Supreme Court, Erie County, October 3, 2025

OPINION OF THE COURT

Peter Allen Weinmann, J.

This court is presented with a novel issue of first impression.

Corey Hogan is a well-known Western New York attorney who is presently suspended from the practice of law. He now wishes to represent himself in order to sue his former clients to recover legal fees, advances and disbursements for the work which was the rationale for his suspension. He now claims $1.177 million from his former clients.

The threshold issue for this court to determine is whether Mr. Hogan—as a suspended attorney—has the legal right to represent himself, and furthermore, if he does, whether he has the legal right to sue his former clients for work which was the rationale for his suspension.

The defendants are farmers who sought representation and legal counsel in 2015 from plaintiff, the managing attorney of the HoganWillig firm, a suburban law firm at the time with over 100 professionals including attorneys, paralegals, and administrative staff. Over the course of more than two years, plaintiff provided substantial legal services to defendants; assisted with refinancing efforts; defended against creditor claims; negotiated with creditors; and provided financial analysis to stabilize the business, including farm management services such as the collection of receivables from crop sales; payment of bills; marketing of farm products; coordinating digital mapping of farm fields; contact with customers regarding the sale of farm products; and bookkeeping and accounting services.

In addition, according to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department's decision (Matter of Hogan, 212 AD3d 152 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 1117 [2023]), plaintiff provided his clients with financial assistance in the form of "advances" of funds, the majority of which were used to pay expenses associated with the operation of the farming business, including the purchase of supplies such as fuel, fertilizer, seed, and equipment parts, and the payment of other expenses such as trucking costs, wages for farm employees, insurance premiums, land lease payments, and owners' draws paid to the clients.

Moreover, added the Court, some of the advances of funds were used to pay marketing costs, delinquent balances on debt owed to vendors and creditors, and disbursements associated with lawsuits in which HoganWillig was representing the clients. The sources of the advances were Hogan's personal funds; HoganWillig's credit card accounts; HoganWillig's operating account; and an LLC that was created, solely owned, and funded by Hogan. Plaintiff provided no promissory notes or loan documentation; sale or purchase contracts; leases; or any other memorialization of the terms of repayment.

Furthermore, added the Court, plaintiff purchased 11 pieces of farming equipment, and filed a UCC financing statement listing the defendants as debtors to plaintiff's LLC, and listing as collateral all crops, livestock, farming equipment and supplies. Finally, {**88 Misc3d 1029}plaintiff arranged for three mortgages in the amount of $100,000, $150,000, and $250,000 listing HoganWillig as the mortgagee and defendants as the mortgagor. As if all that were not enough, the Court found that plaintiff did not disclose to his clients the terms of the transactions, nor did he advise his clients of the potential of any conflict of interest, or the advisability of seeking independent legal counsel.

But the straw that broke the camel's back was plaintiff's advice to his clients that they file for bankruptcy, after he had steered them into $2.5 million in debt—which did not even include the $1.177 million they allegedly owed to plaintiff for all the good work that he did for them.

In 2022, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department issued a seven page unanimous opinion listing the aforementioned transactions and much more, and holding that plaintiff violated five specific Rules of Professional Conduct. They noted that plaintiff failed to express contrition or remorse and failed to sufficiently acknowledge "his substantial disregard of his ethical obligations." (Matter of Hogan, 212 AD3d at 161.) Accordingly, after due deliberation and consideration, the Court suspended Corey Hogan from the practice of law for a minimum of two years.

The Court issued a two page order finding the plaintiff guilty of professional misconduct, and notably held:

"It is further ORDERED that Corey J. Hogan is hereby commanded during the term of [*2]such suspension to desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form either as principal or agent, clerk or employee of another, and is hereby forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission, or other public authority, or to give to another an opinion as to the law or its application, or any advice in relation thereto" (emphasis added).

In a case of first impression, it is now up to this court to determine whether the order of the Appellate Division prohibits Mr. Hogan from representing himself in order to sue his former clients.

In the first layer of analysis, this court looks to the plain meaning of the language utilized by the Fourth Department. In its order, the Court specifically utilizes broad language: "desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form either as principal or agent." At bar, clearly Mr. Hogan is acting for himself—a {**88 Misc3d 1030}principal party. He has filed papers and appears in court on his own behalf, thus violating the Court's order that he is "forbidden to appear as an attorney . . . before any court, judge, justice." There is no language permitting an exception of any kind—whether for pro se representation or otherwise.

The parties have submitted two cases, ostensibly involving the same suspended attorney acting pro se. The first case is at the trial level, and the second comes almost four years later from the Appellate Division, Second Department. In the first case, Spinnell v Doris L. Sassower, P.C. (155 Misc 2d 147 [Civ Ct, NY County 1992]), the suspended attorney was being sued by another attorney. The suspended attorney, Sassower, represented herself. The issues, primarily jurisdictional, were not directly on point, insofar as to whether the defendant could represent herself. However, Justice Michael D. Stallman of the Civil Court of the City of New York addressed the issue sua sponte in a footnote, noting: "While a suspended attorney may not represent another party during the period of her suspension, she may appear pro se in her individual capacity, and pro se as the president of the professional corporation." (Id. at 148 n 1.)

Thus a court of inferior jurisdiction would seem to permit the suspended attorney to appear and represent himself or herself. However, the opinion is completely silent as to the exact, detailed and specific terms of the order of suspension—unlike at bar. At bar, it is clear that the Fourth Department specified: "refrain from the practice of law . . . and is hereby forbidden to appear as an attorney . . . before any court, judge, [and] justice."

In the second case, Blaustein v Sassower (232 AD2d 516 [2d Dept 1996]), a different Court seemed to take a different tack. There, a client in a divorce matter sued his attorney, the [*3]same Sassower from the other case, for legal malpractice. There, the Appellate Division, Second Department, did not preclude the suspended attorney from defending herself pro se in her individual capacity, but in contradistinction to the earlier case, the Court did hold that she could not represent her professional corporation in the litigation. But again, as with the first case, the Court did not address the exact, specific and particular terms of the Appellate Division's order of suspension.

Applying both Sassower decisions to the facts at bar, it is evident that there is a significant factual distinguishing circumstance. At bar, the Fourth Department specifically and {**88 Misc3d 1031}categorically issued an order of the Court prohibiting Mr. Hogan from "the practice of law in any form either as principal or agent" (emphasis added). The first Sassower case, from a level below State Supreme Court and in another county of the state, did not reference the specifics, particularities, or actual terms in the order of suspension pertaining to Ms. Sassower. Likewise, the Second Department's opinion four years later also made no mention of the details, particularities, and terms of the order of suspension. But notably, the Court narrowed Sassower's ability to self-represent. There the Court held she could self-represent as an individual, but not as president of her own P.C. (professional corporation). But again, there the facts are distinguishable from those at bar. There are no terms or particularities in the order referenced. And again, the Second Department is a Court of different, concurrent jurisdiction to the Fourth Department, thus that decision is not controlling. And finally, there the suspended attorney was defending two lawsuits—not seeking to proactively file a lawsuit. In sum, the two cases cited, while arguably distinguishable, simply do not support any argument that Mr. Hogan may self-represent, in view of the Fourth Department's extremely limiting and qualifying language in its order of suspension.

Finally, Mr. Hogan cited at oral argument the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for the proposition that courts may not prohibit even non-attorneys from self-representation. Further, he argued that because he was suspended, and now acting as a non-attorney, he had the constitutional right to represent himself. However, even the U.S. Supreme Court has held that this constitutional right applies only in the realm of criminal law, where a defendant, made to respond to a criminal charge, has the right to self-representation (Faretta v California, 422 US 806 [1975]). At bar Mr. Hogan seeks the opposite—not to defend, but to affirmatively file a lawsuit—and in a civil—not a criminal court. Thus even the U.S. Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court cannot help Mr. Hogan here.

In view of the aforementioned, this court now holds that Corey J. Hogan, as an attorney suspended from the practice of law, may not represent himself in filing a lawsuit, whether against his former clients or otherwise.

This case analysis does not end here, however, because the farmers have filed a motion [*4]for summary judgment alleging that regardless of any self-representation issue, Mr. Hogan is legally prohibited from suing the very party tied to the representation that was the rationale for his suspension.

The {**88 Misc3d 1032}law concerning summary judgment is found in CPLR 3212 (b), which permits the court to grant the moving party victory if the claim can be established as a matter of law. The motion must be denied if any party can show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact.

At bar, the defendants allege there is no question of fact requiring a trial, and that the determination may be made as a strict application of law. Defendants cite chapter and verse of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department's seven page opinion relying on a litany of behaviors committed by plaintiff that would make a card shark blush: providing business consulting under the guise of legal services; advancing personal funds to pay marketing costs and pay debts to vendors; taking security interests in the client's property to secure and collateralize the client's debts to plaintiff; filing a UCC statement listing the clients as debtors to the plaintiff; arranging three mortgages to the clients with plaintiff as mortgagee; and becoming a secured creditor and mortgagee to clients while legally representing them in refinancing transactions and defense of creditor claims. For all this, note the farmers, the appellate court found plaintiff in violation of the following Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0):

Rule 1.5 (b)—failing to appropriately communicate with a client;

Rule 1.7 (a) (2)—representing a client where there is a significant risk that the lawyer's professional judgment will be adversely affected by his or her personal interests;

Rule 1.8 (a)—entering into a business transaction with a client;

Rule 8.4 (h)—engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his or her fitness as a lawyer; and

22 NYCRR 1215.1—failing to provide a letter of engagement explaining scope, fees, and services to be provided.

In short, defendants have presented a smorgasbord of violations encompassing conflicts of interest; predatory behavior; exploitation; self-dealing; and abuse of trust. It is self-evident, they contend, that there is absolutely no issue of fact.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the entire scenario is rife with genuine issues of material fact. The farmers, plaintiff alleges, retained the benefits of extensive legal representation, including negotiating with creditors, assisting with refinancing efforts, and preserving the farming operation, yet they have failed to pay for those services. Plaintiff's efforts were integral to the survival of the defendants' business, contends plaintiff. The Court did [*5]not criticize the quality of the legal work provided, nor did they allege that Hogan's services were incompetent, substandard, or ineffective. On the contrary, the defendants benefitted from Hogan's work: they avoided foreclosure, maintained their farm, and created a pathway for financial stability. None of these assertions, however, raise even a hint of an issue of fact. They are partisan subjective opinions that may be subject to debate, but they certainly are not "facts," let alone issues of fact. As United States Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan once said, everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but no one is entitled to their own facts.

The bumper crop of cases, and thus the applicable case law, comes primarily from the Second Department, which apparently has its share of suspended attorneys. The leading case is Matter of Winston (214 AD2d 677 [2d Dept 1995]), where the Court held in no uncertain terms: "[A]n attorney who engages in misconduct by violating the Disciplinary Rules is not entitled to legal fees for any services rendered" (id. at 677 [emphasis added and citation omitted]). Citing Winston, another Supreme Court held:

"[A] disbarred attorney forfeits his entire fee if his misconduct relates to his representation in the matter for which the fees are sought. It is well settled that [a]n attorney who engages in misconduct by violating the Disciplinary Rules is not entitled to legal fees for any services rendered (Pessoni v Rabkin, 220 AD2d 732 [2d Dept 1995] . . . , citing Matter of Winston . . . )" (Nawaz v Boryczka, 34 Misc 3d 1234[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50367[U], *2 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Three other cases from the Second Department cite Winston, and denied legal fees to attorneys who had engaged in misconduct and then sought to bill for the services which were the grounds for the misconduct (Saint Annes Dev. Co. v Batista, 165 AD3d 997 [2d Dept 2018]; Quinn v Walsh, 18 AD3d 638 [2d Dept 2005]; Jay Deitz & Assoc. of Nassau County, Ltd. v Breslow & Walker, LLP, 153 AD3d 503 [2d Dept 2017]).

In what appears to be a recurring pattern, the Second Department has developed a whole body of case law denying legal fees to suspended attorneys who wish to bill for the very deeds which led to their suspension or disbarment (Matter of Satin, 265 AD2d 330 [2d Dept 1999]; Pessoni v Rabkin, 220 AD2d 732 [2d Dept 1995]; Brill v Friends World Coll., 133 AD2d 729 [2d Dept 1987]; Baugher v Cullen & Dykman, LLP, 173 AD3d 959 [2d Dept 2019]; Biagioni v Narrows MRI & Diagnostic Radiology, P.C., 127 AD3d 800 [2d Dept 2015]; Filler v Motta, 45 Misc 3d 41 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]).

As a consequence, this court holds that there are no issues of fact precluding a grant of [*6]summary judgment in favor of the farmers, and that the overwhelming body of accumulated case law prohibits Mr. Hogan as a suspended attorney from collecting fees, advances and disbursements from his former clients for the representation which was the very ground for his suspension from the practice of law.

Next, courts have held that "[t]he doctrine of 'clean hands' is a fundamental principle of equity as well as of public policy." (Levy v Braverman, 24 AD2d 430, 430 [1st Dept 1965].) The doctrine comes into play here because Corey Hogan alleges an equitable claim to be paid for services rendered. "Where a litigant has himself been guilty of inequitable conduct with reference to the subject matter of the transaction in suit, a court of equity will refuse him affirmative aid. Therefore, as a matter of law," held the Appellate Division, First Department, such plaintiff "should [be] denied relief . . . and his complaint should [be] dismissed" (id.). As the Court of Appeals has held,

"No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes" (McConnell v Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 NY2d 465, 469 [1960] [citation omitted]; accord Hytko v Hennessey, 62 AD3d 1081 [3d Dept 2009] [Equitable remedies are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands where the party seeking to assert the equitable remedy has committed some unconscionable act that is directly related to the subject matter in litigation and has injured the party attempting to invoke the doctrine]).

Applying the doctrine of unclean hands and Levy and McConnell, and Hytko, plaintiff at bar shall not be "permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong." Both equity and public policy, as described by the Appellate Division First and Third Departments and the Court of Appeals, therefore would prohibit Mr. Hogan from receiving compensation for his work for the farmers. Hogan's representation clearly harmed the farmers to the tune of a more than $2 million debt, to say nothing of the ethical morass they could never have anticipated when they sought out assistance and counsel for their foundering farm.

Finally, counsel for the farmers asks this court to sanction Mr. Hogan by awarding costs and legal fees for his allegedly frivolous conduct in launching this litigation (22 NYCRR 130-1.1). "Frivolous" is defined by the statute as conduct that "is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument [or] is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another." (Id. subd [c] [1], [2].) At bar, applying extreme logic to the entire saga of events, it cannot be said that Mr. Hogan's request to be paid for his representation of his clients is "completely without merit," however unethical the services may have been. After all, there is an old adage that no one works for free. Most would agree that lawyers should be paid for their work. Thus it might be said that while Mr. Hogan's attempt to get paid could arguably be better characterized as: audacious; ballsy; disingenuous; nervy; [*7]brazen; shameless; or greedy, it is not entirely accurate to characterize it as "frivolous," as defined by the statute. Really the most functional characterization for Mr. Hogan's conduct is arguably best described by a term that is not even considered part of the English language but comes from what has been described as one of God's gifts to humanity, Yiddish. The term most appropriate to characterize Mr. Hogan's conduct at bar is "chutzpah." The great author Leo Rosten has described chutzpah as the criminal defendant standing in court after being convicted of killing his parents, begging for mercy because he is an orphan. That is chutzpah. This court therefore holds that while Mr. Hogan's plea in seeking payment for decidedly unethical conduct which caused his suspension from the practice of law is not frivolous; it is unarguably a stunning and breathtaking example of chutzpah. The defendants' application for sanctions is therefore denied.

For the above-stated reasons, it is therefore ordered that the defendants' motion granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing plaintiff's complaint in its entirety, on the merits, and with prejudice, is granted; it is further ordered that the remainder of defendants' relief is denied.