF

Defendant.

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INDEX NO. 950485/2020

MOTION DATE 04/01/2021

MOTION SEQ. NO. 002

**DECISION + ORDER ON
MOTION**

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 were read on this motion to/for DISMISS.

Upon the foregoing documents, defendant Archdiocese of New York (the Archdiocese or defendant) moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) or, alternatively, pursuant to CPLR 3212.

The complaint alleges that “[f]rom approximately 1985 to 1987, when Plaintiff was approximately 14 to 15 years old, Br. Timothy engaged in unpermitted sexual contact with Plaintiff” (NYSCEF Doc No 1 at ¶ 21). Plaintiff alleges that they attended Mount St. Michael Academy in the Bronx and that Brother Timothy “was a Roman Catholic cleric employed by the Archdiocese, the Marist Brothers and Mount St. Michael Academy. Br. Timothy remained under the direct supervision, employ, and control of Defendants” (*id.* at ¶¶ 17, 19).

In determining dismissal under CPLR Rule 3211 (a) (7), the “complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction” (*Goldfarb v Schwartz*, 26 AD3d 462, 463 [2d Dept 2006]). The “allegations are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference” (*Godfrey v Spano*, 13 NY3d 358, 373 [2009]). “[T]he sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action,

and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]). Additionally, “[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]).

A motion to dismiss a complaint based upon documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) “may be appropriately granted where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff’s factual allegation, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]). Not every piece of evidence in the form of a document is properly deemed “documentary evidence.” The appellate courts have noted this distinction, finding that legislative history and supporting cases make it clear that “judicial records, as well as documents reflecting out-of-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are ‘essentially undeniable,’ would qualify as ‘documentary evidence’ in the proper case” (Fontanetta v Doe, 73 AD3d 78, 86 [2d Dept 2010]; Amsterdam Hosp. Grp., LLC v Marshall-Alan Assocs., Inc., 120 AD3d 431, 432 [1st Dept 2014]).

In support of its motion to dismiss, defendant submits the deed to where the alleged abuse occurred, showing that the property was not owned by defendant; certificates of incorporation for co-defendant(s) and reports of their existence; and the affidavit of defendant’s Associate General Counsel, Roderick Cassidy. The Cassidy affidavit states, inter alia, that the Marist Brothers is an “independent religious order which was and is separate and distinct from the Archdiocese”; “the Archdiocese did not -- and does not -- have any supervisory authority over the Marist Brothers or

its employees” including Timothy; and that defendant does not have any relationship with the student of Mount St. Michael Academy (NYSCEF Doc No 26 at ¶¶ 4-8).

However, an affidavit from defendant’s counsel does not constitute “documentary evidence” within the meaning of CPLR 3211 (a)(1) (see J.D. v Archdiocese of New York, — AD3d —, 2023 NY Slip Op 01588 [1st Dept Mar. 23, 2023]; Correa v Orient-Express Hotels, Inc., 84 AD3d 651 [1st Dept 2011] citing, inter alia, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP v Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 10 AD3d 267, 271 [1st Dept 2004]; Fontanetta v Doe, 73 AD3d 78, 86 [2d Dept 2010] [“it is clear that affidavits and deposition testimony are not ‘documentary evidence’ within the intendment of a CPLR 3211(a)(1) motion to dismiss”]). While lack of ownership over the school’s premises may negate any duty of care that a landowner has to its tenants or guests and invitees, such a duty is distinctly different from the legal duty asserted here, which is the ability to control a third-party tortfeasor because of special relationship existing between the defendant and tortfeasor, such as an employment relationship (see J.D. v Archdiocese of New York, — AD3d —, 2023 NY Slip Op 01588 [1st Dept Mar. 23, 2023]). In this regard, defendant’s cases in support are distinguishable and essentially irrelevant (NYSCEF Doc No 19 at ¶ 35, citing Bautista v Archdiocese of New York, 164 AD3d 450, 451 [1st Dept 2018] [where the court found defendant “was not liable as an agent of the owner under Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6)” because it “established that it did not have the authority to supervise or control the job”] and Farrulla v Happy Care Ambulette Inc., 125 AD3d 529, 530 [1st Dept 2015] [where the court found a defendant could not be liable for an motor vehicle accident if it “did not own, maintain or operate” the vehicle]).

The only evidence submitted that is relevant to the claims against the defendant is the Cassidy affidavit, who affirms that “the Archdiocese did not hire, retain, employ, oversee,

supervise, provide, or control the staff or employees at Mount St. Michael Academy, including Brother Timothy Brady”; “Brother Timothy Brady was not an employee, agent, or servant of the Archdiocese”; and “[t]he Archdiocese did not play any role in assigning and/or appointing Brother Timothy Brady to any position at Mount St. Michael Academy” (NYSCEF Doc No 26 at ¶ 7). Although “a trial court may use affidavits in its consideration of a pleading motion to dismiss,” where, as here, the Court declines to convert the motion into one for summary judgment, such affidavits “are not to be examined for the purpose of determining whether there is evidentiary support for the pleading” (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., Inc., 40 NY2d 633, 635 [1976]). Consequently, affidavits submitted from a defendant “will almost never warrant dismissal under CPLR 3211” (Lawrence v Miller, 11 NY3d 588, 595 [2008]) “unless [they] establish conclusively that plaintiff has no cause of action” (Rovello, 40 NY2d at 636).


Here it cannot be said that defendant met its burden establishing that plaintiff has no claim against it as a matter of law because the affidavit is not conclusive (see J.D., 2023 NY Slip Op 01588). It is important to note that an affidavit is not necessarily subject to cross examination and the issue of whether an employment relationship exists sufficient to hold defendant liable for negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care in hiring, supervising, or retaining Brother Timothy may be a fact-intensive analysis as to the extent of defendant’s power to order and control the employee’s performance of work (see generally Castro-Quesada v Tuapanta, 148 AD3d 978, 979 [2d Dept 2017], quoting Barak v Chen, 87 AD3d 955, 957 [2d Dept 2011]; Griffin v Sirva, Inc., 29 NY3d 174, 185-86 [2017] [noting that factors as to whether one is an employer may include ““(1) the selection and engagement of the servant; (2) the payment of salary or wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of control of the servant's

conduct”] quoting State Div. of Human Rights v GTE Corp., 109 AD2d 1082, 1083 [4th Dept 1985]).

Defendant’s alternate request for relief pursuant to CPLR 3212 is denied as well. First, CPLR 3212 (a) explicitly requires that issue be joined and defendant has not yet filed an answer (see Alro Builders and Contractors, Inc. v Chicken Koop, Inc., 78 AD2d 512, 512 [1st Dept 1980]). Second, it is clear that discovery remains outstanding related to the issue mentioned above about the exact nature and scope of the relationship between defendant and the tortfeasor, among others. Accordingly, summary judgment is premature (see Rutherford v Brooklyn Navy Yard Dev. Corp., 174 AD3d 932, 933 [2d Dept 2019]; Rodriguez Pastor v DeGaetano, 128 AD3d 218, 227-28 [1st Dept 2015]).

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is denied; and it is further ORDERED that the movant shall file and serve an answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days from service of a copy of this order with notice of entry; and it is further ORDERED that the parties shall proceed with discovery pursuant to CMO No. 2, Section IX (B) (1) and the stipulated compliance conference order dated 10/28/2022 (NYSCEF Doc No 47).

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

<p><u>4/17/2023</u> DATE</p>			 <hr/> <p>ALEXANDER M. TISCH, J.S.C.</p>
CHECK ONE:	<input type="checkbox"/> CASE DISPOSED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DENIED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
APPLICATION:	<input type="checkbox"/> GRANTED		<input type="checkbox"/> GRANTED IN PART
CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:	<input type="checkbox"/> SETTLE ORDER		<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
	<input type="checkbox"/> INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN		<input type="checkbox"/> FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT
			<input type="checkbox"/> REFERENCE