Pending before this Court is a motion to recuse, filed by Oneida County District Attorney Todd C. Carville, Esq., on behalf of the People of the State of New York, on June 25, 2025. The motion is comprised of a Notice of Motion, the Attorney Affirmation of District Attorney Carville, and People's Exhibits 1-5.

Although there is no pending accusatory instrument against Kaitlyn Conley, the motion asks this Court to recuse itself in the case of The People of the State of New York v Kaitlyn Conley and vacate its prior orders in that case, dating back to February 4, 2025. Pursuant to a briefing schedule set by this Court on June 26, 2025, counsel for Conley timely filed opposition [*2]papers on July 24, 2025. Defense counsel's opposition is comprised of the Attorney Affirmation of Melissa K. Swartz, Esq. and J. David Hammond, Esq., Exhibits A-Q, and the Memorandum of Law in Opposition of Attorneys Swartz and Hammond. District Attorney Carville timely filed a Reply Affirmation on July 31, 2025.

This Court heard oral argument from the parties on August 7, 2025, at which time this Court reserved decision. This Court has carefully reviewed and considered the affirmations, memoranda, and exhibits provided by the parties. Additionally, this Court has conducted an exhaustive review of the case law governing recusal, including not only the cases cited by counsel, but also other applicable cases and statutes, as well as the Code of Judicial Conduct. After this thorough review and after searching my conscience, I have absolutely no reservation whatsoever that I have been and can continue to be fair and impartial in this case.

There are no allegations requiring my mandatory recusal in this case, so the question of whether I should recuse myself lies within my discretion (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]). The timing of this motion, which is premised upon information not brought to this Court's attention until six months after the occurrence of the alleged events upon which the motion is based, and which was not filed until after this Court issued rulings adverse to the District Attorney, is, in this Court's view, highly suspicious. The District Attorney's motion, which is premised upon untrue allegations, smacks of desperation and appears to constitute judge shopping. The Supporting Depositions the District Attorney offers to support his allegation that I made comments indicating a bias in favor of Conley are factually inaccurate and professionally irresponsible. Moreover, Kevin Revere and Scott McNamara—the deponents who offer these Supporting Depositions—each may have their own motives for desiring to further the District Attorney's agenda in this case. Such motivations significantly, if not entirely, erode the credibility of those deponents in the eyes of this Court. Furthermore, this Court is in a unique position to know these allegations are untrue. The District Attorney's attacks on this Court's demeanor and method of questioning are both stale and meritless. Instead, such conduct was simply a matter of this Court—being fully prepared by having researched and read the law—engaging in an active and productive oral argument, as it often does. Likewise, the District Attorney's claim that this Court's rulings have been infected by bias fails; each of this Court's rulings in this case have been legally justified and, in several instances, required. For these reasons, among others, which are discussed in more detail below, the District Attorney's motion for recusal is denied in its entirety.

To allow this Court to properly address the myriad of allegations by District Attorney Carville in demanding my recusal, it is incumbent upon this Court to examine every facet of this case since I was assigned to handle it on February 3, 2025. An outline of the instant Decision and Order is provided below.

A. Prior Prosecution and Appellate Reversal 5

B. Remand and Assignment of the Case to This Court 6

C. Preparation for February 4, 2025 Appearance 6

D. February 4, 2025 Oral Argument 9

E. The District Attorney Announces His Decision to Re-Present the Case to the Grand Jury 12

F. Events Preceding the Oneida County Sheriff's Office's Motion to Unseal 12

G. Oneida County Sheriff's Office's Motion to Unseal Records 13

H. June 10, 2025 Oral Argument on Motion to Unseal 16

I. June 12, 2025 Order of This Court 24

J. Defense Counsel's Application to Lift Gag Order 25

A. Oral Argument on the Recusal Motion 26

B. Applicable Law on Recusal 29

A. This Court's Ethical Obligations and Unblemished Ethical Record 33

B. There is No Case From Which This Court Can Recuse 34

C. This Court's Decisions Have Been Legally Justified, Not the Result of Any Bias or Prejudice 35

1. Decision to Release Conley from Custody 36

2. This Court's Initial Decision to Seal Records on February 4, 2025 38

3. This Court's Decision to Deny the Unsealing Application on June 10, 2025 41

4. June 12, 2025 Order Requiring District Attorney to Refrain From Using Sealed Evidence 44

5. Dissatisfaction With This Court's Decisions is Not an Adequate Basis for Recusal 45

D. This Court's Conduct While Presiding Over This Case Has Been Respectful and Appropriate 46

E. The Alleged Statements Attributed to This Court By the District Attorney's Deponents Do Not Warrant Recusal 50

1. This Court's Response to These Allegations 53

2. The Deponents Are Each Motivated to Assist the District Attorney's Office in this Case 57

3. The Timing of the Motion and Supporting Depositions Provide Grounds for Denying the Motion 58

F. The Cases Cited by the District Attorney Are Distinguishable 60

G. The District Attorney's Other Alleged Bases for Recusal Lack Merit 62

1. This Court's Assignment Was Proper 62

2. This Court Correctly Ordered that Conley's Restraints Be Removed 63

3. This Court Has No Interest in Controlling the Outcome of this Case 64

H. The District Attorney's Office Has Failed to Demonstrate "Actual Bias" 65

I. The District Attorney's Motion is a Pretext for "Judge Shopping" 66

J. The District Attorney's Own Errors Cannot Become Grounds for Recusal 67

K Recusal is Not Warranted Where This Court Has Been and Will Continue to Be Fair and Impartial 70

On November 6, 2017, an Oneida County jury convicted Conley of manslaughter in the first degree, a lesser-included offense under Count 1 of the Indictment, which had charged [*3]murder in the second degree. On January 11, 2018, Conley was sentenced in Oneida County Court (Hon. Michael L. Dwyer, J.) to 23 years of incarceration. On Conley's direct appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed the conviction and sentence (see People v Conley, 192 AD3d 1616 [4th Dept 2021]).

Conley thereafter brought a motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 seeking to vacate her conviction. In an order issued February 23, 2024, Oneida County Court (Dwyer, J.) denied that motion. Conley appealed that order to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, which heard oral argument on the morning of December 11, 2024. In a Memorandum and Order issued January 31, 2025, the Appellate Division reversed the denial of Conley's CPL 440.10 motion, vacated Conley's conviction, and dismissed Count 1 of the Indictment "without prejudice to the People to re-present any appropriate charge with respect to such dismissed count to another grand jury" (People v Conley, 234 AD3d 1363 [4th Dept 2025]). The same day, the Appellate Division sent a letter to Conley's counsel, Melissa Swartz, Esq., that included the following directive: "If the indictment is dismissed, prepare an order upon remittitur for the trial court (see CPL 470.45) and move to seal defendant's records (see CPL 160.50)."

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department issued its decision at 3:00 PM on Friday, January 31, 2025. On Sunday, February 2, 2025, Attorney Swartz faxed and mailed a letter to Oneida County Court requesting, pursuant to CPL 470.45, "that Conley be transported to Oneida County Court to 'execute the direction of the appellate court.'" The letter added that Attorney Swartz and District Attorney Carville were aware that both Oneida County Court Judges had conflicts that prevented them from presiding over this case. Accordingly, Attorney Swartz copied Hon. Deborah Karalunas, the Fifth Judicial District Administrative Judge, on her letter "in the hopes of having another judge expeditiously assigned to this matter."

On Monday, February 3, 2025, in response to Attorney Swartz's letter, District Administrative Judge Karalunas signed an Order assigning the case to this Court. Upon being assigned to this case, this Court notified the parties that it would have Conley produced for an appearance in Oneida County the next day, February 4, 2025. This Court played no role in the decision regarding which judge should be assigned the Conley matter.

Upon being assigned on February 3, 2025, my Principal Law Clerk and I immediately began researching the legal issues surrounding how the dismissal of Conley's indictment would impact her custody status. This research led to CPL 470.45, which provides that this Court must "execute the direction of the appellate court" and that its options, "depending upon the nature of such direction," were to "discharge the defendant from custody, exonerate h[er] bail or issue a securing order." This Court's research also revealed that under these circumstances, in which no criminal charges were pending against the defendant and the Appellate Division had not directed the issuance of a securing order, it could not order that a defendant be held in custody. Crucially, this Court also located the following language from the Court of Appeals in a case interpreting CPL 470.45: "once a defendant's conviction has been reversed and the indictment dismissed the appropriate remedy is discharge from custody; there is then no basis for further detention" (Licitra v Coughlin, 61 NY2d 450, 452 [1984]).

Armed with this research, and consistent with this Court's usual practice, my Principal [*4]Law Clerk drafted a proposed "Order of Release from Custody." My Principal Law Clerk emailed this proposed order to District Attorney Carville and Attorney Swartz on February 3, 2025 at 12:54 PM. The email asked both attorneys to advise of any recommended changes by 3:00 PM that day. At 5:52 PM on February 3, 2025, District Attorney Carville, advising that he had been away from his desk and had just received my Principal Law Clerk's email, responded: "I was under the impression that the People would have an opportunity to be heard tomorrow regarding a request that defendant be committed to the custody of the sheriff pending resubmission of the case to the grand jury and the grand jury's disposition thereof pursuant to CPL § 470.45."

At 6:25 PM, my Principal Law Clerk replied:

"This is merely a proposed order, and the Court will allow you to make any legal arguments you care to make during tomorrow's proceeding. You are also welcome to file any memoranda of law you may deem appropriate, if you wish.

The direction from the appellate court is that the conviction is vacated and the indictment dismissed without prejudice to the People re-presenting the case to another grand jury. We drafted a proposed release order for the parties' consideration because we thought release from custody would be the natural result of the conviction having been vacated and the indictment dismissed. Certainly, if there is contrary authority you can provide on that issue, the Court will consider that authority.

The same goes for Ms. Swartz; she is welcome to provide whatever arguments and law she deems appropriate during tomorrow's appearance, as well."

The next morning, Tuesday, February 4, 2025, at 8:19 AM, approximately three hours before the scheduled court appearance, Attorney Swartz emailed this Court, providing a copy of the Appellate Division's January 31, 2025 letter and requesting "that provisions be added to the proposed Order that comply with Penal Law 60.35 (4) and CPL 160.50." This Court reviewed the Appellate Division's letter, Attorney Swartz's request, and the applicable statutes. At 9:54 AM, this Court's Principal Law Clerk replied via email to advise the attorneys that this Court would "add pertinent language to the proposed order and provide copies of the updated proposed order to both attorneys" in court later that day.

This Court researched CPL 160.50 prior to editing the proposed order and concluded that the prior criminal action had been terminated in favor of Conley within the meaning of CPL 160.50 (3). As a result, sealing was automatic under CPL 160.50 (1) in the absence of a showing that the interest of justice required otherwise. Despite including sealing language in the updated proposed order, this Court, consistent with its usual practice, fully intended to—and in fact did—allow the attorneys to make any arguments they wished regarding the propriety of including sealing language in that proposed order (including any argument that sealing was not in the interest of justice).

At 10:39 AM on February 4, 2025, District Attorney Carville emailed this Court and Attorney Swartz to provide four cases which solely addressed the issue of this Court's "authority to fix bail or commit the defendant to the custody of the sheriff pending resubmission of the case to the grand jury." Despite sending these cases more than two hours after Attorney Swartz requested sealing pursuant to CPL 160.50, District Attorney Carville's email did not address or otherwise respond to Attorney Swartz's request for sealing. In preparation for oral argument, this Court and its Principal Law Clerk promptly read all four cases provided by District Attorney [*5]Carville and concluded that all four were distinguishable from the circumstances of this case.^[FN1]

At the February 4, 2025 appearance, a transcript of which is attached hereto as Appendix A, the District Attorney's Office was represented by District Attorney Carville and Assistant District Attorney Nicholas Fletcher. Conley was produced from Bedford Hills Correctional Facility and was present with attorneys Melissa Swartz, Esq. and Stefano Cambareri, Esq. This Court began by noting it had been assigned to the case by Judge Karalunas on February 3, 2025. This Court also noted that per the direction of the Appellate Division, the case "was remitted to the trial court pursuant to CPL section 470.45, and there was to be a motion to seal the defendant's records pursuant to CPL 160.50." Following those introductory comments, this Court invited arguments from both parties.

District Attorney Carville argued why he believed this Court could hold Conley in custody pursuant to CPL 210.45 (9), pending resubmission of the case to the Grand Jury. This Court, having already carefully researched the issue and read the cases relied upon by District Attorney Carville, engaged in a back-and-forth discussion with him about whether, under these circumstances, this Court in fact had any discretion to keep Conley in custody. District Attorney Carville repeatedly referenced the cases he had provided to this Court in advance of oral argument, and this Court repeatedly reminded District Attorney Carville that in those cases, unlike in this case, the Appellate Division orders at issue (from the First and Second Departments) had directly mandated the trial courts to issue securing orders upon remand. The District Attorney conceded that as of that date, there were no charges or accusatory instruments pending against Conley, and that nothing had prevented his office from filing a felony complaint against Conley prior to the February 4, 2025 court appearance. This Court cited to Licitra, supra, and gave the District Attorney an opportunity to explain how it could hold Conley in custody absent a directive to that effect from the Appellate Division (as in the cases cited by the District Attorney) or the filing of a new accusatory instrument. The entirety of District Attorney Carville's argument focused on keeping Conley in custody. District Attorney Carville never addressed the sealing issue, despite this Court having identified that as one of the issues this Court would ultimately determine.

This Court also heard from Attorney Swartz on behalf of Conley, who argued that this Court had no authority to keep Conley in custody because there was no accusatory instrument pending against her. Attorney Swartz concurred with this Court's view that the cases cited by the District Attorney were distinguishable, noting that the Appellate Division, Fourth Department had not issued any directive in this case regarding a securing order.

At the conclusion of the February 4, 2025 appearance, this Court—(1) relying on Licitra; (2) noting the inapposite nature of the cases cited by the District Attorney; (3) noting the absence of a directive from the Appellate Division, Fourth Department requiring a securing order; and (4) considering the fact that no criminal charges were pending against Conley—ordered Conley's [*6]release from custody.

Regarding defense counsel's request for sealing, this Court stated:

"Finally, pursuant to CPL 160.50, subsection 1, with this matter having been terminated in favor of Ms. Conley, the court is ordering the sealing of the record in this case, which the court finds to be consistent with the interest of justice."

This Court provided both attorneys with "a proposed order that includes these directives," asking if the attorneys had any objections "to the form of this order" other than the arguments they had already made. Attorney Swartz did not object and District Attorney Carville replied: "No objection from the People, Your Honor."

This Court, having heard no objection to the proposed order during oral argument, signed that Order. Neither party, prior to this Court signing the Order on February 4, 2025, offered any argument for why sealing under CPL 160.50 (1) would not be in the interest of justice. The sealing paragraphs of the February 4, 2025 Order provided:

"ORDERED, that because the January 31, 2025 Memorandum and Order of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed the indictment against defendant and vacated her judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10, thus terminating the criminal action against defendant in her favor within the meaning of CPL 160.50 (3), and because the Court has determined that the interest of justice do not require otherwise, the record of this action shall be sealed pursuant to CPL 160.50 (1), and the Clerk of the Court shall immediately notify the Commissioner of the Department of Criminal Justice Services and the Oneida County Sheriff's Office of such sealing and the fact that this action has been terminated in favor of the defendant; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court, the Oneida County Sheriff's Office, any other police department or law enforcement agency that had involvement with this case, and the Department of Criminal Justice Services shall comply with the sealing requirements outlined in CPL 160.50 (1) (a)-(e)."

Following the Appellate Division's vacatur of Conley's conviction and dismissal of her prior indictment, District Attorney Carville advised local media outlets on February 5, 2025 that his office needed to review the case in light of the appellate ruling before determining whether it would re-present the case to a new Grand Jury. Ultimately, on April 17, 2025, the District Attorney's Office issued a press release indicating its intention to re-present the case:

"Since receiving the Fourth Department Appellate Division's decision at the end of January, the Oneida County District Attorney's Office has, comprehensively and to a great extent, reviewed and reevaluated the evidence regarding the investigation into the death of Mary Yoder. In so doing, it is the decision of the District Attorney's Office to present that evidence before an Oneida County Grand Jury to determine what, if any, charges would be appropriate. Until the Grand Jury has taken action, the Office of the District Attorney cannot ethically provide any further comment."

Between May 27, 2025 and May 28, 2025, several developments transpired in this case that led to communications between the District Attorney's Office, Attorney Swartz, the Chief Clerk of Oneida County Combined Courts, and this Court. These events immediately preceded the Oneida County Sheriff's Office ("OCSO") filing an application to unseal the records in this case, an application that is discussed below. This Court has sealed the particulars of these developments and communications. Specifically, this Court has redacted references to these developments, including information on the status of the grand jury presentation, in the transcript of the June 10, 2025 appearance. That appearance included a closed, in camera session, the transcript of which remains sealed. Should this Decision and Order be appealed, unredacted transcripts should be provided to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department for their consideration.

Thereafter, on May 28, 2025, OCSO, represented by then-Oneida County Attorney Amanda Cortese-Kolasz, Esq., filed an ex parte application with this Court, seeking to unseal the records from Conley's prior prosecution pursuant to CPL 160.50 (1) (d) (ii). This application was supported by a sworn affidavit from Lt. Richard Paul of OCSO, who averred that since the appellate ruling, OCSO had "recommenced its investigation into the death of Mary Yoder." Lt. Paul stated that OCSO needed "access to all official records and papers . . . in order to continue its extensive investigation into the death of Mary Yoder" and to "take critical next steps in the investigation process" (emphasis added).

Although this application was properly filed ex parte, Attorney Swartz learned of the application from the District Attorney's Office and filed a letter with this Court on May 29, 2025 opposing OCSO's application. She indicated that OCSO's application was prompted by her having reminded the District Attorney's Office, a few days prior, that Conley's case records remained sealed. She accused OCSO of bringing the application on behalf of the District Attorney's Office, an approach she argued was an "end-run" method strictly prohibited under CPL 160.50 (1) (d) (ii) and the case law interpreting that statute.

Based upon Attorney Swartz's letter, this Court realized that the ex parte application had been disclosed to the defense. As a result, this Court deemed it appropriate to allow all potentially affected parties—including the District Attorney, defense counsel, and the County Attorney—to be heard on OCSO's application. This Court scheduled the application for oral argument on June 10, 2025 and directed by letter-form Order that any party wishing to be heard was to file papers or supplemental papers no later than noon on June 5, 2025, on notice to all counsel.

On June 5, 2025, Attorneys Swartz and Hammond, on behalf of Conley, timely filed an affirmation and memorandum of law in opposition to OCSO's unsealing application. Also on June 5, 2025, County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz timely filed a supplemental memorandum of law in further support of OCSO's unsealing application. The District Attorney's Office, apparently [*7]satisfied to allow the County Attorney to represent its position, declined to file any papers in connection with the unsealing application prior to the June 5, 2025 deadline, despite this Court having given that office the opportunity to do so.

After reviewing the County Attorney's supplemental memorandum of law on June 5, 2025, Attorney Swartz wrote to this Court to advise of errors she observed in both the County Attorney's initial and supplemental memoranda of law, which included fictitious cases as well as cases and statutes that were cited for propositions they did not support. This Court also independently reviewed the County Attorney's memoranda of law, as is its practice. Based upon that review, this Court found that County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz had cited six (6) cases that did not exist, quoted two (2) statutes that did not contain such quotes, quoted three (3) cases that did not contain such quotes, cited two (2) statutes that did not represent the principles for which they were cited, and cited two (2) cases that did not represent the principles for which they were cited. Accordingly, this Court issued an Order dated June 6, 2025 striking County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz's memoranda of law and directing that she not file any further papers in connection with OCSO's pending application. Despite this Order, this Court permitted County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz to fully participate in oral argument and the questioning of witnesses on June 10, 2025.

While OCSO's unsealing application was pending, this Court determined that the circumstances raised in the application and defense counsel's opposition thereto required this Court to inquire: (1) whether sealed evidence already had been presented to the Oneida County Grand Jury in violation of the February 4, 2025 Order; and (2) whether OCSO's claim that it was still engaged in an "ongoing" investigation into the death of Mary Yoder was factually accurate. For those purposes, this Court issued an Order on June 4, 2025, pursuant to CPL 190.25 (4) (a), directing that the District Attorney's Office deliver to this Court, for in camera review, all documents related to any recent Grand Jury presentation regarding the death of Mary Yoder, as well as any emails or other correspondence between the District Attorney's Office and OCSO from February 4, 2025 onward regarding Conley and/or the investigation into the death of Mary Yoder. This Court directed that the District Attorney's Office provide such materials by Monday, June 9, 2025. After an objection by the District Attorney's Office to which this Court responded by providing statutory authority for its request, the District Attorney timely complied, allowing this Court to conduct the in camera review prior to the June 10, 2025 oral argument.

At 10:05 PM on June 9, 2025, 13 hours prior to the scheduled argument on June 10, 2025, ADA Fletcher, on behalf of the District Attorney's Office, emailed this Court a memorandum of law in support of OCSO's application to unseal. ADA Fletcher acknowledged that his papers were not timely but argued that the striking of the County Attorney's memoranda of law constituted a change in circumstances that justified this Court considering its late filing.

Oral argument on OCSO's motion to unseal was held on June 10, 2025. County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz appeared on behalf of OCSO; District Attorney Carville, along with ADAs Nicholas Fletcher, Sarah DeMellier, and Michael LaBella, appeared on behalf of the District Attorney's Office; and Conley appeared with Attorneys Melissa Swartz and J. David Hammond. At the start of the appearance, this Court ordered that because the parties would be discussing "sealed evidence and secret Grand Jury proceedings," the courtroom was closed and the arguments and rulings were to remain confidential.

Prior to hearing testimony and arguments, this Court made some preliminary statements regarding the status of the case. First, this Court reiterated that the sealing provisions in its February 4, 2025 Order had been entered without opposition by the District Attorney—written, verbal, or otherwise. Second, this Court identified what it believed to be the two questions raised by OCSO's unsealing application: (1) whether OCSO had established its need for "access to all official records and papers in order to continue" its alleged "extensive ongoing investigation into the death of Mary Yoder"; and (2) whether the "District Attorney's Office, during its recent presentation of this case to the Grand Jury," violated the sealing provisions of the February 4, 2025 Order. Third, this Court addressed why it had converted the ex parte application to an application on notice. Finally, this Court explained that it would not be considering the late submission of ADA Fletcher in support of OCSO's application;^[FN2] despite this preliminary ruling, however, this Court did permit the District Attorney's Office to make their legal arguments on the record.

After making these statements, this Court placed Lt. Richard Paul, the affiant who had offered an affidavit in support of OCSO's application, under oath and questioned him. This Court questioned Lt. Paul, then permitted counsel to do so. Lt. Paul's testimony, as relevant, revealed the following: (1) ADA Fletcher contacted him about providing an affidavit to support an unsealing application, which prompted Lt. Paul and the County Attorney to communicate with one another about the application; (2) the "extensive" ongoing investigation into the death of Mary Yoder that Lt. Paul referenced in his affidavit merely meant turning the case over to the District Attorney's Office and the District Attorney's Office then re-presenting the case to the Grand Jury; (3) at the time Lt. Paul provided his affidavit, he was aware that the District Attorney's Office had already begun its Grand Jury presentation regarding Mary Yoder's death; (4) it was not until Lt. Paul was contacted by ADA Fletcher that he learned that OCSO and the District Attorney's Office may have used sealed evidence; and (5) no OCSO Deputy or Investigator, including Lt. Paul, was assigned to investigate Conley's case.^[FN3]

This Court then gave all parties an opportunity to make their arguments. County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz argued that once OCSO became aware of the sealing order and the need to unseal records, it promptly brought the application to unseal. Importantly, County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz confirmed Lt. Paul's testimony that this application first arose out of [*8]conversations between ADA Fletcher and Lt. Paul, and that she then spoke with Lt. Paul after those conversations. In other words, County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz acknowledged that the idea for this application came from the District Attorney's Office, and that she and Lt. Paul coordinated to bring the application because the District Attorney's Office asked them to do so.

District Attorney Carville confirmed that that his office first realized they had made "an error" in failing to get Conley's evidence unsealed when Attorney Swartz brought that issue to their attention. At that point, District Attorney Carville contends, his office ceased further Grand Jury presentation pending resolution of the application to unseal.^[FN4] When asked by this Court about his failure to object to sealing on February 4, 2025, the District Attorney attempted to blame this Court, arguing that this Court was under its own obligation to deny the defense's request to seal Conley's records. He also blamed defense counsel for bringing the request and this Court for considering it on short notice, claiming he "was ambushed by the request"^[FN5] and that Attorney Swartz made "a shrewd move" to set his office up for this exact mistake. Ultimately, District Attorney Carville admitted that at the time he failed to object, he "did not believe [CPL 160.50] carried over to underlying evidence." He also admitted that on February 4, 2025, he was focused upon keeping Conley incarcerated and therefore was not prepared to [*9]address the sealing issue.

In short, District Attorney Carville admitted that he did not consider, on February 4, 2025, the impact that him agreeing to sealing under CPL 160.50 would have on his case, because supposedly, he was preoccupied with arguing that Conley should remain incarcerated. Rather than accepting responsibility for these mistakes, however, District Attorney Carville, on June 10, 2025, blamed the mistake on: (1) the late timing of the request; (2) defense counsel "shrewdly" making a request the Appellate Division told her to make; and (3) this Court's failure to itself interpose a basis for staying sealing where he had failed to raise any such basis himself.^[FN6]

District Attorney Carville contended that a grand jury is "investigative" in nature and that in this case, the Oneida County Grand Jury was conducting an "ongoing investigation." The claim of such an "ongoing investigation," however, was debunked by Lt. Paul's testimony, this Court's in camera review, and the sealed portion of the argument that occurred on June 10, 2025, which collectively revealed to this Court that "no new or meaningfully different investigation had been conducted by [OCSO] since Miss Conley's release from custody in February of 2025."

In opposition to the application to unseal, Attorney Swartz explained that she had requested sealing on February 4, 2025, on notice to the People, because the Appellate Division's decision "automatically trigger[ed] 160.50." She argued that CPL 160.50 (1) is straightforward and that the District Attorney's Office does not "get a pass" for failing to follow that statute simply because "it's inconvenient." Attorney Swartz reiterated that the District Attorney's Office could have opposed unsealing in the interest of justice on February 4, 2025 but failed to do so, noting that under CPL 160.50, that was the District Attorney's only opportunity to prevent sealing. Attorney Swartz also challenged OCSO's claim that it was engaged in any bona fide ongoing investigation into the death of Mary Yoder, noting that OCSO has no officers assigned to the case and that OCSO brought the unsealing application at the request of ADA Fletcher. She explained that under cases decided by the New York Court of Appeals, a prosecutor's office cannot bring an application to unseal, and that only law enforcement agencies are statutorily permitted to do so.

After hearing arguments from the parties, this Court cleared the courtroom of everyone except for District Attorney Carville, three ADAs, the court clerk, this Court's Principal Law Clerk, and the court reporter, in order to make a record of its in camera review of Grand Jury materials. It was based on this in camera review that this Court was able to ascertain the extent of the Grand Jury presentation, compare it to the two prior trial presentations in Conley's case, and come to doubt the veracity of OCSO's claim that there remained a bona fide, ongoing investigation into the death of Mary Yoder. Although this Court has carefully redacted the June 10, 2025 transcript to remove its in camera discussion and to remove other details about the Grand Jury that may violate CPL 190.25 (4) (a), an unredacted version of the June 10, 2025 transcript should be presented to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department for its own review, in the event this Decision and Order is appealed. Review of this information will further substantiate this Court's June 10, 2025 rulings and provide the full context for such rulings.

Following a recess, this Court issued a bench ruling denying OCSO's application to unseal. As the first basis for denying the application, this Court found that although the application to unseal was brought by OCSO, it was in fact an application brought on the District Attorney's behalf, which is prohibited under CPL 160.50 (1) (d) (ii) and the case law interpreting that statute. This conclusion, this Court explained, was supported by Lt. Paul's testimony that ADA Fletcher devised the idea for the unsealing application and contacted Lt. Paul to get an affidavit for that purpose. This conclusion also was supported by the timing of the application, which was brought after the District Attorney already had been re-presenting the case to the Grand Jury—a fact this Court considered "more consistent with a completed investigation than it is with an investigation that remains open and ongoing." This Court explained:

"Based upon these facts, the Court finds that the sheriff's office application to unseal was brought at the behest of the district attorney's office, and therefore, was not, in fact, an application by a law enforcement agency authorized under the Criminal Procedure Law 160.50 (1) (d) (ii). The Court of Appeals has made clear that a prosecutor's office cannot bring an unsealing application under CPL 160.50, and this Court believes that a prosecutor's office cannot get around this clear limitation by misstating that an application brought at its behest is, instead, being sought by a local police agency. As defense counsel aptly pointed out, the current application is an attempt by the DA's office to make an end run around what this specific statutory provision permits. This is a case like William T., in which a CPL 160.50 application has been made impermissibly invoked [sic] for prosecutorial purposes. Although the unsealing application here has been brought with the sheriff's name on it, the facts available to this Court show that the application, in fact, has been made at the district attorney's office's request and for the district attorney's office's benefit. Case law does not permit CPL 160.50 to be applied for prosecutorial purposes, as it has been here."

As a second basis for denying the unsealing application, this Court rejected the false assertion in Lt. Paul's affidavit that OCSO remained involved in an ongoing investigation into the death of Mary Yoder. On this issue, this Court noted that: (1) the Grand Jury presentation had already begun prior to OCSO bringing the application to unseal; and (2) Lt. Paul had confirmed that no law enforcement personnel at OCSO is assigned to investigate this case. This Court stated:

"the Court does not accept the factual premise of the sheriff's office application that it has shown that justice requires unsealing so it can continue an allegedly ongoing investigation. Based on the evidence before this Court, there is no such ongoing investigation. The investigation has been completed, as defense counsel argued, for years. Because there is no evidence of an ongoing investigation, the county attorney has failed to make its showing that justice requires unsealing pursuant to 160.50 (1) (d) (ii)."

In addition to denying the application to unseal on these two bases, this Court's in camera review led it to find that the District Attorney's Office had used substantial evidence that was sealed within the meaning of CPL 160.50 (1) during its recent Grand Jury re-presentation, under [*10]the standard defined by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Dondi (63 NY2d 331 [1984]).^[FN7] This Court concluded that the District Attorney's violation of the sealing provisions of this Court's February 4, 2025 Order was "unmistakable." On this topic, this Court emphasized the District Attorney's failure to take any action to prevent sealing in the first instance:

"The Court reiterates, on February 4th, 2025, the district attorney had a full and fair opportunity to oppose sealing under CPL 160.50 (1) but failed to do so. That opposition could have taken the form of a written motion, on notice to the defense; it could have also taken the form of an oral application to this Court on February 4th, 2025; or it could have taken the form of objecting to the proposed Order. . . . None of those things happened, though, so it was not the Court's job to protect the district attorney's office from the consequences of its own decisions and lack of objections. Alternatively, if the district attorney was concerned that a Sealing Order might negatively impact its ability to present the case to a Grand Jury, it could have asked the Court to clarify the reach of its Sealing Order at that point or for the Court to insert a carve-out in the sealing language to make it clear that the sealing language was not to be applied in a manner that would prevent it from future presentment to the Grand Jury. However, that also did not occur. Today, District Attorney Carville argued that the Court should have foreseen this issue and either denied sealing sua sponte or brought it to the part[ies'] attention. He further argues that he simply did not contemplate that sealing under CPL 160.50 would work to seal evidence he needed to present the case to the Grand Jury.

First, it is not this Court's job to raise objections on behalf of the district attorney that the district attorney himself failed to contemplate. What the Court had before it was a request by the defense for sealing and a lack of objection from the district attorney to that sealing request. . . ; second, the district attorney's overlooking of what records are, in fact, covered by CPL 160.50, his failure to contemplate that agreeing to sealing on February 4th, 2025, might later hinder his Grand Jury presentation is not something from which this Court is obliged to rescue him. Just as ignorance of the law is no excuse for a criminal defendant, it is no excuse for the district attorney's office."

This Court directed Attorney Swartz to draft a proposed order, on notice to both the County Attorney and District Attorney, to memorialize this Court's rulings. This Court also reminded the parties that what occurred in court that day would remain confidential for the time being to allow all parties "to digest" this Court's rulings and determine next steps. This Court stated, however, that this confidentiality was temporary in nature and that it would consider lifting its "gag order" upon an application by any party to the case.

On June 11, 2025, Attorney Swartz emailed this Court and opposing counsel with a [*11]proposed order related to this Court's June 10, 2025 bench decision. This Court's Principal Law Clerk advised via email that the County Attorney and District Attorney were to provide "any objections or proposed changes" by the end of the day on June 12, 2025. District Attorney Carville and County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz each provided their respective proposed changes to the proposed order on June 11, 2025, and District Attorney Carville also joined in the requested changes submitted by the County Attorney.

This Court carefully considered the proposed order from Attorney Swartz and the proposed changes offered by both the District Attorney and County Attorney. On June 12, 2025, this Court issued a signed Order. This Order denied OCSO's application to unseal, directed that the materials ordered sealed on February 4, 2025 would remain sealed until further court order, determined that the District Attorney's Office had violated CPL 160.50 and this Court's February 4, 2025 Order, and directed the District Attorney's Office to "immediately cease and desist from any further use, dissemination, or presentation of sealed materials related to this matter, unless and until any subsequent Order provides otherwise." Defense counsel filed a notice of entry on this Order on June 12, 2025. To date, the District Attorney's Office has not appealed from this Order, and the time to do so has long since expired.

On June 18, 2025, this Court advised all involved attorneys that information about the June 10, 2025 proceeding apparently had been leaked to or received by outside sources, resulting in inquiries to this Court and its staff. The next day, June 19, 2025, Attorney Swartz brought an application seeking to "lift the gag order and remove confidentiality provisions from filings and proceedings filed in connection with [OCSO's] motion to unseal." This Court gave the District Attorney and County Attorney until June 25, 2025 to respond, and each timely did so. This Court made Attorney Swartz's application returnable, on submission, on June 27, 2025.

After a careful balancing of its obligations under CPL 190.25 (4), which governs the secrecy of Grand Jury proceedings, and CPL 160.50, which governs the sealing of criminal records, this Court issued a Decision and Order on June 30, 2025 which granted in part and denied in part Attorney Swartz's application to lift the gag order and related confidentiality directives. In that Decision and Order, this Court outlined which documents related to OCSO's unsealing application could be disclosed in full and which could be disclosed only in redacted form. For those documents that could be disclosed only in redacted form, the Decision and Order attached the redacted forms of such documents as appendices.

On June 25, 2025, the same day his office filed its papers in opposition to Attorney Swartz's application to lift the gag order, District Attorney Carville filed the instant motion for recusal of this Court under 22 NYCRR §§ 100.3 (E) (1) (a) (i)-(ii). The motion primarily relies upon Supporting Depositions from two witnesses, Kevin Revere and Scott McNamara, who allege that during a Holiday Party at Turning Stone Casino on December 11, 2024, I made statements indicating that I believe Conley to be innocent. Based upon these Supporting Depositions, the District Attorney accuses this Court of being biased in favor of Conley and of taking steps, because of such bias, to interfere with the District Attorney's prosecution of this case. In addition to requesting recusal, the District Attorney's motion asks this Court to "revert the case back to the state in which it inherited it" by vacating its prior orders, including the [*12]sealing provisions in its February 4, 2025 Order.

Attorneys Swartz and Hammond, on behalf of Conley, oppose the District Attorney's Office's motion, asserting that this Court's rulings have been legally justified and that this Court has neither treated the District Attorney with hostility nor favored the defense. They first argue that because "there is no pending criminal matter involving Kaitlyn Conley," there is no case from which this Court can recuse itself. Additionally, the defense contends that because the District Attorney's allegations in support of recusal were raised only after this Court issued rulings adverse to their position, the motion should be viewed with skepticism. Attorneys Swartz and Hammond accuse the District Attorney's Office of using this motion to "deflect from their own easily preventable failures" in this case, which they argue is indicative of the District Attorney's Office's "fixation on blame-shifting."

This Court heard oral argument on the District Attorney's motion to recuse on August 7, 2025. During that argument, counsel largely reiterated the arguments made in their papers, but this Court was able to clarify certain factual matters relevant to the resolution of this motion.

Upon questioning from this Court, District Attorney Carville acknowledged that he was present at the December 11, 2024 Holiday Party and, for the first time, admitted that he was seated at the same circular, ten-person table at which I was seated. He then admitted that despite being at the very same table as me during the party, he did not hear me make any statements whatsoever regarding Conley's guilt or innocence. In addition to conceding that he did not hear me comment on Conley's case, District Attorney Carville never explained in his motion papers how Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara had made him aware of what they claim I said about Conley's case. At oral argument, however, in response to questions from this Court, District Attorney Carville finally addressed this issue; he said that on the afternoon of June 10, 2025, mere hours after this Court denied OCSO's unsealing application, the following events transpired:

"I was invited to the opening of Murnane Field, and I was approached by Kevin Revere at Murnane Field, who asked me how my day was going. And I simply responded 'Not great.' He then replied 'I can't believe she's on this case.' And I said, 'What do you mean by that?' And then he informed me that you had made a statement to him at the party, the December 11th party, that you believed that Kaitlyn Conley was innocent."

In this Court's view, this description by District Attorney Carville of the alleged June 10, 2025 conversation he had with Mr. Revere is puzzling because the flow of that conversation makes little sense. District Attorney Carville saying his day had been "not great" is not a comment that naturally would have prompted Mr. Revere to immediately begin discussing this Court's involvement in Conley's case, unless that topic already had come up in the conversation. In other words, "I can't believe she's on the case" is a non sequitur to the comment that District Attorney Carville was having a bad day.

According to District Attorney Carville, Mr. Revere told him that Mr. McNamara had heard me make such alleged statements, as well:

"Mr. Revere stated Scott was there too, Scott heard the whole thing. So I reached out to Mr. McNamara that evening, and he verified that he had heard the same thing, and there was an argument between you and Kevin that he recalled. He actually stated that when he [*13]was — because he was away during [the] February 4th hearing, that he and his wife were watching TV in Florida and saw the news that you were on the case, and he remarked to himself that he couldn't believe that you were handling the case after what you had said at the party."

District Attorney Carville confirmed that even though Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara had known about these alleged statements since December 11, 2024 and throughout the time I have been presiding over Conley's case, they had not brought these allegations to his attention until six months later on June 10, 2025, within hours of this Court having denied OCSO's application to unseal records from Conley's prior prosecution. DA Carville confirmed that Mr. Revere is a former OCSO Deputy and that Mr. McNamara was the District Attorney whose office had prosecuted Conley's two prior trials.

Regarding this Court's February 4, 2025 rulings and conduct, District Attorney Carville admitted at oral argument that during a radio appearance on The Keeler Show on the morning of February 4, 2025, he had acknowledged that "generally," the outcome following an appellate reversal and dismissal of an indictment would be to "release" the defendant. He also agreed that during a radio appearance on Talk of the Town on February 5, 2025, he twice said he "respected" this Court's February 4, 2025 rulings, and did not make any comments regarding this Court having acted unfairly or in a hostile manner toward him on February 4, 2025.

Following these oral arguments and questions, this Court asked District Attorney Carville a few additional questions in camera. This in camera questioning related to this Court's efforts to assess the credibility of Kevin Revere. Specifically, this Court inquired into whether there has been any contact between the Oneida County District Attorney's Office and Mr. Revere regarding other matters being handled by that office. This Court has redacted the in camera portion of the August 7, 2025 transcript to prevent public disclosure of the matters discussed therein, but in the event of an appeal of this Decision and Order, an unredacted version of the August 7, 2025 transcript should be presented to the Appellate Division for its own in camera review. Only with the benefit of such information can this Court's view of Mr. Revere's credibility be fully understood. Following this in camera questioning, this Court heard argument from Attorney Swartz on behalf of Conley, as well as additional argument from District Attorney Carville.

"Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal" (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; accord People v Warren, 100 AD3d 1399, 1400 [4th Dept 2012]). This determination is "discretionary" and directed to "the personal conscience of the court" (Moreno, 70 NY2d at 405; see Shuman v Bower, 278 AD2d 860, 860 [4th Dept 2000]). If the moving party premises a recusal motion upon an appearance of impropriety or impartiality, that party must make a "showing that the court displayed actual bias" (People v Sides, 215 AD3d 1250, 1252 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 936 [2023]; see Matter of McLaughlin v McLaughlin, 104 AD3d 1315, 1316 [4th Dept 2013], rearg denied 112 AD3d 1385 [4th Dept 2013] [affirming denial of motion to recuse where the movant's claim of bias was "not supported by the record"]; People v Nenni, 269 AD2d 785, 786 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 801 [2000] ["Defendant failed to demonstrate that any alleged bias or prejudice on the part of the Judge unjustly affected the result of the case"]).

The discretion afforded to a judge faced with a recusal motion stems from the logic that "[t]he judge presiding over a case is in the best position to appreciate the implications of those matters alleged in a recusal motion" (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F 2d 1307, 1312 [2d Cir 1988], cert denied sub nom. Milken v Sec. Exch. Commn., 490 US 1102 [1989]). "In deciding whether to recuse himself [or herself], the trial judge must carefully weigh the policy of promoting public confidence in the judiciary against the possibility that those questioning his impartiality might be seeking to avoid the adverse consequences of his [or her] presiding over their case" (id.). "Litigants are entitled to an unbiased judge; not to a judge of their choosing" (id.). Accordingly, a "judge is as much obliged not to recuse himself [or herself] when it is not called for as he [or she] is obliged to when it is" (id.; see also Matter of Wilson v Brown, 162 AD3d 1054, 1056 [2d Dept 2018]; Trimarco v Data Treasury Corp., 146 AD3d 1004, 1008 [2d Dept 2017]; Silber v Silber, 84 AD3d 931, 932 [2d Dept 2011]).

Part 100 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge sets forth the rules governing judicial conduct. As relevant here, 22 NYCRR § 100.3 (E), which is entitled "Disqualification," requires a judge to "disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned" (22 NYCRR § 100.3 [E] [1]). That Rule then provides examples of situations in which a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including where "the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party" (22 NYCRR § 100.3 [E] [1] [a] [1]) or where "the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding" (22 NYCRR § 100.3 [E] [1] [a] [ii]).

When a party alleges bias under 22 NYCRR § 100.3 (E), such a claim must be "supported by the record," and the party must prove that the alleged bias led to a decision by the judge "'on some basis other than what [she] learned from [her] participation in the case'" (McLaughlin, 104 AD3d at 1316, quoting Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of Buffalo v Pisa, 55 AD2d 128, 136 [4th Dept 1976]). In other words, "even in the event actual bias does exist, that alone does not necessitate reversal, unless the record indicates that the [judge's] decision was based upon such bias and not upon an impartial consideration of the evidence" (Pisa, 55 AD2d at 136). "'[A] judge has an obligation not to recuse himself or herself, even if sued in connection with his or her duties, unless he or she is satisfied that he or she is unable to serve with complete impartiality, in fact or appearance'" (Wilson, 162 AD3d at 1056, quoting Trimarco, 146 AD3d at 1008).

Importantly, "[i]t is well settled that '[t]he fact that a judge issues a ruling that is not to a party's liking does not demonstrate either bias or misconduct'" (Tripi v Alabiso, 189 AD3d 2060, 2062 [4th Dept 2020], quoting Gonzalez v L'Oreal USA, Inc., 92 AD3d 1158, 1160 [3d Dept 2012], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 874 [2012]; accord Matter of Dale v Burns, 103 AD3d 1243, 1244 [4th Dept 2013], app dismissed 21 NY3d 968 [2013]).

Where "a party inexplicably withholds an allegation of bias until after the court adversely rules against it, denial of the recusal motion is generally warranted and the court's discretion in so ruling will not be disturbed" (Glatzer v Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 95 AD3d 707, 707 [1st Dept 2012]; accord Gravagna v Gravagna, 186 AD3d 1333, 1334 [2d Dept 2020], lv dismissed 36 NY3d 1084 [2021]). Similarly, a party's "claims of bias" will be "undermined" if the party continues to participate in the proceedings for a lengthy period after the alleged basis for recusal arose, "without complaint" (Glatzer, 95 AD3d at 707-708; see Fulton Mkt. Retail Fish Inc. v Todtman, Nachamie, Spizz & Johns, P.C., 158 AD3 502, 503 [1st Dept 2018]).

Regarding a court's comments and demeanor toward an attorney or litigant, recusal will [*14]be warranted only if the record shows that "the court was so vexed that it could not be impartial" (Fulton Mkt., 158 AD3 at 502) or that a court's comments, considered "alone or in the aggregate," were severe enough to cause his or her "impartiality to be reasonably questioned" (People v Greenberg, 114 AD3d 434, 435 [1st Dept 2014]). It is not enough to show that a court "was at times annoyed," particularly if such annoyance was prompted by an attorney's "disrespectful attitude" toward the court (Fulton Mkt., 158 AD3d at 502; see also Greenberg, 114 AD3d at 435 [impartiality not shown even though "the judge at times may have been irritated with defense counsel"]). The fact that judges need not be perfect in their tone toward litigants and counsel has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court:

"Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune" (Litecky v United States, 510 US 540, 555-556 [1994] [emphasis in original]).

Courts should exercise caution to ensure that recusal motions are not a pretext for engaging in "judge shopping" (see Quality Choice Healthcare, Inc. v County of Orange, 70 Misc 3d 223, 225 [Sup Ct, Orange County 2020] ["plaintiffs' application for recusal gives the appearance of judge shopping"]; Ash v Bd. of Mgrs. Of 155 Condominium, 23 Misc 3d 1103[A] [Sup Ct, NY County 2008] [courts should not allow litigants to "bait" a judge into recusing himself or herself, because that would allow litigants to engage in "unacceptable" judge shopping]; Ortiz v City of New York, 136 Misc 2d 500, 502 [Sup Ct, NY County 1987] ["It is untenable to require judges to recuse themselves whenever even an unsupported allegation of bias is made. One would be hard pressed to find a judge that would completely satisfy all litigants and such a system would undoubtedly promote the undesirable problem of judge shopping"]; People v Diaz, 130 Misc 2d 1024, 1030 [Suffolk County Ct 1986] ["While the prosecutor graciously suggests that these cases be transferred to any other Judge of this Court to 'insure the integrity of the judicial process,' it is no less judge shopping to improperly, and without legal basis therefor, seek to avoid one judge as it is to seek another"]). Notably, the Appellate Division, Third Department has recognized that "as a policy," even the "appearance of improper 'Judge-shopping'" should be avoided (People v Mackey, 175 AD2d 346, 348 [3d Dept 1991]).

I have served this community as a public servant since 1994. I began my legal public service career as First Assistant District Attorney for Oneida County, a position I held for seven years. In 2000, I was elected to Oneida County Family Court; I served in that role for five years, from January 2001 until January 2006. From January 2006 to the present, I have served as a Supreme Court Justice for the Fifth Judicial District. I am proud of my record of integrity and fairness over my roughly 25 years on the bench. Throughout that time, I have scrupulously followed all ethical rules governing my duties as an officer of the Court and a Judge. I am gratified by my unblemished ethical record over the course of my more than thirty-year legal [*15]career.

I am unfailingly vigilant regarding my ethical obligations as a Judge and to that end, I always have performed my judicial duties without bias or prejudice against or in favor of any person or litigant. Importantly, I have never publicly commented on, discussed, or given my opinion regarding any proceeding pending in any Court. I have searched my personal conscience regarding the allegations contained in the instant recusal motion and I now state, without any reservation, that I have been fair and impartial in each of my decisions and rulings in this matter. I also affirm, with certainty, that I never commented on Conley's case on December 11, 2024 or on any other occasion. I have absolutely no doubt that I can continue to preside in this matter, should it proceed, fairly and impartially, without bias or prejudice to either the District Attorney or Conley. Nor do I have any doubt that my prior decisions in this case have been legally warranted and have not been infected by any bias or partiality.

Preliminarily, this Court notes that there are no pending charges against Conley, and thus no current proceeding to which the District Attorney's recusal motion can be directed. This situation is analogous to that from Matter of Card v Siragusa (214 AD2d 1022 [4th Dept 1995], mtn to amend denied 1995 WL 581538 [4th Dept 1995]). In Card, the petitioner sought to have a Supreme Court Justice recuse himself in a guardianship case in which the Justice had declined to sign the order to show cause through which the petitioner sought to commence the case. In that situation, the Fourth Department explained: "we observe that there is no pending guardianship proceeding . . . . Therefore, there is no underlying proceeding to which the recusal relief requested may properly be directed" (id. at 1023). The same is true here, as there is no case to which this recusal motion can be directed. Nevertheless, in the interest of thoroughness, this Court will address each of the alleged bases for recusal proffered by District Attorney Carville.

District Attorney Carville contends that because this Court allegedly made statements on December 11, 2024 indicating a bias in favor of Conley, all of this Court's rulings since being assigned to the case necessarily have been infected by and tailored to serve that bias. His recusal motion takes particular issue with this Court's decision to include sealing language in its February 4, 2025 Order.

In opposition to this prong of the District Attorney's recusal motion, Attorneys Swartz and Hammond argue that this Court's rulings have been statutorily mandated rather than discretionary, meaning that such rulings could not have been impacted by bias. Regarding the decision to release Conley, defense counsel argues that in the absence of a new accusatory instrument being filed after the indictment was dismissed, "there was no criminal action left to secure." With respect to this Court's decision to include sealing language in its February 4, 2025 Order, Attorneys Swartz and Hammond assert that upon dismissal of Conley's indictment and the District Attorney's failure to seek a stay of sealing under CPL 160.50 (1), sealing was automatically required by law. Finally, the defense contends that this Court had no choice but to deny OCSO's application to unseal, because it was an improper proxy motion brought at the request of the District Attorney's Office and because the underlying factual premise for the application—that there was an ongoing investigation regarding the death of Mary Yoder—was [*16]proven false.

Contrary to the position of the District Attorney's Office, none of the decisions that this Court has issued since being assigned to this case in February have been infected by bias. That is, the District Attorney has not established that this Court's decisions were "based upon" this Court's alleged bias rather than "upon an impartial consideration of the evidence" and applicable law (Pisa, 55 AD2d at 136; see also McLaughlin, 104 AD3d at 1316). In fact, each of this Court's decisions have been amply supported by the law and the facts.

On February 4, 2025, this Court had no discretion regarding whether to issue an order to keep Conley in custody; this Court was legally required to direct her release. On January 31, 2025, the Appellate Division vacated Conley's conviction and dismissed the indictment against her. As of February 4, 2025, the date Conley was produced to appear before this Court, the District Attorney had not yet filed any new charges against Conley. In fact, even up to the present, the District Attorney's Office still has not filed any new charges against Conley.

The Court of Appeals has plainly stated: "once a defendant's conviction has been reversed and the indictment dismissed the appropriate remedy is discharge from custody; there is then no basis for further detention" (Licitra v Coughlin, 61 NY2d at 452). On February 4, 2025, there was "no basis for further detention" because the indictment had been dismissed and the District Attorney had not filed any new accusatory instrument against Conley. Legally, release from custody therefore was mandated by case law (see id.).

Upon remittal, this Court's task was to "execute the direction of the appellate court" and, "depending upon the nature of such direction, either discharge the defendant from custody, exonerate h[er] bail or issue a securing order" (CPL 470.45). Here, the Appellate Division left this Court with circumstances in which a conviction had been overturned, an indictment had been dismissed, and no charges were pending against Conley. Applying the mandate of Licitra, this Court had no grounds upon which to "issue a securing order." Securing orders, which are governed by CPL article 510, are premised upon a defendant being "under the control" of a criminal court (see CPL 510.10 [1]). Plainly, a defendant cannot be "under the control" of a criminal court when she has no charges pending against her. If the District Attorney wanted to provide a court with grounds for issuing a securing order against Conley, it could have filed a felony complaint on February 3rd or February 4th to levy a new charge or charges against her. The District Attorney opted not to do so, however.

Notably, District Attorney Carville even acknowledged to radio host Bill Keeler, during an interview on the morning of February 4, 2025, that "generally," the result of an indictment being dismissed on appeal would be release from custody, a ruling he now attacks as being premised upon bias. In light of his public acknowledgement that the February 4, 2025 appearance likely could result in Conley's release, his current claim that this Court's decision to release her was grounded in bias is disingenuous.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department did not state that this Court was required to issue a securing order on remand, which is precisely what distinguishes the cases upon which the District Attorney relied on February 4, 2025. In both People v Suarez (148 AD2d 367 [1st Dept 1989]) and People v Rodwell (100 AD2d 772 [1st Dept 1984]), the appellate courts specifically directed the trial courts, upon remittal following dismissal of the indictments, to issue securing orders pursuant to CPL 210.45 (9). Likewise, in People v Kress (192 AD2d 722 [2d Dept 1993]), [*17]the appellate court ordered the defendant, following dismissal of the indictment, to appear before the trial court on remittal so the trial court could "issue a securing order . . . pending resubmission of the case to the Grand Jury and the Grand Jury's disposition thereof" (id. at 722-723). This Court rejected District Attorney Carville's reliance on these cases, noting that the Fourth Department had not given any such specific directive here, and that, as such, Licitra governed.

Under the circumstances presented to this Court on February 4, 2025, therefore, this Court had no choice but to direct Conley's release from custody. This Court's ruling in that respect was legally required; it could not have been—and was not—infected by bias.

Likewise, this Court's decision to include sealing language in its February 4, 2025 Order, at the request of defense counsel, was legally justified. In its January 31, 2025 letter, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department directed Attorney Swartz to "move to seal defendant's records" under CPL 160.50. She advised this Court's Principal Law Clerk of that request, via email, on the morning of February 4, 2025, and copied District Attorney Carville on that request. This Court's Principal Law Clerk, after reviewing CPL 160.50, the case law applying that statute, and the letter from the Appellate Division to Attorney Swartz, responded that this Court would "add pertinent language to the proposed order" and give both attorneys "copies of the updated proposed order" during the appearance later that day.

CPL 160.50 (1) provides:

"Upon the termination of a criminal action or proceeding against a person in favor of such person, as defined in subdivision three of this section, unless the district attorney upon motion with not less than five days notice to such person or his or her attorney demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the interests of justice require otherwise, or the court on its own motion with not less than five days notice to such person or his or her attorney determines that the interests of justice require otherwise and states the reasons for such determination on the record, the record of such action or proceeding shall be sealed and the clerk of the court wherein such criminal action or proceeding was terminated shall immediately notify the commissioner of the division of criminal justice services and the heads of all appropriate police departments and other law enforcement agencies that the action has been terminated in favor of the accused, and unless the court has directed otherwise, that the record of such action or proceeding shall be sealed."

CPL 160.50 (3), in turn, defines the circumstances under which a criminal action or proceeding should be considered "terminated in favor of" a person. These circumstances include when "an order dismissing the entire accusatory instrument against such person pursuant to [CPL] article [470] was entered" (CPL 160.50 [3] [a]).

Here, on Conley's appeal pursuant to CPL article 470, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed the only count of the indictment under which she had been convicted (see Conley, 234 AD3d at 1363). Thus, pursuant to CPL 160.50 (3) (a), the criminal action against Conley had been terminated in her favor. That fact triggered this Court to consider CPL 160.50 (1). Under CPL 160.50 (1), sealing automatically would be required in this scenario unless either the District Attorney proved "that the interests of justice" required that sealing be stayed or "the [*18]court on its own motion" found "that the interests of justice" were inconsistent with sealing. In either case, the defense would be entitled to five days' notice to oppose a stay of sealing and to argue why the otherwise automatic sealing provision of CPL 160.50 (1) should be applied.

There is no dispute that on February 4, 2025, the District Attorney never argued to this Court that "the interests of justice" required that the otherwise automatic sealing guaranteed under CPL 160.50 (1) should be stayed or limited in any way. In fact, the District Attorney simply did not address the defense's request for sealing at all. Then, when presented with a proposed order that contained sealing provisions, the District Attorney specifically stated on the record that the People had no objection to that proposed order. As explained above, the District Attorney was on notice of this request and had several hours—part of which he spent on a radio interview—to prepare argument on this issue (see supra n 5). He even got the benefit of additional time to prepare because Conley's transport arrived nearly two hours late. This Court did not cut off District Attorney Carville's argument or otherwise prevent him from addressing this issue if he had wished to do so. Nor did the District Attorney ask this Court for additional time to research and prepare argument on this issue. Instead, District Attorney Carville opted not to make any arguments related to the defense's sealing request, then accepted the proposed order provided by this Court. The defense's request for sealing on February 4, 2025, therefore, was unopposed.

Even though the proposedorder contained sealing provisions, Court never intended to prevent either party from making arguments related to sealing if they wished to. Indeed, this Court, upon providing the proposed order to the parties, invited them to make any arguments related to the terms of that proposed order that they had not already made. Still, District Attorney Carville remained mute regarding the sealing provisions, saying only that the People did not have any objection to this Court's proposed order.

Here, this Court was presented with a request from defense counsel for sealing—a request the Appellate Division directed her to make and which was warranted because the indictment had been dismissed on appeal—and an absence of any objection from the District Attorney to that request. This Court therefore granted sealing on the basis that it was unopposed, having heard no argument regarding why doing so would not be "in the interests of justice." To the extent this Court stated that it found sealing to be in the interests of justice, it merely tracked the language of CPL 160.50, based upon the fact that neither party had offered any arguments for why sealing was not in the interests of justice.^[FN8]

Under these circumstances, this Court's decision to seal Conley's records on February 4, 2025 was legally warranted. It was not the result of any bias on this Court's part or any desire by this Court to interfere with the District Attorney's Office's prosecution of this case.

This Court's denial of OCSO's application to unseal likewise was justified by the [*19]applicable facts and law and was not the product of any bias. Specifically, this decision was premised upon two findings, both of which were well-supported by the record; as such, this Court had no choice but to deny the application.

First, this Court concluded that although the application bore the name the Oneida County Sheriff's Office, that office only brought the application because it was asked to do so by the District Attorney's Office. The undisputed evidence revealed that the District Attorney's Office orchestrated the effort to bring this application and contacted Lt. Paul to get an affidavit for that purpose. The undisputed evidence also revealed that the District Attorney's Office coordinated with then-County Attorney Cortese-Kolasz to have her be the attorney to bring the motion, as counsel for OCSO. Considering the Court of Appeals precedent making clear that unsealing applications under CPL 160.50 (1) (d) (ii) are not available to prosecutors (see Matter of Katherine B. v Cataldo, 5 NY3d 196, 202-203 [2005] [exceptions to sealing are "precisely drawn" and narrowly construed, and the "law enforcement agency" exception is not broad enough to permit applications to unseal brought by prosecutors]; see also People v Anonymous, 34 NY3d 631, 638-642 [2020] [applying Katherine B. and declining to interpret the "law enforcement agency" exception to cover prosecutors, noting that a prosecutor can move to stay sealing in the first instance under CPL 160.50 (1), but cannot subsequently move to unseal]), the fact that the District Attorney's Office orchestrated this application was legally improper. Under the undisputed facts present here, this Court properly concluded that OCSO's application "impermissibly invoked CPL 160.50 (1) (d) (ii) for prosecutorial purposes" in violation of Katherine B. (Matter of Albany County Dist. Attorney's Off. v William T., 88 AD3d 1133, 1135 [3d Dept 2011]).

Second, this Court denied the motion to unseal on the basis that the factual premise upon which it was based—the sworn statement in Lt. Paul's affidavit that OCSO was engaged in an "extensive" ongoing investigation regarding the death of Mary Yoder for which it needed these sealed records—was false. Lt. Paul testified that OCSO does not have an Investigator or Deputy assigned to investigate Mary Yoder's death, and at the time of OCSO's unsealing application, the District Attorney's Office was well into its Grand Jury re-presentation, using sealed evidence in violation of a court order. The allegation that re-presenting the case to the Grand Jury was itself part of OCSO's "ongoing investigation" was belied by this Court's in camera review of the Grand Jury materials, which led this Court to conclude that no meaningful investigative steps had been taken in the case since Conley's last trial. Because the factual premise underlying OCSO's application to unseal was disproven, this Court properly denied that application. In other words, this Court correctly concluded that at the time of the application, there was no such "extensive" ongoing investigation into the death of Mary Yoder.

This Court notes that even though the application to unseal the records, nunc pro tunc, has already been denied, District Attorney Carville stated at oral argument on the instant recusal motion that he is once again asking for nunc pro tunc unsealing. This Court denies this request for two reasons. First, as discussed above, a District Attorney can oppose sealing in the first instance under CPL 160.50 (1) but cannot, except in limited circumstances not presented here (see CPL 160.50 [1] [d] [i]), move to unseal (see Anonymous, 34 NY3d at 638-642); thus, District Attorney Carville is legally barred from making this request. Second, this Court already has ruled on an unsealing request in this case, and that decision remains the law of the case (see generally People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 503 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 755 [2001] ["law of the case is a judicially crafted policy that 'expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to [*20]reopen what has been decided'"]). Regardless of how aggrieved the District Attorney may feel about this ruling, it remains binding, especially given that the District Attorney's Office never appealed the June 12, 2025 Order that contained this ruling.

Finally, this Court ordered the District Attorney's Office, as part of the June 12, 2025 Order, to refrain from any further use of sealed records. Specifically, what this Court ordered was as follows: "the Oneida County District Attorney's Office is directed to immediately cease and desist from any further use, dissemination, or presentation of sealed materials related to this matter, unless and until any subsequent Order provides otherwise" (emphasis added). This ordering paragraph was based upon the facts, the law, and common sense.

On June 10, 2025, this Court found, following its in camera review of Grand Jury materials, that it was "unmistakable" that the District Attorney's Office had presented sealed evidence to the Grand Jury in violation of the February 4, 2025 Order. In reaching this conclusion, this Court applied the Court of Appeals' definition of what constitutes sealed records under CPL 160.50 (see Matter of Dondi, 63 NY2d 331, 337-338 [1984] [CPL 160.50 covers records and evidence "integral to both" an individual's "arrest and his prosecution"]). Although this Court stated on June 10, 2025 that it had not yet determined what the sanction or remedy would be for this violation, it ultimately opted to include the above-quoted language in its June 12, 2025 Order.

This Court submits that the inclusion of this language was appropriate in light of this Court's February 4, 2025 Order and its finding that the District Attorney already had violated that Order. The subject ordering paragraph simply reiterates that the District Attorney's Office must ensure it does not once again violate the Order this Court previously issued—without objection—on February 4, 2025. In other words, this portion of the June 12, 2025 Order is a mere reminder of the District Attorney's obligation not to use sealed evidence; it did not provide any new remedy to the defense or impose any new sanction upon the District Attorney's Office that had not previously existed. This Court's inclusion of that language in the June 12, 2025 Order certainly was not the result of any bias on this Court's part.

Each of this Court's decisions have been legally justified and none of those decisions have been infected by bias. It appears to this Court that while the District Attorney's Office is alleging illegality and bias, the reality is that they just do not like this Court's rulings and therefore are seeking a different judge, a hallmark of judge shopping. Mere dissatisfaction with a court's rulings cannot be an adequate basis for recusal (see Tripi, 189 AD3d at 2062; Dale, 103 AD3d at 1244; Gonzalez, 92 AD3d at 1160). The determinations and rulings about which the District Attorney complains—rulings that, for the most part, the District Attorney did not appeal—simply do not rise to the high standard required for recusal (see McLaughlin, 104 AD3d at 1316 [decisions must be shown to be premised on the judge's bias rather than facts a judge learns while presiding over the case]; Pisa, 55 AD2d at 136 [same]). This is especially true where, as here, the factual premises upon which the claims of bias are based are patently false.

Next, District Attorney Carville alleges that during his argument on February 4, 2025, "the Court interjected frequently and became loud in her responses." He characterizes this Court's "tone" as having "appeared hostile towards the People."

In opposition, Attorneys Swartz and Hammond acknowledge that this Court "asked pointed questions" of District Attorney Carville on February 4, 2025, but correctly note that this Court had legal authority to support its disagreement with District Attorney Carville's arguments. They also correctly note that "many judges" actively question attorneys during oral arguments. They recall that this Court's "tone and demeanor" on February 4, 2025 "at no point seemed hostile," and they contrast that recollection to their perception of District Attorney Carville's tone on June 10, 2025, which they describe as "aggressive" and "strikingly combative." Finally, Attorneys Swartz and Hammond point out that the allegations regarding this Court's conduct on February 4, 2025 were more than four months old when District Attorney Carville brought his motion, and that he did not raise any complaints about this Court's demeanor that day until after this Court issued an Order adverse to his office's position on June 12, 2025.

This Court's consistent practice is to thoroughly prepare for oral argument in every case and to come to Court prepared with questions, having carefully read the case law and statutes relied upon by the parties. This case was no different. When I came to court on February 4, 2025 (and June 10, 2025, for that matter), I already was well-versed on the legal arguments the parties intended to make. This is why I was active in my questioning, as I typically am at oral argument. As the transcripts of the oral arguments demonstrate, there was no hostility or unfairness on my part; in fact, what those transcripts illustrate is simply my active manner of conducting oral argument. In this Court's view, oral argument without an active bench is not productive. Oral argument is only productive if a Judge is prepared to intelligently discuss the cases and statutes cited by the parties, as I consistently have done in this case.

This Court has carefully reviewed the transcript of the February 4, 2025 appearance ^[FN9] and has considered my own recollection of that appearance. After doing so, this Court disputes District Attorney Carville's accusation that I used a "hostile" tone that day. I did not raise my voice;^[FN10] I did not make any comments that were disparaging toward District Attorney Carville; and I did not say anything that was inappropriate in tone or content. In this Court's view, what the February 4, 2025 transcript reveals is an active discussion between this Court and District Attorney Carville regarding the applicability of the cases he cited. This type of meaningful legal debate between a Judge and an attorney is the very essence of oral argument. The mere fact that this Court clearly expressed its view that the cases cited by District Attorney Carville were inapplicable to this case did not turn this Court's legitimate legal observations into hostility, bias, [*21]or unfairness.^[FN11]

In short, none of this Court's legal discussions with District Attorney Carville on February 4, 2025 indicate that "the court was so vexed that it could not be impartial" (Fulton Mkt., 158 AD3 at 502). Nor did such conduct rise to a level that my "impartiality [can] be reasonably questioned" (Greenberg, 114 AD3d at 435). Here, as in Greenberg, this Court knew the cases upon which the District Attorney intended to rely and could prepare for argument accordingly; that—not bias— explains why this Court was able to be active in questioning the District Attorney (see 114 AD3d at 434 ["While the court interrupted defense counsel's arguments . . . , the court had the fully briefed motion papers of both parties setting forth all of their arguments"]). The District Attorney mistakenly claims hostility when in fact what occurred was simply a reasonable disagreement on the law, conveyed during an active oral argument.

My opportunity to prepare for argument by reading in advance the cases upon which the District Attorney intended to rely also explains why I came to argument on February 4, 2025 with an understanding of the inapplicability of such cases to these facts. This preparation and my reasonable interpretation of the case law—not bias—is what explains why this Court's questioning of District Attorney Carville raised many of the points Attorney Swartz apparently intended to raise that day. This Court interpreted the applicable law in a way that aligned with Attorney Swartz on February 4, 2025, not because this Court is biased in Conley's favor, but because this Court genuinely believed that to be the correct application of the law to these facts. As explained above, this Court continues to adhere to its view that its rulings were legally warranted.

The February 4, 2025 oral argument with District Attorney Carville is far cry from cases in which intemperate or inappropriate comments by a Judge were deemed severe enough to warrant recusal. In People v Leggett (76 AD3d 860 [1st Dept 2010]), for example, this Court engaged in "pervasive denigration of defendant's counsel, in front of the jury," including by calling a line of counsel's questioning "silly," by accusing counsel of turning the trial into a "comedy," and by asking counsel to behave "like a professional . . . and not a clown" (id. at 862-863). In People v Berger (255 US 22 [1921]), the trial judge in a World War I espionage case expressed outright prejudice toward German-Americans, saying: "One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German-Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty" (id. at 28). Although these are only two examples, they show the extreme misbehavior Judges must manifest on the record for their conduct or statements to give rise to recusal. Here, I acted appropriately and never made any disparaging or unprofessional comments toward District Attorney Carville. I stand by my conduct on February 4, 2025; the transcript of the oral argument from that day amply demonstrates the propriety of my behavior and temperament.

Regarding the District Attorney's apparent criticism of the manner in which this Court provided the parties with proposed orders prior to the February 4, 2025 appearance, this Court notes that those proposals were premised upon extensive research that my Principal Law Clerk [*22]and I performed in advance of that appearance. The proposed orders were, by their very terms, "proposed," and this Court, through its Principal Law Clerk, made clear to the parties that they were free to make any arguments they saw fit on February 4, 2025 and to seek alternative relief to that which this Court was proposing. I did not prevent any party, on February 4, 2025 or at any other time, from making any argument they wished.

On the topic of the District Attorney's perception of how this Court treated him in court on February 4, 2025, this Court notes that such complaints are inconsistent with what he stated during his radio appearance on Talk of the Town of February 5, 2025. In that interview, District Attorney Carville twice said he "respected" this Court's February 4, 2025 rulings and said nothing about this Court having treated him with hostility. In view of such comments, only an objective of "judge shopping" can explain District Attorney Carville's newfound claims of hostility and bias.

Additionally, District Attorney Carville fails to explain why, if he believed this Court acted in a hostile and unfair manner toward him on February 4, 2025, he waited to raise such concerns until bringing the instant motion on June 25, 2025, more than 4 ½ months later, after this Court had issued rulings adverse to his office's position. The staleness of these claims and the District Attorney's failure to raise them until after adverse rulings were issued warrants the rejection of this aspect of the recusal motion (see Glatzer, 95 AD3d at 707 ["where, as here, a party inexplicably withholds an allegation of bias until after this Court adversely rules against it, denial of the recusal motion is generally warranted"]), as does the fact that District Attorney Carville continued to participate in proceedings before this Court for 4 ½ months "without complaint" prior to bringing this motion (see id. at 707-708; see also Fulton Mkt., 158 AD3d at 503).

The District Attorney's recusal motion focuses predominantly upon statements that two witnesses—Kevin Revere and Scott McNamara—allege I made during a Holiday Party at Turning Stone Casino on the evening of December 11, 2024. I vehemently deny having made the statements these deponents attribute to me. Both Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara provided the District Attorney with sworn Supporting Depositions. Mr. Revere, the Chief of Staff for Oneida County Executive Anthony Picente and a former OCSO Sheriff's Deputy, reports the following in his Supporting Deposition dated June 13, 2025:

"On Wednesday December 11, 2024, at about 6:00 pm I was at the Oneida Nation Holiday Party at the Turning Stone Cansino [sic] in Verona, NY. Alcohol was available and I had eaten food throughout the event and had two glasses of wine all night. I was seated at a table along with Anthony Picente, Scott McNamara, Roann Destito, Scott Musacchio, Todd Carville, Bernadette Clark, some of our spouses, among others. All the people at the table I have known for a long time. Several of us started to talk about the Kaitlyn Conley case because her appeal was recently reported in the media. I don't recall who initiated the conversation but while we were discussing it I expressed my opinion of her guilt and Judge Clark expressed her opinion of her innocence. Judge Clark stated that she believed the husband did it. I remember saying to her 'Are you out of your fucking mind? Her DNA was on the bottle of poison!'. Judge Clark responded stating that they [*23]explained all that and the husband did it because he was having an affair with the sister. I replied that no, the DNA wasn't explained away but from what I remembered the allegation of an affair was explained and found not to have happened. The party was scheduled to end at around 8:30 pm and I left sometime around 7:30 pm.

I remember this conversation with Judge Clark because I immediately regretted using the language I did because even though we've known each other for many, many years and are friendly, Judge Clark is still a judge and I probably shouldn't have used that language."

Mr. McNamara, the former Oneida County District Attorney, states the following in his Supporting Deposition dated June 20, 2025:

"On Wednesday December 11, 2024, at about 6:00pm I went to the Oneida Nation Holiday Party at the Turning Stone Casino in Verona, NY. I was seated at a table along with my wife, Gretchin Revere, Kevin Revere, Scott Musacchio, Scott Musacchio's wife, Roann Destito, Anthony Picente, and Judge Bernadette Clark. At some point the conversation at the table turned to the conviction of Kaitlyn Conley. I am not sure who brought up the topic, but I know it was not me. Judge Clark was explaining her view of the facts to Roann Destito. Based upon Roann's comments it was clear she was not familiar with the case. Judge Clark was making comments that lead me to believe she felt that Kaitlyn Conley was wrongfully convicted, as she stated that Mary Yoder's husband was the person responsible for Mary's death. I was somewhat surprised that Judge Clark was making these comments in front of me as I was the District Attorney when Conley was convicted. Kevin Revere was adamant that he believed Conley was guilty. I remember him pointing out to Judge Clark that Conley's DNA was on the bottle of colchicine seized by the police. Judge Clark discussed her views with Kevin and continuously stated that the victim, Mary Yoder's husband, was having an affair with one of Mary's sisters. In my opinion, based upon the evidence known to me and much of it being presented at the trials, Bill Yoder did not have an affair with Mary's sister. The evidence was clear that he started dating Mary's sister sometime after Mary died. I have a vivid memory of what Judge Clark was saying because I did not agree with her or her version of the facts she was expounding."

The District Attorney argues that the statements these deponents accuse me of having made on December 11, 2024 prove that I have a bias against the prosecution of Conley, and that such bias provides a basis for recusal.

Attorneys Swartz and Hammond, in opposition, note that when Attorney Swartz attempted to call and speak to Mr. Revere regarding his Supporting Deposition, Mr. Revere never returned her call. They also note Mr. McNamara's status as the prior District Attorney whose office twice prosecuted Conley, securing the conviction that later was reversed. Defense counsel questions why District Attorney Carville did not bring such information to this Court's attention when he learned of it, prior to the issuance of the June 12, 2025 Order. Attorneys Swartz and Hammond accuse the District Attorney of having "deliberately" and "inexplicably" withheld these allegations until after this Court issued its adverse Order on June 12, 2025.

Finally, Attorneys Swartz and Hammond explain why the allegations made by Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara do not warrant recusal. They characterize the Supporting Depositions as offering "nothing more than subjective recollections by individuals who are [*24]themselves clearly biased against Conley." Moreover, they note that judges "routinely form preliminary impressions" in cases but that such impressions "do not amount to bias" or "impair a judge's ability to set aside personal views and rule according to the law and facts." They add: "A judge's ability to form an opinion and still render impartial decisions is the cornerstone of judicial integrity."

I categorically and unequivocally deny having made the statements attributed to me by Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara, whether on December 11, 2024 or at any other time. I have never publicly commented on any pending case in my 25 years on the bench. Given my unblemished ethical record over several decades of public service, it defies logic to think that I would choose to publicly speak about the merits of a pending case in front of the current District Attorney, the former District Attorney whose office twice prosecuted the case, a former member of OCSO, the Oneida County Executive, and their respective spouses at a small table at a Holiday Party. Unlike other individuals at this party, including Mr. Revere, who admitted he drank alcohol, I did not consume any alcoholic beverages that night and have a clear recollection of what occurred.

Considering the Supporting Depositions of Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara, I will provide my own recollection of the December 11, 2024 Holiday Party at Turning Stone Casino. I did attend this party. Several other Judges from the Fifth Judicial District, including Oneida County Supreme Court and Family Court Judges, also attended this party. Some retired and current Justices of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department also were present.

On the morning of December 11, 2024, about nine hours prior to this Holiday Party, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department held oral argument on Conley's appeal from the denial of her CPL 440.10 motion. As is their practice, the Fourth Department had live-streamed the argument. At the Holiday Party later that same day, it was District Attorney Carville who brought up the topic of Conley's case. District Attorney Carville stated: "I watched the appellate argument earlier today; it did not go well. Her conviction is going to get reversed. The case is coming back." I was sitting roughly a foot away from District Attorney Carville when he made these unsolicited comments about Conley's case. In response to District Attorney Carville's obvious distress, I stated: "Well, a court's questioning during oral argument does not always indicate how the Court will ultimately rule." District Attorney Carville responded: "No, it was really bad for us." At this point, Mr. McNamara, the former District Attorney, stated: "Conley's so guilty she will get convicted again." Mr. Revere then chimed in, loudly saying: "Her DNA was on the bottle of colchicine." These were the only statements about Conley's case that I recall were made during the December 11, 2024 Holiday Party.

It is noteworthy that neither Mr. Revere nor Mr. McNamara attempt to quote me regarding what I allegedly said on December 11, 2024. Mr. Revere confidently quotes what he said and finishes his Supporting Deposition by explaining why he "remember[s] this conversation," yet he paraphrases what he claims I said rather than quoting me. Similarly, Mr. McNamara purports to "have a vivid memory" of what I allegedly said but does not quote me. In addition to declining to quote me, Mr. McNamara is noticeably careful in how he characterizes my alleged statements, saying that my comments "lead him to believe" I thought Conley to be innocent. The deponents' respective choices not to quote me, despite claiming to have strong [*25]memories of a conversation that occurred more than six months prior to their Supporting Depositions, is one basis—among many—for questioning the accuracy and credibility of those Depositions. The fact that these deponents opted not to quote me also is one of the ways in which these Supporting Depositions appear to be carefully crafted.

Another example of how these Depositions appear to be carefully crafted is seen in the fact that Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara each claim not to recall how the topic of Conley's case came up during the party. This Court specifically recalls that it was District Attorney Carville who brought up the case, given his concerns about how poorly the appellate argument had gone for the District Attorney's Office. Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara, however, did not admit that fact, perhaps because doing so would make District Attorney Carville a party to these alleged conversations. If District Attorney Carville was a party to these alleged conversations, his failure to say anything about the alleged conversations for more than six months would render his motion to recuse even more dubious, and his argument that discussing this case publicly was inappropriate might be undermined. In view of these considerations, it is possible that Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara claim not to remember who brought up Conley's case because not remembering that fact conveniently aligns with District Attorney Carville's version of the events and shields District Attorney Carville's motion from additional scrutiny.

As the Supporting Depositions of Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara both indicate, one of the individuals present at the December 11, 2024 party was former New York State Assemblywoman RoAnn Destito. Ms. Destito is my first cousin and was seated next to me at that party. After receiving the instant motion to recuse and the Supporting Depositions of Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara, I asked Ms. Destito about her recollection of the conversation at the December 11, 2024 Holiday Party. She stated: "I did not hear you make any statements about Katie Conley." She added: "I have never heard you talk about any of your cases."

For clarification, District Attorney Carville's allegation at oral argument that Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara are "friends" of mine is not accurate. I know both Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara as long-term professional acquaintances—individuals with whom I have worked and interacted in a professional capacity over the course of my career—but neither are individuals with whom I spend time socially or personally. I do not consider them "friends." Accordingly, I reject the suggestion that their Supporting Depositions should be given more weight or afforded more credibility because their "friendship" with me would have made it difficult for them to make these allegations. We are professional acquaintances and professional acquaintances alone.^[FN12]

This Court finds it telling that District Attorney Carville, according to both his sworn affirmation and his statements at oral argument, did not hearthe alleged December 11, 2024 statements attributed to me by Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara, despite the fact that he was [*26]sitting a mere foot away from me when I supposedly made these alleged statements. In this Court's view, there is only one explanation for why the District Attorney did not hear me make these alleged statements: because I never made them.

Even though District Attorney Carville did not hear me make any comments about the Conley case on December 11, 2024, his affirmation describes this Court as having "heatedly argued for" Conley's innocence at that time. Likewise, he stated at oral argument on this motion that I made these comments during "a very contentious argument." This allegedly "heated" and "very contentious" argument occurred at a table at which ten individuals were sitting. What is not explained is why, if this was in fact a "heated" and "very contentious" argument, District Attorney Carville would not have heard me engaging in such an argument. Presumably, if this argument was "heated" and "contentious," others seated at the table, including District Attorney Carville himself, would have heard this argument. It is telling that the two people who I recall as having sat closest to me during the Holiday Party—District Attorney Carville and Ms. Destito—did not hear me make the statements attributed to me by Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara.

Both Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara may have personal interests that could have motivated them to falsely or inaccurately attribute comments to this Court. These two individuals may be biased and interested witnesses. Mr. Revere is a former member of OCSO, the law enforcement agency who investigated the death of Mary Yoder and brought charges against Conley. Additionally, this Court's in camera questioning of District Attorney Carville on August 7, 2025 confirmed that Mr. Revere has a motivation to attempt to endear himself to the Oneida County District Attorney's Office,^[FN13] a goal that assisting that office in this high-profile case might accomplish. For his part, Mr. McNamara is the former District Attorney whose office twice prosecuted Conley; as such, he obviously has an interest in seeing her prosecuted again so that the conviction his office obtained at great effort and expense—a conviction that later was reversed—might again be secured. Notably, Mr. McNamara has frequently spoken to the media regarding his strong views on Conley's guilt.

Additionally, this Court finds significant the far-too-convenient timing and circumstances under which Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara came forward with these claims, as well as the delays associated with their disclosures. Neither individual came forward until more than six months after they claim I made these alleged statements, and more than four months after I was [*27]assigned to this case. According to District Attorney Carville's statements at oral argument, Mr. McNamara told District Attorney Carville that he was very upset about this Court being assigned to the case after he saw the media coverage of the February 4, 2025 oral argument. If that is so, this Court questions why Mr. McNamara would wait six months until mid-June, and only after this Court had made rulings unfavorable to the District Attorney's Office, to make the new District Attorney aware of his concerns. There is no explanation for why Mr. McNamara would not have brought these alleged statements to District Attorney Carville's attention back in February. The same is true of Mr. Revere, who obviously has strong feelings about Conley's guilt; there is no reasonable explanation for why he did not come forward with these allegations as soon as he learned that this Court was handling Conley's case. Instead, both deponents waited and advised District Attorney Carville of what they knew on June 10, 2025, within a matter of hours of this Court having issued a ruling adverse to the District Attorney's position in this case. In this Court's estimation, the assertion that this timing was merely a coincidence strains credulity.

These delays in Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara coming forward are even more baffling when this Court considers District Attorney Carville's admissions at oral argument that (1) he had spoken with Mr. McNamara since the appellate reversal of Conley's case; and (2) he was "sure" that members of his office would have spoken with both Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara between February 4, 2025 and June 10, 2025. The inescapable conclusion, from these facts, is that both Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara had earlier opportunities to advise the District Attorney's Office of their concerns about this Court's alleged bias but inexplicably failed to do so.

Although the District Attorney argues that he did not learn of these deponents' allegations until after court on June 10, 2025, this Court nevertheless views the delays of the deponents in coming forward with this information as casting doubt upon the deponents' respective motivations. Even though Mr. McNamara learned of my appointment in early February and apparently was upset about it, and even though he had spoken to District Attorney Carville after February 4, 2025, thus giving him the opportunity to come forward with these allegations sooner, Mr. McNamara "inexplicably with[eld]" such allegations until after this Court declined to unseal the records in this case on June 10, 2025 (see Glatzer, 95 AD3d at 707).^[FN14] Likewise, the District Attorney cannot explain why Mr. Revere waited until after this Court denied unsealing on June 10, 2025 to bring his allegations to the District Attorney's attention, even though he had spoken with representatives of the District Attorney's Office prior to that date.^[FN15] Under these [*28]circumstances, rejecting this alleged basis for recusal is appropriate (see id.; see also Gravagna, 186 AD3d at 1334).

Legally, the District Attorney's motion primarily relies upon two cases, both of which are inapposite to the instant facts. The first is Schrager v New York Univ. (227 AD2d 189 [1st Dept 1996]). In Shrager, a medical malpractice action involving a delayed diagnosis and an alleged failure to fully remove a cancerous tumor, the judge disclosed to counsel, just prior to trial, "that he had successfully been treated for cancer, that his son worked in the same hospital as" one of the defendant doctors, and "that his daughter-in-law was currently being treated by one of the defendant" doctors (id. at 190). Based on those disclosures, plaintiff's counsel asked the judge to recuse himself, but the judge, apparently convinced he could remain impartial, declined to recuse (see id.). Thereafter, during trial, the judge "repeatedly interrupted the questioning of witnesses, admonished plaintiffs' counsel in front of the jury, and unnecessarily injected himself into the proceedings by sustaining at least one defense objection never made, and asking pointed questions of witnesses, all in a manner favoring the defense" (id.). On appeal, the First Department concluded that the judge's "improper interference with plaintiffs' presentation of their case" and "open bias toward the defense" deprived plaintiffs of a fair trial (id. at 191).

Although this Court agrees that recusal was warranted under the facts of Shrager, those facts are totally unlike this case. First, I do not personally know Kaitlyn Conley, her family, or anyone associated with her. I have never had any contact with Conley or her family other than seeing them in court on February 4, 2025, June 10, 2025, and August 7, 2025. Second, the transcripts of the Court appearances on February 4, 2025 and June 10, 2025 indicate that this Court actively questioned District Attorney Carville in much the same way I have done during countless other motion terms over the course of my 25 years on the bench, and in no way disparaged him. This Court provided the District Attorney a full and fair opportunity to make all his arguments; nothing I did prevented the District Attorney from presenting any arguments he wished to make. Finally, Shrager involved a judge's misconduct during a trial in the presence of a jury, a more concerning type of behavior plainly not implicated here. As stated above, the District Attorney's accusations that I have been loud, hostile, and agitated during proceedings in this case are untrue and the transcripts of the proceedings speak for themselves on that issue.^[FN16] Ultimately, this Court's conduct in this case bears no resemblance to the misconduct deemed inappropriate in Shrager.

The second case upon which the District Attorney's Office relies is People v Greenfield Constr. Co. (48 AD2d 765 [4th Dept 1975]). In Greenfield, the Fourth Department determined that recusal was required where a County Court Judge made "regrettable" statements "about the determination of the Grand Jury which cast doubt upon his impartiality" (id. at 766). Specifically, the judge had made a public statement to the media about a grand jury, saying "that [*29]something was obviously done improperly" (id.). On appeal, the Fourth Department wisely cautioned that judges should not make comments of this nature publicly "during the pendency of [an] action," and that "[t]he desire for publicity is a tempting tonic which no jurist should imbibe" (id.).

The comments attributed to this Court by Mr. Revere and Mr. McNamara are significantly different than the circumstances and comments made by the judge in Greenfield. Specifically, unlike in Greenfield, neither deponent alleges that I made any statement about this case publicly or to the media. Instead, the allegations are that I made these supposed comments in such a way that only two people at a ten-person table heard me, and in such a way that neither of the two individuals seated closest to me heard me make any such comments. Greenfield, therefore, does not support the District Attorney's instant motion to recuse.

In his affirmation in support of the motion to recuse, District Attorney Carville makes unsubstantiated insinuations regarding how I was appointed to preside over this case, calling the circumstances of my appointment "unusual." By stating that he is "unaware if" I "was assigned or requested the assignment," he insinuates that I may have sought out this case.

As outlined above, Judge Karalunas assigned this case to me due to the conflicts declared by both Oneida County Court Judges and the need to get the case scheduled. The inflammatory suggestion that I would seek out assignment on this case simply to frustrate the prosecution is utterly baseless and irresponsible; it may even implicate District Attorney Carville's ethical responsibilities under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (see 22 NYCRR § 1200.0, Rules 3.1 [a] and 3.3 [a]). Because the District Attorney's arguments regarding the circumstances of this Court's assignment are based upon a definitively false premise, the District Attorney has not shown any "impropriety in the manner in which this matter was assigned to [this Court] in the first instance" (Mokay v Mokay, 124 AD3d 1097, 1099 [3d Dept 2015]).

District Attorney Carville also alleges that this Court demonstrated bias in directing that Conley's shackles and restraints be removed at the start of the February 4, 2025 appearance. This Court finds this allegation particularly distasteful because the District Attorney—who did not object to the removal of restraints in this case—could not have requested that Conley remain shackled without justification, because to do so would have violated her due process rights (see generally Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622, 626-629 [2005]; People v Best, 19 NY3d 739, 742 [2013]; People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 152-153 [2011]).

My standard practice in all cases involving incarcerated individuals is to ask law enforcement to remove the incarcerated individual's shackles at the start of a proceeding, so long as no party or law enforcement agent has brought any facts to this Court's attention suggesting that the removal of restraints would create a danger. This explains why, on February 4, 2025, I had Conley's restraints removed, an action to which neither party objected. In fact, when I directed Conley's restraints to be removed, District Attorney Carville remained mute, which is inconsistent with his current claim that my directive to remove Conley's restraints demonstrates [*30]bias.

A criminal court may not keep a defendant restrained in the courtroom unless such court "state[s] a particularized reason for doing so on the record" and that reason is tied to an "essential state interest" amounting to "necessity" (Best, 19 NY3d at 743). This rule applies with equal force to nonjury proceedings (see id. at 744). Here, no party offered any argument or factual reasoning to this Court regarding why it should keep Conley shackled on February 4, 2025, and no charges were pending against her, so this Court could not have expressed "a particularized reason for" keeping her shackled (id. at 743). Under this scenario, therefore, this Court would have had no basis for keeping Conley restrained. Accordingly, the District Attorney's complaint about this Court's decision to unshackle Conley is completely without merit, especially considering that he never objected to that decision.

District Attorney Carville accuses this Court of having a "desire to control the outcome of this criminal case,"^[FN17] and argues that this Court's continuation of sealing in this case "speaks directly to" such a desire. This Court flatly and unequivocally denies having any interest in how this case may turn out, let alone a desire to specifically control such an outcome. As explained at length above, this Court has made rulings throughout this case that it believes to be supported—and, in some instances, required—by law. Such rulings stem from this Court's efforts to impartially apply the law to these facts, not from any desire to interfere with this prosecution or otherwise achieve any particular result in this case. This Court's rulings are the result of the District Attorney's conduct in their efforts to prosecute this case, not the result of this Court acting on any "intention" to achieve a particular outcome. Instead, this Court's only "intention" has been to apply the law accurately.

Relatedly, this Court rejects as untrue the District Attorney's claim that I have prejudged or predetermined the ultimate question that might end up being presented in this case, that of whether Conley is criminally responsible for Mary Yoder's death. Contrary to the assertions of District Attorney Carville, Mr. Revere, and Mr. McNamara, I do not have any opinion on that question, let alone an opinion that is biased in favor of the defense.

Where, as here, a recusal motion is based upon an allegation of impropriety or impartiality rather than legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, the moving party must prove "that the court displayed actual bias" (Sides, 215 AD3d at 1252). The claim of such bias must be "supported by the record" and the moving party must establish that some decision of the judge was based upon such bias, rather than upon consideration of the evidence in the case (see McLaughlin, 104 AD3d at 1316; Pisa, 55 AD2d at 136). Additionally, the moving party on a recusal motion must prove that "'any bias on the court's part unjustly affected the result to the detriment of'" the moving party (Matter of Indigo S., 213 AD3d 1205, 1206 [4th Dept 2023], quoting Allison v Seeley-Sick, 199 AD3d 1490, 1491-1492 [4th Dept 2021] [emphasis added]; [*31]see also Nenni, 269 AD2d at 786).

Here, for the reasons explained at length above, each of this Court's decisions and actions in this case have been grounded in the reasonable application of the law, not in bias (see supra Section III.C.). The District Attorney's inaccurate characterizations of this Court's conduct notwithstanding, there is no proof that I have displayed "actual bias" in this case. Because the District Attorney's Office has not demonstrated actual bias on my part and has not demonstrated that any of my decisions were premised upon bias rather than a consideration of the law and the evidence, they have not shown that bias has "unjustly affected the result[s]" in this case (Indigo S., 213 AD3d at 1206). Thus, the motion must be denied on this basis, as well (see Gravagna, 186 AD3d at 1334 [the moving party "failed to set forth any proof of bias or prejudice on the part of the court," so recusal was not justified]; McLaughlin, 104 AD3d at 1316 [recusal properly denied where the moving party's "claim of bias is not supported by the record"]).

Under these circumstances, this Court believes the District Attorney's recusal motion represents an effort to engage in inappropriate "judge shopping." In analyzing this motion, this Court is obligated to consider "the possibility that those questioning [her] impartiality might be seeking to avoid the adverse consequences of [her] presiding over their case" (Drexel Burnham, 861 F 2d at 1312). For policy reasons, this Court must also avoid even the "appearance of improper 'Judge-shopping'" (Mackey, 175 AD2d at 348).

This Court considered the suspicious timing of the District Attorney's motion as outlined above, including the fact that District Attorney Carville and his deponents failed to bring these allegations to this Court's attention until six months later and only after this Court issued rulings adverse to the District Attorney. This Court cannot and will not ignore the possibility that this motion is an orchestrated maneuver by the District Attorney's Office to seek my removal not because such removal is warranted, but because that office wishes to explain away the numerous critical mistakes it has made in this case. Under these circumstances, this Court would be naïve not to think the District Attorney's Office's motion might be aimed at getting me removed from this case so that office can obtain a judge they perceive as more favorable and attempt to get this Court's previous rulings thrown out.

It is also noteworthy that at the time the District Attorney brought this motion, it had not appealed or collaterally attacked any of my rulings. As of the oral argument on August 7, 2025, the District Attorney's Office still seemed uncertain and noncommittal regarding whether they had any appellate avenues available to them.^[FN18] These facts suggest that this recusal motion may have been a last-ditch, "Hail Mary" effort by the District Attorney to try to undo this Court's rulings through what the District Attorney thought—at the time—was its only option, namely accusing this Court of bias and seeking recusal. This, too, raises the specter that this motion is premised upon "judge shopping."

Each of this Court's rulings that the District Attorney's Office now attempts to characterize as having been infected by bias are attributable to errors and procedural missteps by that office. On February 4, 2025, District Attorney Carville did not object to defense counsel's request for sealing or this Court's proposed order containing sealing provisions. As a result, this Court signed that Order without opposition from the District Attorney with respect to sealing.

Thereafter, the District Attorney's Office, despite having more than two additional months, continued to ignore CPL 160.50; that office failed to consider how CPL 160.50 and this Court's sealing order would impact their case, then commenced a Grand Jury presentation in April 2025 at which they presented sealed evidence in violation of CPL 160.50 and the February 4, 2025 Order. The District Attorney's Office was re-presenting this case using sealed evidence until defense counsel asked whether they had obtained an order unsealing the records in Conley's case.

At this juncture, the District Attorney's Office realized it needed to unseal the records, but apparently recognized that under CPL 160.50 (1) (d) (ii), such an application could only be brought by "a law enforcement agency," not by a prosecutor's office (see Katherine B., 5 NY3d at 203 [the "law enforcement agency exception" in CPL 160.50 (1) (d) (ii) does not allow applications to unseal to be by brought by prosecutors]). Accordingly, ADA Fletcher contacted Lt. Richard Paul of OCSO and the Oneida County Attorney to ask them to bring an application to unseal. The affidavit of Lt. Paul referred to an "extensive" ongoing investigation and averred that records needed to be unsealed so OCSO could pursue that investigation. As this Court later learned through reviewing records and questioning Lt. Paul, however, OCSO was not actually taking any ongoing investigative steps in this case; instead, an order unsealing the records was being sought so the District Attorney could cover its tracks. Neither this inaccuracy nor the fact that OCSO brought the application at the District Attorney's Office's behest were disclosed on the face of the motion; these were facts this Court had to flesh out on its own.

It is certainly not this Court's error that District Attorney Carville did not object to sealing on February 4, 2025. It is not this Court's error that the District Attorney's Office did not use the two-plus months between February 4, 2025 and its commencement of re-presentation to the Grand Jury to gain a better understanding of CPL 160.50 to take steps to ensure their compliance with that statute. It is not this Court's error that the District Attorney's Office, not understanding the reach of CPL 160.50, presented sealed evidence during their Grand Jury re-presentation. It is not this Court's error that the District Attorney's Office coordinated OCSO's pretextual application to unseal in a manner not permitted by CPL 160.50 (1) (d) (ii). It is not this Court's error that in connection with that application, the County Attorney offered memoranda of law containing several fictitious and inaccurate citations. And finally, it is not this Court's error that OCSO alleged an "ongoing investigation" that did not actually exist. The fact that this Court identified these oversights, missteps, and inaccuracies by the District Attorney's Office and ruled against them in relation to such mistakes does not mean this Court is biased. In this Court's view, it instead demonstrates a practice of carefully analyzing the relevant facts before applying the law. Holding the District Attorney accountable for these unforced errors, in other words, was legally justified, not an exercise in partiality and not in any way due to bias.

On these facts, this Court echoes the observations of Attorneys Swartz and Hammond [*32]that the District Attorney's Office's motion to recuse seems to be an effort to "deflect from their own easily preventable failures" and shift the blame for their errors elsewhere. At each juncture, this Court reasonably has applied the law to the circumstances presented to it, and at each juncture, those circumstances have included self-inflicted mistakes by the District Attorney's Office. The District Attorney's Office should not be free to make procedural mistakes then use those mistakes to accuse this Court of bias when this Court identifies and fails to rescue that office from their self-inflicted errors (cf. Solow v Wellner, 157 AD2d 459, 459 [1st Dept 1990] [counsel cannot engage in conduct aimed to "provoke a disqualification" and thereby obtain recusal, because to do so "would be to reward him for his wrongdoing"]). As the court in Diaz appropriately noted:

"It is certainly not the intent of the law or the Code of Judicial Conduct to permit a party to engage in conduct 'in a course of litigation that might cause any conscientious judge to express, even in caustic terms, his disapproval of it, and thereby put himself in position thereafter to urge successfully motions to disqualify the judge in his subsequent cases before him.' (United States v Zagari, 419 F Supp 494, 505, citing Davis v Board of School Commrs., 517 F2d 1044.) Parties or lawyers, once embroiled in a self-created controversy with a Judge, 'would have a license under which the judge would serve at their will' (Davis v Board of School Commrs., supra, at p 1050.)" (Diaz, 130 Misc 2d at 1027-1028).

Ultimately, upon thoroughly examining my conscience and considering all the facts and analysis outlined above, this Court is fully confident in stating that it has been and can continue to be fair and impartial in this case. Having "carefully weigh[ed] the policy of promoting public confidence in the judiciary against the possibility that" the District Attorney may be alleging impartiality to prevent this Court from continuing to preside over this case (Drexel Burnham, 861 F 2d at 1312), I unequivocally conclude that justice is best served by my continuing to preside in this case. Remaining on this case is the correct, although not the easiest, course of action.

"The easiest course of action which this court could take . . . would be to recuse itself. This court would then be free of the albatross which has weighed heavily upon it for the last several months. Presumably for now, the fires which have been fueled by the charges of animus, hostility, bias and prejudice will be dampened, and the court would be free and unfettered to deal with the many other matters pending before it. . . . Perhaps, another Judge, given the same set of facts and circumstances would opt for recusal and self-disqualification in an effort to avoid an unpleasant confrontation. However, the question of when a Judge should disqualify himself is generally a matter of personal conscience . . . since only the individual judge knows fully his own thoughts and feelings. . . . While the option of recusal is indeed a tantalizing morsel available for the taking, this court's own conscience and sense of justice will not permit the first tempting bite" (Diaz, 130 Misc 2d at 1030).

Here, this Court steadfastly believes it can be fair and impartial, as it has been throughout the case. I harbor no bias or prejudice against the District Attorney's Office or in favor of [*33]Conley. Thus, I will not take the easy out of recusing in this case to avoid "unpleasant confrontation[s]" or for the sake of convenience when no factual or legal basis for recusal exists. Given my strong belief that I can be fair and impartial in this case, I am obligated not to recuse myself (see Drexel Burnham, 861 F 2d at 1312; Wilson, 162 AD3d at 1056; Trimarco, 146 AD3d at 1008; Silber, 84 AD3d at 932).

For the reasons set forth above, this Court must deny the District Attorney's motion. If this Court were to validate the District Attorney's Office's efforts to proffer as true these contrived, false, and far-too-convenient statements, it would incentivize other litigants to use untrue, misleading, or exaggerated allegations as a strategy to remove judges perceived to be unfavorable. Regrettably, tactics such as this seem to be occurring more commonly, placing judges in the precarious and unsettling position of responding to false allegations while balancing their duty to preside with the option of recusal (see generally Diaz, 130 Misc 2d at 1027-1031).

When a party appears to be using these tactics to engage in judge shopping—that is, to avoid a judge who has issued rulings adverse to that party—the need to condemn such tactics to discourage their use becomes even more critical. Here, this Court views the current motion to recuse as an attempt to manipulate and undermine the judicial process using false allegations. Such efforts must be strongly resisted to protect the independence and integrity of the judiciary (cf. Matter of Wisehart, 281 AD2d 23, 32-33 [1st Dept 2001], app dismissed 96 NY2d 935 [2001] [noting, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the impropriety of an attorney's "pattern and practices" of "conjur[ing] up false, reckless, and highly personal charges against the 'offending' tribunal," then "seek[ing] recusal in an effort to delay or otherwise obfuscate the issues"]).

In Diaz, another case in which a trial judge denied a prosecutor's motion to recuse, the court made the following historical analogy, which this Court believes remains very fitting today:

"At another time, in another jurisdiction, another Judge, under similar circumstances, found himself confronted with allegations of prejudice and bias. Then, however, it was the defendants who claimed bias against them and who sought to have the Judge disqualify himself. In refusing to do so, during the historic Watergate trials, Judge John Sirica in the United States District Court, District of Columbia, wrote:

'the Court cannot overlook the fact that it has an obligation to deny insufficient recusal motions. There is as much obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when there is no occasion as there is for him to do so when there is . . . .

After such study as I could give the matter, I reached the conclusion that whether a judge should recuse himself in a particular case depends not so much on his personal preference or individual views as it does on the law, and that under the law, I have no choice in this case" . . . "In the absence of a valid legal reason, I have no right to disqualify myself and must sit." (United States v Mitchell, supra, at pp 1325-1326, quoting from Edwards v United States, 334 F2d 360, 362, n 2, cert denied 379 U.S. 1000; see also, Matter of Natter, 70 Misc 2d 791; Matter of Robin O., 80 Misc 2d 242.)

While the significance of the issues before this court pale by comparison to those which confronted Judge Sirica in Watergate, a criminal case which 'has been called one of the most important cases in American judicial history' (Mitchell v Sirica, 502 F2d 375, 376, supra), nonetheless, the principle that a Judge is under an obligation to deny a groundless application for recusal transcends the magnitude of those issues" (Diaz, 130 Misc 2d at 1030-1031).

Having found the motion in this case to be similarly "groundless," this Court has arrived the same conclusion reached by Judge Sirica, namely that "[i]n the absence of a valid legal reason, I have no right to disqualify myself and must sit" (United States v Mitchell, 377 F Supp 1312, 1326 [D DC 1974], affd sub nom. Mitchell v Sirica, 502 F2d 375 [DC Cir 1974]). As the court eloquently stated in Diaz, "only the individual judge knows fully" how he or she feels about a case, and while recusal may be "a tantalizing morsel available for the taking, this court's own conscience and sense of justice will not permit the first tempting bite" (Diaz, 130 Misc 2d at 1030). After careful thought and deliberation, this Court must deny the District Attorney's motion to recuse.

Now, therefore, in accordance with the above, it is hereby

ORDERED that the District Attorney's motion to recuse is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the District Attorney's motion, to the extent it also requests that this Court vacate its prior rulings in this case dating back to February 4, 2025, grant unsealing nunc pro tunc, and/or "revert the case back to the state in which [this Court] inherited it," is DENIED.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order. The original Decision and Order is returned to the attorney for the non-moving party, Kaitlyn Conley. All other papers are being delivered by this court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this Decision and Order does not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that rule with respect to filing, entry, and notice of entry.