The People have moved to consolidate three separate criminal cases—CR-017491-24BX, CR-017837-24BX and CR-006718-25BX—that are pending against defendant Jeanine Lataillade. Lataillade opposes consolidation, has moved to dismiss the accusatory instruments in CR-017491-24BX and CR-017837-24BX on CPL § 30.30 speedy trial grounds, and also seeks to dismiss a weapon-possession count of the CR-017491-24BX instrument on grounds of facial insufficiency. She separately challenges the discovery nondisclosure of underlying materials related to IAB log # 23-6404 for testifying witness Officer Nunez.

As explained below, consolidation is GRANTED and dismissal DENIED. The nondisclosure issue is referred to the trial court, which is better positioned to determine whether a discovery sanction is warranted under CPL § 245.80.

All three of the criminal cases against Lataillade arise out of alleged disputes with her daughter.

The first case was initiated via a July 10 complaint (superseded in October to fix a drafting error) charging misdemeanor counts of PL §§ 120.14 (1) (menacing in the second degree), 265.01 (2) (criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree), 215.50 (3) (criminal contempt in the second degree), and 110.00/120.00 (1) (attempted assault in the third degree), as well as 240.26 (1) (harassment in the second degree), a violation. The weapons charge arose out of allegations that [*2]Lataillade threw a glass jar at her daughter, striking her on the leg. With respect to the criminal contempt charge, the complaint provided that Lataillade was aware that her daughter was in possession of a valid order of protection issued by Bronx Family Court, which directed Lataillade to refrain from committing criminal offenses against her daughter, including harassment and menacing.

Lataillade was arraigned on July 11, 2024. The People's October 8, 2024 certificate of compliance ("CoC"), filed on the 89th day,^[FN1] was apparently deemed valid at an appearance before Judge Chin on October 31, 2024, and was again deemed valid by Judge Bondy on March 17, 2025.

The second case arose out of a July 15, 2024 criminal complaint charging misdemeanor counts of PL §§ 155.25 (petit larceny), 215.50 (3) (criminal contempt in the second degree), and 165.40 (criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree), as well as 240.26 (1) (harassment in the second degree), a violation. Specifically, Lataillade was alleged to have violated both the same order of protection issued by a Bronx Family Court referee and also the order of protection issued at arraignment in CR-017491-24BX, which directed Lataillade to refrain from coming any criminal offenses against her daughter. Lataillade was charged with having knowledge of both orders of protection.

Lataillade was arraigned on July 15, 2024. The People's CoC, filed on October 14, 2024,^[FN2] was initially deemed valid by Judges Chin and Bondy at the same conferences mentioned above.

The third case arose out of a March 8, 2025 complaint, which charged Lataillade with two counts of PL § 215.50 (3) (criminal contempt in the second degree) and one count of PL § 145.00 (1) (criminal mischief in the fourth degree), both misdemeanors. Lataillade was charged with knowingly violating February 25, 2025 orders of protection issued by Judge Bondy in CR-017491-24BX and CR-017837-24BX, which remained valid until March 10, 2025 and which directed Lataillade to refrain from criminal mischief against her daughter.

Lataillade was arraigned on March 9, 2025.

A. The Parties' Arguments

Relying on both CPL § 200.20 (2)(b), which permits joinder of offenses arising out of different criminal transactions when proof of one offense would be admissible in a trial on the other, and § 200.20 (2)(c), which allows for discretionary joinder of offenses not joinable under (b) that are nevertheless "defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law," the People contend that consolidation is warranted because all three dockets involve the same parties and related offenses. The People also assert that consolidation of the dockets will facilitate the judicial process by avoiding duplicative and overlapping testimony.

Lataillade's response focuses on the prejudice that would ensue if consolidation were granted, enabling the People to introduce propensity evidence which would generally be inadmissible (affirmation in opposition at ¶ 3). Lataillade also challenges the premise that all three dockets share admissible evidence. Finally, Lataillade contends that consolidation is inappropriate given the People's failure to (1) provide outstanding discovery for docket numbers CR-017837-24BX and CR-017491-24BX and (2) certify compliance for docket number CR-006718-25BX (affirmation in opposition at ¶ 3). Lataillade also distinguishes the cases by emphasizing that the order of protection ostensibly violated in docket number CR-017491-24BX was a limited order of protection issued by Bronx Family Court as opposed to orders of protection issued by Bronx Criminal Court (affirmation in opposition at ¶ 6).

In their reply, the People argue that Lataillade has not shown prejudice, and that the jury would be able to properly discern the proof required for each offense (affirmation in support at § I). Consolidation also would not impermissibly introduce propensity evidence, but rather show knowledge and receipt of an order of protection, which is material to proving the subsequent violation of that order of protection (reply affirmation in support at § I).

B. Analysis

Multiple accusatory instruments may be consolidated prior to trial if they contain offenses that are otherwise joinable under CPL § 200.20 (see People v. Watson, 281 AD2d 691, 693 [3d Dept. 2001]). As mentioned above, CPL § 200.20 (2)(b) permits joinder of offenses arising out of [*3]different criminal transactions where proof of one offense would be admissible and material in a trial on the second, and § 200.20 (2)(c) permits discretionary joinder of offenses not joinable under (b) that are defined by "the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar." Meanwhile, CPL § 200.20 (4) permits consolidation of separate accusatory instruments when the instruments charge "different offenses of a kind that are joinable in a single indictment pursuant to" § 200 (2), while permitting discretionary consolidation even if some offenses charged "are not so joinable." While these subsections all directly apply to indictments, they also govern consolidation of misdemeanor informations and complaints "[w]here appropriate" through CPL § 100.45 (1), and less directly via CPL § 100.15.

In arguing against joinder, Lataillade relies primarily on People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1 [1982], and People v Edwards, 46 Misc 3d 1206(A), 2015 NY Slip Op 50004(U) (City Court, Mt. Vernon 2015), contending that consolidation of the three dockets at bar is inappropriate because it would subject Lataillade to an unfair prejudice and require the People to sustain different elements of proof to achieve a conviction on each docket. But the Lane decision dealt broadly with the standards for consolidation, addressing how trial courts should exercise their discretion by "generally weigh[ing] the public interest in avoiding duplicative, lengthy and expensive trials against the defendant's interest in being protected from unfair disadvantage" as well as "a trial free of undue prejudice" (Lane, 56 NY2d at 8). The actual issue addressed and resolved by the Lane Court—a defendant's "contention is that he wishes to testify as to a criminal transaction alleged in one indictment but desires to remain silent as to a criminal transaction alleged in the other indictment," id.—is not at issue here.

Lane does not otherwise prohibit the consolidation sought by the People in these cases. To the contrary, there are clear practical reasons to try all of these cases together rather than to order duplicative trials involving the same core parties (see id. at 7—8).

Edwards, to the contrary, arose from circumstances that more closely resemble those in the cases at bar: a charge of contempt in one case that arose out of a violation of an order of protection in the other. The Edwards court "exercise[d] its discretion" to deny a prosecution request for consolidation because "the differences between the charges outweigh the similarities" and allowing consolidation would "be prejudicial to the defendant" (Edwards, 2015 NY Slip Op 50004[U], at *3).

But as a decision from a court of coordinate jurisdiction, Edwards does not bind, and an exercise of discretion in one case would not govern the outcome in another, even if that case is similar. In any event, all three of these cases share an element that Edwards lacked: each requires evidence of Lataillade's knowledge and receipt of a valid order of protection issued in favor of the complainant. The through line is Lataillade's purported violation of multiple valid orders of protection. And while Lataillade is correct that one of those orders was issued by Family Court, that fact alone does not prevent consolidation that might otherwise be warranted.

Moreover, as the People observe, several appellate decisions have blessed consolidation of accusatory instruments that charge both underlying offenses and contempt arising out of a subsequent order of protection (see, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 234 AD3d 986, 987, 989 [2d Dept. 2025] [approving consolidation of attempted murder case and subsequent contempt case]; People [*4]v. Warren, 81 Misc 3d 138(A), 2024 NY Slip Op. 50016(U), at *1 [App. Term 1st Dept. 2024] ["Evidence relating to the acts of domestic violence charged in the first information, which resulted in the issuance of an order of protection, was relevant and admissible in the second, charging defendant with further acts of domestic violence and criminal contempt, to establish the basis for the issuance of the order of protection."]; People v. Tyran, 248 AD2d 1011, 1011 [4th Dept. 1998] [approving consolidation of underlying case with contempt charge arising from case]). Those decisions show that contempt charges may be joined, in certain circumstances, with the cases from which the alleged contempt arose—and, by extension, that the outcome in Edwards would not have been the only permissible exercise of that particular court's discretion.

Lataillade responds that consolidation would permit propensity evidence suggesting that she is a serial contemnor, in violation of the rule in People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901). Courts generally treat § 200.20 (2)(b) as a codification of that rule (see, e.g., People v. Morman, 145 AD3d 1435, 1437 [4th Dept. 2016]), so joinder under (2)(b) should not granted if the People cannot point to a non-propensity purpose, such as intent (see People v. Sin, __ NY3d __, 2025 NY Slip Op 03100, at *2-3 [May 22, 2025] [listing Molineux purposes]). Here, though, proving the shared intent or knowledge element would be a valid Molineux purpose, and Lataillade has not persuasively shown that the potential prejudice of consolidation outweighs the probative value of doing so. Any prejudice, moreover, could be addressed by an appropriate jury instruction from the trial court (see People v. Sumpter, 191 AD3d 1160, 1163-64 [3d Dept. 2021] [observing that any potential consolidation error arising from prejudice under § 200.20 (2)(c) was dissipated by appropriate jury instructions]).

Lataillade's Molineux-based objection to consolidation also would not directly resolve whether the offenses would otherwise be joinable under § 200.20 (2)(c) even if not joinable under 200.20 (2)(b) (but see People v. Mero, __ NY3d __, 2024 NY Slip Op 06385, at *8-10 [Dec. 19, 2024] [Rivera, J., dissenting] [discussing risks posed by lenient consolidation under § 200.20 (2)(c)]).

Lataillade also has not persuasively shown that consolidation is inappropriate because of the People's purported failure to either provide outstanding discovery for docket numbers CR-017491-24BX or CR-017837-24BX and certify compliance for docket number CR-006718-25BX. Rather, if she is successful in securing dismissal at trial of docket number CR-017491-24BX (involving the Bronx Family Court order of protection), the subsequent diminishment would inure to her benefit.

Accordingly, consolidation is appropriate because the offenses are joinable under subsection (2) (b), and would also be appropriate as an exercise of discretion under subsection (2) (c) even if the charges were not joinable under subsection (2) (b) (see People v. Rodney, 79 AD3d 1363, 1363—64 [3d Dept. 2010] [approving joinder under (2) (c) to the extent that (2) (b) did not apply]). Since the charges are joinable, the matters also should be consolidated for trial under subsection (4) as an exercise of discretion. To the extent that any offenses would not be joinable at all, they should be consolidated for trial under § 200.20 (4). The People's request for consolidation is therefore GRANTED.

A. The Parties' Arguments

Lataillade contends that the People's October 8 CoC did not stop their speedy trial time because missing discovery rendered illusory the People's CoC and declaration of readiness (affirmation in support at 2). This argument is premised in part on her contention that at the March 17 appearance, Judge Bondy deemed the CoC valid after 249 days of chargeable time had already accrued, and the People were directed to disclose activity logs and body worn camera ("BWC") for Police Officer ("Officer") Ramirez but failed to do so; email correspondence between the parties allegedly reveals that the People failed to exercise due diligence by promptly requesting outstanding disclosure from their discovery liaison in response to Judge Bondy's directive (affirmation in support at 3).

Lataillade also argues that the prosecution's motion to consolidate is baseless and, as such, the time pending consideration by this Court should not be excludable (affirmation in support at 8). Lastly, she raises a facial insufficiency argument, asserting that the criminal possession of a weapon charge is facially insufficient because the glass jar Lataillade purportedly threw at the complainant could not be deemed a dangerous instrument (affirmation in support at 8-9).

The People respond that because Judge Bondy validated their CoC, the discovery that he ordered to be provided is irrelevant to their speedy trial readiness. Although addressed in their motion to consolidate, the People reiterate that their decision to move for joinder of Lataillade's dockets was not influenced by the discovery order (mem. in opposition at 21). With respect to facial insufficiency, they argue that point to specific allegations from the complainant that Lataillade threw a glass jar which struck the complainant on the leg (affirmation in opposition at 22).

Lataillade's reply brief reiterates her prior arguments and maintains that Judge Bondy directed the People to provide outstanding activity logs and BWC footage for Officer Ramirez (affirmation in support at 8-9).

Lataillade contends that the People were directed to disclose underlying materials related to IAB log # 23-6404 for Officer Nunez but have failed to do so (affirmation in support at 6). Lataillade further argues that the relevant materials were discoverable given the Second Department's April 2025 holding in People v Coley, 2025 NY Slip Op 01945 [2d Dept 2025], which undermined the court's earlier, March decision that they were not.

The People respond that underlying attachments to IAB logs are not automatically discoverable and submit that at the March 17, 2025, conference, the court acknowledged that the People had not disclosed Officer Nunez's IAB log because they were "operating under the belief that attachments to those logs were not automatically discoverable" (opposition at 19). Although the People concede that the prosecution was directed to disclose the IAB underlying materials, they detail their efforts to comply with the court's order, including having to wait for a transcript of the [*5]compliance conference to facilitate their request for the outstanding materials (opposition at 19 citing tr at 8, lines 8-9). Thus, although they have yet to receive these materials, the People contend they nonetheless exercised due diligence to comply with the court's directive (affirmation in opposition at 19-20).

In reply, Lataillade maintains that the People failed to request the outstanding underlying IAB materials until approximately three weeks after the compliance conference (reply affirmation in support at ¶ 8). A single request on March 18, 2025, to the 43rd Precinct for the outstanding materials does not establish due diligence (reply affirmation in support at ¶ 7).

B. Analysis

A CoC is valid if it is the product of due diligence and good faith, a case-specific inquiry that assesses, among other things, the amount of discovery provided, efforts made to comply with discovery obligations, and the complexity of the case [People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211-13 [2023]). The People must also be actually ready for trial (see People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985]).

The March 17 transcript, which Lataillaide attaches to her motion papers, reveals that Judge Bondy validated the CoCs in both CR-017837-24BX and CR-017491-24BX: "the court deems the COC docket ending 837 valid and deems the COC valid on docket ending 491" (March 17, 2025 Tr. at 14—15). Moreover, a review of the transcript establishes that when the Court directed further Giglio disclosure, the Court was referring to docket number CR-017837-24BX, not CR-017491-24BX (see Tr. at 8-10).

Judge Bondy validated the CoC based in part on the People's reasonable belief that, under then-governing law, the pertinent Giglio material was not automatically discoverable. Assuming without deciding that Coley changed that understanding, Lataillade does not persuasively show why a subsequent change in the governing law would undermine Judge Bondy's holistic assessment of the People's good faith and diligence—which, significantly, would be up to Judge Bondy, not the undersigned, to reassess via a motion to reargue or renew.

Regardless, emails attached to the People's opposition demonstrate extensive efforts to obtain the relevant materials, delayed in part by NYPD policies pertaining to disclosure. Lataillaide has not otherwise shown how any delay in producing the logs amounted to chargeable post-readiness delay, especially as the clock otherwise stopped upon the filing of the People's consolidation motion (see People v. Carter, 91 NY2d 795, 799 [1998]).

Lataillade argues that the People's motion did not stop the clock because it was filed strategically and was frivolous. But as discussed above, it was not frivolous, and Lataillade does not cite any decisions standing for the proposition that strategic-but-meritorious motions do not stop the speedy trial clock. The cases she relies on do not appear to stand for that proposition. People v. Thomas involved an affirmation that was deemed to not actually be a pretrial motion [59 Misc 3d 64, 66 [App. Term 1st Dept. 2018]). And People v. Brown involved a withdrawn motion (207 AD2d 556, 557 [1st Dept. 1994]). Neither mentions "strategic" motions practice.

Lataillade also cites People v. Zayas for the principle that "[w]hen a pre-trial motion is filed, [*6]only the time the motion is under the court's consideration is excludable" (82 Misc 3d 1244(A), 2024 NY Slip Op. 50534(U), at *3 [N.Y.C Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2024]). But § 30.30 (4) (a) specifically excludes reasonable periods of delay resulting from both "pre-trial motions" and "the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court." In any event, and placed in its appropriate context, the statement from Zayas relates to a document filed by the People that was not actually a motion, and was thus never under "consideration" at all (see id. at *2—3).

Finally, while Lataillade suggests that the People's motion was spurious because they had previously asked for hearings to take place on two different dates, Judge Bondy denied that request. In any event, matters may be appropriate for consolidation despite having different witnesses with different schedules, so the People's stances are not inherently contradictory.

All the same, the People have not yet provided the log, despite being directed to do so. To the extent this could warrant a discovery sanction—especially if the log is not ultimately produced—the matter of a sanction or other remedy under CPL § 245.80 is referred to the trial court.

A. The Parties' Arguments

Lataillade asserts that the PL § 265.01 (2) count is insufficiently pleaded because the People have not proffered any allegations which allege that the glass jar Lataillade purportedly threw at her daughter could be deemed a dangerous instrument (affirmation in support at 8-9). The People respond that the instrument provides specific allegations from the complainant that Lataillade threw a glass jar which struck her daughter on the leg (affirmation in opposition at 22). Additionally, the People submit that whether the glass jar would constitute a dangerous weapon pursuant to PL § 265.01 (2) is a decision for the trier of fact where the facial sufficiency of a charge does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt (affirmation in opposition at 22-23). In reply, Lataillade points to the lack of case law to suggest that throwing an empty bottle at someone's leg without any injury suffices to violate the statute (affirmation in reply at 2).

B. Analysis

A count of a misdemeanor information is facially sufficient if supported by factual matter that, if accepted as true, would establish every element of the charged crime while also providing reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense (see People v. Ocasio, 28 NY3d 178, 180 [2016]). The standard is not demanding, in part because all allegations must be given a "fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v. Guaman, 22 NY3d 678, 681 [2014]), and be evaluated in the context of "common sense [and] the significance of the conduct alleged" (People v. Gonzalez, 184 Misc 2d 262, 264 [App. Term 1st Dept. 2000]).

The information alleged that Lataillade threw a glass jar at her daughter, hitting her in the leg. The corresponding count charged, PL § 265.01 (2), prohibits possession of (among other things) a "dangerous . . . instrument" with intent to use the same against another, and a "dangerous instrument" is defined as any object that could cause death or serious physical injury "under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used" (PL § 10.00[13]). [*7]Thus, even everyday items can become "dangerous instruments" if used or threatened to be used in a manner that can cause serious physical injury (see People v. Carter, 53 NY2d 113, 116 [1981]).

Here, the accusatory instrument both identifies the allegedly dangerous instrument while also setting out the circumstances in which the object was used or attempted to be used. And while the decision to charge only attempted assault in the third degree is a tacit admission by the People that no serious physical injury (or even physical injury) was actually caused, it is far from theoretical that a glass jar hurled with some force against another person could cause a serious physical injury. Thus, wisdom of charging this as a standalone weapons offense aside, a common-sense reading of the accusatory instrument supports the charge.

Lataillade's reliance on People v Knowles is unpersuasive. Knowles involved a box cutter that was recovered from the defendant after his arrest for an unrelated open-container violation. On post-trial weight-of-the-evidence review, the Appellate Division determined that the box cutter was not a "dangerous instrument" because there was no allegation that it was used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used (see Knowles, 178 AD3d 453, 454-55 [1st Dept 2019]). Knowles is not a decision about facial sufficiency, but even if it were, it is easily distinguishable because the glass jar here was "used" by Lataillade allegedly throwing it at her daughter.

In sum, under the lenient facial sufficiency standard, the count in question is facially sufficient.

In sum, the Court

GRANTS the People's motion to consolidate docket numbers CR-017491-24BX, CR-017837-24BX and CR-006718-25BX; and

DENIES Lataillade's motions to dismiss in their entirety; and

REFERS to the trial court, if necessary, any question regarding discovery sanctions arising from the late disclosure of the materials ordered by Judge Bondy.

This constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.