

Green v City of New York

2023 NY Slip Op 32245(U)

July 5, 2023

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Index No. 153915/2022

Judge: Judy H. Kim

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This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: HON. JUDY H. KIM PART 05RCP

Justice

-----X

BRANDON GREEN,

Plaintiff,

- v -

THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Defendant.

-----X

INDEX NO. 153915/2022

MOTION DATE 06/13/2023

MOTION SEQ. NO. 001 002

DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11

were read on this motion for DISMISSAL.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18

were read on this motion to AMEND CAPTION/PLEADINGS.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking "relief for disparate impact and intentional racial discrimination" pursuant to Executive Law §296 (the New York State Human Rights Law, or "NYSHRL"), Administrative Code §8-107 (the New York City Human Rights Law or "NYCHRL"), and Article I, section 11 of the New York State Constitution (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2 [Compl.]).

Plaintiff alleges that he is an African American male who has been employed as a Correction Officer by the New York City Department of Correction ("DOC") for "nearly" a decade [NYCEF Doc. No. 2 [Compl. at ¶¶ 4, 7]]. Plaintiff alleges that he received the COVID-19 vaccination within the time period required by the vaccine mandate imposed by the City but that after submitting his proof of vaccination "about one or two days" after the deadline for such submission he was medically separated from service in the DOC without prior notice or notice of

his right to hearing in front of the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings which, he contends, violated Civil Service Law §72 (Id. at ¶¶11-13). At the time of his termination, plaintiff was assigned to the Otis Bantum Correctional Center (“OBCC”), working under “absolutely deplorable working conditions for staff and living conditions for inmates” (Id. at ¶8). While employed there, he was required “to work excessive hours with breaks, ... in areas where inmates cannot be controlled by securing them in their cells so that they are free to gang up on female uniform staff members for sexual assault and abuses, forcing the [p]laintiff to work with reckless disregard for his health and wellbeing as well as that of the supervisees” (Id. at ¶54).

Plaintiff asserts that the circumstances of his employment were part of a larger pattern of misconduct by defendant and details, in a conclusory fashion, a “history of structural & institutional discrimination, generally, and specifically within the Department of Correction” between 2011 to 2021 (Id. at ¶¶18-21). He alleges that in order to reduce its workforce of uniformed DOC employees without resorting to layoffs, “the City and the Department have resorted to obscene hostile work environments, including allowing inmates to sexually harass and assault female uniform staff and forcing uniform staff to work without mandated breaks required by Section 162 of the Civil Service Law” (Id. at ¶¶20, 27). Defendant has also, according to plaintiff, increasingly fabricated claims of misconduct against Black and Hispanic DOC employees for purposes of discipline and termination in order to reduce its workforce by means other than layoffs (Id. at ¶41). Plaintiff concludes the complaint by detailing the demographics of DOC’s uniform workforce as of 2018 (Id. at ¶¶42-50). Plaintiff’s complaint then sets forth two causes of action, for punitive and compensatory damages “for emotional distress ... as a proximate cause of the Defendant’s discrimination on the basis of race.”

In motion sequence 001, the City moves, pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), to dismiss this action. Plaintiff does not oppose the City's motion, but instead, in motion sequence 002, moves for leave to amend his complaint and to consolidate the instant action with Santiago et al., vs. City of New York, an action pending before this Court under Index No. 159551/2021.

DISCUSSION

The City's Motion to Dismiss

The City's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted. In addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction and the court should accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord the pleading the benefit of every reasonable inference, and only determine whether the facts, as alleged, fit within any cognizable legal theory (See Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]). However, "bare legal conclusions and inherently incredible facts are not entitled to preferential consideration" (M & E 73-75, LLC v 57 Fusion LLC, 189 AD3d 1, 5 [1st Dept 2020]).

Plaintiff's disparate impact claim falls within this latter category. To state a claim of discrimination under a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must allege that a facially neutral practice had a disproportionate effect on a protected class (Burgis v City of New York Dept. of Sanitation, 2018 NY Slip Op 33322[U], 8 [Sup Ct, NY County 2018] citing Levin v Yeshiva Univ., 96 NY2d 484, 491 [2001]). Under the NYCHRL, in particular, "a cause of action may be maintained where a policy or practice of a covered entity or a group of policies or practices of a covered entity results in a disparate impact to the detriment of any [protected] group" and "[s]uch claims are subject to a more lenient standard" (Burgis v City of New York Dept. of Sanitation, 2018 NY Slip Op. 33322[U], 8 [Sup Ct, NY County 2018] [internal citations and quotations omitted]).

Here, plaintiff fails to set forth either a facially neutral practice or a disproportionate effect on a protected class. To the extent his complaint asserts, in a conclusory fashion, that unpleasant and dangerous working conditions for Correction Officers and targeted harassment caused a disproportionate number of Black and Hispanic Correction Officers to resign or be terminated, it fails to set forth any specific factual allegations to support this claim. Moreover, although plaintiff includes demographic information for the DOC as of October 15, 2018, he adds no information as to how these demographics have changed over time (if, indeed, they have) to establish any sort of disparate impact.

To the extent that plaintiff appears to be arguing that, given the high proportion of minority representation among the DOC workforce, efforts to reduce that workforce are, on their face, discriminatory, such argument has no foundation in law (See e.g., Matter of New York State Off. of Mental Health, Manhattan Psychiatric Ctr. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 223 AD2d 88, 90 [3d Dept 1996] [“A prima facie case of disparate impact is not established by a simple showing of static disparities in an employer’s workforce”]). In short, plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting his claims regarding the DOC policy of workforce reduction, let alone that such a policy caused a statistically significant disparity in Correction Officers of a particular race. His disparate impact claim is, therefore, dismissed (See e.g., Shinaul v. NY City Dept. of Corr., 2021 NY Slip Op 31806[U], *3 [Sup Ct, NY County, 2021]).

To the extent that plaintiff’s complaint asserts a claim for “intentional racial discrimination” the Court views this as claim for employment discrimination based on race, pursuant to Article I, §11 of the New York State Constitution, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. No claim for employment discrimination under Article I, §11 of the New York State Constitution lies here. Under the circumstances, the proper method to assert such an equal protection claim is

through the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law (See Brown v State, 89 NY2d 172, 190-91 [1996]), which plaintiff has done. The complaint also fails to state an employment discrimination claim under the NYCHRL or NYSHRL, however.

To state a claim under the NYSHRL, plaintiff must allege “that [he] is a member of a protected class, that [he] was qualified for [his] position, that [he] suffered an adverse employment action, and that the adverse action was due to circumstances that could be deemed discriminatory” (Thomas v Mintz, 60 Misc 3d 1218(A) [Sup Ct, NY County 2018] [internal citations and quotations omitted], aff’d as mod., **6 182 AD3d 490 [1st Dept 2020]). The elements of a discrimination claim under the NYCHRL largely mirror the foregoing, except that plaintiff need not plead that he suffered an “adverse employment action” but only that he was adversely or differently treated based on his race in a way that disadvantaged him (See e.g., Hosking v Mem. Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 186 AD3d 58, 62 [1st Dept 2020]; see also Harrington v City of New York, 157 AD3d 582 [1st Dept 2018]).

Ultimately, plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim must be dismissed as he fails to set forth any factual allegations suggesting that the defendant’s disputed actions occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. “[He] does not allege facts that would establish that similarly situated persons who ... [were] not of African American descent were treated more favorably than plaintiff” (Thomas v Mintz, 182 AD3d 490, 490-91 [1st Dept 2020]; see also Askin v Dept. of Educ. of City of New York, 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]). To the extent that plaintiff contends that the City discriminated against him by terminating him without certain required notice and hearings required by Civil Service Law §72, this claim is misplaced—that statute is a procedural mechanism for placing disabled public employees who cannot perform the duties of their job on involuntary leave and does not apply here. However, even

assuming plaintiff intended to cite Civil Service Law §75, compliance with this statute was not necessary under the circumstances alleged by plaintiff, i.e., his failure to timely produce proof of COVID-19 vaccination, a condition of employment (See e.g., Matter of New York State Off. of Children and Family Services v Lanterman, 14 NY3d 275, 282 [2010]). Finally, the Court observes that to the extent plaintiff's claims are based upon his termination, this claim is mooted by his representation, in his proposed amended complaint, that he has been reinstated to his former position.

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

Plaintiff's motion to amend is denied. "Leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given absent prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit" (Capezzano Constr. Corp. v Weinberger, 150 AD3d 811, 811 [2d Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Although plaintiff has failed to comply with CPLR §3025(b)'s requirement that he attach a version of the proposed amended pleading showing the changes or additions to be made to the pleading, it appears that no substantive changes have been made to the complaint beyond the addition of two paragraphs stating that plaintiff has been reinstated as a Correction Officer but "in being returned to work ... was subjected to the hostile working conditions designed to make [him] quit" in that he has been "forced to work excessive hours and without breaks" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 15 [Am. Compl. at ¶¶18-19]). As this proposed amended complaint lacks any facts or claims that are materially distinguishable from the operative complaint, it suffers from the same deficiencies of the original complaint outlined above. As the proposed amended complaint is palpably devoid of merit, plaintiff's motion to amend is denied.

In light of the foregoing, that branch of plaintiff’s motion to consolidate this action with Santiago et al. vs. City of New York, Index No. 159551/2021, is denied as moot.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the City of New York’s motion to dismiss this action is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint is denied; and it is further


ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to consolidate this action is denied as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that this action is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that within fifteen days of the date of this decision and order counsel for the City of New York shall serve a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry, upon the plaintiff as well as the Clerk of the Court (60 Centre Street, Room 141B) and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119); and it is further

ORDERED that such service upon the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the “E filing” page on this Court's website at the address www.nycourts.gov/suptctmanh).

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.



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7/5/2023
DATE

HON. JUDY H. KIM, J.S.C.

CHECK ONE:

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APPLICATION:

CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: