

**US Bank Trust N.A. v Shah**

2025 NY Slip Op 34016(U)

October 7, 2025

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Index No. 850382/2024

Judge: Francis A. Kahn III

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: HON. FRANCIS A. KAHN, III PART 32
Justice

INDEX NO. 850382/2024
MOTION DATE
MOTION SEQ. NO. 002

US BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS OWNER
TRUSTEE FOR VRMTG ASSET TRUST,

Plaintiff,

- v -

KEDAR SHAH, RAMESH SHAH, HRIETU SHAH, BOARD
OF MANAGERS OF ONE UNION SQUARE EAST
CONDOMINIUM, JOHN DOE 1 THROUGH JOHN DOE 12,
SAID NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS, PARTIES INTENDED
BEING POSSIBLE TENANTS OR OCCUPANTS OF
PREMISES, OR CORPORATIONS, OTHER ENTITIES OR
PERSONS WHO CLAIM, OR MAY CLAIM, A LIEN
AGAINST THE PREMISES

Defendant.

DECISION + ORDER ON
MOTION

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 46, 47, 48, 49, 50,
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68

were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY

Upon the foregoing documents, the motion is determined as follows:

This is an action to foreclose on a consolidated mortgage encumbering a parcel of residential real
property located at 1 Irving Place, Unit P-14B, New York, New York. The mortgage, dated December
30, 2003, was given by Defendant Kedar R. Shah ("Shah") to non-party Washington Mutual Bank FA
("WAMU") to secure an indebtedness with an original principal amount of \$520,000.00. The loan is
memorialized by a note dated the same day as the mortgage. Plaintiff commenced this action, and pled
Defendants defaulted in repayment of the indebtedness beginning on or about December 1, 2023.
Defendant Shah answered and pled forty-eight affirmative defenses, as well as two counterclaims.
Plaintiff replied to the counterclaims. Now, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against the
appearing Defendants, to strike their answers and affirmative defenses, for a default judgment against
the non-appearing Defendants, for an order of reference and to amend the caption. Defendant Shah
opposes the motion.

In moving for summary judgment, Plaintiff was required to establish prima facie entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law though proof of the mortgage, the note, and evidence of Defendants' default
in repayment (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v James, 180 AD3d 594 [1st Dept 2020]; Bank of NY v Knowles, 151
AD3d 596 [1st Dept 2017]; Fortress Credit Corp. v Hudson Yards, LLC, 78 AD3d 577 [1st Dept 2010]).
Also, based on the affirmative defenses pled, Plaintiff was required to demonstrate, prima facie, its
standing (see eg Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Tricario, 180 AD3d 848 [2nd Dept 2020]), as well as its strict
compliance with, or demonstrate the inapplicability of, RPAPL §§1303, 1304 and 1306 (see U.S. Bank,

*NA v Nathan*, 173 AD3d 1112 [2d Dept 2019]; *HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Bermudez*, 175 AD3d 667, 669 [2d Dept 2019]). Proof supporting a *prima facie* case on a motion for summary judgment a cause of action for foreclosure must be in admissible form (see CPLR §3212[b]; *Tri-State Loan Acquisitions III, LLC v Litkowski*, 172 AD3d 780 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2019]). A plaintiff may rely on evidence from persons with personal knowledge of the facts, documents in admissible form and/or persons with knowledge derived from produced admissible records (see eg *U.S. Bank N.A. v Moulton*, 179 AD3d 734, 738 [2d Dept 2020]). No precise set of business records must be proffered, so long as the admissibility requirements of CPLR 4518[a] are fulfilled and the records evince the facts for which they are relied upon (see eg *Citigroup v Kopelowitz*, 147 AD3d 1014, 1015 [2d Dept 2017]).

Plaintiff's motion was supported by an affirmation from Scott Mackintosh ("Mackintosh"), a Assistant Secretary of Fay Servicing ("Fay"), the present servicer of the loan for Plaintiff. Mackintosh avers that his affidavit is based on personal review of Fay's business records. Mackintosh's affidavit laid a proper foundation for the admission Fay's records into evidence under CPLR §4518 by sufficiently showing that the records "reflect[ed] a routine, regularly conducted business activity, and that it be needed and relied on in the performance of functions of the business", "that the record[s][were] made pursuant to established procedures for the routine, habitual, systematic making of such a record" and "that the record[s] [were] made at or about the time of the event being recorded" (*Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Gordon*, 171 AD3d 197, 204 [2d Dept 2019]; see also *Bank of Am v Brannon*, 156 AD3d 1 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2017]). The records of other entities were also admissible since Mackintosh established that those records were received from the makers and incorporated into the records Fay kept and that it routinely relied upon such documents in its business (see eg *U.S. Bank N.A. v Kropp-Somoza*, 191 AD3d 918 [2d Dept 2021]). Further, the records referenced by Mackintosh were annexed to the moving papers (cf. *Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Kirschenbaum*, 187 AD3d 569 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2020]). Fay's authority to act on Plaintiff's behalf was established with submission of a power of attorney dated February 24, 2025 (see *U.S. Bank N.A. v Tesoriero*, 204 AD3d 1066 [2d Dept 2022]; *Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Silverman*, 178 AD3d 898 [2d Dept 2019]; *US Bank N.A. v Louis*, 148 AD3d 758 [2d Dept 2017]).

Mackintosh's review of the attached records demonstrated the material facts underlying the claim for foreclosure, to wit the mortgage, note, and evidence of mortgagor's default in repayment under the note (see eg *ING Real Estate Fin. (USA) LLC v Park Ave. Hotel Acquisition, LLC*, 89 AD3d 506 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2011]; see also *Bank of NY v Knowles*, supra; *Fortress Credit Corp. v Hudson Yards, LLC*, supra).

As to standing in a foreclosure action, it is established in one of three ways: [1] direct privity between mortgagor and mortgagee, [2] physical possession of the note prior to commencement of the action that contains an indorsement in blank or bears a special indorsement payable to the order of the plaintiff either on its face or by allonge, and [3] assignment of the note to Plaintiff prior to commencement of the action (see eg *Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Tricario*, 180 AD3d 848 [2d Dept 2020]; *Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Ostiguy*, 127 AD3d 1375 [3d Dept 2015]). "The attachment of a properly endorsed note to the complaint may be sufficient to establish, *prima facie*, that the plaintiff is the holder of the note at the time of commencement" (*Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Webster*, 142 AD3d 636, 638 [2d Dept 2016]; cf. *JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Grennan*, supra). In this case, Plaintiff annexed a copy of the note, endorsed in blank on its face, to the complaint which is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff was the holder of the note when the action was commenced (see *Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC v Siame*, 185 AD3d 408 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2020]; *Bank of NY v Knowles*, supra at 597).

Plaintiff was also required to proffer "sufficient evidence demonstrating the absence of material issues as to its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304" (*Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum*, 85 AD3d

95, 106 [2d Dept 2011]). While RPAPL §1304 does not specify the proof necessary to demonstrate compliance therewith, the Court of Appeals has “has long recognized a party can establish that a notice or other document was sent through evidence of actual mailing . . . or . . . by proof of a sender's routine business practice with respect to the creation, addressing, and mailing of documents of that nature” (*Cit Bank N.A. v Schiffman*, 36 NY3d 550, 556 [2020][internal citations omitted]). “In other words, there are two methods by which a plaintiff can demonstrate the requisite mailings” (*U.S. Bank N.A. v Romano*, 231 AD3d 1079, 1080 [2d Dept 2024]).

Proof of actual mailing may be shown with an affidavit of mailing or domestic return receipts with attendant signatures (*see eg US Bank v Zientek*, 192 AD3d 1189, 1191 [2d Dept 2021]). Also, evidence of a satisfactory office practice can raise a rebuttable presumption that the required notice was sent and received by the addressee (*Cit Bank N.A. v Schiffman*, supra). A practice giving rise to the presumption “must be geared so as to ensure the likelihood that [the] notice . . . is always properly addressed and mailed” (*Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray*, 46 NY2d 828, 830 [1978]) and can be demonstrated via an affiant who explains “among other things, how the notices and envelopes were generated, posted and sealed, as well as how the mail was transmitted to the postal service” (*Cit Bank N.A. v Schiffman*, supra). Proof from a person with “personal knowledge of the practices utilized by the [sender] at the time of the alleged mailing” is sufficient (*Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Donnelly*, 22 NY3d 1169, 1170 [2014]; *see also Citibank, N.A. v Conti-Scheurer*, 172 AD3d 17, 21 [2d Dept 2019][internal quotation marks omitted]). An affidavit from the person who performed the mailing is not necessary (*see Bossuk v Steinberg*, 58 NY2d 916, 919 [1983]).

In support of the motion, the mailing of the statutory notices was attested to and described by Mackintosh who attested to personal knowledge of the mailing practices and procedures of Fay. In the affidavit, Mackintosh described Fay’s process of mailing of the default notices in this case in adequate detail (*see United States Bank Trust, N.A. v Mehl*, 195 AD3d 1054 [2d Dept 2021]; *Citimortgage, Inc. v Ustick*, 188 AD3d 793, 794 [2d Dept 2020]). Compliance with RPAPL §1306 was shown by submitting a copy of a proof of filing statement from the New York State Department of Financial Services (*see United States Bank Trust, N.A. v Mehl*, supra at 1056) and RPAPL §1303 via the affidavits of Plaintiff’s process server (*see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Ozcan*, 154 AD3d 822 [2d Dept 2017]).

As to the branch of Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendants’ other affirmative defenses, CPLR §3211[b] provides that “[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground that a defense is not stated or has no merit”. For example, affirmative defenses that are without factual foundation, conclusory or duplicative cannot stand (*see Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v Vorobyov*, 188 AD3d 803, 805 [2d Dept 2020]; *Emigrant Bank v Myers*, 147 AD3d 1027, 1028 [2d Dept 2017]).

All the affirmative defenses and counterclaims are entirely conclusory and unsupported by any facts in the answer or by the papers submitted in opposition. As such, these affirmative defenses are nothing more than an unsubstantiated legal conclusion which is insufficiently pled as a matter of law (*see Board of Mgrs. of Ruppert Yorkville Towers Condominium v Hayden*, 169 AD3d 569 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2019]; *see also Bosco Credit V Trust Series 2012-1 v Johnson*, 177 AD3d 561 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2020]; *170 W. Vil. Assoc. v G & E Realty, Inc.*, 56 AD3d 372 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2008]; *see also Becher v Feller*, 64 AD3d 672 [2d Dept 2009]; *Cohen Fashion Opt., Inc. v V & M Opt., Inc.*, 51 AD3d 619 [2d Dept 2008]). Further, to the extent that no specific legal argument was proffered in support of a particular affirmative defense or claim, those were abandoned (*see U.S. Bank N.A. v Gonzalez*, 172 AD3d 1273, 1275 [2d Dept 2019]);

*Flagstar Bank v Bellafigliore*, 94 AD3d 1044 [2d Dept 2012]; *Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A v Perez*, 41 AD3d 590 [2d Dept 2007]).

In opposition, Defendants' claim that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate all the elements of a cause of action for foreclosure is without merit. The affidavit and proffered business documents were all in admissible form. Further, since none of the salient facts on these issues were contradicted by any of the appearing defendants, they are "deemed to be admitted" (*Bank of Am NA v Brannon*, 156 AD3d, 1, 6 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2017]). Moreover, as "the affirmative defenses are precluded, no discovery could lead to facts that would warrant denial of plaintiff's summary judgment motion" (*Bernstein v Dubrovsky*, 169 AD3d 410 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2019]).

The branch of Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment against the non-appearing parties is granted without opposition (*see* CPLR §3215; *SRMOF II 2012-I Trust v Tella*, 139 AD3d 599, 600 [1<sup>st</sup> Dept 2016]).

The branch of Plaintiff's motion to amend the caption is granted without opposition (*see generally* CPLR §3025; *JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Laszio*, 169 AD3d 885, 887 [2d Dept 2019]).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its foreclosure claim against the appearing parties and for a default judgment against the non-appearing parties is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the Defendants' affirmative defenses and counterclaims pled by all the appearing Defendants are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that **Roberta Ashkin, Esq., 400 East 70th Street New York New York 10021, (646) 779-8520** is hereby appointed Referee in accordance with RPAPL § 1321 to compute the amount due to Plaintiff and to examine whether the property identified in the notice of pendency can be sold in parcels; and it is further

ORDERED that in the discretion of the Referee, a hearing may be held, and testimony taken; and it is further

ORDERED that by accepting this appointment the Referee certifies that he is in compliance with Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Judge (22 NYCRR Part 36), including, but not limited to §36.2 (c) ("Disqualifications from appointment"), and §36.2 (d) ("Limitations on appointments based upon compensation"), and, if the Referee is disqualified from receiving an appointment pursuant to the provisions of that Rule, the Referee shall immediately notify the Appointing Judge; and it is further

ORDERED that, pursuant to CPLR 8003(a), and in the discretion of the court, a fee of \$350 shall be paid to the Referee for the computation of the amount due and upon the filing of his report and the Referee shall not request or accept additional compensation for the computation unless it has been fixed by the court in accordance with CPLR 8003(b); and it is further

ORDERED that the Referee is prohibited from accepting or retaining any funds for himself or paying funds to himself without compliance with Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge; and it is further

ORDERED that if the Referee holds a hearing, the Referee may seek additional compensation at the Referee’s usual and customary hourly rate; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall forward all necessary documents to the Referee and to Defendants who have appeared in this case within 30 days of the date of this order and shall promptly respond to every inquiry made by the referee (promptly means within two business days); and it is further

ORDERED that if Defendant(s) have objections, they must submit them to the referee within 14 days of the mailing of plaintiff’s submissions; and include these objections to the Court if opposing the motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale; and it is further

ORDERED that failure to submit objections to the referee may be deemed a waiver of objections before the Court on an application for a judgment of foreclosure and sale; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff must bring a motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale within 45 days of receipt of the referee’s report; and it is further

ORDERED that if Plaintiff fails to meet these deadlines, then the Court may sua sponte vacate this order and direct Plaintiff to move again for an order of reference and the Court may sua sponte toll interest depending on whether the delays are due to Plaintiff’s failure to move this litigation forward; and it further

ORDERED that the “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants are removed as party defendants as the New York County Clerk will not accept any judgment for filing with a “Doe” defendant in the caption; and it is further

ORDERED the caption is amended as follows:

SUPREME COURT STATE OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK  
-----X  
US BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NOT IN  
ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS  
OWNER TRUSTEE FOR VRMTG ASSET TRUST,

Plaintiff,

-against-

KEDAR R. SHAH; RAMESH B. SHAH AKA RAMESH  
SHAH; HRIETU SHAH; BOARD OF MANAGERS OF  
ONE UNION SQUARE EAST CONDOMINIUM,

Defendants.  
-----X

and it is further,

ORDERED that counsel for Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon the County Clerk (60 Centre Street, Room 141B) and the General Clerk’s Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119), who are directed to mark the court’s records to reflect the parties being removed pursuant hereto; and it is further

ORDERED that such service upon the County Clerk and the Clerk of the General Clerk’s Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the *Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases* (accessible at the “E-Filing” page on the court’s website at the address (www.nycourts.gov/suptmanh)); and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Order with notice of entry on all parties and persons entitled to notice, including the Referee appointed herein.

All parties are to appear for a virtual conference via Microsoft Teams on **February 19, 2026 at 11:40 a.m.** If a motion for judgment of foreclosure and sale has been filed Plaintiff may contact the Part Clerk (SFC-Part32-Clerk@nycourts.gov) in writing to request that the conference be cancelled. If a motion has not been made, then a conference is required to explore the reasons for the delay.


**Servicer: FAY SERVICING -- Servicer Telephone: 800-495-7166**

10/7/2025  
DATE

CHECK ONE:  CASE DISPOSED  GRANTED  DENIED

APPLICATION:  SETTLE ORDER  NON-FINAL DISPOSITION  GRANTED IN PART  OTHER

CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:  INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN  FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT  REFERENCE

  
 FRANCIS KAHN, III, J.S.C.  
**HON. FRANCIS A. KAHN III**  
**J.S.C.**