This Court, amongst others, has disagreed with cases that incorporate the Garrett rule into Article 245. See, e.g., Darren, 75 Misc 3d 1208[A], at *4 n.1 [refusing to apply the Garrett limit to Article 245]; Martinez, 75 Misc 3d 1212[A], at *5 n.3 [same]; People v. Soto, 72 Misc 3d 1153, 1160 n.4 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2021] [same]; People v. Rosario, 70 Misc 3d 753, 766-69 [County Ct., Albany County 2020] [same]). Garrett is about constitutional due process, not the new statutory requirements. (See generally 23 NY3d 878 [2014]). And the Constitution provides a floor, not a ceiling. Under C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][iv], the People now have a statutory duty to disclose all evidence and information—including that which is "known to police"—that tends to impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness. Thus, Garrett's constitutional analysis is not applicable here, and this Court declines to override the statute's plain text with it.

Here, the People affirm—under penalty of perjury (Pr. Surreply at 1)—that they communicated with the Law Department and "disclosed any and all materials the Law Department had possession of." (Id. at 11). The defense has not provided any substantive indication that this is false. Therefore, the People properly discharged their duties.

III. The People improperly withheld discoverable material without first seeking a protective order.

The People here unilaterally redacted and withheld materials from records in their [*3]discovery production. In this case, the People allege that Mr. Payne drove while intoxicated and crashed into a parked car. In emails with the defense attorney, the People describe the person who owned the parked car as an "eye witness." (See Def. Mot. Ex. D). However, the People redacted what they describe as "the individual, who's [sic] car was rear-ended by defendant's vehicle, vehicle policy number, date of birth, . . . and license customer identification number" from records they produced to the defense. (Pr. Resp. at 12). The People have not shown the Court what lies underneath these redactions.

The People's only argument in support of these redactions is that, in their view, the information has "no bearing, relevance, and do[es] not relate to the subject matter of the case." (Pr. Surreply at 10; see also Pr. Resp. at 12). In explaining what they mean by that, the People argue that, in their view, the defense can still "investigate" any possible defense and that the withheld information would not tend to "absolve[]" Mr. Payne of guilt. (Pr. Resp. at 12). In furtherance of this argument, the People note that they identified the eyewitness about whom this information purportedly relates by disclosing his phone number. (Id.).

The People misapprehend their discovery duties. They appear to conflate whether something "relate[s]" to the case with whether they believe it to be relevant, material, or useful for the defense's investigation. (See, e.g., Pr. Surreply at 9 ["Defendant has not and cannot show the relevance of the owner of that vehicle's policy number, date of birth, . . . and license customer identification number."]). But the redacted information, which is in the People's possession, plainly relates to the subject matter of the case—it includes driver and vehicle information of the "eye witness" whose car the People claim Mr. Payne crashed into in this case. (See Def. Mot. Ex. D). This material is contained within records that are in the People's file for this case. The People's opinion that material would not be useful for the defense's investigation or relevant to proving guilt at trial is not the same as whether the material relates to the case. (See People v. Francis, 2022 NY Slip Op. 50655[U], at *4-*5 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022]). The People have no authority to make such judgments about information in their file for this case and then unilaterally withhold it.

The People's reliance on "good faith" and "due diligence" here is also misplaced. "That the People may have applied good faith and due diligence in making their own determination that . . . records do not — or should not — fall within the statute is of no moment." (Soto, 72 Misc 3d at 1162). "That is not the People's determination to make." (Id. [not the People's determination to choose to withhold police witness' disciplinary records]; see also Francis, 2022 NY Slip Op. 50655[U], at *4-*5 [not the People's determination to deem NYPD photographs in case as not "relevant to the charges"]; People v. Ajunwa, 75 Misc 3d 1220[A], at *4 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022] [not the People's determination to withhold a police report as "duplicative"]). If the People have material that relates to the case, their obligation is simply to disclose it, unless they can cite specific limited statutory exceptions or claim that it is work product.

The Court strains to imagine a situation where material contained within records in the People's case file would somehow not "relate" to the case. If the People believe—as they appear to imply here—that information is of such little probative value that disclosure is outweighed by [*4]some other factor, Article 245 requires that the People seek a protective order before withholding it (absent specific limited statutory exceptions). (See C.P.L. § 245.70). In this case, they never made any such an application.

Here, because the People did not actually produce all known automatic discovery from their possession, their certificate of discovery compliance was not proper. They filed their COC even though they had not provided the discovery required by C.P.L. § 245.20[1]. (See C.P.L. § 245.50[1]). They also filed their COC even though they did not certify in good faith that they had "disclosed and made available all known material" subject to discovery. (See C.P.L. § 245.50[1]). Instead, the People did precisely what they "may not do": they "file[d] a certificate of compliance in which they claim[ed] to have exercised due diligence and turned over all known material and information, while at the same time not actually [having] turn[ed] over all known material and information." (Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d at 271; see also Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574 [noting the same]).

Because the People's COC was not proper, it did not stop the speedy-trial clock. Therefore, the clock ran from arraignments on October 31, 2021, until the defense requested this motion schedule on January 24, 2022. (See C.P.L. § 30.30[4][a]; People v. South, 29 Misc 3d 92, 95 [Sup. Ct., App. Term, 2d Dep't 2010]). That is 85 days, which does not exceed the People's 90-day speedy-trial deadline. (C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b]). Therefore, the defense's motion to dismiss must be DENIED.

However, the People are ORDERED to disclose to the defense unredacted copies of the documents at issue in this motion.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.