Supreme Court, New York County

Decided on September 19, 2025

Index No. 156873/2019

Denis Reo, J.

[*1]

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 112, 113 were read on this motion to/for SUMMARY JUDGMENT (AFTER JOINDER)

Plaintiffs Arne and Lissa Mattsson, who are married, bring this action for defamation, libel per se and loss of consortium, seeking redress for harms that they allegedly suffered as the result of two articles published by defendant NYP Holdings, Inc. d/b/a The New York Post, written by defendant Priscilla DeGregory, and edited by defendant Stephen Lynch. Plaintiffs contend that, in the articles, defendant Vivian Jackson made false and defamatory statements concerning alleged sexual abuse committed by Mr. Mattsson against her son, defendant W.J. (W.J.), in 2013, when he was a minor student at Our Lady of Pompeii School.

Defendants W.J. and Vivian Jackson now move, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment dismissing all claims alleged against them or in the alternative, for a stay of this action [*2]pending resolution of the action entitled W.J., a/k/a John Doe v Our Lady of Pompeii School et al. (Index No. 151709/2018 [Sup Ct, NY County 2018]) (the W.J. action).

For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed. The motion for a stay is denied as moot.

FACTS

In 2016, W.J., a teenager at the time, disclosed to his mother that he was sexually abused at middle school in 2013. The disclosure came about while W.J. was hospitalized for a second suicide attempt (see W.J. dep [NYSCEF Doc No. 92], at 79; see also Vivian Jackson dep [NYSCEF Doc No. 93], at 13). W.J. testified that the suicide attempt stemmed from that sexual abuse (see W.J. dep, at 153). Vivian Jackson testified that she believed, and continues to believe, that her son was sexually abused (see Vivian Jackson dep, at 51-52). She further testified that, since 2016, she has understood, through her son, that W.J.'s abuser was a staff member at Our Lady of Pompeii School, his middle school, named Arne Mattsson (see Vivian Jackson dep, at 165-170).

Subsequently, in February of 2016, Vivian Jackson went to the Manhattan District Attorney's office with W.J. and their attorney, claiming that in 2013, Mr. Mattsson forcibly engaged in sexual relations with W.J. Mr. Mattsson supervised WJ in 2013, at an afterschool program offered at the school (W.J. dep, at 117-119). Vivian Jackson reported W.J.'s allegations to the police and cooperated with the District Attorney's investigation into the allegations (see Vivian Jackson's dep, at 40-42; 71-74; see also W.J. dep, at 127-129). W.J. testified that he was sexually abused in the incidents that he disclosed to his mother and the District Attorney's office (see W.J. dep, at 128-129).

The District Attorney's office advised Vivian Jackson that, during the course of their investigation, an anonymous letter was sent to the authorities accusing Mr. Mattsson of an additional sexual abuse allegation (see Vivian Jackson dep, at 46-47). However, after the investigation, the District Attorney's office determined that more evidence was needed to charge Mr. Mattsson (see id. at 48).

On March 12, 2018, W.J., assisted by his mother, retained an attorney to pursue a civil action against Our Lady of Pompeii School, associated entities, and Mr. Mattsson — the W.J. action (Vivian Jackson dep, at 121-124; see second amended complaint in the W.J. action [NYSCEF Doc No. 88]).

During the pendency of the W.J. litigation, Vivian Jackson, pursuant to the advice of W.J.'s civil attorney, and with the assistance of her sister, provided a single twenty-minute telephone interview, about the allegations in the case to a reporter from the New York Post (see Vivian Jackson dep, at 102-107). W.J. never spoke to the reporter, or anyone at the New York Post (see W.J. dep, at 140).

Subsequently, the New York Post published two articles on the subject, a web article on October 14, 2018, and a newspaper version on October 15, 2018 (see complaint [NYSCEF Doc No. 1], exhibit B). The online and print articles are identical, except for the headlines (id., ¶ 32). Both W.J. and his mother testified that they agreed with every substantive assertion, attributed to Vivian Jackson, within the articles (see Vivian Jackson dep, at 33-39; 44-48; see also W.J. dep, at 29-35). Vivian Jackson agreed with the content of the articles, and testified consistently herein, that her hope in speaking to the New York Post was to encourage other sexual abuse survivors to come forward (see Vivian Jackson dep, at 48).

The web article, in its entirety, reads as follows:

"Mom claims Catholic school teacher raped her son: suit

By PRISCILA DeGREGORY

A seventh-grade boy with Asperger's syndrome was raped by a teacher at a Catholic school in Greenwich Village, a lawsuit alleges — and the accuser's mom fears her son is not the only victim.

The family of the now-19-year-old accuser has anonymously sued Our Lady of Pompeii School and third-grade teacher Arne Mattsson in Manhattan Supreme Court, saying the teen was sexually abused repeatedly starting Valentine's Day 2013.

The then-13-year-old had joined an after-school program in October 2012 in which students were assigned as assistants to teachers two days a week, the suit says. The boy was assigned to the married teacher — who "groomed" him for the next few months, the teen's mom told The Post.

"He knew exactly who to pick,'' the single mom alleged. "He knew [my son] was vulnerable and looking for a male role model. He knew exactly what to say to my son. "They became like best friends."

The mom, who, like her son, did not want to be identified, said "the first sex attempt" came Feb. 14, 2013.

The teen "remembers that day very clearly," she said.

In an affidavit, her son said, "The teacher forced himself on me. At first, he made me touch his genitals with my hand and my mouth. Over the course of time, his actions escalated to rape. This continued until the end of the school year in May 2013."

He says in the suit that Mattsson threatened to hurt his family if he told anyone.

The abuse came to light almost three years later during therapy, when the teen was hospitalized for weeks for suicidal thoughts, his mom and court papers say.

She said that after learning of her son's abuse, she went to the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, which opened an investigation.

The mom also said she learned an anonymous letter was sent to the Bleecker Street school by another student making similar claims against Mattsson. Prosecutors confirmed with a DNA test that the note wasn't sent by her son, she said.

She said her son felt "vindicated" when he heard about the letter.

"He was like, 'Mom, there is somebody else like this out there,'" the mother recalled.

Still, she said the DA's office determined it needed more evidence.

Mattsson's lawyer, Andrew Bernstein, said that prosecutors closed the case on his client and that the school allowed him to return to the classroom around September 2017.

"The allegation against Mr. Mattsson is completely false, and he is absolutely innocent," he said.

The DA's office declined to comment, as did the school.

The teen's mom said she hopes other accusers will step forward.

The family's lawyer, Jeffrey Antin, said, "If this allegation against this teacher became known to other students, it might prompt other students to be less afraid to say if something happened to them, as well"

(10/14/18 web article [NYSCEF Doc No. 105]). The October 15, 2018 newspaper article (NYSCEF Doc No. 104) reports the same information (see Complaint, Exhibit B). Of note, none of the quotes in the articles were attributed to W.J.

Plaintiffs commenced this action on July 12, 2019, by filing the summons and complaint. By order and decision dated December 23, 2019 (NYSCEF Doc No. 38), Justice Shlomo Hagler dismissed the complaint as against the New York Post, DeGregory and Lynch, for failure to state a cause of action.

Discovery in this action, including depositions and interrogatories, was complete by mid-2024. On October 3, 2024, plaintiffs filed the Note of Issue (NYSCEF Doc No. 95).

DISCUSSION

In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants contend that because "the complained of statements originate in and relate to the central allegations in the pending W.J. action," such statements are absolutely privileged pursuant to the "litigation privilege" (defendants' memorandum [NYSCEF Doc No. 84], at 12-13).

An absolute privilege affords a speaker or writer immunity from liability for an otherwise defamatory statement to which the privilege applies, regardless of the motive with which the statement was made (Park Knoll Assoc. v Schmidt, 59 NY2d 205, 208-209 [1983]). With respect to the litigation privilege, "[a] statement made at any stage of a judicial proceeding in communications among the parties, witnesses, counsel, and the court, regardless of the motive with which it is made, 'is absolutely privileged if, by any view or under any circumstances, it may be considered pertinent to the litigation'" (Davidoff v Kaplan, 217 AD3d 918, 910 [2d Dept 2023], quoting Martirano v Frost, 25 NY2d 505, 507 [1969]; see also NCCMI, Inc. v Bersin Props., LLC, 226 AD3d 88, 96, n2 [1st Dept 2024] ["the litigation privilege protects statements made in judicial proceedings as nonactionable for defamation claims"]). The privilege related to litigation extends to similar types of communications that are "pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation" (Front, Inc. v Khalil, 24 NY3d 713, 720 [2015]).

Although this court agrees that the statements made by Vivian Jackson in the New York Post article are absolutely privileged, the litigation privilege does not apply here, because the alleged defamatory statements "were not communications among the parties, witnesses, counsel, and the court, either during actual litigation or pertinent to good faith anticipated litigation" (S&P Pharmacy Corp. v Syed, 238 AD3d 1188, 1190 [1st Dept 2025]).

Nevertheless, this court finds that the allegedly defamatory statements are absolutely privileged under the "fair report" privilege, as set forth in Civil Rights Law § 74 FN1. Pursuant to the fair report privilege, "[a] civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm, or corporation, for the publication of a fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other official proceeding" (Civil Rights Law § 74; see Cholowsky v Civiletti, 69 AD3d 110, 114 [2d Dept 2009] [it is "incumbent on the party asserting the privilege to establish that the statements at issue reported on a 'judicial proceeding'"]). "The privilege afforded by Civil Rights Law § 74 is an affirmative defense to a claim of defamation" (Greenberg v Spitzer, 155 AD3d 27, 42 [2d Dept 2017]). Whether an article presents a fair and true report of a judicial or official proceeding is a threshold question of law for the court to decide (Holy Spirit Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity v New York Times Co., 49 NY2d 63, 68 [1979]).

The privilege created by Section 74 is "absolute and is not defeated by the plaintiff's allegations of malice or bad faith" (Pelayo v Celle, 270 AD2d 469, 469 [2d Dept 2000]; accord Panghat v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 89 AD3d 597, 597 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 19 NY3d 389 [2012], cert denied 568 US 943 [2012]). Thus, the fair report privilege cannot be overcome even by the assertion that the defendant "knew" that allegations reflected in an official proceeding were false (see CBS Broadcasting Inc. v Counterr Group, 2008 WL 11350274, * 14, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 126089, * 41 [SDNY 2008 ] [the fact that a party "knew the statements it published were false is of no consequence, as malice does not defeat the privilege accorded by Section 74 to reports of judicial proceedings"]).

The fair report privilege has been liberally interpreted to provide broad protection for news reports of judicial proceedings (Holy Spirit, 49 NY2d at 67). Thus, this privilege applies "where the publication is a comment on a judicial, legislative or other official proceeding ... and is a 'fair and true' report of that proceeding" (Saleh v New York Post, 78 AD3d 1149, 1151 [2d Dept 2010]). Courts construe the first element broadly, and the report or article need not stem directly from a judicial proceeding, but rather, can be about a judicial proceeding. Accordingly, "[c]omments that essentially summarize or restate allegations of a pleading filed in an action are the type of statements that fall with section 74's privilege" (Lacher v Engel, 33 AD3d 10, 17 [1st Dept 2006]; accord Russian Am. Found., Inc. v Daily News, L.P., 109 AD3d 410, 413 [1st Dept 2013]). However, "i[f] the context in which the statements are made make it impossible for the ordinary viewer [listener or reader] to determine whether defendant was reporting on a judicial proceeding, the absolute privilege does not apply" (Cholowsky, 69 AD3d at 114-115 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

As to the "fair and true" element, courts again take a broad view, with the Court of Appeals noting that for a report to be characterized as fair and true, "it is enough that the substance of the article is substantially accurate" (Holy Spirit, 49 NY2d at 67). Minor inaccuracies will not remove the article from the ambit of the statute (Saleh, 78 AD3d at 1153; Posner v New York Law Publ. Co., 228 AD2d 318, 318 [1st Dept 1996]). Courts have rejected the notion that a news report be tested for literal accuracy because the language should not be "dissected and analyzed with a lexicographer's precision ... because a newspaper article [or on-line report] is, by its very nature, a condensed report of events which must, of necessity, reflect to some degree the subjective viewpoint of its author" (Holy Spirit, 49 NY2d at 68; accord Alf v Buffalo News, Inc., 21 NY3d 988, 990 [2013]). Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the article "provided substantially accurate reporting" (Alf, 21 NY3d at 990 ["'newspaper accounts of ... official proceedings must be accorded some degree of liberality'"] [citation omitted] ; see also McRedmond v Sutton Place Rest. & Bar, Inc., 48 AD3d 258, 259 [1st Dept 2008]).

"Substantially accurate is interpreted liberally," and "the test is whether the published account of the proceeding would have a different effect on the reader's mind than the actual truth, if published" (Highland Capital Mgt., L.P. v Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 178 AD3d 572, 573 [1st Dept 2019] [quotation marks and citation omitted]). Even the failure to report other facts that were favorable to the complainant in the published news report constitutes a fair report where "those omissions did not alter the substantially accurate character of the article" (McDonald v East Hampton Star, 10 AD3d 639, 640 [2d Dept 2004]; accord Rakofsky v Washington Post, 39 Misc 3d 1226[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50739[U], * 9 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013]). However, if the report "suggests more serious conduct than that actually suggested in the official proceeding, then the privilege does not attach, as a matter of law" (Daniel Goldreyer, [*3]Ltd. v Van de Wetering, 217 AD2d 434, 465-436 [1st Dept 1995]). In summary, a court "must look for substantial and contextual accuracy of the news report as the standard for determining a fair report under [section 74]" (Rakofsky, 39 Misc 3d 1226[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50739[U], at * 9).

Accordingly, based on these principles, New York courts routinely grant motions to dismiss defamation claims based on the fair report privilege where, as here, they arise from reporting on court proceedings (see e.g. Golan v Dailey News, L.P., 214 AD3d 558, 559 [1st Dept 2023] ["the court correctly determined that a news article published by defendants reporting on allegations that plaintiff, a real estate developer, took advantage of vulnerable homeowners by paying them less than fair market value for homes in gentrifying neighborhoods was privileged under Civil Rights Law § 74," because "(t)he article contained fair and true accounts of the judicial proceedings against plaintiff"]; Lively v Wafra Inv. Advisory Group, Inc., 211 AD3d 432, 434 [1st Dept 2022] ["to the extent defendants' statements are based on the Equal Opportunity Commission complaint filed by the employee who complained of plaintiff's behavior, the statements are protected under Civil Rights Law § 74"]; Highland Cap. Mgt., L.P., 178 AD3d at 573 ["Here, the articles and tweets were substantially reports of the arbitration decision"]).

As is relevant here, the fair report privilege may be invoked by "'all persons,'" not just "'newspapers and radio broadcasters'" (Williams v Williams, 23 NY2d 592, 597 [1969]; accord D'Annunzio v Ayken, Inc., 876 F Supp 2d 211, 221 [EDNY 2012] ["Section 74 applies to 'any person,' not just to journalists or attorneys"] [citation omitted]; Highland Cap. Mgt. v Stern, 2017 WL 1537058, * 1 [Sup Ct, NY County 2017], affd, 157 AD3d 501 [1st Dept 2018] [comments given to the media by a party to the case are covered by the fair report privilege so long as the comment is "fairly descriptive of the allegations"]).

As such, New York courts routinely apply Civil Rights Law § 74 to protect individuals (not media outlets) who comment on court proceedings, as Vivian Jackson did to the New York Post (see e.g. Durst Pyramid LLC v Silver Cinemas Acquisition Corp., 222 AD3d 431, 432 [1st Dept 2023] ["The complaint alleges that the tenant 'wrongfully removed Landlord's property'" and "(t)he allegedly defamatory statement, in turn, appeared in an article describing the landlord's lawsuit against defendants and included a statement from the landlord's representative that "we are still showing the space — minus the stuff (the tenant stole). Read in context and applying the ordinary meaning of words, the quoted statement is protected by the absolute privilege of Civil Rights Law § 74 as a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding, and also was 'substantially accurate'"]; Highland Cap. Mgt., 157 AD3d at 501 ["Defendant Stern's statement to the Wall Street Journal, that plaintiff investment advisor 'just took our money,' fell within the statutory privilege against libel claims for the publication of a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding (because) (t)he statement in the context of the article, which was about lawsuits filed against plaintiffs, would be understood by an ordinary reader to refer to defendant('s) claim that plaintiff improperly withdrew money from an investment fund plaintiff managed, in which (defendant) invested"]; McRedmond, 48 AD3d at 259 [affirming dismissal of defamation claim based on litigant's statements "in various news articles and Web sites"]; Lacher, 33 AD3d at 17 ["this Court finds that because the statements made by defendant to the NYLJ were a 'fair and true' report of the malpractice action, they fall within the privilege"]; Hudson v Goldman Sachs & Co., Inc., 304 AD2d 315, 316 [1st Dept 2003] [affirming dismissal of defamation claim based on litigant's comments to newspaper]; Haynes v Bonner, 69 Misc 3d 1201[A], 2020 NY Slip Op [*4]51139[U], * 4 [Sup Ct, NY County 2020] [immunizing interview comments to a CNN reporter]).

Likewise, here, because all of the challenged statements made by Vivian Jackson to the New York Post reported on the W.J. action, an official court proceeding, and did so fairly and accurately, the statements are privileged.

First, it is clear that all of the statements attributed to Vivian Jackson originate in and relate to the central abuse allegations in the pending W.J. action. The context of the articles are plain on their face, as both headlines cite the "suit" and/or "claims" (see web article headline ["Mom claims Catholic school teacher raped her son: suit"; see also print article headline ["Teach raped my son — Boy was 13 claims suit vs. Village Catholic School"]). Moreover, the articles themselves cite the "suit," "lawsuit," and allegation(s), and reference both W.J.'s affidavit in the suit, and "court papers" (see articles). As such, because the comments by Vivian Jackson essentially summarized or restated the allegations in the W.J. action, they are immunized by the fair report privilege.

However, plaintiffs claim that Vivian Jackson's statements are not privileged because she offered additional facts to the New York Post that fell outside merely reporting or commenting on the W.J. action, and that thus, "[a] reasonable reader would view the statements made by Vivian to The Post as intended to label Plaintiff as a child rapist" (opposition affirmation of Adam M. Peska, Esq. [NYSCEF Doc No. 101], ¶¶ 24-25). These additional facts "include that: (1) she 'fears' W.J. is not the only victim; (2) there was another student who sent a letter and had alleged that the Plaintiff sexually assaulted [him]; (3) that DNA confirmed that W.J. did not send the letter; (4) Plaintiff took advantage of W.J. who he had 'groomed' and 'he knew exactly who to pick'; (5) [Mr. Mattsson and W.J.] had become 'best friends,' (6) that Plaintiff 'knew [W.J.] was vulnerable' and (7) that W.J. suffered from Asperger's Syndrome" (id., ¶ 25).

Civil Rights Law § 74 extends to matters that do not "clearly and directly fall within any allegations of the complaint," but instead constitute "background to the misconduct attributed to the [plaintiff] in the complaint" (Ford v Levinson, 90 AD2d 464, 465 [1st Dept 1982]). The protection set forth in Civil Rights law § 74 also "'extend[s] to reports of judicial proceedings that are mixed with commentary or opinion"' (Haart v Scaglia, 78 Misc 3d 1238[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50475[U], * 10 [Sup Ct, NY County 2023], quoting Center of Med. Progress v Planned Parenthood Federation of Am., 551 F Supp 3d 320, 329 [SDNY 2021], affd sub nom Daleiden v Planned Parenthood Federation of Am., 2022 WL 1013982 [2d Cir 2022]). A report is considered substantially accurate "if, despite minor inaccuracies, it does not produce a different effect on a reader than would a report containing the precise truth" (Tacopina v O'Keeffe, 645 Fed Appx 7, 8 [2d Cir 2016] [citation and quotation marks omitted]), and does not "suggest more serious conduct than that actually suggested in the official proceeding" (Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd., 217 AD2d at 435-436).

Applying these principles, this court finds that the statements that Mr. Mattsson groomed W.J., that Mr. Mattsson and W.J. had become 'best friends,' and that Mr. Mattsson knew W.J. was vulnerable, do not suggest conduct more serious than that which was alleged in the W.J. action — sexual abuse of a minor by an adult (see e.g. Burke v Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 195 AD3d 674, 674-675, 676 [2d Dept 2021] [in action alleging alleged sexual abuse by a teacher against a student, court dismissed defamation claim, finding that challenged statements set forth in article that "These were regular things," "she was removed from class. She was held after gym class," and that the plaintiff had "reported to school authorities 'circumstances that should have raised red flags,'" "did not suggest more serious conduct than what is alleged in the [*5]plaintiff's complaint"]; GS Plasticos Limitada v Bureau Veritas, 84 AD3d 518, 518 [1st Dept 2011] ["The statements contained in the May 28 letter regarding 'deficient practices, sheer lack of competence or other behavior' reflected the substance of plaintiff's complaint against defendants," in which "plaintiff alleged, among other things, that it was 'impossible for (defendant) to argue that it had responsibly conducted its analyses with due care and taken appropriate steps to perform its services in a skillful and competent manner,' and (thus) did not suggest more serious conduct than was alleged in the complaint"]; Cross River Bank v Korangy Publishing Inc., 85 Misc 3d 1274[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50709[U], * 3 [Sup Ct, NY County 2025] [finding that "purported defamatory statements" do not suggest that plaintiff "engaged in worse conduct than that for which it was cited" in a consent order]).

Moreover, although plaintiff contends that the court record in the W.J. action does not refer to W.J. as having Asperger's Syndrome (see Complaint, ¶ 37), this court finds that the statement in the article that W.J. has Asperger's Syndrome constitutes protected background information with respect to the allegations contained in the W.J. action, especially given the affirmation of W.J.'s attorney in that action which refers to W.J.'s "fragile mental and physical state," and stating that he is "particularly vulnerable" (see affirmation of Jeffrey S. Antin [NYSCEF Doc No. 35], ¶¶ 10 [b] and [c]; see e.g. Ford, 90 AD2d at 465 ["Realistically considered, (the challenged statement) constitutes background to the misconduct attributed to the Fords in the complaint rather than a separate and independently defamatory accusation, and comes within the statutory privilege afforded to a 'fair and true report' of a 'judicial proceeding'"]). Moreover, this statement could not have worsened the effect on Mr. Mattsson's reputation, given the allegations in the W.J. action that he sexually abused a minor child.

Plaintiffs also challenge Vivian Jackson's statement that she "fears" that W.J. is not the only victim. Whether a statement is conveying a fact about the plaintiff requires the court to consider the content of the communication as a whole, and its tone and apparent purpose (Davis v Bonheim, 24 NY3d 262, [2014]). Viewing this statement in context, this court finds that the word "fears" implies that the statement is likely an expression of opinion (see GS Plastico Limitada, 84 AD3d at 519), such that "a reasonable reader would understand the statements defendant made about plaintiff as mere allegations to be investigated rather than as facts" (Brian v Richardson, 87 NY2d 46, 53 [1995] [emphasis in original]). Thus, this statement is also protected as a report of a judicial proceeding mixed with commentary or opinion.

Finally, plaintiffs take issue with Vivian Jackson's statements that there was another student who had sent a letter and had alleged that Mr. Mattson had sexually assaulted him, and that DNA confirmed that W.J. did not send the letter. Plaintiffs acknowledge that such a letter was sent and received, but contests Vivian Jackson's statement that a DNA test was performed on the letter as false (see complaint, ¶ 38). However, whether or not a DNA test was performed on the letter does not materially change the underlying charge in the W.J. action, as set forth in Mr. Antin's attorney affirmation, that "it is expected that other student(s) or former students at Our Lady of Pompeii School will come forward to allege that something similar happened to them while enrolled there" (Antin affirmation, ¶ 8). Rather, even if false, this statement is nothing more than a minor inaccuracy that did not cause Mr. Mattsson any harm beyond that caused by the primary factual allegations regarding the alleged rape of a child.

Accordingly, this court finds that the statements made by Vivian Jackson in the New York Post articles are fair and substantially accurate reports of a judicial proceeding, and, therefore, are absolutely privileged under Civil Rights Law § 74 (see e.g. Reeves v Associated [*6]Newspapers, Ltd., 232 AD3d 10, 16 [1st Dept 2024] ["The motion court correctly determined that the alleged defamatory statements published by defendants in an online news article reporting on the contentious divorce and child custody battle between Karl and Michelle were privileged under Civil Rights Law § 74]; Nix v Major League Baseball, 189 AD3d 547, 548 [1st Dept 2020] ["At a minimum, the statement was a nonactionable 'fair and true, i.e., 'substantially accurate,' report of the New York federal complaint"]; Napoli v New York Post, 175 AD3d 433, 434 [1st Dept 2019] ["The court properly dismissed plaintiff's claims" because "(t)he allegedly defamatory statements appearing in various news articles essentially summarize or restate the allegations in judicial filings in a case related to plaintiff, so they are protected by Civil Rights Law § 74"]).

Plaintiffs' citation to Thomas H. v Paul B., 18 NY3d 580 (2012) does not change this result. In that case, the Court of Appeals declined to discuss a defamation claim, finding that an issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendants, during a meeting with the plaintiff and his wife, made unqualified statements accusing the plaintiff of sexually assaulting their underage daughter on two occasions, accompanied by specific details of the plaintiff's threats and actions during the incidents. Plaintiffs argue that "[a]s held in Thomas H., Vivian possessed no license to defame the Plaintiff because she merely reported what was told to her by her son, W.J." (Peska affirmation, ¶ 28]). However, Thomas H. is completely inapposite, because the defendants in that case, unlike defendants here, never raised the issue of a qualified or absolute privilege (see Thomas H., 929 NY3d at 586 ["it should be noted that defendants did not argue in their summary judgment motion that their statements were immunized by a ... privilege]").

Accordingly, the defamation cause of action is dismissed as a matter of law.

Given the dismissal of the defamation cause of action, the loss of consortium claim, which is derivative in nature, must be dismissed as well (see LoFaso v City of New York, 66 AD3d 425, 427 [1st Dept 2009] [dismissal of plaintiff's defamation claim "required dismissal of his wife's claim for loss of consortium"]; Misek-Falkoff v American Lawyer Media, Inc., 300 AD2d 215, 216 [1st Dept 2002] ["Since Civil Rights Law § 74 bars all of plaintiff's claims, it is unnecessary to address the parties' other arguments regarding each individual cause of action," including the loss of consortium claim]).

Thus, defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. In light of this finding, defendants' motion to stay is denied as moot.

The court has considered the remaining arguments and finds them to be without merit.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants' alternative motion for a stay of this action is denied as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

DATE 9/19/2025

DENIS REO, A.J.S.C.