Yunga v City of New York

Supreme Court, Bronx County

Decided on December 11, 2025

Index No. 31637/2020E

Ashlee Crawford, J.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 13-35 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT — SUMMARY.

Upon the foregoing documents, it is

Defendants City of New York ("City"), New York City Department of Education ("DOE"), and New York City School Construction Authority ("NYCSCA") move pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims under Labor Law §§ 240 (1), 241 (6), 200, and for common law negligence. Plaintiff only opposes dismissal of his claims under Labor Law §§ 240 (1), 200, and for common law negligence, and cross-moves for partial summary judgment as to liability on those claims.^FN1

Plaintiff not having opposed dismissal of his claim under Labor Law § 241 (6), such claim is dismissed as abandoned. (see Gamez v Sandy Clarkson LLC, 221 AD3d 453, 454-455 [1st Dept 2023]; Martin Assoc., Inc. v Illinois Natl. Ins. Co., 188 AD3d 572, 573 [1st Dept 2020]; Saidin v Negron, 136 AD3d 458, 459 [1st Dept 2016], lv dismissed 28 NY3d 1069 [2016], cert denied 583 US 842 [2017]).

On November 7, 2019, plaintiff was injured while working on a renovation project at the Alfred E. Smith High School at 333 East 151st Street, Bronx, New York. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was patching a ceiling while standing on a six-foot A-frame ladder, when the ladder suddenly tilted, causing plaintiff to fall to the ground. The City owns the building; NYSCA entered into a construction agreement with plaintiff's non-party employer, Nehal [*2]Construction, to perform the renovation work (Contract [NYSCEF Doc. 31]).

Summary Judgment

A party seeking summary judgment "must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of fact (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). "[M]ere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient" to defeat summary judgment (id.). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be denied if there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of material fact (Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]).

I. Labor Law § 240 (1)

Labor Law § 240 (1) provides in relevant part that where there is erection, demolition, repairing, or altering of a building, contractors and owners "shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed." "The statute imposes upon owners, contractors and their agents a nondelegable duty that renders them liable regardless of whether they supervise or control the work" (Barreto v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 25 NY3d 426, 433 [2015]). "[W]here an accident is caused by a violation of the statute, the plaintiff's own negligence does not furnish a defense; however, where a plaintiff's own actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident, there can be no liability" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Thus, in order to recover under section 240 (1), the plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that such violation was a proximate cause of his injury" (id.). Labor Law § 240 (1) is to be liberally construed so as to accomplish its legislative purpose of protecting workers (Stoneham v Joseph Barsuk, Inc., 41 NY3d 217, 221 [2023]; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 513 [1991]).

"Not every worker who falls at a construction site, and not every object that falls on a worker, gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)" (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]). "[L]iability is contingent upon the existence of a hazard contemplated in section 240 (1) and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein" (id., citing Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]).

Plaintiff has met his prima facie burden under Labor Law 240 (1) against the City of New York, and the City has not raised an issue of fact to defeat summary judgment. No parties have addressed whether DOE and NYCSCA are proper Labor Law defendants. Therefore summary judgment is denied as to those defendants.

II. Labor Law § 200 and Common Law Negligence

"In order to prevail in any action premised upon [common law] negligence, it must be established that defendant owed plaintiff a duty, that defendant, by act or omission, breached such duty, that such breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and that plaintiff sustained damages" (Salvador v New York Botanical Garden, 71 AD3d 422, 423 [1st Dept 2010]). "Section 200 of the Labor Law is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon [*3]an owner or general contractor to provide construction site workers with a safe place to work" (Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]). "Claims for personal injury under the statute and the common law fall into two broad categories: those arising from an alleged defect or dangerous condition existing on the premises and those arising from the manner in which the work was performed" (Cappabianca v Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 99 AD3d 139, 143-44 [1st Dept 2012]). "Where an existing defect or dangerous condition caused the injury, liability attaches if the owner or general contractor created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it" (id. at 144). "Where the injury was caused by the manner and means of the work, including the equipment used, the owner or general contractor is liable if it actually exercised control over the injury-producing work" (id.).

While plaintiff cites the existence of dust and a protective floor covering as dangerous conditions, there is an issue of fact as to whether they proximately caused the accident. Therefore, the parties' motions directed to the Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims are both denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that that part of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim is GRANTED only as against defendant City of New York and DENIED as against defendants New York City Department of Education and New York City School Construction Authority; and that part of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment by defendants City of New York, New York City Department of Education and New York City School Construction Authority is GRANTED IN PART as directed to plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) claim, which claim is DISMISSED; and the motion is DENIED as directed to plaintiff's claims under Labor Law §§ 200 and 240 (1) and for common law negligence; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a pre-trial conference to be calendared by the Clerk of the Court.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

DATE 12/11/2025

ASHLEE CRAWFORD, J.S.C.