The Defendant is charged by information, under docket number CR-001524-25NY, with one count each of Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 135.05) and Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law § 145.00[1]). In addition, the Defendant is charged by information, under docket number CR-001868-25NY, with two counts each of Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law §§ 120.00[1][one count]; 120.00[2][one count]) and Criminal Obstruction of Breathing or Blood Circulation (Penal Law §§ 121.11[a][one count]; 121.11[b][one count]) and one count each of Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.30[4]), Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law §§ 110/120.00[1]), and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.26[1]). The Defendant moves this Court to, inter alia, (1) invalidate the People's certificates of compliance (COCs) and supplemental COCs (SCOCs); and (2) dismiss the accusatory instruments on statutory speedy trial grounds under CPL § 30.30.

For the reasons that follow, the Defendant's motion to invalidate the COCs and to dismiss on speedy trial grounds is GRANTED. The Court finds that one-hundred forty-three (143) days are charged to the People on docket number CR-001524-25NY and one-hundred thirty-nine (139) days are charged to the People on docket number CR-001868-25NY. In light of this finding, the Court does not reach the remaining branches of the Defendant's motion as they are moot.

The criminal action under docket number CR-001524-25NY commenced with the filing of a misdemeanor complaint on January 10, 2025, and the Defendant was arraigned that same day. The criminal action under docket number CR-001868-25NY commenced with the filing of a misdemeanor complaint on January 14, 2025, and the Defendant was arraigned that same day. On January 22, 2025, the People filed a supporting deposition from the complainant, M.M., on each docket.

At the court appearance on February 27, 2025, the court (Pauley, J.) held a discovery [*2]conference to resolve a dispute involving redactions made by the People to the complainant's therapy records. The People sought a ruling on whether the redacted portions are discoverable. The court directed the People to provide it with the redacted and unredacted records for an in camera review. As the People had not moved for a protective order, the court informed the parties that the speedy trial clock would continue to run while it reviewed the records and that nothing prevented the People from filing a COC and stating ready for trial. During the conference, the Defense raised a separate discovery issue: the People's nondisclosure of sealed records relating to two arrests of the complainant.^[FN1] These arrests were cross-complaints and occurred at the same time that the Defendant was arrested in connection with the instant cases. The Defense indicated that it would address this issue by motion after the People filed a COC.

On March 6, 2025, the People filed a COC and a certificate of readiness (COR) on each docket.^[FN2] Thereafter, they filed SCOCs on March 19, 2025 and April 7, 2025 on each docket. On May 16, 2025, the court (Pauley, J.) issued a decision, holding that the disclosure of the therapy records, as redacted, satisfied the People's automatic discovery obligations. On May 28, 2025, the People filed a SCOC on each docket.

At the next court appearance on June 2, 2025, the Defendant requested a motion schedule to file the instant motion. On June 25, 2025, the Defendant filed the instant motion. On July 14, 2025, the People filed a response opposing the motion. On July 22, 2025, the Defendant filed a reply affirming the contentions in his motion.

The Defendant asserts that the People's COCs are invalid because the People have not disclosed the sealed records relating to the complainant's arrests and failed to exercise due diligence and good faith to disclose these records prior to sealing and prior to filing of the initial COCs. He argues that since the COCs are improper, the People's statements of readiness must be deemed invalid as well.

At the outset, the People argue that the Court should deny the Defendant's motion as untimely. They state that the Defendant did not address the instant discovery issue by motion as soon as practicable but instead waited one-hundred and nine (109) days after the initial COCs to file this motion, despite the issue being discussed at the discovery conference. They contend that, with reasonable diligence, the Defendant could have challenged the COCs sooner.

CPL § 245.50, which went into effect on January 1, 2020, was recently amended to require that challenges to the validity of a COC or SCOC be by motion within thirty-five (35) days of service of the certificate, unless, upon good cause shown, the court extends this time [*3]frame, or particular circumstances warrant a challenge beyond this time frame. CPL § 245.50(4)(c)(i) and (ii). Importantly, however, the 35-day time limit runs from the effective date of the amendments, August 7, 2025, and therefore, does not apply retroactively to the Defendant's instant challenge. L 2025, c 56, part LL, § 8. Rather, the prior version of CPL 245.50 applies here and provides that, to the extent that a defendant is aware of a potential defect or deficiency related to a COC or SCOC, he or she shall notify the prosecution of such defect or deficiency as soon as practicable and shall make any challenges to the sufficiency of a COC or SCOC by motion as soon as practicable. The Appellate Term for the Second Department held that where a defendant's omnibus motion — filed seventy-two (72) days after the People filed their COC — was the first notification of any deficiency in, or challenge to the sufficiency of, the COC, the motion was not filed as soon as practicable under CPL § 245.50(4)(c). People v. Seymour, 84 Misc 3d 23 (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2024); see also People v. Gonzalez, 83 Misc 3d 1240(A), 2024 NY Slip Op 50894(U), *3 (Crim. Ct., Kings County 2024) (court denied motion to dismiss where defendant's first mention of defect to COC was made 97 days after COC filed).

As a preliminary matter, CPL § 245.10 requires the People to meet their initial discovery obligations (CPL § 245.20) as soon as practicable but not later than thirty-five (35) days after the defendant's arraignment. Unlike the prior requirement under CPL § 245.50 to notify as soon as practicable, which leaves the timing to the court, the requirement under CPL § 245.10 comes with a time limit: thirty-five (35) days. Therefore, the People themselves were not compliant with their statutory obligations when they turned over discovery materials in March of 2025 and filed their initial COCs on March 6, 2025, the fifty-fifth (55th) day after arraignment on docket number CR-001524-25NY and the fifty-first (51st) day after arraignment on docket number CR-001868-25NY.

Regardless, the Defense raised the issue of the complainant's arrest-related records via telephone call with the assigned ADA and again raised the issue at the February 27, 2025 discovery conference. The Defense also raised the issue via email to the assigned ADA on March 14, 2025, eight (8) days after the People filed the initial COCs. During the discovery conference, it was discussed that the Defense would raise the issue by motion after the People filed a COC. From a review of the minutes of the conference, it is a reasonable understanding that the Defense would await the court's ruling on the redactions to the therapy records and, if it disagreed with the extent of the redactions, it would address both issues by one motion. After the court (Pauley, J.) issued its decision on May 16, 2025, the Defense sought a motion schedule at the next court appearance on June 2, 2025, to file the instant motion.

The Court finds that the Defense notification of a potential deficiency on two occasions prior to the initial COCs as well as eight (8) days after the initial COCs does not violate CPL § 245.50(4)(b). Additionally, in light of these circumstances, the Court finds that Defendant's request to file the instant motion on June 2, 2025, seventeen (17) days after the court's decision on the redactions, sufficiently complied with CPL § 245.50(4)(c). Accordingly, the People's request to deny the instant motion as untimely is DENIED.

CPL § 245.20(1) sets forth twenty-one (21) categories of material subject to automatic disclosure, but the People's disclosure obligations are not limited to these categories. See CPL § 245.20(1)(v); People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 208-209 (2023); People v. Walker, 228 AD3d 1318 [*4](4th Dep't 2024); People v. Pennant, 73 Misc 3d 753 (Dist. Ct., Nassau County 2021); People v. Soto, 72 Misc 3d 1153, 1155 (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021) (CPL § 245.20[1] provides a "non-exhaustive list of the items the People must automatically disclose to the defendant"). There is a "presumption in favor of disclosure" when interpreting what to disclose as automatic discovery under CPL § 245.20(1). CPL § 245.20(7); see People v. Rahman, 79 Misc 3d 129(A), 2023 NY Slip Op 50692(U) (App. Term, 2d Dep't, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2023); People v. Rugerio-Rivera, 77 Misc 3d 1230(A), 2023 NY Slip Op 50069(U) (Crim. Ct., Queens County 2023); People v. Bonifacio, 179 AD3d 977, 978 (2d Dep't 2020); see also People v. Best, 76 Misc 3d 1210(A), 2022 NY Slip Op 50859(U) (Crim. Ct., Queens County 2022); People v. Diaz, 75 Misc 3d 314 (Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2022); People v. Edwards, 74 Misc 3d 433 (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021); People v. Soto, 72 Misc 3d 1153 (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021); People v. Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d 371 (Sup. Ct., Bronx County 2021); People v. Georgiopoulos, 71 Misc 3d 1215(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50380(U) (Sup. Ct., Queens County 2021); People v. Kelly, 71 Misc 3d 1202(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50264(U) (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021); People v. Altug, 70 Misc 3d 1218(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50145(U) (Crim. Ct., NY County 2021).

When the defendant claims that the COC is missing discoverable items, the court must determine whether the People "exercis[ed] due diligence and ma[de] reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery." CPL § 245.50(1); see also CPL § 245.20(2) (the "prosecutor shall make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of" discovery materials outside of their possession); CPL § 245.50(3) (court may deem prosecution ready where mandatory discovery has been lost or destroyed or is otherwise unavailable "despite diligent and good faith efforts, reasonable under the circumstances"). In assessing the People's reasonable efforts and due diligence, the court must engage in a case-specific analysis of the facts and circumstances presented in that matter. Bay at 212. In Bay, the Court of Appeals explained:

An analysis of whether the People made reasonable efforts sufficient to satisfy CPL article 245 is fundamentally case-specific, as with any question of reasonableness, and will turn on the circumstances presented. There is no rule of "strict liability"; that is, the statute does not require or anticipate a "perfect prosecutor." On the other hand, the plain terms of the statute make clear that while good faith is required, it is not sufficient standing alone and cannot cure a lack of diligence.

The recent amendments to CPL Article 245 codify and expand upon the diligence assessment articulated in Bay. See CPL § 245.50(5). When assessing due diligence, "the court shall look at the totality of the [People's] efforts to comply with the provisions of [Article 245], rather than assess [their] efforts item by item." Id. That is, "[t]he court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors" set forth in CPL § 245.50(5)(a) and "no one factor shall be determinative." CPL § 245.50(5)(b). The relevant factors provided therein include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) the efforts made by the People to comply with the statutory requirements;

(2) the volume of the discovery provided and outstanding;

(3) the complexity of the case;

(4) whether the People knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed;

(5) the explanation for any discovery lapse;

(6) the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery;

(7) whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied;

(8) whether the omission was corrected;

(9) whether the People self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and

(10) whether the People's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

See CPL § 245.50(5)(a). In Bay, the Court further explained that although "due diligence" is not defined in CPL Article 245, "it is a familiar and flexible standard that requires the People 'to make reasonable efforts' to comply with statutory directives." Bay at 211 (citing People v. Bolden, 81 NY2d 146, 155 [1993]; see People v. Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 80-81 [1995]). "Reasonableness, then, is the touchstone - a concept confirmed by the statutory directive to make 'reasonable inquiries.'" Bay at 211-212 (internal citations omitted).

The People bear the burden of establishing that they did, in fact, prior to filing the initial COC despite a belated or missing disclosure:

(1) exercise due diligence (see above); and

(2) make reasonable inquiries (Bay at 213).

Importantly, the court shall not invalidate a COC where the People have exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the required disclosure materials specified in CPL § 245.20. CPL § 245.50(6).

Here, the Defendant and the complainant are married to each other. Charges were filed against each of them in connection with an incident that allegedly occurred on January 9, 2025. The charges against the Defendant were filed under docket number CR-001524-25NY. When police went to their home in response to 911 calls four days later on January 13, 2025, both the Defendant and the complainant told police about an alleged assault by the other occurring before the January 9, 2025 incident, and new charges were filed against each of them. The charges against the Defendant were filed under docket number CR-001868-25NY. After investigation, the People elected not to pursue the charges against the complainant and asked the court to advance the two cases against the complainant for dismissal purposes. Upon advancement on January 27, 2025, the People moved to dismiss the complainants' cases in the furtherance of justice. At that time, the Court granted the motions to dismiss and sealed the cases pursuant to CPL § 160.50.

The People's automatic discovery obligations in the two instant cases against the Defendant began upon arraignment of those cases, specifically, on January 10, 2025 under docket number CR-001524-25NY, and on January 14, 2025 under docket number CR-001868-25NY. See CPL § 245.10(1)(a)(ii). The People acknowledge that the complainant's arrest-related records were automatically discoverable prior to dismissal and sealing of the two cases against her on January 27, 2025. The Court finds that the People have not set forth any reasonable basis for their failure to disclose the records during the time period between the Defendant's [*5]arraignment on the instant cases and the sealing of the cases against the complainant. The People's reasoning that disclosure "was not [their] primary concern at the time" because they were focused on "righting a wrong" upon their determination that "the complainant is a survivor of intimate partner violence" (People's Response at § D[4]) is unpersuasive. Such concerns, while genuine, are not a valid basis for the People to disregard their automatic discovery obligations. Moreover, there is no indication before this Court that the People could not disclose the records to the Defendant while, at the same time, investigate the allegations against the complainant. Further, sealing of the two cases against the complainant did not meet the People by surprise. The People were fully aware of when the cases were expected to be sealed because they themselves requested that the cases be advanced for dismissal purposes, and they made the application for dismissal. Lastly, at the time the People moved to dismiss the complainants' cases, the People could have requested a stay of sealing in order to comply with their discovery obligations. Considering the totality of the People's efforts to comply with their automatic discovery obligations, the Court finds that the People's failure to turn over the complainant's arrest-related records prior to sealing was a substantial shortcoming and demonstrated a lack of due diligence, good faith, and reasonableness. Thus, the Defendant's motion to invalidate the COCs is GRANTED.

To be successful on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating the existence of a delay in excess of the applicable speedy trial time limit. People v. Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986). Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the People to establish that certain periods within that time should be excluded. People v. Barden, 27 NY3d 550 (2016); People v. Santana, 80 NY2d 92, 105 (1992); People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980).

Generally, the burden is on the People to establish their entitlement to exclude any pre-readiness delays from the calculation under a CPL 30.30 motion and the burden is on a defendant to prove that any post-readiness delays that directly implicate the People's ability to proceed with trial are chargeable to the People, unless the People failed to satisfy their burden to ensure that the record is sufficiently clear as to who is chargeable for an adjournment (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 210, 215-216 [1992]).

People v. Robinson, 67 AD3d 1042, 1044 (3d Dep't 2009), lv. denied 13 NY3d 910 (2009). The People are considered to be ready for trial when they communicate their actual readiness in open court or file a certificate of actual readiness with the court and serve a copy on the defendant's attorney. People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 (1985).

On January 10, 2025, the action under docket number CR-001524-25NY commenced with the filing of a misdemeanor complaint, and, on January 14, 2025, the action under docket number CR-001868-25NY commenced with the filing of a misdemeanor complaint. CPL § 1.20(17)(a "criminal action is commenced by filing of the accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court . . . "). On each day, the Defendant was arraigned on the associated complaint, and the court adjourned the case to February 27, 2025 for the People to file the necessary supporting deposition. On January 22, 2025, the People filed a supporting deposition on each case off-calendar. As the speedy trial clock did not toll during these adjournment [*6]periods, the entire periods are charged to the People. Accordingly, the People are charged with forty-eight (48) days on docket number CR-001524-25NY and forty-four (44) days on docket number CR-001868-25NY. See People v. Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 (1987); People v. DiMeglio, 294 AD2d 239 (1st Dep't 2002). [CR-001524-25NY: forty-eight (48) total days charged; CR-001868-25NY: forty-four (44) total days charged]

On February 27, 2025, the court (Pauley, J.) conducted a discovery conference and adjourned the cases to April 3, 2025 for trial. During the conference, the court informed the parties that it would conduct an in camera review of therapy records but noted that, unless the People filed a motion for a protective order, the speedy trial clock would continue to run. The court further stated that nothing prevented the People from filing a COC and COR. The People indicated that they were not moving for a protective order and acknowledged that the speedy trial clock would run until they filed a COC and COR. On March 6, 2025, the People filed a COC and COR on each docket, and, on March 19, 2025, the People filed a SCOC, which included a statement of readiness for trial, on each docket. As previously discussed, these COCs are invalid, and, thus, these statements of readiness are ineffective. See CPL § 30.30(5)(a). Therefore, the People are charged with the entirety of this thirty-five (35) day adjournment. [CR-001524-25NY: eighty-three (83) total days charged; CR-001868-25NY: seventy-nine (79) total days charged]

On April 3, 2025, the People stated ready for trial on each docket. However, the court (Pauley, J.) adjourned the cases to May 6, 2025 for its ruling on the People's redactions to the therapy records. On April 7, 2025, the People filed a SCOC with a statement of readiness for trial on each docket. As the People have not yet filed a valid COC, these statements of readiness are ineffective. Additionally, as the People have not established any other basis to exclude time, the speedy trial clock did not toll during this adjournment period. See People v. Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 216 (1992). Thus, the People are charged with thirty-three (33) days for this entire adjournment. [CR-001524-25NY: one-hundred sixteen (116) total days charged; CR-001868-25NY: one-hundred twelve (112) total days charged]

On May 6, 2025, the cases were adjourned to May 14, 2025 for a ruling on the redactions. On May 14, 2025, the People announced their readiness for trial on each docket, and the cases were adjourned to June 2, 2025 for a ruling on the redactions and for trial. On May 16, 2025, the court (Pauley, J.) issued its decision on the redactions. Thereafter, on May 28, 2025, the People filed a SCOC with a statement of readiness for trial on each docket. Because the People have not yet filed a valid COC, the People could not effectively state ready for trial at these times. Further, as the People have not established any other basis to exclude time, the speedy trial clock did not toll during these adjournment periods. See People v. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 216. Accordingly, the People are charged with twenty-seven (27) days for the entirety of these adjournment periods. [CR-001524-25NY: one-hundred forty-three (143) total days charged; CR-001868-25NY: one-hundred thirty-nine (139) total days charged]

On June 2, 2025, the Defendant requested a motion schedule, and the Court set a schedule and adjourned the cases to September 2, 2025 for decision. Because this adjournment period was occasioned by motion practice, it is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(a). [CR-001524-25NY: one-hundred forty-three (143) total days charged; CR-001868-25NY: one-hundred thirty-nine (139) total days charged]

Thus, the Court finds that there are one-hundred forty-three (143) total chargeable [*7]days to date on docket number CR-001524-25NY and one-hundred thirty-nine (139) total chargeable days to date on docket number CR-001868-25NY.

Since more than ninety (90) days are charged on each docket, the Defendant's motion to dismiss both cases pursuant to CPL § 30.30 is GRANTED. CPL § 30.30(1)(b).

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.