People v Alexander
2025 NY Slip Op 25253 [88 Misc 3d 922]
November 18, 2025
Supreme Court, Nassau County
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, May 20, 2025
The People of the State of New York
v
Tremaine Alexander, Defendant.
Supreme Court, Nassau County, November 18, 2025
HEADNOTES
Crimes — Sentence — Resentencing — Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Jeffrey Groder for defendant.
Anne T. Donnelly, District Attorney (Veronica Guariglia and Sarah Rabinowitz of counsel), for the People.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Teresa K. Corrigan, J.
Defendant, Tremaine Alexander, through his attorney Jeffrey Groder, moved to be resentenced pursuant to CPL 440.47 and Penal Law § 60.12 alleging that he was the victim of domestic violence and that the trauma he suffered was a significant contributing factor in his having murdered his mother's then current boyfriend. A hearing was conducted over several{**88 Misc 3d at 923} days. Defendant's application for resentencing is denied for the reasons stated herein.
Subject Crime:
On January 30, 2003, the defendant was in his bedroom when he heard arguing coming from his mother's (Ella Isom) room wherein Isom was advising her boyfriend (Frank Beamon) that he needed to move out of the house. Defendant approached the room and asked Isom and Beamon to quiet down. A short time later he heard louder arguing and again approached the room. Isom opened the door, and the defendant saw her upset with her hair in a state of disarray. The defendant told Beamon that he was not to speak to or treat Isom in a disrespectful way and a physical fight ensued between Beamon and the defendant. As Beamon was much larger than the defendant, he was able to tackle the defendant to the ground, restrain him with both his body and a pipe that he placed against the chest and neck of the defendant, and ultimately and forcefully put the defendant into the bathroom. Beamon held the bathroom door closed with his body strength and continued his argument with Isom. According to the defendant, he not only heard words being exchanged but could tell from the sounds that a physical fight was occurring. Beamon eventually stopped holding the bathroom door as he was leaving the residence. The defendant left the bathroom, saw the condition of Isom, left the home and went to his car, retrieved a gun and shot Beamon, killing him.
Evidence/Documents Reviewed:
In addition to the hearing transcript, the court received into evidence and reviewed the following documents:
[*2]defense/petitioner's 1 = hearing exhibits (33 items)
defense/petitioner's 2 = hearing exhibits (15 photos of the defendant)
defense/petitioner's 3a through 3n = photographs of the defendant
People/respondent's A = trial and sentencing minutes
People/respondent's E = appellate briefs
Witness Testimony:
Anna Hope—Defendant's aunt; she and Isom are sisters. She described an estranged relationship with Isom based on Isom's choice of boyfriends throughout the defendant's life and placing the boyfriends' needs and concerns above those of her child, the defendant. Ms. Hope described a loving relationship between {**88 Misc 3d at 924}the defendant and Boyd Bostic, the defendant's father (now deceased). Bostic and Isom divorced because of infidelity. Ms. Hope recounted an event in which Isom's boyfriend at the time, Ricky Hicks, was in a fight with Isom. The defendant, a toddler, got knocked to the floor, cut his chin and required stitches to close the wound. As a result of that incident, the defendant was taken by his father and placed into the care of his paternal grandmother and his father where he stayed until he was 11 or 12 years old. Ms. Hope was personally aware of the violent nature of the relationship between Isom and Hicks and saw him "cause trouble" on several occasions at family gatherings by showing up unannounced, screaming, and accusing the family of hiding other boyfriends of Isom. Ms. Hope heard Hicks threaten violence and knew he would throw items around the home. Ms. Hope did not see physical violence as, on at least one occasion, she called the police before Hicks' behavior escalated to a physical altercation. Ms. Hope then testified about her knowledge of Fred Ulmer, Isom's boyfriend after Hicks. Ms. Hope initially thought that Ulmer was a good person. However, that quickly changed when she learned of and saw arguments that evolved from jealousy and watched Ulmer become very controlling of Isom. He would show up at her job to "see anything that might be going on" and on one occasion he appeared at Ms. Hope's home, assaulted Isom and then left before the police arrived. Ms. Hope did not know Beamon, the homicide victim in this matter. Ms. Hope discussed her close relationship with the defendant, providing him money in his commissary, visiting him while incarcerated, sending care packages, writing letters and speaking over the telephone.
James Palmer—Defendant's uncle and sibling of Ms. Hope and Isom. Only five years older than the defendant, he has a brother-like relationship with the defendant, rather than uncle-nephew. He saw the defendant at least once a week when they were growing up. Mr. Palmer testified about his knowledge of Hicks as Isom's boyfriend and described him as abusive although he never saw any physical abuse. He heard Isom say that Hicks hit her and that she was afraid of him. He recounted one time when Hicks came to Mr. Palmer's home looking for Isom and that everyone in the house was afraid of him, so they acted as if they were not home and refused to open the door to him. Mr. Palmer recounted that his personal interactions with Hicks were few and that Hicks invoked fear in him based on his knowledge of Hicks' behavior as abusive. This feeling was {**88 Misc 3d at 925}irrespective of the fact that Mr. Palmer never observed Hicks physically abuse Isom. With respect to Ulmer, Mr. Palmer recounted an incident at his sister's (Ms. Alexander) house wherein Ulmer put holes in the wall of the house during an argument. This occurred after Ulmer kicked Isom and the defendant out of the apartment they were sharing and Isom went to Ms. Alexander's house, with the defendant, for somewhere to stay. Mr. Palmer [*3]had no knowledge of the homicide victim in this case beyond what he learned from the defendant. Mr. Palmer and the defendant have and continue to communicate throughout defendant's incarceration.
Gloria Alexander—Aunt of defendant; sister of Isom, Ms. Hope and Mr. Palmer. She described an estranged relationship with Isom. She personally witnessed and described the aggressive and abusive actions of Hicks against Isom. She described Hicks physically "grabbing" Isom to forcefully remove her from Ms. Alexander's home. She described "several" incidents wherein she observed Hicks forcefully grab Isom in the front yard of the home and pull her away while cursing at her and "slapping" her. Ms. Alexander intervened and "jumped in" to protect Isom. These events occurred in front of the defendant two to three times and Ms. Alexander recalled the defendant crying and calling for his mother. Ms. Alexander also recounted times when the defendant wanted to visit his mother. Ms. Alexander would bring the child to Isom's home where she lived with Hicks, they would knock on the door and hear Isom and Hicks inside the location, but no one would open the door. Thereafter, Isom told Ms. Alexander that Hicks became upset with the unannounced visits and intimated that a physical fight occurred between Isom and Hicks. Additionally, Hicks would also take Isom's paychecks and on one occasion when Isom refused to turn over the paycheck, Hicks gave her a black eye which was observed by Ms. Alexander. Regarding Isom's boyfriend, Ulmer, Ms. Alexander described him as abusive in that Ulmer, in a physical altercation with Isom, pushed Isom through the wall of Ms. Alexander's home believing that she was cheating on him. Thereafter, Ulmer kicked Isom out of his home and Isom moved in with Ms. Alexander. On that date, Isom appeared with bruising and other marks on her body indicating a physical fight. Ms. Alexander's knowledge of Beamon was that he too was violent towards Isom. He would also take Isom's money causing her to hide her money in Alexander's room as the two sisters were living together at the time. {**88 Misc 3d at 926}She saw Isom with black eyes inflicted by the deceased and warned Isom against letting him move in as the defendant was now living with them. Ms. Alexander believed that Beamon lived in the house for approximately two weeks before the murder. Defendant told both Ms. Alexander and Isom that he did not like how the deceased was treating Isom. Ms. Alexander heard much screaming between the deceased and Isom, saw Isom with swollen eyes after the screaming matches, and often told the two that they needed to calm down and stop arguing.
Danny Gonzalez—best friend of the defendant. Mr. Gonzalez has known the defendant since he was 11 years old and the defendant was approximately eight years old. Mr. Gonzalez has prior contacts with the criminal justice system which the court found did not impact his credibility. When defendant was living with Isom in Inwood, Mr. Gonzalez would see defendant daily. He personally observed Isom with busted lips, black eyes, and knots and bruises at least 10 times during that time frame. Ulmer was Isom's boyfriend at that time. He described one incident in detail wherein, after an argument with Isom in front of the defendant and Mr. Gonzalez, Ulmer physically dragged Isom out of a car and into their home. Mr. Gonzalez and defendant heard screaming in the house. Ten to 15 minutes later, Isom came out of the house with a large knot over her right eye and a bleeding lip. Defendant was crying and Isom was comforting him. A second incident involved the defendant coming to Mr. Gonzalez' home when defendant was about nine years old upset about Ulmer hurting his mother. [*4]A family member of Mr. Gonzalez went to speak to Ulmer and returned saying to the defendant that he no longer had to worry about Ulmer "laying hands" on anyone. Defendant lived with Mr. Gonzalez from the time defendant was 17 until he moved in with Isom and Alexander to the residence where the murder occurred. Mr. Gonzalez advised that the defendant still saw Isom during that time frame.
Jamyrra Content—subpoenaed to testify. She lived in the duplex residence where the subject murder occurred. She is not friends with the defendant. She testified that she knew that defendant, his mother and his aunt lived in the adjoining apartment of the house. On the day of the murder, and on numerous occasions prior thereto ("more than ten"), she described hearing both verbal and physical altercations inside{**88 Misc 3d at 927} defendant's residence. She knew it was physical as items within her home and on her walls were shaking. She heard both male and female voices but not what was being said. On the day of the murder, she heard and then saw defendant and Beamon arguing. She could remember very few details of the actual murder beyond the fighting and Beamon eventually collapsing near the street in front of the home.
Defendant's Testimony:
The defendant recounted his prior contacts with the criminal justice system as two marihuana violations and a disorderly conduct violation. His schooling was problematic in that he was in regular schooling, was placed in special education classes because of his behavior and academic shortcomings by the third grade, worked his way out of special education classes and then returned to special education classes in the seventh grade. He recalled being asked to go on medication but says it did not happen. The defendant testified that by the third grade he had already been a witness to his mother's domestic abuse, he was realizing that he was being raised by his grandmothers even though his mother was around, and he was missing his mother. In the beginning of living with his paternal grandmother, he was not able to see his mother. Then his father allowed for supervised visitation and thereafter the defendant was allowed to see his mother without supervision. He was able to sleep at her apartment and spend a few days at a time with her. By the seventh grade, he had already been drinking alcohol and started smoking marihuana on a regular basis. He was sent to a program for substance abuse, went two or three times and never returned. The program wanted him to share what was happening in his home life and he did not want to share anything that would put him at risk of being taken away from his mother. He grew up between Queens (with his mother) and Long Island (with his grandparents/other family) and eventually remained on Long Island. He testified the neighborhoods were violent and drug infested.
The defendant recounted incidents of domestic abuse he observed or was subjected to. Although he does not recall the first incident because of his age, he knows that Isom and Hicks were having a fight and the defendant got thrown to the ground, split his chin open, and received stitches. That is the incident that caused the defendant's father to remove him from Isom's residence. Thereafter, the defendant recounted an {**88 Misc 3d at 928}incident wherein Isom and Hicks were again arguing, the dispute turned physical with Hicks choking Isom and the defendant jumped onto Hicks to help his mother. The defendant was too little to have any impact and that is when Isom picked up an iron, threw it at Hicks and it struck the defendant on the arm, causing a burn. The [*5]defendant then recounted his first memory of Hicks demanding sex from his mother, in the middle of the night, when the defendant was sleeping in the same room as them on a sleepover. When Isom refused because the defendant was in the room, Hicks grabbed their belongings and threw them out of the apartment. Isom and the defendant walked about 20 blocks to his grandmother's home. The defendant then recounted incidents where he went to work with Hicks to a construction site and because the defendant refused to call Hicks "dad" in front of the other workers, Hicks would punish him by either withholding food during the day or spanking the defendant with a belt, switch or extension cord.
Defendant recounted his time in a sports-oriented summer camp wherein the basketball coach inappropriately touched the defendant which caused him to switch to swimming so as not to be near that coach for the duration of the camp.
The defendant then recounted an incident when he was nine years old, and Isom took him to a man's house around Christmas time. They were to sleep over at this house. In the middle of the night, the defendant recalled hearing Isom screaming, the unidentified man's mother screaming to leave Isom alone and Isom taking the defendant out of the house, crying, and them walking back to his grandmother's home. The defendant recalls Isom telling him everything would be okay, and they were never going back to that house.
Thereafter, Isom started dating Ulmer who resided in Nassau County. He recounted the time that Isom went with a friend (Jerry) to get sandwiches for the defendant, defendant's friend Danny Gonzalez and themselves. Upon arriving home, Ulmer saw Isom in the car with Jerry, approached the car with an anti-theft device commonly known as "the club," banged on the car with the club and dragged Isom out of the car by her hair. Ulmer was dragging Isom across the lawn into their home. Isom was trying to break Ulmer's grip and the defendant, to help his mom, threw a baseball at Ulmer and physically tried to stop Ulmer who simply pushed him away while still holding {**88 Misc 3d at 929}onto Isom and carrying the club. Isom eventually came out of the house to see the defendant. She was crying and telling the defendant everything would be okay. Ulmer eventually told the defendant he would pay to fix Isom's hair and that he was sorry. The next incident the defendant recounted happened when he was about 11 years old. Ulmer and Isom were again arguing and the defendant approached them to help his mother. Ulmer told the defendant that it wasn't his business and grabbed the defendant's two hands into his one hand without releasing him. The defendant tried to break free but could not. Once Ulmer released him, the defendant retreated to his room, crying, with the realization that he could not protect his mother from Ulmer. The defendant said that living with Ulmer was like walking on eggshells; the tension in the house was very high; Isom would often sleep in his room after a fight, and the defendant wanted to take to the streets to escape. When defendant was a teenager, he observed another incident where Isom and Ulmer were screaming at each other in the car outside the home and upon entering the home, Ulmer "smacked" Isom in the side of the head causing her to hit into a railing. Isom stayed in the defendant's room that night as well. Another incident occurred wherein the defendant used the house phone to make a phone call. Later that evening he heard Isom and Ulmer arguing over that phone call. The defendant intervened to tell Ulmer that he made the phone call. An argument ensued which turned physical with the defendant landing in the kitchen sink at the hands of Ulmer. The defendant suffered lacerations from broken glass during that fight and Isom was begging Ulmer, who was much bigger than the defendant, to stop. [*6]The defendant moved out the next day.
The defendant moved back in with his mother prior to the subject offense. Beamon moved in with them sometime after and closer in time to the subject offense. Other than the defendant asking Beamon to respect Isom the first time he met him, and one minor disagreement about Beamon placing an empty container in the fridge rather than the sink, the defendant had limited interaction with Beamon prior to Beamon moving into the home. Once Beamon moved in, the defendant would hear him and Isom arguing. On January 30, 2003, the defendant was awakened by the arguing. He initially knocked on their bedroom door and heard Isom say that everything was {**88 Misc 3d at 930}okay, so the defendant went back to his bedroom. Approximately 15 to 20 minutes later, defendant heard continued arguing and specifically heard Isom asking Beamon to move out. Defendant went back to the room and saw Isom exiting with her hair out of place. The defendant testified that the sight of Isom with her hair out of place and the screaming and yelling that preceded it made him think "this cannot be happening again." (Hearing tr [HT] at 336.) Defendant told Beamon not to speak to or treat Isom with such disrespect. Beamon cursed at the defendant, "mushed" his face and a physical fight ensued. The defendant landed on the ground at some point and his airway was being blocked by a pole that Beamon had against the defendant's chest and neck area. The defendant testified in great detail about the fight and his actions. In general, the defendant was ultimately thrown into the bathroom by Beamon, who held the door closed with his hand. The defendant heard Beamon and Isom still arguing. At some point, Beamon released the bathroom door and left the interior of the home. The defendant went to his car, retrieved a gun, shot Beamon, returned the gun to his car, kicked Beamon while in the street and retreated to a neighbor's house where he showered and was subsequently arrested. The defendant described his emotional state as one of disbelief that he was once again seeing his mother being abused by her boyfriend. He testified: "I am feeling like this has to be put to an end. Mentally, at that point, I cannot deal with it. I can't let my mother deal with this anymore." (HT at 345-346.) Defendant admitted to lying at his trial on any testimony related to his having and shooting a gun. He says it was on advice of counsel.
Defendant next recounted both his accomplishments and his disciplinary matters while incarcerated and advised that the most recent tickets related to violent behavior are the result of the killing of Beamon or because of the filing of this DVSJA (Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act) application. He believes that they are the result of Beamon's family not wanting him released and/or because upon entering a new prison facility, you get challenged by other inmates. The defendant testified that he suffered significant injuries during these altercations and was hospitalized. He also had his paperwork graffitied with Beamon's name and other paperwork was removed from his cell and it has not been returned to him. The defendant additionally discussed his attempt to seek mental {**88 Misc 3d at 931}health services in or around 2007, before the DVSJA was enacted. He had just broken up with his girlfriend, he was having trouble assimilating to his incarceration and he was feeling hopeless. When fellow inmates chided him about getting help, he felt embarrassed and did not continue with services. The defendant again sought mental health services after the DVSJA was enacted based on a combination of the new law, COVID lock down, his mother's failing mental health and the greater acceptance of therapeutic services throughout communities. Defendant is working to obtain coping skills based on both his past experiences related to domestic violence and how to move forward, along [*7]with dealing with his anxiety.
On cross-examination, the People questioned the sincerity and veracity of the defendant's testimony, casting doubt on his ability to recall the 1980s being difficult, or the incidents he detailed, as he would only have been between 1 and 10 years old. The People pointed out the inconsistencies in the time frames of certain events but not the events themselves. The People spent extensive time on the subject crime, the defendant's ability to have lived elsewhere, when exactly the deceased moved into the home, the defendant's lying about the shooting at the trial, and his actions being out of rage and not fear. The defendant again admitted that he never saw the deceased physically touch his mother. They questioned his sincerity in applying for DVSJA relief and that his documented proof of seeking mental health treatment came after the DVSJA was passed. The defendant attempted to explain that he wanted to bring up the defense of extreme emotional disturbance on his direct appeal but was advised by his appellate attorney that the appeal was restricted to what had occurred at the trial and a new defense could not be raised at that time.FN* The People attempted to cast doubt on the statements by the defendant that he was assaulted when entering a new prison facility based on his charge of murder of the deceased and/or because of the deceased's family having the ability to have the defendant harmed and that the deceased's name was written over the defendant's {**88 Misc 3d at 932}legal paperwork by an unknown person at the prison facility. They claimed it was incredible, and the defendant advised that being in prison is different and you can be assaulted by staff or with the blessing of staff for reasons that might not seem logical to the general public.
Expert Reports and Testimony:
Dr. Alexander Sashya Bardey, M.D., PLLC, was hired by the defendant to perform an independent and impartial psychiatric evaluation of the defendant as it relates to his DVSJA application.
Dr. Bardey detailed the documents he reviewed, the collateral interviews he conducted and the three interviews he had with the defendant. Much of that information coincides with the witness/defendant testimony detailed in this decision. Dr. Bardey outlined the scientific findings associated with the psychological impact of abuse, citing the peer-reviewed articles utilized to support each statement. A summary of those findings is as follows:
"• Environmental factors during childhood (childhood maltreatment, negative life events) are found to predict high levels of anger in adulthood, which is considered part of the brain's fight-or-flight response to a perceived threat.
"• Men who have been abused as children are three times more likely than non-abused men to engage in violent acts as adults, and that specific forms of childhood abuse are associated with specific patterns of adult violence.
"• The cycle of violence hypothesis informs us that those who experience childhood abuse [*8]become more likely to abuse others as adults, likely due to vicarious learning through exposure to violence models.
"• Threats, abuse and violence lead to an excessive activation of fear circuitry and stress response systems, which then compromise normative brain development.
"• Because of the brain's plasticity, or adaptability, prior exposure to traumatic and threatening experiences enables and facilitates more rapid response to threats in the future.{**88 Misc 3d at 933}
"• The psychological responses to traumatic experiences can be altered by additional exposure to trauma and serve as a powerful interoceptive cue that prompts the resurfacing of threat-relevant memories." (Bardey Rep at 6-7.)
Dr. Bardey opined that the defendant's environment as a child involved experiences of violence both inside his home and within his neighborhood. He further stated that "as a bystander to his mother's experiences, as well as a victim in several incidents, Mr. Alexander became serially traumatized by the maltreatment and negative life events he witnessed." (Bardey Rep at 8.) Dr. Bardey found that "[t]he combined exposure to violence in his home and in his community instilled in [the defendant] the making of complex posttraumatic stress disorder, leaving him with a heightened sense of danger, fear, and need to protect himself and his mother." (Bardey Rep at 8.)
Dr. Bardey did not diagnose or find evidence of any thought disorders within the defendant. However, he did find that the defendant suffered from an "unspecified trauma and stressor-related disorder" as contained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR). Dr. Bardey believes that the defendant's "history of abuse led to the development of maladaptive behaviors, poor decision-making skills, and impulsivity, all of which directly contributed to the instant offense." (Bardey Rep at 18.)
Dr. Bardey also found that the defendant tested "at a moderate risk for future violent behavior, imminent violence, and/or the perpetration of serious physical harm." (Bardey Rep at 17.) Dr. Bardey further stated that the defendant "presents with very few historical factors of violence and one clinical risk or future risk management related indicators of violence and/or dangerousness." (Id.) It should be noted that the defendant had several disciplinary issues while incarcerated with violent interactions occurring within the past five years.
Dr. Bardey is of the opinion that the defendant meets the criteria for resentencing under the DVSJA.
Dr. Cheryl Paradis, Psy.D., was hired by the District Attorney's office to perform her own, independent evaluation of the defendant as it related to his DVSJA application. Dr. Paradis had the same information available to her as did Dr. Bardey. Additionally, Dr. Paradis had Dr. Bardey's report, along with the notes of his interviews, prior to performing her evaluation.{**88 Misc 3d at 934}
Dr. Paradis recounted much of the defendant's interview with her including his early [*9]childhood, schooling, criminal past and substance use. Dr. Paradis listed incidents of "trauma exposure" experienced by the defendant via his mother's boyfriends through either personal harm to himself or by observing harm inflicted on his mother. Dr. Paradis points out that when the defendant was hit with a hot iron during an argument that his mother was having with her boyfriend at that time, the defendant blamed it on the boyfriend even though it was the defendant's mother who threw the iron. When discussing reported abuse by Beamon, Dr. Paradis states that "records do not indicate evidence that Mr. Beamon was physically abusive towards Ms. Isom. However, it is acknowledged that abuse can sometimes go unreported." (Paradis Rep at 10 [emphasis added].)
In discussing the instant offense, Dr. Paradis makes a distinction in her report between arguing and fighting. She recounts that arguing consists of words and fighting consists of physical interaction. She appears to indicate that this is a distinction with a difference as it relates to the instant offense. She does not state if it is a distinction without a difference as it relates to domestic violence survivors. She opines that once Beamon left the apartment on the day in question, he was no longer a threat to the defendant or his mother. She downplays the defendant's feelings of being overwhelmed and in fear by stating "many of [the defendant's] actions suggest clear thinking and the ability to plan. For instance, he knew where to find a weapon, decided to return the gun after shooting [the deceased] and left the scene to go to a friend's apartment, where he showered." (Paradis Rep at 12.)
Dr. Paradis's conclusions are as follows:
"• There is credible evidence that [the defendant] observed domestic violence in his mother's home.
"• [The defendant] did not live with his mother for many years of his childhood and had supportive family members in his life.
"• There is no evidence that [the deceased] was abusive towards the defendant's mother.
"• The abuse reported does not qualify as the 'most serious' in that no child protective services agency was involved in the defendant's life and no reports of abuse to law enforcement exist.{**88 Misc 3d at 935}
"• The defendant's emotional and behavior problems were never severe enough to require psychiatric treatment or placement in a juvenile facility.
"• The defendant's 'real-life functioning does not indicate the presence of a severe mental illness at the time of the instant offense.'
"• When discussing the instant offense and the defendant being detained inside the bathroom of the home while the deceased and the defendant's mom 'argued' or 'fought', Dr. Paradis opines that 'while it is unclear what [the deceased's] intent was, one plausible explanation is that he was trying to de-escalate the fight. When [the deceased] left the apartment, he was seemingly trying to end the conflict.' " (Paradis Rep at 17.)
Dr. Paradis continues by stating:
"In my opinion there is insufficient evidence to conclude that [the defendant's] violent behavior was solely, primarily, or directly caused by the abuse he observed and sustained [*10]during childhood/adolescence. There is no clear or direct line of causation. Many individuals with similar histories of abuse or trauma do not act in the violent matter . . . . Although he was likely in a state of high emotion, he still had the capacity to have made better choices." (Paradis Rep at 18 [emphasis added].)
The testimony and resultant cross-examination of each doctor was extensive. The directs of each detailed the methodology each doctor used, and their testimony primarily mirrored their reports with few exceptions of significance. On cross-examination, several interesting factors came to light that helped form this court's conclusion.
As it relates to Dr. Bardey, he advised the court that the trigger the defendant experienced on the date of incident was relatively minor—he heard Isom and Beamon having an argument and he observed Isom's hair out of place. "His response was very exaggerated compared to the size of the trigger. And that is consistent with an individual who's been serially abused." (HT at 147-148.) In discussing goal directed intentional behavior, Dr. Bardey testified that on the day in question, the defendant was engaging in goal directed behavior; {**88 Misc 3d at 936}however, rational thought was not the driving force of that behavior. He described "intense emotionality" as the force behind the goal directed behavior of grabbing a gun and shooting Beamon. (HT at 150.) When discussing the defendant's belief that Isom was sexually abused by her boyfriends, Dr. Bardey explained that we must look at this through the eyes of a child as that is what the defendant was when he heard Isom's boyfriends demanding sex while the defendant was sleeping in the same room as them, Isom refusing the demand and then Isom and defendant being kicked out of the apartment for Isom's failure to satisfy her partner. (HT at 179-180.) When questioned as to why he did not perform any psychological tests on the defendant as it relates to PTSD, Dr. Bardey advised the court that the question was the defendant's behavior in 2003 and whether he was experiencing symptoms at that time that formed his behavior. Testing in 2025 would be irrelevant and, in fact, Dr. Bardey does not believe that the defendant currently suffers from PTSD; he currently suffers from an unspecified stress disorder. (HT at 183-184.) He likewise stated that the "substantial" abuse required by the statute was the sum total of all of the continuous abuse the defendant experienced or witnessed from childhood and the events with the deceased was the final trigger. (HT at 251-252.)
Testimony of note from Dr. Paradis was as follows: She advised the court that if a couple, who are known to be the victim and abuser in a domestic relationship, are "equal in size" and have a physical fight, the fight could be categorized as "wrestling" and if there is no injury, she would likely not use the word "abuse" for that incident. (HT at 451.) Dr. Paradis highlighted the loving home environment the defendant was in when his father removed him from his mother based on the volatile atmosphere surrounding the defendant's mother. Dr. Paradis, in her direct testimony, appeared to downplay many of the incidents discussed by the defendant and the defendant's family. She stated:
"Well, of course no abuse is okay. And no child should be treated this way. And no child should observe their mother being abused by anyone. Is it the most severe that I have read about or heard about, no, it's not. There is apparently no severe injuries. No injuries that needed medical attention. I don't believe the police were called to the home. [*11]Certainly not routinely. I don't believe there is evidence {**88 Misc 3d at 937}of orders of protection or that ACS was involved. These are the things that you see in cases where it's been more severe abuse." (HT at 459.)
Regarding the incident of sexual abuse, Dr. Paradis explained it as "bad judgment" on the part of the boyfriend, despite the child and his mother being sent out into the night to find another place to live. When discussing the incident in question, Dr. Paradis does state that the defendant was in a state of very high emotion. She discounted his feeling of fear by stating, "usually, if someone's in a state of fear, they would withdraw from what they're afraid of." (HT at 466.) However, on cross-examination it is learned that "fear" was not mentioned by the defendant as part of his emotions. He stated that he simply "wanted it to stop," and that the incident was bringing up memories of things that had happened to him in the past. (HT at 517.) Dr. Paradis equates the word substantial, as used in the DVSJA, with the word extreme. As such, the defendant did not suffer from substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse. On cross-examination, Dr. Paradis reluctantly agrees that a young child witnessing his mother and her boyfriend in a verbal argument (she disagreed that it was a fight) wherein the mother throws a hot iron at the boyfriend but misses and hits her child could be considered "violent." (HT at 499.) Dr. Paradis does acknowledge that the DVSJA does not require a history of mental illness or that the accused had previously sought mental health services but does believe that if your symptoms at the time of the event don't qualify you for a psychiatric illness, then you were likely not undergoing severe trauma. (HT at 522.) Dr. Paradis acknowledges that the defendant did seek mental health services in and around 2007 and that she failed to include that in her report. She agreed with defense that there was a stigma attached to mental health issues in the 2000s that is much different today. (HT at 537.) Dr. Paradis also opined that although many victims of domestic violence do not and cannot report the abuse as it is happening, "the victim can call the next day." (HT at 540.) Because that did not occur in this case, and because the abusers were never arrested, she questions the severity and veracity of the abuse. Lastly, Dr. Paradis states her belief that when the deceased in the instant offense left the house, he was de-escalating the fight, without any evidence or facts to support that belief. (HT at 543.){**88 Misc 3d at 938}
Conclusions of Law:
The language of the DVSJA clearly and unambiguously sets forth three factors for a court to consider upon a determination following a hearing, namely whether: (a) at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household; (b) such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior; and (c) having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the defendant, that a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the customary statutory sentencing guidelines would be unduly harsh. (Penal Law § 60.12; see also People v Addimando, 197 AD3d 106, 111 [2d Dept 2021].)
Although the statute does not expressly set forth the standard of proof that must be borne by the defendant, as the movant, the appellate courts have applied the preponderance of the [*12]evidence standard, which "requires enough evidence to 'produce a reasonable belief in the truth of the facts asserted.' " (People v Addimando at 112, quoting Jarrett v Madifari, 67 AD2d 396, 404 [1st Dept 1979]; see also People v Rivera, 230 AD3d 517, 519 [2d Dept 2024].)
Moreover, the legislative history of the DVSJA is "relevant and is not to be ignored, even if words be clear." (People v Addimando at 112, quoting People v Badji, 36 NY3d 393, 399 [2021].) "The legislative history [of the DVSJA] reveals that the statute sought to address harsh punishment received by victims of domestic violence who commit crimes against their abusers." (People v Addimando at 112.) Although, in certain circumstances, the statute may also be applied to defendants who commit crimes against non-abusers, the justification for the DVSJA
"was to align the realities—that 93% of women convicted of killing an intimate partner had been abused by such partner in the past—with compassion, assistance and appropriate justice, affording judges discretion to 'fully consider the impact of domestic violence when determining sentence lengths' in order to avoid long, unfair prison sentences 'when a survivor defends herself and her children.' " (People v Liz L., 221 AD3d 1288, 1289 [3d Dept 2023], quoting Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2019, ch 31 at 6.){**88 Misc 3d at 939}
As an initial matter, determinations as to the credibility of witnesses are the purview of the finder of fact. In this case, this court heard and saw the witnesses and reviewed all the documentary evidence related to same. (See People v Glenn, 53 AD3d 622 [2d Dept 2008]; People v Dantzler, 208 AD3d 590 [2d Dept 2022].) However, the Court of Appeals has held that the Appellate Division has plenary review power and can make its own findings of fact based on the submitted record. (People v Brenda WW., 44 NY3d 594 [2025].)
1. Element No. 1: At the time of the offense, the defendant was the victim of substantial domestic abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household.
The first element of the DVSJA includes three prongs: (a) that the defendant was the victim of substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse; (b) that the abuse was inflicted by a member of the same family or household as the defendant; and (c) that the substantial abuse occurred "at the time of the instant offense" (Penal Law § 60.12 [1]). The People argue that the defendant did not prove any of these prongs based on their position that whatever actual abuse the defendant suffered was not substantial; his mother may have been the victim of some abuse from her boyfriends but that did not cross over to the defendant, and even if there was abuse that crossed over, it did not occur at the time of the instant offense.
The evidence before this court depicts a young man who grew up in two very different environments. When the defendant, as an adolescent, was with his paternal family or his extended maternal family, his life was serene and nurturing. However, when the defendant was in the presence of his mother, his life was filled with chaos and upheaval based on the dysfunctional relationships his mother had with her various boyfriends. And regardless of where he was physically, the defendant was growing up in neighborhoods tainted by the violence of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The home life chaos began before the defendant can even remember when a physical altercation between his mother and her then boyfriend (Hicks) resulted in the defendant being thrown to the floor which caused his chin to split open. Stitches were required [*13]to close the wound and the defendant's father removed him from his mother's custody. Thereafter, when with his mother, the defendant observed numerous instances of arguments wherein his mother ended up in tears and he was unable to help her. This court finds that the instances detailed above wherein the defendant observed {**88 Misc 3d at 940}his mother crying, or with a busted lip, or with her hair in disarray, but not having observed the actions that caused those events, are credited as truthful as the defendant heard the raised voices or saw the aftermath of the events, and properly surmised that a physical altercation occurred. The court likewise credits those instances where the defendant did observe people laying hands on his mother and credits those instances in which the defendant was physically abused. The court finds, based on the testimony of Dr. Bardey and the court's own knowledge of domestic violence from its years of practice within the criminal justice system, that a young person, who has viewed their mother being consistently abused by her boyfriends from a very young age through their teenage years, even if that abuse does not occur on a daily basis, can still be impacted by those observations and suffer from the actions of domestic violence inflicted upon his parent by others. Because the defendant was a child when these actions began, his brain formation was impacted by this barrage of abusive behavior. His consistent inability to protect his mother as he got older and watched her being physically abused impacted his psyche. He was just as much the recipient of the abuse as she was.
The court must next determine if this abuse was "substantial." The Legislature did not define this word in the DVSJA. As such, it is open to interpretation by the court. Courts have differed on the meaning of substantial. One court has held that the legislative history of the DVSJA makes clear that "[t]he bill was enacted to give relief to a small number of survivors who experienced severe, serious abuse of the worst kind." (People v B.N., 79 Misc 3d 740, 756 [Sup Ct, Cayuga County 2023].) Another court determined that an alleged abusive relationship three months in duration, wherein there was contradictory evidence as to the severity of the abuser's behavior, was not sufficient to equate with "substantial" physical, sexual or psychological abuse. (People v J.M., 84 Misc 3d 201 [Sup Ct, Orange County 2024].) A seven-month relationship wherein the abuser punched and kicked the defendant, made her prostitute herself, bit her face, gave her black eyes on several occasions and threatened to kill her was sufficient to establish "substantial" physical, sexual or psychological abuse. (People v Ava OO., 233 AD3d 1186 [3d Dept 2024].) This court could not find a single reported case wherein the abuse suffered by the defendant was, for the most part, physically inflicted on the {**88 Misc 3d at 941}parent; whatever physical abuse that was inflicted directly on the defendant was not, in and of itself, substantial in nature. The evaluation requires a determination by the court as to whether the cross-over psychological abuse of seeing your mother consistently harmed by her boyfriends, equates with significant psychological harm to the defendant.
Dr. Paradis advised the court that in her opinion, "substantial" equates with "most serious" or "extreme" and because there are no records of child protective services involvement, no arrests of the abusers, no juvenile delinquency findings against the defendant and no orders of protection issued, the abuse could not be substantial. Dr. Bardey advised the court that the incidents of abuse must be evaluated in context through the eyes of the child who witnessed and/or experienced them. He opined that the "substantial" abuse required by the statute was the sum total of all of the continuous abuse the defendant experienced or witnessed from childhood [*14]through his teenage years and the events with the deceased were the final trigger. (HT at 251-252.) He stated, "as a bystander to his mother's experiences, as well as a victim in several incidents, [the defendant] became serially traumatized by the maltreatment and negative life effects he witnessed." (Bardey Rep at 8.) A young child who consistently sees his mother in harm's way, even if that is not an everyday event, has their brain formation impacted by such events and "prior exposure to traumatic and threatening experiences enables and facilitates more rapid response to threats in the future." (Bardey Rep at 7.) Given the science of brain formation, and the defendant's exposure to instances of domestic abuse throughout his formative years while with his mother, this court finds that the incidents described equate with the legal requirement of substantial abuse inflicted upon the defendant.
The next requirement is whether the substantial abuse occurred at the time of the offense. It is "not enough that defendant was indisputably subjected to substantial physical and psychological abuse in the past . . . [T]he 'at the time of' language must create some requirement of a temporal nexus between the abuse and the offense or else it is meaningless." (People v Williams, 198 AD3d 466, 466-467 [1st Dept 2021]; see also People v Jennifer F., 235 AD3d 776 [2d Dept 2025].) However,
"nothing in the DVSJA requires a finding that the abuse and the offense occur contemporaneously, {**88 Misc 3d at 942}and to hold otherwise would be tantamount to requiring that a defendant make a showing akin to a justification defense in order to be entitled to its ameliorative sentencing scheme, which is inapposite to the legislative history." (People v Liz L., 221 AD3d 1288, 1290 [3d Dept 2023].)
Dr. Paradis advised the court that the argument that occurred on the date of the incident was not domestic violence as no one saw Beamon get physical with Isom and Beamon's leaving the home was his attempt to de-escalate an argument with Isom and a physical altercation with the defendant. Dr. Bardey described this altercation as a triggering event that caused the defendant to find himself in another situation where his mother needed protecting from an abusive boyfriend and when he failed to physically stop Beamon, the defendant determined the only way to make the abuse stop was to shoot Beamon. The defendant stated that he advised Beamon that he was not going to allow him to speak to Isom in that manner or to harm her. Thereafter, the defendant sees Isom's hair "out of place" when she left the bedroom. The defendant was questioned about Isom's hair being "tussled" or "out of place." It was clearly significant to the defendant based on his testimony. In fact, in the incident described herein with Ulmer, wherein Isom's hair was "out of place," Ulmer apologized to the defendant and agreed to pay to "fix" Isom's hair. During the subject crime, when the defendant again saw Isom's hair "out of place," it meant something to him. His description about how neat his mother kept her hair, how she wrapped it in a scarf when resting so as not to have it disturbed, how he previously saw Isom's hair disturbed after physical altercations with her boyfriends, and then seeing Isom's hair "out of place" when she opened the bedroom door cemented in his mind that physical abuse had just occurred. The defendant did not need to see it; he knew it. Thus, this event of domestic abuse was a triggering event that sparked the defendant's behavior and was a continuation of the psychological domestic abuse experienced by the defendant throughout his lifetime.
Thus, the court finds that the defendant met his burden of proving that he was the victim of substantial abuse from his mother's boyfriends and such abuse was continued and triggered, "at the time of the instant offense," as required by Penal Law § 60.12.{**88 Misc 3d at 943}
[*15]2. Element No. 2: Substantial abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior.
The DVSJA underwent a significant amendment in 2019. It was no longer a requirement that the victim of a defendant's crimes be the abuser, and the abuse no longer needed to be the causal factor for the commission of the subject crime, but rather a significant contributing factor. Moreover, a defendant does not have to be in the middle of an abusive attack or on the verge of being abused for the statute to apply. (People v D.M., 72 Misc 3d 960, 966 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2021]; see Penal Law § 60.12, as amended by L 2019, ch 31].) " 'Significant contributing factor' means the domestic violence was sufficiently significant to have likely helped bring about the defendant's criminal behavior." (People v D.L., 72 Misc 3d 257, 264 [Columbia County Ct 2021] [defendant's sexual abuse at the hands of his uncle led to his drug addiction and drug abuse which led to him committing burglaries to feed his drug addiction which led to the crime for which he was convicted and resentenced under the DVSJA].)
Dr. Paradis opined that in her expert opinion, the domestic violence abuse suffered by Isom, which she did not believe crossed over to the defendant, was not a significant contributing factor for the subject crime. Dr. Paradis found the event preceding the murder to be nothing more than an argument. She opined that because no one observed any physical altercation, it could not be domestic violence. She added that in her opinion, Beamon was attempting to de-escalate the argument by leaving the home and was no longer a threat to anyone (if they had believed he was a threat in the first place). She stated that the defendant had the ability to make better choices and his goal-oriented behavior to get a gun and shoot Beamon was not impacted by any prior domestic abuse.
Dr. Bardey opined the exact opposite to Dr. Paradis. He believed that the argument, which escalated to a physical altercation between the defendant and Beamon, was the direct result of the defendant once again seeing his mother abused by a boyfriend, the defendant being physically incapable of fighting that boyfriend due to his small stature (as proved by Beamon manhandling the defendant and restraining him in the bathroom) and the defendant's belief that the only way to protect Isom from further domestic abuse was to kill Beamon.
All the parties agreed that the fight between the defendant and Beamon was not domestic violence being inflicted upon the {**88 Misc 3d at 944}defendant at that time. Defense says it was domestic violence against Isom. The People say it was just an argument. The Second Department has held that the cumulative effect of domestic abuse on a defendant, when evaluated together with the events immediately surrounding the subject crime, can be used as evidence of a "contributing factor" even when the deceased never inflicted abuse on the accused at the time of the subject crime. (People v Burns, 207 AD3d 646 [2d Dept 2022].) That same Court also held that an evaluation related to the DVSJA should not presuppose that there was a way in which a defendant could avoid further abuse, or that because a murder could have been avoided by the accused simply walking away from the situation, the DVSJA does not apply. They stated, "The court again based this finding on, inter alia, an arcane belief/suggestion that the defendant could have avoided the murder by withdrawing from [the] apartment, which are antiquated impressions of how domestic violence survivors should behave." (People v Addimando, 197 AD3d 106, 111 [2d Dept 2021].)
Under the facts as credited by the court from the hearing and the documentary evidence provided, this court believes that the cumulative domestic abuse, directly inflicted on Isom which crossed over to the psychological formation of the defendant being unable to stop his mother's abuse at the hands of her boyfriends, was a contributing factor to this crime. Moreover, the fight itself became a triggering event which brought to the forefront of the defendant's mind his belief that the only way to save his mother was to stop Beamon. Unable to do that with his physical strength (the same problem he had throughout his young life), he used a gun and shot and killed Beamon.
3. Element No. 3: Sentence would be unduly harsh.
The legal criterion for this element requires the court, having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the defendant, to find that a sentence in accordance with the customary statutory sentencing guidelines is unduly harsh. The intent of the legislature in passing the DVSJA was to provide relief to individuals who posed "no threat to public safety" and were found to have an "extremely low [risk of] recidivism" (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2019, ch 31 at 6). Thus, the granting of a reduced sentence should pose "no compromise to public safety." (Id.) Even where the court might find that a defendant has satisfied the first two elements of the DVSJA, the{**88 Misc 3d at 944} court, in its discretion, may determine that a reduced sentence is not appropriate under the third element. (See People v B.N., 79 Misc 3d 740 [Sup Ct, Cayuga County 2023] [Despite horrific abuse suffered by the defendant at the hands of the deceased, and her having successfully completed several treatment programs while incarcerated, defendant's accumulation of numerous tier violations, consistently denying responsibility for the death of another and blaming all adverse actions taken against her on others, caused the court to question the risk she might pose to public safety if released early]; see also People v Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d 1317 [4th Dept 2024].)
Here, the defendant refused to accept responsibility for this crime until after the DVSJA was passed. In fact, the defendant's trial testimony, quite unbelievably, says that he has no idea who did the shooting even though the defendant admitted to the events preceding the shooting. The defendant says this was the legal advice he received from his attorney. The defendant was only 22 at the time; however, he has had over 20 years to correct this misstatement and chose to hold out until a time when an admission to the crime could reduce his sentence.
Additionally, the defendant has over 40 disciplinary tickets during his incarceration. These tickets consisted of violations ranging from "being out of place" to smuggling to the violent act of fighting. At least four incidents of violence occurred within the past three years. The defendant testified that these recent fights were the result of him filing a DVSJA motion. He believed that corrections staff and inmates "picked" fights with him because of the possibility that he could be released, and he was simply defending himself. Although the court does appreciate that when entering a new facility, a defendant may be tested for his toughness; and although the court also understands that corrections staff can be complicit in physical altercations within a prison, these fights, in conjunction with Dr. Bardey's finding that the [*16]defendant does have a moderate potential for further violence upon release, cannot be ignored when evaluating the defendant's potential release. As such, this court will not put a community at risk in releasing someone who does not appear to have control over his behavior. Dr. Bardey advised that with therapy and counseling, he believes the defendant will be successful on the outside. This court would like that to be taken into consideration when the defendant first comes up for parole.{**88 Misc 3d at 946}
Accordingly, the defendant's motion for resentencing in accordance with Penal Law § 60.12 is denied.
Footnotes
Appellate counsel argued ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to raise either a justification defense or a defense of extreme emotional disturbance.