March 31, 2026

Order, Family Court, New York County (Jonathan H. Shim, J.), entered on or about January 16, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, following a hearing, modified the parties' judgment of divorce to grant petitioner mother sole legal and physical custody of the subject children and to grant the father weekly supervised telephone calls and email communication with the children, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Family Court providently determined that a change in circumstances existed to warrant modification of the custody and parental access provisions of the 2018 agreement (see Alexander C.E. v Anne Y.E., 176 AD3d 529, 530 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 908 [2020]), and that the mother established that her having sole legal and physical custody would be in the children's best interests (see Matter of Evangelina C. v Maksim K., 203 AD3d 536, 537 [1st Dept 2022]). The court credited the mother's testimony that the father's deteriorating mental health adversely affected his ability to parent in a safe and appropriate manner and hindered the parties' ability to make joint decisions concerning the children. Specifically, the father prevented the children from completing homework while in his care. He pulled his daughter by the hair around the apartment because he perceived her as being disrespectful, prompting her brother to intervene. On another occasion, he physically blocked the daughter from leaving the apartment, again accusing her of disrespect.

Although the father acknowledged that he was angry and frustrated with the children, he expressed no insight into how his behavior affected them. Shortly before the mother filed the modification petition, the father called the children and engaged in rambling conversations about nonsensical topics. He also forgot their scheduled activities and blamed them for his lapses. Additionally, the father admitted to banging his head against the wall, causing the children distress. His relationship with the children had deteriorated to a point where they were fearful of him and did not wish to have in-person contact.

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Contrary to the father's contention, Family Court's determination that limiting his parental access to supervised telephone and email communication was in the children's best interests is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of M.K. v H.M., 209 AD3d 471, 472 [1st Dept 2022]). The evidence showed that the father's mental health had deteriorated over time. The father's repeated emotionally harmful behavior toward the children—such as screaming at them during therapy, discussing the ongoing litigation despite court admonitions and the children's pleas to stop, demeaning the mother, pressuring the children to take sides, and prioritizing legal battles over their well-being—demonstrated a profound disregard for their psychological health. Moreover, his parenting time and telephonic communications repeatedly caused the children emotional distress, and he consistently blamed the mother and the court system for his strained relationship with the children (see id.).

"Although not controlling, the court was entitled to place great weight on the [children's] wishes due to their age and maturity" (Matter of K.M.P. v A.D., 235 AD3d 495, 496 [1st Dept 2025]). At the time of the in-camera interview, the children were nearly 15 years old and had consistently expressed a strong preference not to have in-person contact with the father.

The father's argument that the prolonged duration of the proceedings rendered the process fundamentally unfair is unpreserved for appellate review (see Matter of A.R. [A.A.], 237 AD3d 551, 551 [1st Dept 2025]). On the merits, the father frequently caused delays by failing to provide mental health records, changing counsel multiple times, giving evasive and confusing testimony, and insisting on the Mental Health Services evaluation being completed before proceeding with the fact-finding hearing. The trial was conducted as expeditiously as possible amid pandemic-related court backlogs, and the court took all reasonable steps to facilitate his relationship with the children, but delays were largely due to the father's own actions and noncompliance with court directives.

Similarly, the father's evidentiary rulings argument is unpreserved and is not supported by the record. In any event, even if the court had erred in some of its evidentiary rulings, the error was harmless because there is no reason to believe that the outcome of the hearing would have been different (see Matter of Chirag C. v Jaimie D., 226 AD3d 470, 471 [1st Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 907 [2024]).

As to the father's bias claims, the contention is also unpreserved, and he presents no factual basis to demonstrate that the court's decision was the result of a predetermined outcome (see Matter of Skarlith G. v Guelvis J.C., 184 AD3d 470, 471 [1st Dept 2020]).

We have considered the father's remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Moulton, J.P., Kennedy, Rodriguez, Michael, Chan, JJ.