Pryor v Hanbin Wong
2025 NY Slip Op 52203(U)
July 29, 2025
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
William Pryor, Doing Business as Law Offices of William Pryor, Respondent,
v
Hanbin Wong, Esq., Doing Business as Hanbin Wang, Esq., Appellant.
Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, 9th And 10th Judicial Districts
Decided on July 29, 2025
2024-452 W C
Present: : Gretchen Walsh, J.P., Elena Goldberg-Velazquez, Joseph R. Conway, JJ
Hanbin Wang, for appellant. Law Offices of William Pryor (William Pryor of counsel), for respondent.
Appeals from a judgment of the City Court of Yonkers, Westchester County (Karen T. Beltran, J.), entered April 9, 2024 and an order of that court dated May 29, 2024. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the sum of $4,258.96. The order denied defendant's motion to set aside or vacate the judgment.
[*1]ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the City Court for a new trial; and it is further,
ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed as moot.
Plaintiff commenced this small claims action to recover the sum of $4,238.96, representing four months' rent after the deduction of a security deposit. Following a nonjury trial, the City Court (Karen T. Beltran, J.) entered a judgment on April 9, 2024 awarding plaintiff the sum of $4,258.96. By order dated May 29, 2024, the court denied a motion by defendant to set aside, pursuant to CPLR 4404 (b), or vacate, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a), the judgment. Defendant appeals from the judgment and the order.
In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UCCA 1807; see UCCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]).
It is undisputed that defendant subleased a portion of an office from plaintiff pursuant to a written sublease, the most recent renewal of which expired on December 31, 2022, and that defendant vacated the premises four months prior to that date. Defendant argues that there was no overlease in effect during the period at issue because it had expired and not been renewed, thereby terminating the parties' sublease and, as a result, plaintiff's right to collect rent for those [*2]four months (see 380 Yorktown Food Corp. v 380 Downing Dr., LLC,107 AD3d 786 [2013]; Sow v Thanvi, 50 Misc 3d 134[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50045[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). When plaintiff was asked at trial if he had the "entire lease," he testified that he "d[id] not have the lease for that year from the primary landlord." This testimony is ambiguous in that it could be construed as meaning either that there was no operative overlease in effect for 2022 or that there was such a lease but he was not in possession of it at trial. Since the validity of the sublease and plaintiff's entitlement to rent are dependent on an operative overlease during the period at issue and plaintiff's testimony regarding the existence of such an overlease was unclear (see North Oaks Pharmacy v North Shore Towers Assoc., 63 AD2d 728 [1978]), substantial justice requires a new trial.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, the appeal from the order is dismissed as moot, and the matter is remitted to the City Court for a new trial.
WALSH, J.P. and GOLDBERG-VELAZQUEZ, J., concur.
CONWAY, J., taking no part.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: July 29, 2025