Supreme Court, Bronx County

Decided on December 29, 2025

Index No. 22646/2019E

Ashlee Crawford, J.

[*1]

Plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for partial summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim against defendants Thor 180 Livingston LLC ("Thor 180"), The Brooklyn Tabernacle Church ("Church"), and The 180 Livingston Street Condominium ("Condo") (mot. seq. 004). Defendants and third-party defendant Watermark Contractors Inc. ("Watermark") separately oppose.

Defendants/third-party plaintiffs The Brooklyn Tabernacle Foundation, Inc. ("Foundation"), Brooklyn Management Corp. ("BMC"), Thor Equities, LLC ("Thor Equities"), Thor 180, the Condo, and the Church move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, including plaintiff's claims under Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and 241 (6) and for common law negligence; and for summary judgment on their third-party claims for contractual indemnification and breach of contract against Watermark (mot. seq. 005). Plaintiff only opposes dismissal of his claims under Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6), and Watermark only opposes that part of the motion directed to the third-party claims against it.

Watermark moves for partial summary judgment dismissing the common law contribution and indemnification, and breach of contract claims asserted by the Church, Foundation, BMC, and Condo, and the contractual indemnification and contribution claims asserted by the Foundation, BMC, and Condo (mot. seq. 003). Defendants/third-party plaintiffs oppose. Plaintiff partially opposes only to the extent of asking the Court to refrain from determining causation of the accident or the extent of his injuries.

BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2019, plaintiff was injured while working at a construction project located at 180 Livingston Street, Brooklyn, New York. Plaintiff was jackhammering the floor, when a hole opened, causing him to fall into the cellar about 25 feet below (Pl. 3/7/22 Tr. at 27:12-14, 41:21-42:12, 44:3-10, 52:2-6, 67:11-17 [NYSCEF Doc. 90]). Thor 180 owned the premises and leased it to the Church (Borgstede Aff. [NYSCEF Doc. 110]; Kaplan Aff. [NYSCEF Doc. 111]). Pursuant to a contractor agreement between the Church and plaintiff's employer, Watermark, the latter was retained as general contractor for the project (Church-Watermark Agmt. [NYSCEF Doc. 112]; Kaplan Aff. ¶ 9; Watermark Contract [NYSCEF Doc. 112]).

Plaintiff testified that he was not wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) at the time of the accident (Pl. 3/7/22 Tr. at 58:19-22). Normally, to do jackhammering work, plaintiff would use a harness and tie-off, but he testified that his harness was not in the shanty on the morning of the accident (id. at 59:7-22, 95:14-96:9; Plaintiff 11/3/23 Tr. at 62:17-64:21, 188:10-18 [NYSCEF Doc. 91]). Plaintiff stated that he did not tell anyone that his harness was missing because he was the only one there that morning, he is "just a worker," and he never had to use PPE (Pl. 3/7/22 Tr. at 59:14-60:12). Plaintiff testified that Gregory Rendon from site safety told him to tie off when he was working above ten feet (id. at 62:7-18). However, there were no beams, pipes, or other places above plaintiff at the time of the accident that he could have tied off a harness (id. at 99:15-100: 11).

Plaintiff stated that he was not given planks to stand on while performing the demolition work (Pl. 3/7/22 Tr. at 92:8-25), did not see anyone on the site working on planks while doing demolition work, and was not told to avoid standing on the same level of floor he was [*2]demolishing (id. at 92:22-93:5). Plaintiff did not remember if there were planks available to use at the site (id. at 93:6-11).

Plaintiff stated that each Wednesday, Watermark's owner, Kevin Mahrr, would come to the site and give instructions to the labor foreman and carpenter foreman (Pl. 3/7/22 Tr. at 20:23-22:9). Plaintiff received his instructions only from the labor foreman (id. at 22:8-16). Plaintiff insisted that he was a laborer at the time of the accident, and he could not remember who the labor foreman was (Pl. 3/7/22 Tr. at 11:24-12:7, 20:3-22:11).

Gregory Rendon, a Senior Project Manager for Watermark at the time of the accident, claimed that plaintiff was the labor foreman on the construction project and had held that role for several months by the time of the accident (Rendon 12/1/23 Tr. at 31:18-33:11, 39:6-21, 39:6-13 [NYSCEF Doc. 92]). Before plaintiff was foreman, he worked as a laborer for about a year; at that time, Chris Mannin was the labor foreman (id. at 33:12-34:6). Rendon gave instructions to the carpenter foreman, Jason Montague, and the assistant project manager, both of whom were higher ranked than plaintiff (Rendon 12/1/23 Tr. at 36:5-39:5).

Every laborer on the project — about eight to ten workers — reported to plaintiff as labor foreman (Rendon 12/1/23 Tr. at 39:14-21, 40:11-22). Plaintiff's role as foreman was to make sure all laborers were working in a safe and proper manner (id. at 40:23-41:7). All Watermark employees were told when they were hired, and on a weekly basis, that when they are engaging in demolition, they need to wear a harness and to stand on beam-to-beam planking on the floor (id. at 72:3-75:3). Plaintiff attended the weekly safety meetings (id. at 74:21-75:3). As laborer foreman, plaintiff should have known to use a harness and lanyard and to stand on a plank (id. 159:24-160:4, 162:9-13).

Rendon gave every Watermark laborer, including plaintiff, their own harness (id. at 103:19-104:19). Rendon further testified that there were steel beams above plaintiff's head to tie off a harness at the time of accident (id. at 112:21-114:4). He also identified planks in photographs of the accident location on which plaintiff could have stood on while working (id. at 136:3-137:9; Rendon 3/11/24 Tr. at 261:17-20 [NYSCEF Doc. 107]).

DISCUSSION

A party seeking summary judgment "must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of fact (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). "[M]ere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient" to defeat summary judgment (id.). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be denied if there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of material fact (Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]).

I. Abandoned Claims

Plaintiff does not oppose defendants' motion seeking dismissal of his claims under Labor Law 200 and for common law negligence. While Watermark argues those claims should be preserved (Lucas Aff. in Opp. ¶ 7 [NYSCEF Doc. 126]), it lacks standing to assert such an argument (see CPLR 1008; cf. Urquia v Deegan 135 Realty LLC, 231 AD3d 567, 568 [1st Dept 2024]). Further, the Church, Foundation, BMC, and the Condo do not oppose dismissal of the third-party claims for common law contribution and indemnification. Therefore, those claims [*3]and third-party claims are dismissed as abandoned (see Gamez v Sandy Clarkson LLC, 221 AD3d 453, 454-455 [1st Dept 2023]; Martin Assoc., Inc. v Illinois Natl. Ins. Co., 188 AD3d 572, 573 [1st Dept 2020]; Saidin v Negron, 136 AD3d 458, 459 [2016], lv dismissed 28 NY3d 1069 [2016], cert denied 583 US 842 [2017]).

II. Labor Law Defendants

Defendants argue that they are not proper Labor Law defendants and should be dismissed from the case. They maintain that while Thor 180 owned the premises at the time of the accident and formed the Condo to lease out units to tenants, the Condo had no direct ownership interest in the premises where the accident occurred. Moreover, neither Thor 180 nor the Condo contracted for, controlled, or supervised the work. Defendants contend that the connection of Thor Equities to the premises is even more attenuated: it is simply the publicly traded parent affiliate of Thor 180. Finally, BMC and the Foundation, which respectively were formed to manage real estate and to support the Church in its religious and charitable activities, were inactive shell companies at the time of the accident and remain so. Defendants argue that the only proper Labor Law defendant is the Church, which was the sole entity that contracted for and supervised the work (Memo of Law in Supp. at pp. 4-5 [NYSCEF Doc. 96]; Borgstede Aff. [NYSCEF Doc. 110]; Kaplan Aff. [NYSCEF Doc. 111]).

In the first instance, plaintiff does not address why the Foundation, BMC, or Thor Equities are proper defendants under the Labor Law (Pl's Affirm. in Opp ¶¶ 6-11 [NYSCEF Doc. 133]), and it is not otherwise apparent that they are. Thus, plaintiff's Labor Law claims asserted against those parties are dismissed as abandoned (see supra).

Plaintiff also pursues Labor Law liability against Thor 180 and the Condo, which owned the premises but did not contract for the work. "In cases imposing [Labor Law] liability on a property owner who did not contract for the work performed on the property, this Court has required 'some nexus between the owner and the worker, whether by a lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest'" (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009][citation omitted]; see also Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d 46, 51 [2004]). "In short, ownership is a 'necessary condition' although 'not a sufficient one' for a non-contracting party's liability" under the Labor Law (Guryev v Tomchinsky, 20 NY3d 194, 201 [2012] [citation omitted]; see also Morton v State, 15 NY3d 50, 56 [2010]). Here, there is an issue of fact as to whether a sufficient nexus existed to impose Labor Law liability upon Thor 180 and the Condo.

III. Labor Law § 240 (1)

Labor Law § 240 (1) provides in relevant part that where a building is being demolished, erected, or altered, contractors and owners "shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed." "The statute imposes upon owners, contractors and their agents a nondelegable duty that renders them liable regardless of whether they supervise or control the work" (Barreto v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 25 NY3d 426, 433 [2015]). "[W]here an accident is caused by a violation of the statute, the plaintiff's own negligence does not furnish a defense; however, where a plaintiff's own actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident, there can be no liability" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Thus, in order to recover under section 240 (1), the plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that such violation was a proximate cause of his injury" (id.). Labor [*4]Law § 240 (1) is to be liberally construed so as to accomplish its legislative purpose of protecting workers (Stoneham v Joseph Barsuk, Inc., 41 NY3d 217, 221 [2023]; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 513 [1991]).

"Not every worker who falls at a construction site, and not every object that falls on a worker, gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)" (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]). "[L]iability is contingent upon the existence of a hazard contemplated in section 240 (1) and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein" (id., citing Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]).

"To raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of an accident, the defendant must produce evidence that adequate safety devices were available, that the plaintiff knew they were available and was expected to use them, and that the plaintiff unreasonably chose not to do so, causing the injury sustained" (Nacewicz v Roman Catholic Church of the Holy Cross, 105 AD3d 402, 402-03 [1st Dept 2013]; see Biaca-Neto v Boston Road II Housing Dev. Fund Corp., 34 NY3d 1166, 1167-1168 [2020]).

Plaintiff has met his prima facie burden as to liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) against the Church; but, as already discussed, there is an open question as to whether Thor 180 and the Condo may be held liable for plaintiff's injuries without having contracted for the work. In addition, defendants raised an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff, as the labor foreman tasked with ensuring all workers used safety devices, was the sole proximate cause of his own injuries; and whether appropriate safety devices were available to plaintiff at the time of the accident. Therefore, the parties' motions for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim are denied.

IV. Labor Law § 241 (6)

Labor Law § 241 (6) "imposes a nondelegable duty of reasonable care upon owners and contractors 'to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety' to persons employed in, or lawfully frequenting, all areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed" (Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 348 [1998]). To establish a claim under Labor Law section 241 (6), plaintiff must show that defendant "violated an Industrial Code regulation that sets forth a specific standard of conduct and is not simply a recitation of common-law safety principles" (Toussaint, 38 NY3d at 94 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Labor Law § 241 (6) requires that a plaintiff establish that a violation of a safety regulation was the proximate cause of the accident (Gonzalez v Stern's Dept. Stores, 211 AD2d 414, 415 [1st Dept 1995] [citation omitted]).

Defendants argue that dismissal of plaintiff's Labor Law 241 (6) claim is required, because he was the sole proximate cause of his injuries and because none of the Industrial Code sections are a sufficient or applicable predicate (Memo of Law in Supp. at III[A]-[B][NYSCEF Doc. 96]). Defendants specifically argue that the following sections are either inapplicable or were not violated: 23-1.7(a)-(e)(Protection from general hazards, overhead hazards, falling hazards, drowning hazards, slipping hazards, tipping and other hazards); 23-1.16(a)-(f) (Safety belts, harnesses, tail lines and lifelines); 23-1.17(a)-(e) (Life nets); 23-1.21 (a)-(e) (Ladders and ladderways); 23-1.15(a)-(e) (Safety railing); 23-1.30 (Illumination); 23-1.8(c) (Protective apparel, head protection, foot protection, waterproof clothing, protection from corrosive substances); 23-2.4(a)-(c) (Flooring requirements in building construction); 23- 3.1 (Special [*5]approval required); 23-3.2(a)-(d) (General requirements); 23-3.3(a)-(m) (Demolition by hand); and 23-3.4(a)-(c) (Mechanical methods of demolition).

In opposition, plaintiff only addresses Industrial Code §§ 23-1.16, -1.17, -2.4, -3.2, and -3.4, thereby abandoning all other predicates not raised in his legal arguments (Burgos v Premier Props. Inc., 145 AD3d 506, 508 [1st Dept 2016]; 87 Chambers, LLC v 77 Reade, LLC, 122 AD3d 540, 542 [1st Dept 2014]; Katz Affirm. in Opp ¶¶ 62-68 [NYSCEF Doc. 133]). Further, while plaintiff plead in his bill of particulars every subsection of Industrial Code §§ 23-1.16, -1.17, -2.4, -3.2, and -3.4, he failed to identify the relevant subsections in his motion papers (Katz Aff. in Opp. ¶¶ 62-68 [NYSCEF Doc. 133]). The Court therefore deems these provisions abandoned as well (see Caminiti v Extell W. 57th St. LLC, 166 AD3d 440, 441 [1st Dept 2018]; McLean v Tishman Constr. Corp., 144 AD3d 534, 535 [1st Dept 2016]). In any event, the Court notes that most of the provisions listed in plaintiff's bill of particulars are not applicable to the facts here, including at least sections 23-1.7, -1.8, -1.15, -1.17, -1.21, -2.4, -1.30, - 3.1, and -3.2.

Accordingly, that part of defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law 241 (6) claim is granted and that claim is dismissed (mot. seq. 005).

V. Contractual Indemnification

The Church and Condo, the Foundation, BMC, move for summary judgment on their third-party claim against Watermark for contractual indemnification. Watermark opposes and moves for summary judgment dismissing that claim as asserted by the Condo, Foundation, BMC.

"A party is entitled to full contractual indemnification provided that the 'intention to indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances'" (Drzewinski v Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co., Inc., 70 NY2d 774, 777 [1987] [citation omitted]). "The right to contractual indemnification depends upon the specific language of the contract" (DiBrino v Rockefeller Ctr. N., Inc., 230 AD3d 127, 136 [1st Dept 2024] [citation omitted]). "Indemnification provisions are strictly construed and a promise to indemnify should not be found unless it can be clearly implied from the language and purpose of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances" (Madison Hospitality Mgt. LLC v Acacia Network Hous., Inc., 230 AD3d 1063 [1st Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Here, the broad indemnification provision in the contract between the Church and Watermark was triggered by plaintiff's accident in the course of Watermark's work (see Asian v Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC, 225 AD3d 462, 463 [1st Dept 2024]; Watermark Contract § 13.1 [NYSCEF Doc. 112]). The subject indemnification provision also does not run afoul of General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 as it sufficiently contains the savings language "to the fullest extent permitted by law" (Brooks v Judlau Contr., Inc., 11 NY3d 204, 210 [2008]; see Guzman v 170 W. End Ave. Assoc., 115 AD3d 462, 463-464 [1st Dept 2014]; Dutton v Pankow Bldrs., 296 AD2d 321, 322 [1st Dept 2002]).

Watermark agreed to indemnify "Owner [defined as the Church] and/or Owner's partners, directors, trustees, officers, members, managers, agents servants and/or employees, and the following parties, each as defined in the "Lease" (as hereinafter defined): Landlord and the Landlord Parties" (Watermark Contract § 13.1). "Landlord" is defined as Thor 180 (Watermark Contract, Ex. 6 [Lease] at Preamble, p. 57). "Landlord's Parties" is defined as "Landlord [Thor 180], Landlord's parent, any subsidiaries, Landlord's managing agent, Landlord's mortgagee and/or ground lessor and their respective officers, directors, employees, successors, assignors [*6]and any other party Landlord may designate" (Lease at Art. of Definitions, p. 58, and ¶ 8.1 [j] [ii], p. 74).

Third-party plaintiffs argue that the Condo is a "Landlord's Party," and that BMC and the Foundation are agents of the Church, entitled to indemnification pursuant to the Watermark Contract (Memo of Law in Supp., pp. 15-17 [NYSCEF Doc. 96]).

Strictly construing the indemnification agreement (see Maggio v 24 W. 57 APF, LLC, 134 AD3d 621, 628 [1st Dept 2015]), there are issues of fact as to whether the Condo is a "subsidiary" or other "Landlord's Party" under the Watermark Contract and Lease, and whether BMC and the Foundation are "agents" of the Church under the Watermark Contract (see Bordonaro v E.C. Provini Co., Inc., — AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 06805, *3 [1st Dept Dec. 9, 2025]; Watermark Contract, Lease; Borgstede Aff. ¶ 6; Kaplan Aff. ¶¶ 7-8). Therefore, the motions for summary judgment on the third-party claims for contractual indemnification by the Condo, BMC, and the Foundation are denied.

Watermark argues that there is a question of fact as to negligence by third-party plaintiffs, precluding summary judgment (Lucas Aff. in Partial Opp. ¶¶ 15-16 [NYSCEF Doc. 126]). However, plaintiff abandoned his Labor Law § 200 and negligence claims against third-party plaintiffs, and the record presents no basis to deny the Church summary judgment on its contractual indemnification claim (Quiroz v New York Presbyt./Columbia Univ. Med. Ctr., 202 AD3d 555, 556-557 [1st Dept 2022]; see Travalja v 135 W. 52nd St. Owner LLC, 232 AD3d 503, 505 [1st Dept 2024] [owner entitled to contractual indemnification where any liability was purely vicarious]). Therefore, the Church's motion for summary judgment is granted, conditioned on a finding of liability against the Church on plaintiff's remaining claims.

VI. Breach of Contract — Failure to Procure Insurance

The Church and Condo the Foundation, BMC move for summary judgment on their third-party claim against Watermark for breach of contract for failure to procure insurance. Watermark opposes and moves for summary judgment dismissing that claim.

"A party moving for summary judgment on its claim for failure to procure insurance meets its prima facie burden by establishing that a contract provision requiring the procurement of insurance was not complied with" (Benedetto v Hyatt Corp., 203 AD3d 505, 506 [1st Dept 2022]). "The burden then shifts to the opposing party, who may raise an issue of fact by tendering the procured insurance policy in opposition to the motion" (id.). "[A] written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms" (Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v Vertin, 23 NY3d 549, 559-560 [2014]). "[A] certificate of insurance is merely evidence of a contract rather than conclusive proof that coverage was procured" (Shala v Park Regis Apt. Corp., 192 AD3d 607, 608 [1st Dept 2021] [citation omitted]).

Third-party plaintiffs submit their contract, which requires Watermark to procure and maintain a commercial general liability insurance policy of $5,000,000 combined single limit, including primary and umbrella coverage (Watermark Contract § 12.1, Ex. 5 [a] [1] [b][NYSCEF Doc. 112]). The commercial general liability insurance polic(ies) were required to designate "Owner [the Church] and all other Indemnitees, as additional insureds (id. at Ex. 5 [A] [5] [ii]), and to be primary and non-contributory (id. at Ex. 5 [B]).

Watermark submits its $1,000,000 per occurrence primary and $5,000,000 per occurrence umbrella policies (Primary Policy at p. 14 [NYSCEF Doc. 78]; Umbrella Policy at p. 6 [NYSCEF Doc. 79]). The primary policy names as additional insured "any person or [*7]organization for whom you are performing operations when you and such person or organization have agreed in writing in a contract or agreement that such person or organization be added as an additional insured on your policy" (Primary Policy at p. 66 at ¶ A). The coverage is primary and non-contributory for Additional Insureds—Owners, Lessees Or Contractors" (Primary Policy at p. 59).

The umbrella policy names as additional insured "[a]ny additional insured under any policy of 'controlling underlying insurance' will automatically be an additional insured under this insurance (Umbrella Policy at Coverage Form § 1 (1) (d) at p. 14 [NYSCEF Doc. 79]). The primary policy is a controlling underlying insurance policy (id. at p. 55).

Further, as to all third-party plaintiffs, Watermark has met its burden by tendering its insurance policies (Benedetto, 203 AD3d at 506). The Court rejects third-party plaintiffs' argument that Watermark breached the contract by its insurer's failure to provide additional insured coverage (see Agurto v One Boerum Dev. Partners LLC, 221 AD3d 442, 445 [1st Dept 2023]; Garcia v Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 231 AD2d 401, 401-402 [1st Dept 1996]; Greenfield Aff. in Opp. ¶¶ 8-9 [NYSCEF Doc. 128]). Third-party plaintiffs do not raise any substantive arguments as to whether the insurance policies themselves are non-compliant with the contract. Therefore, Watermark's motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party claims for breach of contract is granted; and the third-party plaintiffs' motion on the same claim is denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim is DENIED (mot. seq. 004); and it is further

ORDERED that the motion by defendants Thor 180 Livingston LLC ("Thor 180"), Thor Equities, LLC ("Thor Equities") and defendants/third-party plaintiffs The Brooklyn Tabernacle Foundation, Inc. ("Foundation"), Brooklyn Management Corp. ("BMC"), The Brooklyn Tabernacle Church ("Church"), and The 180 Livingston Street Condominium ("Condo") is GRANTED IN PART as follows:

(a) summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against BMC, the Foundation, and Thor Equities is GRANTED;

(b) summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims under Labor Law §§ 200, 241 (6) and for common law negligence is GRANTED;

(c) summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law § 240 (1) claim as asserted against Thor 180, the Condo, and the Church is DENIED;

(d) summary judgment on the third-party claim for contractual indemnification asserted against third-party defendant Watermark Contractors Inc. ("Watermark") is GRANTED only as asserted by the Church, conditioned on a finding of liability against the Church on plaintiff's remaining claim, and is otherwise DENIED;

(e) summary judgment on the third-party claim for breach of contract for failure to procure insurance against Watermark is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion by Watermark for partial summary judgment dismissing the third-party claims against it is GRANTED to the extent that the third-party claims for common law contribution and indemnification and breach of contract for failure to procure insurance asserted by BMC, the Foundation, the Condo, and the Church are DISMISSED, and the remainder of the motion is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a pre-trial conference to be calendared by the [*8]Clerk of the Court.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

DATE 12/29/2025

HON. ASHLEE CRAWFORD