Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a small claims matter in Syracuse City Court on June 2, 2025, seeking a refund of rent and security deposit in the amount of $5,000.00. Plaintiff alleges that the residential unit was uninhabitable. The case is scheduled for hearing before an arbitrator on July 24, 2025.

On or about July 2, 2025, Defendant DLH Properties Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss, supported by an Affidavit from Sarah Bryan, who purports to be a district manager for DLH Properties, Inc. The motion advances the following arguments: (1) that Plaintiff was never a tenant of DLH Properties Inc. under any lease; (2) that DLH Properties, Inc. is merely a holding company and does not own any real property in New York State; (3) that "Clarendon Heights Apartments" is not a legal entity; and, (4) that DLH Properties, Inc. operates only in Cortland County and has no presence in Onondaga County, allegedly depriving this Court of jurisdiction.The motion is denied in its entirety for the reasons set forth below.

This Court begins by noting that written motion practice in small claims court is strongly disfavored and rarely, if ever, to be entertained (Rackowski v Araya, 152 AD3d 834, 836 [3d Dept 2017]). The statutory framework governing small claims proceedings in city courts was enacted specifically to provide a simplified, accessible forum for litigants without legal training to resolve disputes quickly and inexpensively. "One of the hallmarks of small claims procedure is the absence of legal niceties, and technical rules" (Weiner v Tel Aviv Car & Limousine Serv., [*2]Ltd., 141 Misc 2d 339, 341 [Civ Ct, NY County 1988]). Lay claimants are at a distinct and well-documented disadvantage when faced with formal motion practice in small claims court, a forum specifically designed to operate free from the procedural complexity of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). The entire statutory design of the small claims system under the Uniform City Court Act (UCCA) is predicated on the assumption that litigants, often appearing pro se, should not need legal training or familiarity with court procedure to have their claims heard and resolved on the merits.

Forcing a self-represented party to respond to a motion to dismiss, particularly one invoking legal doctrines such as lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, or corporate misidentification, introduces procedural barriers that small claims court was explicitly designed to eliminate.

The Legislature codified this purpose in UCCA § 1804 and UCCA § 1807, which obligate the court to "do substantial justice between the parties" and minimize procedural hurdles. Indeed, UCCA § 1803(a) eliminates the need for traditional pleadings, providing that there shall be no required pleading other than a statement of his cause of action by the claimant or someone in his behalf to the clerk. The clerk then reduces the claim "to a concise, written form." It is inconsistent with the legislative mandate for the court to entertain written motions addressed to the face of a pleading drafted by the clerk of the court.

New York courts have uniformly recognized that pretrial motion practice, particularly motions to dismiss, is antithetical to the statutory scheme. In Friedman v Seward Park Hous. Corp. (167 Misc 2d 57, 58 [App Term, 1st Dept 1995]), the Appellate Term reversed dismissal of a small claims case on a motion, emphasizing that the informality and convenience of small claims practice is necessarily frustrated by requiring pro se litigants to respond to formal motion practice under the CPLR. That principle was reaffirmed in Williams v Friedman Mgt. Corp. (11 Misc 3d 139[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50579[U], *at *1 [App Term, 1st Dept]), where the court noted that substantial justice is best served by a prompt trial of plaintiff's claim.

This Court is under no obligation to entertain a motion to dismiss in small claims, particularly where, as here, Plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to present evidence. As held in Moskowitz v Herrmann (60 Misc 3d 1230[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51274[U], *at *2 [City Ct, White Plains 2018]), pre-answer motions to dismiss are inconsistent with the simplified procedures envisioned by the UCCA, and their use should be limited to only the clearest and most extraordinary cases (see also Selvy v Albany Police Dept., 186 Misc 2d 518 [Albany City Ct 2000]).

Defendant asserts that the action must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to name the correct legal entity, alleging that DLH Properties, Inc. does not own the property, and that "Clarendon Heights Apartments" is not a legal entity.

This argument is flatly contradicted by UCCA § 1814. Even if Plaintiff did not name the precise legal entity that owns or manages the subject property, such an error is not fatal. UCCA § 1814 grants the small claims court broad authority to amend a caption before, during, or even after trial to correct the name of a party, including correcting misnomers in the caption or identifying the correct entity. The statutory purpose of UCCA § 1814 is to avoid dismissals based on technicalities that would otherwise prevent "substantial justice." As the Appellate Term [*3]held in Goldstein v Uncle Sam's NY LLC (41 Misc 3d 81, 82 [App Term, 1st Dept 2013]), the proper test for amending the caption post-judgment is whether there is anything at all about the way the defendant has referred to itself in conducting its business that could reasonably have led the claimant to name the defendant as it was in fact named in the initial small claims papers.

Here, Plaintiff identifies a specific residential apartment complex as the subject of the alleged tenancy and resulting dispute. Whether the naming of DLH Properties, Inc. reflects a reasonable, good faith understanding of the ownership or management structure of that property is not something that can be resolved on the face of the claim. The question at this stage is not whether Plaintiff named the correct legal entity with precision, but whether there is any factual basis that could support a good faith belief that DLH Properties, Inc., or an affiliated entity, was connected to the premises or the alleged tenancy. That is a factual inquiry that should be addressed at hearing. It is not appropriate to dismiss a claim prior to trial where the underlying dispute may involve complex or opaque corporate relationships, especially where the claimant has no obligation to conduct pre-suit investigation or legal research to untangle those affiliations. Whether amendment is warranted under UCCA § 1814 must await development of the facts. The Court declines to treat technical uncertainty in party naming as a bar to being heard.

Defendant's claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction because DLH Properties, Inc. does not transact business in Onondaga County is legally incorrect.

UCCA §1801 provides that jurisdiction exists where the defendant resides, is regularly employed, has an office for the transaction of business, or "where the claimant is or was a tenant or lessee of real property owned by the defendant and the claim relates to such tenancy or lease, and such real property is situated within the county." (Bogom-Shanon v Altman, 85 Misc 3d 1100, 1105 [Civ Ct, New York County 2024]).

This jurisdictional framework was deliberately expanded by the Legislature in 2021 to correct a longstanding inequity identified by courts and commentators. As early as 1993, courts recognized a statutory "gap" that allowed out-of-county landlords to sue in small claims courts where their tenants resided, while denying those same tenants reciprocal access to sue landlords who resided or maintained offices outside the county (Solomon v Correll, 157 Misc 2d 387, 389 [Binghamton City Ct 1993]; Valentino v Principio, 174 Misc 2d 709, 710 [Geneva City Ct 1997]). In response, the Legislature passed Chapter 485 of the Laws of 2021, amending UCCA §1801 to explicitly confer jurisdiction "when the claimant is or was a tenant or lessee, the defendant is the property owner, the claim relates to such tenancy or lease, and the property is situated within the county." (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2021, ch 485 at 6.) That is precisely the scenario presented here.

Whether DLH Properties, Inc. is ultimately the true owner or merely affiliated with the actual owner is a factual question for trial. At this stage, the notice of claim, which identifies a tenancy at Clarendon Heights Apartments located in Syracuse, Onondaga County, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under UCCA § 1801.

Finally, even if this Court were to construe Defendant's application as a motion to [*4]dismiss under CPLR § 3211(a)(1) based on documentary evidence, dismissal would still be improper.

Even if entertained, such motions face a high burden. A motion premised upon documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR §3211 (a) (1) "may be appropriately granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff's factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law" (Goshen v Mut. Life Ins. Co. of NY, 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]). Thus, the burden on a defendant seeking dismissal of a self-represented claimant's small claim is very high (see Fishman v Allstate Ins. Co., 2022 NY Misc LEXIS 6855, *at *2 [Civ Ct, Bronx County July 8, 2022, No. SC-300-21/BX]).

The Affidavit submitted by Sarah Bryan, purporting to establish that DLH Properties, Inc. does not own any real property in New York State and had no relationship with Plaintiff, is not "documentary evidence" within the meaning of CPLR § 3211 (a) (1) and cannot serve as the basis for dismissal under that statute.

New York courts have consistently held that the type of evidence required to support dismissal under CPLR § 3211 (a)(1) must be unambiguous, authentic, and essentially undeniable (Eisner v Cusumano Constr., Inc., 132 AD3d 940, 941 [2d Dept 2015]; Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73 AD3d 78, 85 [2d Dept 2010]). The term "documentary evidence" refers specifically to judicial records, contracts, deeds, mortgages, or other official, undisputed documents that conclusively resolve the issues raised in the pleadings without the need for further factual development (Olivera-Perez v B.A.M. Bldrs., Inc., 229 AD3d 709, 711 [2d Dept 2024]). Affidavits, even if sworn and notarized, generally do not qualify as documentary evidence because they inherently contain factual assertions, may be based on hearsay or limited personal knowledge, and are subject to credibility determinations that must be made at trial, not resolved on motion (Olivera-Perez v B.A.M. Bldrs., Inc., 229 AD3d 709, 711 [2d Dept 2024]; 90th St. Corp. v 203 W. 90th St. Retail, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 33340[U], *11 [Sup Ct, NY County 2019]).

Accordingly, Ms. Bryant's Affidavit is simply a factual assertion that contradicts the allegations of the claim, it does not "utterly refute" them as required by law. At most, her Affidavit raises disputed issues of fact regarding which entity owns or manages the subject property, and whether a tenancy existed between Plaintiff and DLH Properties, Inc. Such factual disputes are very likely to be properly resolved at the small claims hearing.

Therefore, even if this Court were to consider the motion under CPLR § 3211 (a)(1), dismissal would be improper because Defendant has not submitted qualifying documentary evidence capable of conclusively disposing of the claim at this stage.

The Court has reviewed Defendant's motion and denies it sua sponte without requiring written opposition from Plaintiff, consistent with the informal procedures governing small claims matters under UCCA Article 18. The parties are directed to appear for arbitration on July 24, 2025, at the time previously scheduled.

This letter shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.