People v Hallman

Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on May 1, 2026

CR-025805-25NY

Ilona B. Coleman, J.

The People move to reargue their December 4, 2025 oral motion to deem the accusatory instrument converted, previously denied because several charges were facially insufficient (CPL 170.65 [1]; see also 100.40 [1] [c]). The defense cross-moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency. In other words, both parties ask the court to examine the accusatory instrument for facial sufficiency but move for opposite relief. On reargument, the court agrees that the accusatory instrument must be deemed, and therefore evaluated as, a superseding information (see CPL 100.50). On the cross-motion, the court grants the defense motion to dismiss the charges of PL §§ 120.00 (1), 120.00 [2], and 240.30 [4] but denies it as to the charges of PL §§ 110/120.00 (1) and 240.26 (2).

I. The People's Motion to Deem the Accusatory Instrument Converted

The defendant was initially charged by felony complaint with one count of violating PL § 120.05 (2). On December 4, 2025, the People moved to reduce the sole count to a misdemeanor, reducing the felony complaint to a misdemeanor complaint (CPL 180.50 [3] [b]). At the same time, the People filed an accusatory instrument purporting to be a superseding information charging the defendant with several misdemeanors and one violation (PL §§ 120.00 [1], 120.00 [2], 240.30 [4], 110/120.00 [1], and 240.26 [1]). The People then moved pursuant to CPL § 170.65 (1) for a judicial determination that the accusatory instrument had been "converted" to an information. The court denied the motion, determining that the accusatory instrument was facially insufficient and therefore not a valid information (see CPL 170.65 [1] [complaint is only deemed converted if it "satisf[ies] the requirements for a valid information"]; see also CPL 100.40 [1] [c] [valid information must contain allegations that "establish, if true, every element [*2]of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof"]).

The People's motion for conversion was conceptually flawed from the start. A misdemeanor complaint can either be converted to an information through the filing of a supporting deposition or superseded by an information (CPL 170.65 [1]; CPL 100.50). Here, the People chose the latter route, and therefore the accusatory instrument filed on December 4, 2025, was an information from the time of filing (see People v Torres, 151 Misc 2d 682, 683 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 1991] [holding that "[t]here is no provision in the [CPL] for a superseding complaint"]; see also CPL 100.50). This holding does not mean that the information was facially sufficient; it means only that it is legally an information and thus must be evaluated under the standards applicable to one. Conversion, as defined in CPL § 170.65 (1), is therefore inapplicable.

Thus, on reargument, the People's motion for conversion is granted insofar as the court finds that the superseding information is an information and denied insofar as the court does not find that the superseding information "satisf[ies] the requirements for a valid information" (CPL 170.65 [1]; see Section II, infra).

II. The Defense's Motion to Dismiss the Information for Facial Insufficiency

To be facially sufficient, an information must "set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense," and it must "set forth nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 [2015] [internal quotations and citations omitted]; CPL 100.40 [1]). An information that "fail[s] to allege a complete element of the charged offense is jurisdictionally defective," and any such defective charge is subject to dismissal (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229 [2009]).

1. Physical Injury

The information fails to sufficiently allege that the complainant in this case suffered a "physical injury" within the meaning of PL § 10.00 (9). PL § 10.00 (9) defines "physical injury" as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain." In relevant part, the information alleges that the complainant called 911 and informed the operator that the defendant "punched [her], and [her] eye is bleeding."^FN1 When the deponent police officer arrived at the scene (approximately 16 minutes after the 911 call), he observed that the complainant had "a laceration under her right eye." The complaint does not contain any allegation regarding the level of pain the complainant was experiencing, and it does not contain a sufficient basis for the court to infer that her pain was "substantial," as required under PL § 10.00 (9). A single punch will not necessarily cause "substantial pain," and there is no indication in the information that, for example, the defendant punched the complainant with extreme force or is significantly larger [*3]than the complainant (compare People v Ozua, 54 Misc 3d 1205[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2017]). Nor do the details of the alleged injury support any inference that the complainant experienced substantial pain. The information only states that the complainant had a "laceration," with no details about the length or depth of the cut. It alleges that the complainant was "bleeding" from the laceration, but it does not allege the extent of the bleeding. The deponent police officer does not allege that he observed any swelling, bruising, or even redness around the laceration.

Unlike "substantial pain," the phrase "impairment of physical condition" is not well defined in the case law. However, the Appellate Division has held that proof of "a one-half inch laceration on one of [the complainant's] toes, which stopped bleeding before an emergency medical technician arrived at the scene" was insufficient to establish "impairment of physical condition," even where supplemented with "testimony that she was unable to wear shoes for an unspecified period of time" (People v Fews, 148 AD3d 1180, 1182 [2nd Dept 2017]; see also Matter of Pernell M., 98 AD2d 776, 777 [2nd Dept 1983] [bleeding cut on lip was "insufficient to establish impairment of physical condition"]). The allegations here, sparser than those at issue in Fews, fall short of establishing "impairment of physical condition." Notably, the information does not contain any information about how long the laceration took to heal, whether it required medical attention, whether it resulted in a scar, or whether it affected the function of any body part.^FN2

Because the information fails to allege facts establishing "substantial pain" or "impairment of physical condition" resulting from the defendant's actions, the charges of PL §§ 120.00 (1), 120.00 (2), and 240.30 (4) are facially insufficient (PL 10.00 [9]). The defense motion to dismiss those charges is therefore GRANTED (CPL 170.30 [1] [a]; 170.35 [1] [a]; CPL 100.40 [1] [c]).

2. Intent

As to the remaining charges of PL §§ 110/120.00 (1) and 240.26 (1), the defense argues only that the information does not contain allegations that, if true, establish that the defendant acted with the requisite intent. The court rejects this argument.

Given a "fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading," the information sufficiently alleges the requisite intent for the remaining charges (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]). The information explicitly alleges that the defendant "punched" the complainant. In normal usage, "punching" means intentionally striking with a closed fist. The allegation that the complainant had a bleeding laceration under her eye immediately after being punched supports the inference that the defendant struck her in the face, and thus acted with "intent to cause physical injury" (PL 120.00 [1]); see also People v Hatton, 26 NY3d 364, 370 [2015] ["intent may be inferred from the act itself"]). The act of punching the complainant similarly supports the conclusion that the defendant acted "with intent to harass, annoy or alarm" (PL 240.26).Finally, the People are not required at the pleading stage to allege that the defendant was the initial aggressor and was not acting in self-defense (see People v Khan, 15 Misc 3d 1131[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2007] ["the People need not, for pleading purposes, disprove every conceivable defense"] [citing People v Santana, 7 NY3d 234, 236 [2006]). The motion to deny [*4]the charges of PL §§ 110/120.00 (1) and 240.26 (1) is therefore DENIED.

This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Dated: May 1, 2026

New York, NY

Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.