Recitation, as required by C.P.L.R. § 2219(a), of the papers considered in review of this motion.

Papers Numbered

After argument held on October 21, 2025, and upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision and order on these motions is as follows:

Donna Marie Parco as Trustee of the Gardine Premises Trust & Maryanne Riebesell as Trustee of the Gardine Premises Trust ("petitioners") commenced the instant holdover against Moshe Fisch, Sura Pearl Fisch, Israel Fisch, Jane Doe & John Doe ("respondents") seeking possession of 1838 63rd Street, All Rooms, All Floors, Entire Building, Brooklyn, NY 11204 (the "subject premises" or "apartment").

The 90-day termination notice states that (i) petitioners elect to terminate respondents' month to month tenancy; and (ii) the premises are not subject to rent regulation or to the Good [*2]Cause Eviction Law ("GCEL") as the petitioners own less than 10 units, commonly referred to as the "small landlord" exemption. (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 3).

The petition states the premises are not a multiple dwelling, not subject to rent regulation, and not subject to GCEL as the petitioners are small landlords. The petition annexes the GCEL notice checking off the "small landlord" exemption. (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 1).

Respondents Moshe Fisch & Sura Pearl Fisch retained counsel and filed the instant motion for leave to file an answer,^[FN1] and for dismissal and/or summary judgment for failure to properly plead whether the premises are subject to GCEL and the GCEL exemption. In the alternative, respondents seek leave to conduct limited discovery to determine whether petitioners qualify for the small landlord exemption.

The proposed answer alleges as follows: (i) general denial; (ii) failure to properly plead whether the premises are subject to GCEL, whether an exemption applies, or failure to state good cause grounds to evict; (ii) respondents are entitled to a renewal lease as the premises are subject to GCEL; (iv) petitioners are not entitled to arrears; (v) failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy; (vi) failure to register the premises with HPD pursuant to NYC Admin. Code § 27-2097(b)(3); (vii) breach of the warranty of habitability; (viii) petitioners are not the landlords; (ix) failure to serve the predicate notice; (x) counterclaim for an order to correct; (xi) counterclaim for abatement; (xii) counterclaim for harassment; and (xiii) counterclaim for attorneys' fees. (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 13).

Respondents' arguments in support of dismissal and/or summary judgment are, in relevant part, as follows: (i) this case commenced in July 2025, when the petition was served ^[FN2] and when both the good cause and notice requirements of GCEL were in effect; (ii) petitioners did not provide notice of GCEL to respondents when this case commenced; (iii) petitioners failed to properly plead the GCEL exemption as they did not include in their pleadings "the additional information regarding the the [sic] names of the natural persons and their interests in the property and the other property which they own in this State? [sic]."^[FN3] Because petitioners did [*3]not "disclose the owners of the premises as well as any property they may own in the State of New York," respondents argue petitioners failed to comply with pleading requirements under GCEL; and (iv) the predicate termination notice is defective for the same reasons as the petition and the defective predicate notice cannot be amended.

Petitioners oppose and cross-move to amend the petition to list the subject premises as the only property owned by petitioners. Petitioners argue that, to the extent they were required to list the addresses of all properties owned by petitioners in the petition, they should be allowed to amend their pleading. Petitioners allege respondents are not prejudiced by the failure to include this information as the premises are not subject to GCEL anyway.

In what appears to be opposition to the motion for leave to file an answer, petitioners allege that (i) GCEL does not apply; (ii) no certificate of occupancy is required for the subject premises, built prior to 1938; (iii) petitioners did not harass respondents as they have no connection "Flash Shelton" or "Squatter Hunters," the person and entity respondents allege have been harassing them; (iv) petitioners have always attempted to make repairs and any conditions not repaired are the result of respondents' failure to provide access; and (v) the allegations of improper service are conclusory and insufficient to rebut the process server's affidavit.

This branch of respondents' motion is granted except as to the first affirmative defense.

Pursuant to RPAPL §743, an answer in a holdover proceeding can be submitted "at the time when the petition is to be heard." Courts have interpreted this language to mean that adjournments extend the time to answer unless otherwise agreed. (Aqua Realty LLC v Truesdale, 79 Mis.3d 1217[A], *5-6 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2023]; Eugene Smilovic Housing Development Fund Corp. v Lee, 61 Misc 3d 1216(A), *2 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2018]; Gluck v Wiroslaw, 113 Misc 2d 499, 500 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1982]; 974 Anderson LLC v Davis, 53 Misc 3d 1220(A), *4 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2016]; Warren LLC v Carbello, 2009 NY Misc. LEXIS 2408, *5-6 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2009]).

Moreover, the motion for leave to file an answer was made promptly after respondents retained counsel, thereby extending the time to answer on this basis as well. (see City of New York v Candelario, 156 Misc 2d 330, 331-332 [App Term, 2d Dept 1993], affd in part, revd in part on other grounds 223 AD2d 617 [2d Dept 1996] [an adjournment for tenant to retain an attorney extends tenant's time to file an answer]; Findlay House, Inc. v Zhang Hongliu, 61 Misc 3d 644, 646 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2018]).

Further, the proposed answer contains meritorious defenses and counterclaims. While proposed defenses or counterclaims which "plainly lack merit" should be denied, (see Thomas Crimmins Contracting Co. v New York, 74 NY2d 166, 170 [1989]; Krakovski v Stavros Assoc., LLC, 173 AD3d 1146, 1148 [2d Dept 2019]), most proposed defenses and counterclaims here are potentially meritorious. (see Goldman v City of New York, 287 AD2d 482, 483 [2d Dept 2001]).

None of the proposed defenses or counterclaims are palpably devoid of merit, nor do petitioners offer meaningful opposition other than attempting to argue the merits of the proposed answer. Furthermore, petitioners fail to allege or show prejudice.

Although petitioners dispute the proposed defenses and counterclaims, respondents do not have to prove their defenses or counterclaims on a motion to amend. (see Johnson v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 203 AD3d 462, 464 [1st Dept 2022]; Siddiqui v Smith, 207 AD3d 681, [*4]682—83 [2d Dept 2022]). No evidentiary showing is required. (see Jin Liang Lin v. Gee, 200 AD3d 666, 667 [2d Dept 2001]; Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 229 [2d Dept 2008]).

All the proposed defenses and counterclaims are properly pleaded and have potential merit, except the first affirmative defense discussed at length below. As such, the motion for a late answer is granted in part and denied in part. The proposed answer is deemed served and filed except the first affirmative defense which is stricken.

A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss & Summary Judgment

When considering a motion under CPLR § 3211, the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, deem the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory. (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). In assessing a motion under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the criterion is whether the petitioner has stated a cause of action, not whether petitioner actually has one. (see Romanello v Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 NY3d 881, 887 [2013]; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 636 [1976]).

Thus, "a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) will fail if, taking all facts alleged as true and according them every possible inference favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states in some recognizable form any cause of action known to our law." (Shaya B. Pac., LLC v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 AD3d 34, 38 [2nd Dept 2006]; see also Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88; Romanello v Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 NY3d at 887; 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152 [2002]).

The court must not consider whether petitioners will be able to ultimately prove the allegations made in the pleadings. (see Howard Stores Corp. v Pope, 1 NY2d 110, 114 [1956]; Victory State Bank v EMBA Hylan, LLC, 169 AD3d 963, 964-965 [2nd Dept 2019]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2nd Dept 2010]).

As to summary judgment, this is a drastic remedy, to be granted only where the moving party tendered sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact and then only if, upon the moving party's meeting of this burden, the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of material issues of fact requiring trial. (see CPLR § 3212(b); Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 503, [2012]; Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]).

The motion must be denied where the moving party fails to demonstrate that there are no material issues of fact, (see Scurry v New York City Hous. Auth., 39 NY3d 443, 457 [2023]; Vega v Restani Const. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 503 [2012]), "regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers." (Matthews v Bright Star Messenger Ctr., LLC, 173 AD3d 732, 734 [2d Dept 2019]; see also Coastal Sheet Metal Corp. v Martin Assoc., 63 AD3d 617, 618 [1st Dept 2009]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324; Bazdaric v Almah Partners LLC, 41 NY3d 310, 316 [2024]).

When deciding a summary judgment motion, the court views evidence, inferences and facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. (see Sosa v 46th St. Dev. LLC, 101 AD3d 490, 492 [1st Dept 2012]; Rizzo v Lincoln Diner Corp., 215 AD2d 546, 546 [2d Dept 1995]).

B. Motion to Amend Petition

A summary proceeding petition is required to state the facts upon which the proceeding is based. (see RPAPL § 741(4)). The tenant is entitled to a concise statement of the ultimate facts [*5]upon which the proceeding is based. (see Giannini v Stuart, 6 AD2d 418, 178 NYS2d 709 [1st Dept 1958]). To be entitled to relief, it is necessary that a landlord "plead rent regulatory status and compliance with the appropriate statutes and codes... and actually be in compliance therewith." (Villas of Forest Hills Co. v Lumberger, 128 AD2d 701, 702 [2d Dept 1987]).

Respondents cite to the statutory language stating that where a small landlord exemption is alleged, "such landlord shall provide to the tenant or tenants . . . the name of each natural person who owns or is a beneficial owner of, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, the housing accommodation at issue in the proceeding, the number of units owned, jointly or separately, by each such natural person owner, and the addresses of any such units, excluding each natural person owner's principal residence . . . " (see RPL Art. 6-a, §214(1)).

Pointedly, respondents do not cite to any caselaw holding that such small landlord must provide that information within the four corners of the petition.

Even if petitioners are required to provide the information in the petition, the principle that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given (see Norwood v City of New York, 203 AD2d at 148-149) is just as applicable in this context as in the context of a respondent moving to amend an answer. (see also Edenwald Contracting Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 959 [1983] ["Permission to amend pleadings should be 'freely given'," absent prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay]).

Many pleading irregularities are amendable and do not require dismissal, and the law is clear that many defects even in the regulatory status are amendable. (see 17th Holding LLC v Rivera, 195 Misc 2d 531, 532 [App Term, 2d Dept 2002] [finding that failure to plead rent stabilization does not require dismissal, and is amendable absence prejudice]; Coalition Houses L.P. v Bonano, 12 Misc 3d 146[A], *1 [App Term, 1st Dept 2006]; see also generally Paikoff v Harris, 185 Misc 2d 372, 376 [App Term, 2d Dept 1999]; Hernco, LLC v Hernandez, 46 Misc 3d 137[A], *3 [App Term. 2d Dept 2015]).

Failure to plead GCEL requirements in the petition is akin to failure to plead rent stabilization, a recognizably amendable defect. Indeed, courts have specifically allowed amendment of petitions to include language or notices as to applicability of, or exemption under, GCEL, (see Inga v Revenco, 86 Misc 3d 1210[A], *4-5 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]; Sin Hang Lau v Yun He Zheng, 225 NYS3d 854, 858-859 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]; Barretta v Parilla, 85 Misc 3d 1222[A], *2 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2025]), and have even deemed a petition amended to plead GCEL exemption sua sponte and after trial, (see 47-05 Ctr. SPE L.L.C. v Hack, 2025 NY Slip Op 25129, n. 1 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2025]).

Petitioners here did not fail to plead whether GCEL applies, nor the specific exemption. They merely did not include proof of the small landlord exemption in their pleading. To the extent this is required, the motion to amend is granted.

Respondents are represented by counsel and are aware of their rights and defenses, especially as they relate to the GCEL. Furthermore, as petitioners allege the premises are exempt from GCEL, there is no potential right or defense available to them under GCEL, nor were respondents not placed on notice of a potentially applicable regulatory framework.

As such, no prejudice is shown from amendment of the petition. (see Servs. for the Underserved, Inc. v Mohammed, 79 Misc 3d 1205[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50536[U], *5 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2023]; 37-20 104th Street v. Sanchez, 76 Misc 3d 23, 25-26, 173 N.Y.S.3d 826 [App. Term, 2nd, 11th, & 13th Jud. Dists. 2022] [finding no prejudice where the tenant was prepared to litigate issues and denying dismissal]).

C. Failure to Include Petitioners' Properties Within the State of New York

Respondents argue petitioners were required to include a list of all properties owned by all landlords of the premises. The court is unclear where exactly this information is supposed to be included, as respondents never explicitly state if it is required to be included in the predicate, petition and/or in the GCEL notice.

Where petitioners' cross-motion to amend the petition was granted, the portion of the motion to dismiss the petition is denied as moot. As to failure to include the information in the predicate notice, rather than proving the alleged exemption at trial, as part of petitioners' prima facie case, the court is unpersuaded by respondents' arguments.

On April 20, 2024, GCEL went into effect. In properties where GCEL applies, the law restricts removal of protected tenants as of the effective date. (see L 2024, ch 56, part HH §§ 1; Queens St. Albans Holdings, LLC v Sands, 85 Misc 3d 275, 276 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2024]). The notice requirement pursuant to GCEL went into effect on August 18, 2024. (see L 2024, ch 56, part HH §§ 7(a); Queens St. Albans Holdings, LLC v Sands, 85 Misc 3d at 277).

"Thus, for any eviction proceeding commenced on or after April 20, 2024, a petitioner must plead if the housing accommodation is subject to GCEL (see RPAPL 741) . . . " (QN St. Albans Holdings LLC v Sands, 85 Misc 3d at 277), or plead good cause to evict under GCEL (see TD Equities, Inc. v Cribbs, 2025 NY Slip Op 50775[U], *4 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2025]).

The predicate notice was dated July 10, 2024, after GCEL went into effect, but prior to the notice requirements. As such, the predicate notice was required to state applicability of GCEL, or good cause to evict, but no GCEL notice was required to be attached.

Respondents' argument that the predicate notice is deficient for failure to list the properties owned by petitioners must be analyzed under the same standard applicable for assessing adequacy of a predicate notice in general.

In determining whether a predicate notice is adequate, the standard is one of "reasonableness in view of all attendant circumstances." (Hughes v Lenox Hill Hospital, 226 AD2d 4, 17 [1st Dept 1996]; 323 3rd St. LLC v Ortiz, 13 Misc 3d 141[A], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept 2006]; Ocean Five Two Two Assocs. v. Theodore, 2018 NYLJ LEXIS 4018, *4-5 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2018]).

"A summary holdover petition need only state 'facts upon which the special proceeding is based' so as to inform the tenant of the factual and legal claims that must be met, thus enabling the tenant to interpose any available defense." (McGoldrick v DeCruz, 195 Misc 2d 414, 415-416 [App Term, 1st Dept 2013]; Rascoff/Zsyblat Org., Inc. v Directors Guild of Am., Inc., 297 AD2d 241, 242 [1st Dept 2002]; Sydney Leasing Lp v. Maquilon, 2018 NYLJ LEXIS 674, *3 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2018]; Lincoln 54 LLC v Anansingh, 57 Misc 3d 1212[A], *2 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2017]).

Further, "[a] holdover proceeding will not lie absent a proper predicate notice. Predicate notices 'must be clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal ...'" (Ellivkroy Realty Corp. v HDP 86 Sponsor Corp., 162 AD2d 238, 238 [1st Dept 1990]; Lehtonen v Dellaquila, 67 Misc 3d 139[A], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept 2020]; SAAB Enters. v Bell, 198 AD2d 342, 343 [2d Dept 1993]).

Here, the predicate notice alleges that (i) respondents are month to month tenants; (ii) there is no current lease in effect; (iii) respondents had been living in the premises for over two years; (iv) the premises are not subject to rent regulations as the property is less than 6 units and were vacant after Aril 1, 1953; (v) the premises are exempt from GCEL as petitioners are small landlords owning less than 10 units; and (vi) respondents had to vacate and surrender possession [*6]by October 31, 2024. (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 3).

Under the circumstances, the predicate notice is sufficient on its face and apprises respondents of the factual and legal grounds for the proceeding. That respondents dispute these allegations, or may even ultimately prevail, does not make the notice improper, nor does it mean petitioners failed to state a cause of action. (see Howard Stores Corp. v Pope, 1 NY2d at 114; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 634 [1976]; NY County Dist. Attorney's Off. v Oquendo, 147 Misc 2d 125, 131 [Civ Ct, New York County 1990]).

Requiring petitioners to show proof of the small landlord exemption runs afoul of prevailing caselaw that a predicate notice need not lay bare a landlord's proof at trial and is found to be sufficient where "the notice is 'as a whole sufficient adequately to advise . . . tenant and to permit it to frame a defense'." (McGoldrick v DeCruz, 195 Misc 2d at 415-416, quoting Rascoff/Zsyblat Org., Inc. v Directors Guild of Am., Inc., 297 AD2d at 242).

Just as petitioners are not required to prove that the premises are not subject to rent regulation in the predicate notice, they need not prove the GCEL exemption therein. At trial, petitioners must still prove their prima facie case, including the pleaded regulatory framework.

As such, the motion to dismiss for a defective predicate notice is denied. Respondents' first affirmative defense is stricken. Any further information respondents allege should have been included in the predicate notice are more appropriate for a demand for a bill of particulars or a discovery motion and respondents can obtain any such additional details through these appropriate devices. (see McGoldrick v. DeCruz, 195 Misc 2d at 415; City of New York v Valera, 216 AD2d 237, 238 [1st Dept 1995]; Chelsea 19 Assocs. v Coyle, 22 Misc 3d 140(A), *2 [App Term, 1st Dept 2009]).

The availability of discovery in summary proceedings is well established and courts have consistently held discovery is not "inherently hostile" to the nature of a summary proceeding. (see New York Univ. v Farkas, 121 Misc 2d 643, 645 [Civ Ct, New York County 1983], quoting 42 West 15th Street Corp. v Friedman, 208 Misc. 123, 125 [App Term, 1st Dept 1955]).

Leave to conduct discovery in a summary proceeding may be granted by leave of court pursuant to CPLR §408 where "ample need" is shown by the party requesting disclosure. (see New York Univ. v Farkas, 121 Misc 2d at 646; Mautner-Glick Corp. v. Higgins, 64 Misc 3d 16, 18 [App Term, 1st Dept 2019]). Courts will consider the following factors in determining whether the "ample need" standard is met:

"In determining whether ample need has been established, courts consider a number of factors, not all of which need to be present in every case, including whether the party seeking discovery has asserted facts to establish a claim or defense; whether there is a need to determine information directly related to the claim or defense; whether the requested disclosure is carefully tailored and likely to clarify the disputed facts; whether prejudice will result from granting leave to conduct discovery; whether any prejudice caused by granting a discovery request can be diminished by an order fashioned by the court for that purpose; and whether the court, in its supervisory role, can structure discovery so that pro se tenants in particular will be protected."

(Mautner-Glick Corp. v Higgins, 64 Misc 3d at 18-19, citing New York Univ. v Farkas, 121 Misc 2d at 647; see also Smilow v Ulrich, 11 Misc 3d 179, 182, 806 NYS2d 392 [Civ Ct, New York County 2005] ["movant must demonstrate 'ample need' for a claim or defense. Requests for disclosure should be carefully tailored to obtain information necessary to a tenant's defenses or [*7]counterclaims."], citing New York Univ. v Farkas, 121 Misc 2d at 647).

Here, respondents are entitled to limited discovery as to petitioners' claim that they are small landlords, the pleaded GCEL exemption.

The document demands are denied to the extent that they seek discovery from non-party landlord trustees and/or beneficiaries. Respondents cannot seek discovery without, at minimum, identifying and serving such parties with the discovery motion.

The first demand, seeking the deed or other instrument of ownership or agency, of each property in New York State in which petitioners are owners or beneficial owners, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, is granted. This goes directly to the heart of the petitioners' claimed small landlord exemption to GCEL and will streamline the issues for trial. Moreover, this information is required by RPL Art. 6-a, §214(1)).

The second demand seeking rent rolls, rent ledgers, and/or lease agreements for any property owned by any petitioner is denied. These documents are not necessary to prove any claim or defense.

Demand three, seeking i-cards, certificates of occupancy, and/or the multiple dwelling registrations for each property owned by petitioners is granted for the same reasons as demand one. This demand is granted solely to the extent that such documents are within the exclusive possession and control of petitioners, and are not public records available through the Department of Buildings ("DOB"), Department of Housing Preservation and Development ("HPD"), or other agencies through FOIL requests or subpoenas. If these documents are otherwise available, discovery is denied. (Cabellero v City of NY, 48 AD3d 727, 728 [2d Dept 2008]; Blagrove v Cox, 294 AD2d 526 [2d Dept 2002]).

Finally, demand four seeking "all communication" between petitioners and "Flash Shelton" or "Squatter Hunters," this demand is denied. It is vague and overly broad, not narrowly tailored. "[A] demand for the production of documents must specify the items sought with 'reasonable particularity,' and the burden of specificity is on the requesting party . . . more often than not, the utilization of the language 'any and all,' which is the case here, is an indication of a lack of the requisite specificity." (WM Wellington, LLC v Grafstein Diamond, Inc., 22 Misc 3d 1123[A], *3 [Civ Ct, New York County 2009], citing Mendelowitz v Xerox, 169 AD2d 300, 573 N.Y.S.2d 548 [1st Dept 1991]; Ganin v Janow, 86 AD2d 857, 858 [2d Dept 1982]); Kantor v Kaye, 114 AD2d 782, 782-783 [1st Dept 1985]).

Interrogatories one through three are granted. Respondents properly seek the names of any persons or entities who are considered landlords of the subject premises, the address of each property that petitioners or other landlords are owners or beneficial owners of, and the number of units in each property. This information goes directly to the heart of the petitioners' claimed small landlord exemption to GCEL and will streamline the issues for trial. Moreover, this information is required by RPL Art. 6-a, §214(1)).

Interrogatory four, seeking information as to any potentially destroyed documents granted per the document demand is denied as duplicative. The discovery instructions already discuss how to handle documents that may have been destroyed.

Respondents seek a list of witnesses petitioner intends to call at trial in interrogatory five. Respondents have ample need for a witness list, including names and position or title of each witness. As to addresses or phone numbers, petitioners need provide only work addresses.

Finally, interrogatory six, directing petitioners to state the relationship of "Flash Shelton" or "Squatter Hunters" to the premises, as well as how they came to be involved with the [*8]premises or petitioners, is granted as it goes to respondents' harassment counterclaim.

To the extent that any documents or information directed to be provided herein has already been provided, petitioners need not duplicate the documents or information. To the extent such documents or information do not exist, petitioners are to provide sworn affidavits attesting to same.

Based on all the foregoing, respondents' motion to amend the answer is granted to the extent discussed herein (except the first affirmative defense is stricken), petitioner's cross-motion to amend the petition is granted, respondents' motion to dismiss is denied, and respondents' motion for discovery is granted in part and denied in part.

Petitioners are directed to comply with this Order and respond to respondents' discovery demands/interrogatories within 30 days of service of this Order upon petitioner with notice of entry. This matter is adjourned to December 2, 2025 at 9:30am, Part C Room 402, for the Court to monitor compliance.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court. It will be posted on NYSCEF.