Abdelqader v AI Engrs. Inc.

2025 NY Slip Op 30894(U)

March 19, 2025

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Index No. 153441/2023

Judge: Paul A. Goetz

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: **HON. PAUL A. GOETZ** **PART** **47**

Justice

----------X

MAHER ABDELQADER,

Plaintiff,

- v -

AI ENGINEERS INC., ABULKHAIR A ISLAM, KEVIN HUSSAIN, CHARLES DRDA

Defendants.

----------X

INDEX NO. 153441/2023

MOTION DATE 04/12/2024

MOTION SEQ. NO. 002

DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33

were read on this motion to/for DISMISS.

In this defamation and employment discrimination action arising from plaintiff's termination following public attention and criticism of plaintiff's social media and political activity, defendants AI Engineers Inc. (AIE), Abulkhair A Islam, Kevin Hussain, and Charles Drda move pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a) to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.

BACKGROUND[1]

Plaintiff is an Arab American of Palestinian descent who began working as Vice President and NY Regional Manager of AIE in October 2016 (NYSCEF Doc No 21 ¶¶ 10-13). Defendant Islam, AIE's president and CEO, was aware from the start of plaintiff's employment that he "was very active in the Arab-Palestinian community" and the Democratic party, and "was directly involved in [Democratic] Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib's 2018 election campaign" (*id.* ¶ 16). Plaintiff avers that despite holding different political beliefs than plaintiff, Islam

[1] The foregoing allegations are derived from plaintiff's amended complaint (NYSCEF Doc No 21).

"suggested on more than one occasion that [plaintiff and] AIE participate informally in fundraisers," including for the New York City Mayoral campaign in 2021, "as it would raise AIE's profile" (*id.* ¶ 18).

Plaintiff alleges that "other than when encouraged by Islam to participate" in particular activities, he "engaged in his political activities on his own time, outside of work and [without] us[ing] any company resources" (*id.* ¶ 23). He further alleges that he "did not [] post[] about his political activities on any social media platform that mentioned his employment with AIE, nor did he [] post[] . . . in his capacity as an AIE employee" (*id.* ¶ 24).

In 2019, the blog *The Daily Caller* posted a piece on Congresswoman Tlaib that included statements about plaintiff, claiming that he engaged in anti-Semitic hate speech on his social media platforms (*id.* ¶ 25, Ex A pp. 50-58 ["One of Rep. Rashida Tlaib's key fundraisers, Maher Abdel-quader, has repeatedly promoted anti-Semitic conspiracy theories . . . [in] the Facebook group 'Palestinian American Congress,' where members often demonize Jews"]). The blog post noted that plaintiff "shared a controversial anti-Semitic video from his Facebook account" (*id.* ¶ 26). Plaintiff alleges that "he had not actually viewed" the video at the time that he "regrettably and carelessly shared it," and thus did not "realiz[e] that it contained objectional content" (*id.*). Upon reading the blog post and revisiting the video he shared, plaintiff "immediately removed it" from his account and "issued an apology which explained that he foolishly shared a link without properly reviewing the material and that he did not support its content" (*id.* ¶¶ 27-28). Plaintiff also wrote to Islam about the incident in an email dated January 31, 2019, expressing his rejection of anti-Semitism (*id.* ¶ 31). At the time, Islam appeared to be "satisfied with Plaintiff's explanation and the remedial action he took to address the situation" (*id.* ¶ 33). "Thereafter, Plaintiff continued his political activities on his personal time without issue" (*id.* ¶ 37).

In June and October 2022, both *The New York Post* and *Fox News* reposted *The Daily Caller* 2019 blog post (*id.* ¶ 41, Ex A pp. 21-28 [*Fox News* article titled "Activist with history of antisemitism campaigned with several Democrats over the last year, posts reveal"], Ex A pp. 38-39 [*New York Post* article titled "NY Gov. Kathy Hochul pictured with fundraiser Maher Abdelqader, who shared Holocaust denial content"]).

Plaintiff alleges that on October 8, 2022, defendant Hussain, an Associate Vice President for Bridge Inspection at AIE who "made no secret of his political beliefs in the workplace and his disagreement with and disdain for Plaintiff's political activity and pro-Palestinian community support and activism," shared the *New York Post* and *Fox News* articles "with most of AIE's employees, key clients and various professional groups and organizations" (*id.* ¶ 45)[2]. Plaintiff alleges that "[t]his action was not corrected, but [] likely sanctioned by [] Islam" (*id.* ¶ 48). Additionally, defendant Drda, AIE's Vice President, "demanded that [] Islam fire Plaintiff, or Drda would leave the company with twelve other key employees" (*id.* ¶¶ 50-51). Plaintiff alleges that "Hussain supported and joined [] Drda in the effort to strong arm Islam to take an adverse employment action against [] Plaintiff" (*id.* ¶ 52) and that the two "disseminat[ed] false information about Plaintiff, giving the impression that AIE believed Plaintiff to be anti-Semitic" (*id.* ¶ 54).

"On October 9, 2022, two days after the Fox News report" was published, Islam placed plaintiff on administrative leave "to allow the company to investigate the impact the [] articles had on AIE" (*id.* ¶ 54). Two days later, Islam issued a final written warning to plaintiff, stating: "If your political activity continues to negatively impact AIE, you will leave us with no choice

[2] Plaintiff also alleges that "[m]any of Plaintiff's professional contacts, AIE employees and AIE clients were contacted by Islam, Hussain, Drda, and possibly others at AIE who told them about the *Fox News* and *New York Post* publications and advised them that Plaintiff had been removed from working on any matters" (*id.* ¶ 74).

but to terminate your employment" (*id.* ¶ 58). The memo also asked plaintiff to remove himself from his position on the American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC) Board (a professional organization) and to remove his AIE title from all his social media accounts (*id.*, Ex. A, p. 63-64). Plaintiff alleges that Islam "used thousands of his own dollars and contributions to leverage and persuade ACEC to remove Plaintiff from ACEC membership and its email list" (*id.* ¶ 65).

Plaintiff alleges that Islam issued a memorandum "to all AIE employees" via email on October 11, 2022, reminding them that whenever they share their views publicly or on social media, they should clarify that their views are their own, and not a reflection of AIE, and that plaintiff "has been counseled regarding [his] recent [situation] and about what is acceptable and what is not" (*id.* ¶ 58). On October 14, 2022, defendants issued a press release acknowledging "the anguish and dismay that [the] news [regarding plaintiff] has caused" and that AIE "immediately placed [him] on administrative leave pending further internal investigation" (*id.*).

Plaintiff alleges, however, that "AIE did not engage in any investigation whatsoever," and instead immediately removed plaintiff from the AIE website, prevented him from accessing the company network, barred him from the company premises, and instructed him to cease all communications with AIE employees and clients (*id.* ¶¶ 69-70). While on administrative leave, plaintiff alleges that he "received communications from many people who informed him about the widespread dissemination of AIE's false statements about Plaintiff to people in the industry," and that Islam was "bad mouthing" him (*id.* ¶¶ 78-79). Plaintiff further alleges that people in his industry refused to socialize with him due to "the way AIE publicly handled" the situation (*id.* ¶ 80). Finally, "[s]hortly before the end of the month set for Plaintiff's administrative leave, [] Islam informed Plaintiff that he was fired" as of November 12, 2022 (*id.* ¶ 81).

Plaintiff's causes of action include (i) defamation per se as against all defendants; (ii) unlawful termination of employment in violation of New York State Labor Law § 201-d(1)(a) as against defendants AIE and Islam; (iii) discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) §§ 290-297 as against all defendants; and (iv) discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) § 8-101 to 131 as against all defendants.

DISCUSSION

When reviewing a "motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), [courts] must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference, and determine only whether the facts, as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (*Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp.*, 226 AD3d 60, 85-86 [1st Dept 2024] [internal quotations omitted]). "In making this determination, [a court is] not authorized to assess the merits of the complaint or any of its factual allegations" (*id*. at 86 [internal quotations omitted]). "However, factual allegations that do not state a viable cause of action [or] consist of bare legal conclusions . . . are not entitled to such consideration" (*Doe v Bloomberg, L.P.*, 178 AD3d 44, 47 [1st Dept 2019], quoting *Skillgames, LLC v Brody*, 1 AD3d 247, 250 [1st Dept 2003]).

i. Defamation Per Se

"The elements of a cause of action to recover damages for defamation are (1) a false statement that tends to expose a person to public contempt, hatred, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, (2) published without privilege or authorization to a third party, (3) amounting to fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and (4) either causing special [damages] or constituting defamation per se" (*Davidoff v Kaplan*, 217 AD3d 918, 919-20 [2nd Dept 2023], quoting

Laguerre v Maurice, 192 AD3d 44, 50 [2nd Dept 2020]). "Since falsity is a necessary element of a defamation cause of action and only 'facts' are capable of being proven false, 'it follows that only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action'" (*Nofal v Yousef*, 228 AD3d 772, 772 [2nd Dept 2024], quoting *Gross v New York Times Co.*, 82 NY2d 146, 152-53 [1993]). "Special damages need not be alleged or proven if a plaintiff can establish that the alleged defamatory statements constitute defamation per se[;] a false statement constitutes defamation per se if it charges a plaintiff with a serious crime or tends to injure a plaintiff's trade, business, or profession" (*Fernandes v Fernandes*, 2025 NY Slip Op 00847, *1 [2nd Dept 2025]). To survive a motion to dismiss a defamation claim, "[t]he complaint must set forth the particular words allegedly constituting defamation (see CPLR 3016[a]), and it must also allege the time when, place where, and manner in which the false statement was made, and specify to whom it was made" (*Nofal*, 228 AD3d at 772, quoting *Epifani v Johnson*, 65 AD3d 224, 233 [2nd Dept 2009]).

Plaintiff alleges that defendants knowingly made "false statements charg[ing] Plaintiff with harboring, exhibiting and spreading anti-Semitic hate" which subjected him to public contempt (NYSCEF Doc No 21 ¶¶ 137-135). Defendants argue that plaintiff's defamation cause of action is insufficiently pled against each defendant because: Islam's memorandum to AIE employees is privileged as "communication[s] made by one person to another upon a subject in which both have an interest" (*O'Neill v New York Univ.*, 97 AD3d 199, 212 [1st Dept 2012]), and far from showing malice or that he imputed anti-Semitic beliefs to plaintiff, Islam stated in the internal memorandum that plaintiff "assure[d] Islam that he "is not an anti-Semite" and that plaintiff was "misquoted and misrepresented in these news outlets" (NYSCEF Doc No 21, Ex B, p. 67); plaintiff failed to identify Hussain's and Drda's allegedly defamatory statements, who

they communicated with, or how; and the press release did not contain any false statement, as it merely acknowledged the impact that the news had on AIE employees and clients and advised that plaintiff was placed on administrative leave.

In opposition, plaintiff argues that the statements at issue were expressly quoted in his complaint; defendants publicly disseminated "original blog and news reports that contained false statements about the Plaintiff"; and plaintiff adequately specified the time, place, manner, and to whom the statements were made (NYSCEF Doc No 30). Plaintiff also argues that defendants' statements are not protected by any privilege because they acted with malice, as they "knew how harmful making statements that portrayed Abdelqader as an anti-Semitic would be to his reputation and career" and they were "aware that the statements were false" (*id.*). Finally, plaintiff argues that "Islam's use of language from the news articles in his memorandum to the company, the press release alerting the public that Abdelqader had been placed on leave, pending an 'investigation' and the statement that he had been counseled on his actions suggest that Islam believed the reports of alleged false facts damaging to the Plaintiff's character, that Plaintiff had to be dealt with and the situation at AIE had to be managed because the Plaintiff had done something wrong" (*id.*).

Defendants Hussain & Drda

Plaintiff alleges that "[m]any of Plaintiff's professional contacts, AIE employees and AIE clients were contacted by Islam, Hussain, Drda, and possibly others at AIE who told them about the Fox News and New York Post publications and advised them that Plaintiff had been removed from working on any matters" (NYSCEF Doc No 21 ¶ 74). He also alleges that Hussain and Drda "disseminat[ed] false information about Plaintiff, giving the impression that AIE believed Plaintiff to be anti-Semitic" (*id.* ¶ 54).

Sharing news articles, in and of itself, is not defamatory (compare *Mirage Entm't, Inc. v FEG Entretenimientos S.A.*, 326 F Supp 3d 26, 39 [SDNY 2018] [the "contention that the Tweet was defamatory [merely] by linking to the E! News article is without merit"] with *Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v Bleeping Computer LLC*, 194 F Supp 3d 263, 278 [SDNY 2016] [sharing an article may be defamatory where "posted with[] commentary or accompanied by a reference that [] restate[s] the allegedly defamatory content"]). And, while plaintiff alleges that Hussain and Drda's communications also "advised [] that Plaintiff had been removed from working on any matters" (NYSCEF Doc No 21 ¶ 74), this allegation is insufficiently specific, as "plaintiff was merely paraphrasing the statements" (*American Preferred Prescription, Inc. v Health Mgmt.*, 252 AD2d 414, 420 [1st Dept 1998]) and does not allege how the statements were communicated. Similarly, plaintiff's broad allegation that Hussain and Drda "disseminat[ed] false information about Plaintiff, giving the impression that AIE believed Plaintiff to be anti-Semitic" (NYSCEF Doc No 21 ¶ 54) "lack[s] the specificity required by CPLR 3016 (a)" (*Jackie's Enters., Inc. v Belleville*, 165 AD3d 1567, 1570 [3rd Dept 2018]).

Accordingly, the part of defendants' motion that seeks to dismiss plaintiff's defamation cause of action as against defendants Hussain and Drda will be granted.

Defendants Islam & AIE

Plaintiff's allegations against defendants Islam and AIE are based on (i) the memo Islam distributed to AIE employees on October 11, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc No 21, Ex B pp. 67-68 [Islam acknowledging that reports depicting plaintiff as anti-Semitic "have been very upsetting"; reminding employees "to form and advocate for their own political beliefs as individuals"; and assuring "that the individual involved has been counseled regarding these recent circumstances and about what is acceptable and what is not"] [emphasis in original]); and (ii) the press release

published on October 14, 2022 (*id.*, p. 62 ["Recent news posted on various major media outlets about an officer of AIE [] may have impacted our reputation . . . The company is fully cognizant of the anguish and dismay that such news has caused . . . To that end, we have immediately placed the individual on administrative leave pending further internal investigation"]).

Defendants argue, *inter alia*, that these communications did not contain any false statements, as articles portraying plaintiff as anti-Semitic had, in fact, been published and plaintiff was placed on administrative leave. Plaintiff argues that the statements were false in that they "attribute[ed] to the Plaintiff a history of anti-Semitism, accusing him of distributing hate speech and conspiracy theories," "suggest that Islam believed the reports," and imply that "Plaintiff had done something wrong" (NYSCEF Doc No 30). However, as defendants note, in the memo distributed to AIE employees, Islam expressly rejected the articles' accusations that plaintiff is anti-Semitic, specifically stating: "I have spoken with Maher at great length and he assures me that he is not an anti-semite and that he has been misquoted and misrepresented in these news outlets" (NYSCEF Doc No 21, Ex B pp. 67-68). Additionally, plaintiff himself acknowledges that he posted an anti-Semitic video, albeit unintentionally (*id.* ¶¶ 26-27), and contrary to plaintiff's assertions, the memo does not contain any suggestion by Islam that plaintiff has "a history of anti-Semitism" (NYSCEF Doc No 30).

Moreover, the communications are privileged as "communication[s] made to persons who have some common interest in the subject matter" (*Foster v Churchill*, 87 NY2d 744, 751 [1996]), since "[m]any of [AIE's] employees, clients, stakeholders and business partners [had] all expressed concern about the recent publicity" (NYSCEF Doc No 21, Ex B pp. 67-68). While "[t]he defense of qualified privilege will be defeated by demonstrating a defendant spoke with malice," plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that defendants "acted out of personal spite or ill

will, with reckless disregard for the statements' truth or falsity, or with a high degree of belief that their statements were probably false" (*Foster*, 87 NY2d at 751-52). Rather, defendants recognized that the articles may have impacted AIE's reputation and indicated that they were taking the public's concerns seriously by truthfully conveying that plaintiff had been placed on administrative leave; defendants did not state whether they believed plaintiff was accurately represented in the articles or "restate the allegedly defamatory content" (*Enigma Software Grp.*, 194 F Supp 3d at 278).

Accordingly, the part of defendants' motion that seeks to dismiss plaintiff's defamation cause of action as against defendants Islam and AIE will be granted.

ii. Violation of Labor Law § 201-d(1)(a)

Labor Law § 201-d prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee based on his "political activities outside of working hours, off of the employer's premises and without use of the employer's equipment or other property, if such activities are legal" (Labor Law § 201-d). It defines "political activities" as "(i) running for public office, (ii) campaigning for a candidate for public office, or (iii) participating in fund-raising activities for the benefit of a candidate, political party or political advocacy group" (*id.*). In approving the legislation in 1992, then-Governor Mario Cuomo remarked that the statute properly "strikes the difficult balance between the right to privacy in relation to non-working hours activities of individuals and the right of employers to regulate *behavior which has an impact* [] *on the employer's business*" (Memorandum dated August 7, 1992, filed contemporaneously with approval of the statute [emphasis added]).

Defendants assert that plaintiff's termination was not based on his participation in political activities—as evidenced by the fact that plaintiff participated in political activities for

years with without adverse action, though such activities were known to defendants since his hiring—rather, it was "only because of the wider attention received from the News Articles published by the New York Post and Fox News" that plaintiff was terminated (NYSCEF Doc No 28). In opposition, plaintiff notes that in his final warning before termination, Islam wrote: "If your political activity continues to negatively impact AIE, you will leave us with no choice but to terminate your employment . . . I can no longer tolerate your selfishness and carelessness with regarding to your political activity" (NYSCEF Doc No 21, Ex. B, pp. 63-65). Plaintiff also asserts that "the news articles upon which the Defendants relied are target pieces against political candidates" and he "was victimized because he is an Arab Palestinian activist who works on high profile Democratic party campaigns" (NYSCEF Doc No 30).

While plaintiff's social media activity may have been more closely scrutinized by the news outlets because he was an active participant in Congresswoman Tlaib's campaign, plaintiff nevertheless fails to allege that he was terminated because of his political activity (campaigning for Congresswoman Tlaib[3]), rather than the content he shared[4] and the impact of the resulting media attention on AIE. Labor Law § 201-d prevents employers from discriminating against employees for activities they engage in "solely outside the office, during non-working hours" in part because such activities generally do not "adversely affect[] the business interests" of the employer (*McCavitt v Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp.*, 237 F3d 166, 169 [2nd Cir 2001] [J.

[3] Notably, plaintiff does not allege that he shared any of the content at issue in furtherance of Congresswoman Tlaib's campaign efforts.

[4] See *Sander v Westchester Reform Temple*, 228 AD3d 688 [2nd Dept 2024], *lv granted*, 42 NY3d 910 [2024], in which the plaintiff co-authored a blog post expressing how "the Jewish ideals of *tikkun olam* (repairing the world), the ethics laid out in *pirkei avot, tzedakah* (justice), and *emet* (truth) . . . drive[s] [her] passion for [Palestinian] liberation" and rejection of Zionism, apartheid, and settler-colonial violence (Index No 55745/2022, NYSCEF Doc No 7). In response, she was terminated by her employer, "a proudly Zionist institution" (Index No 55745/2022, NYSCEF Doc No 3). The court held: "Even assuming, without deciding, that blogging is a protected [] activity under Labor Law § 201-d, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff was discharged, not for the activity of blogging, but for the content of the blog post. Thus, we agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiff was not discharged due to a protected [] activity within the scope of Labor Law § 201-d[]" (*Sander*, 228 AD3d at 689).

McLaughlin, concurring]). That is not the case here. In the final warning issued to plaintiff on October 11, 2022, Islam explained that plaintiff's social media activity negatively impacted AIE, noting that "clients [] have contacted us asking what we plan to do about your conduct and reporting to use that your conduct could hinder AIE in our attempts to retain existing work and attract more work"; and "[n]umerous employees have contacted their managers after seeing your posts and have questioned our corporate values and a few have threatened to quit just this week" (NYSCEF Doc No 21, pp. 63-65). Thus, like an employee engaging in an otherwise-protected activity during work hours, plaintiff was not terminated because he engaged in a protected activity, but rather because of the adverse impact his actions had on his employer's business, i.e., AIE receiving negative media attention which strained its relationships with its clients and employees (*Aquilone v Republic Nat'l Bank*, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 19531 *16 [SDNY 1998] ["although an employer ordinarily may not discharge an employee for lawful off-hour recreational [or political] activities, an employer may discharge an employee for *conduct that is detrimental to the company*"] [emphasis added], *overruled on other grnds by McCavitt*, 237 F3d at 168).

Accordingly, the part of defendants' motion seeking to dismiss plaintiff's second cause of action for violation of Labor Law § 201-d(1)(a) will be granted.

iii. Violation of NYSHRL §§ 290-297 and NYCHRL § 8-101 to 131

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL prohibit employers from discriminating against an employee based on any protected characteristic, including national origin. "A plaintiff alleging discrimination in employment in violation of the NYSHRL must establish that (1) she or he is a member of a protected class, (2) she or he was qualified to hold the position, (3) she or he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances

giving rise to an inference of discrimination" (*Acala v Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C.*, 222 AD3d 706, 707 [2nd Dept 2023], quoting *Ayers v Bloomberg LP*, 203 AD3d 872, 874 [2nd Dept 2022]; see also *Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind*, 3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]). "Under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff must establish that she or he was subject to an unfavorable employment change or treated less well than other employees on the basis of a protected characteristic" (*id.*).

The first three elements are not in dispute. Regarding the fourth element, plaintiff alleges that defendants discriminated against him by terminating him based on his Palestinian descent (NYSCEF Doc No 21 ¶¶ 148-50). Plaintiff argues that he "was targeted, first by the media, as a pro-Palestinian anti-Semitic activist, and then this was used by the Defendants to end his employment and destroy his reputation" (NYSCEF Doc No 30 [also noting that plaintiff's "national origin [] goes hand in hand with his political activities" and "[i]n the current political and cultural climate[,] criticism of Israel and support of humanitarian causes for Palestinians is often mistakenly conflated with anti-Semitism"]). Regardless of whether the news outlets inappropriately conflated pro-Palestinian activism more broadly with anti-Semitism, as defendants note, plaintiff "fails to allege any comments [or conduct] by Defendant[s] from which an inference could be drawn that [the] decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment . . . was motived by Plaintiff's Palestinian descent" (NYSCEF Doc No 28) as opposed to backlash directed at AIE based on the views espoused on plaintiff's social media accounts. Accordingly, the part of defendants' motion seeking to dismiss plaintiff's third cause of action for violation of NYSHRL and fourth cause of action for violation of NYCHRL will be granted.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that defendants' motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed, with costs and disbursements to defendants as taxed by the Clerk of the Court, and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.



3/19/2025
DATE

PAUL A. GOETZ, J.S.C.

CHECK ONE:	X	**CASE DISPOSED**		**NON-FINAL DISPOSITION**			
	X	**GRANTED**	**DENIED**	**GRANTED IN PART**		**OTHER**	
APPLICATION:		**SETTLE ORDER**		**SUBMIT ORDER**			
CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:		**INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN**		**FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT**		**REFERENCE**	