People v Dickson
2026 NY Slip Op 01388 [247 AD3d 943]
March 11, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law ยง 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, May 6, 2026
The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
Kapri Dickson, Appellant.
March 11, 2026
HEADNOTES
Crimes — Sex Offenders — Sex Offender Registration Act — Downward Departure
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Twyla Carter, New York, NY (Steven J. Miraglia of counsel), for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill and William H. Branigan of counsel; Ariel Gootkin and Rolanda Coleman on the brief), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Ushir Pandit-Durant, J.), dated September 30, 2021, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The defendant was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of kidnapping in the second degree. After a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C), the Supreme Court assessed the defendant a total of 95 points on the risk assessment instrument, denied the defendant's application for a downward departure from the presumptive risk level, and designated him a level two sex offender. The defendant appeals.
A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of "(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" (People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d 112, 128 [2011]; see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary [hereinafter Guidelines] at 4 [2006]; People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d 841, 861 [2014]). If the defendant makes that twofold showing, the court must exercise its discretion by weighing the mitigating factors to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an overassessment of the defendant's dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism (see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d at 861).
Here, the defendant failed to establish that a downward departure was warranted. While a defendant's response to sex offender treatment may qualify as a ground for a downward departure where the response is "exceptional" (Guidelines at 17; see People v Washington, 84 AD3d 910, 911 [2011]), the defendant failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his response to treatment, while positive, was exceptional (see People v Simms, 232 AD3d 815, 816 [2024]; People v Coleman, 225 AD3d 792, 794 [2024]). Moreover, the defendant failed to demonstrate how the support of his family established a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community (see People v Rucano, 213 AD3d 709, 710 [2023]; People v Peaks, 207 AD3d 482, 483 [2022]; People v Saintilus, 169 AD3d [*2]838, 839 [2019]). Furthermore, the defendant's expression of remorse and acceptance of responsibility were already taken into account by the Guidelines (see People v Banister, 243 AD3d 928, 928 [2025]; People v Musarra, 240 AD3d 624, 625 [2025]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's application for a downward departure and designated the defendant a level two sex offender. Brathwaite Nelson, J.P., Christopher, Ventura and Golia, JJ., concur.