Schurz Beach LLC v U.S. Bank N.A.
2025 NY Slip Op 52230(U)
December 29, 2025
Supreme Court, Bronx County
Ashlee Crawford, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Schurz Beach LLC, Plaintiff,
v
U.S. Bank National Association, AS LEGAL TITLE TRUSTEE FOR TRUMAN 2016 SC6 TITLE TRUST, Defendant.
Supreme Court, Bronx County
Decided on December 29, 2025
Index No. 817308/2021E
Ashlee Crawford, J.
[*1]Plaintiff Schurz Beach LLC commenced this action to quiet title on certain property located at 2730 Schurz Avenue, Unit M-1, Bronx, New York 10465 (Block 5604, Lot 1045). Plaintiff now moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment (1) on its first cause of action, cancelling and discharging a 2007 mortgage encumbering the subject premises pursuant to RPAPL § 1501(4); and (2) on its second cause of action, determining that plaintiff is vested with an absolute and unencumbered title in fee to the subject premises, free and clear of the note and mortgage pursuant to RPAPL § 1501(1).
Defendant US Bank National Association, as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Trust, opposes and cross-moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (a)(4), and (a)(7) to dismiss the complaint due to a prior pending mortgage foreclosure action (US Bank National Association v Schurz Beach LLC, et al., Bronx Supreme Index No. 381092/2008E); or, in the alternative, to stay this action pending a determination of U.S Bank's motion in the foreclosure action to, inter alia, substitute Schurz as a defendant in that case. Plaintiff opposes the cross-motion.
Background
Plaintiff Schurz is the current owner of the subject premises pursuant to a referee's deed recorded on April 29, 2015 (Referee's Deed [NYSCEF Doc. 9]). Defendant U.S. Bank is the assignee of a mortgage recorded on June 4, 2007 (2007 Mortgage [NYSCEF Doc. 10]; 2015 Assignment of Mortgage [NYSCEF Doc. 11]).
In 2007, the prior owners of the subject property, non-parties Danielle Federoff and [*2]Joyce PizzutoFN1, executed a mortgage against the property with non-party Downey Savings and Loan Association, FA ("Downey") (2007 Mortgage [NYSCEF Doc. 10]). In 2008, Downey commenced a mortgage foreclosure action in Bronx Supreme Court against the prior owners (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Schurz Beach LLC, Index No. 381092/2008E). According to defendant U.S. Bank, the mortgage foreclosure action was stayed due to the prior owners' bankruptcy proceedings until in or about 2016 (DiCicco Aff. ¶¶ 9-10, 12 [NYSCEF Doc. 23]).
Meanwhile, in 2012, a separate common charge foreclosure action was brought against the prior owners; Downey was not a party to that action.FN2 Plaintiff Schurz purchased the property at a foreclosure sale (Referee's Deed [NYSCEF Doc. 9]). Several months after the referee's deed was recorded, the 2007 mortgage was assigned by FDIC, as receiver for Downey, to U.S. Bank National Association (2015 Assignment of Mortgage [NYSCEF Doc. 11]).
In 2017, in the mortgage foreclosure action, U.S. Bank was substituted as plaintiff in place of Downey and granted default judgment against the prior owners (1/26/17 Order [NYSCEF Doc. 28]). Then, by order dated November 27, 2018, the foreclosure court granted plaintiff U.S. Bank's motion to substitute Schurz as defendant in place of the prior owners (11/27/18 Order [NYSCEF Doc. 29]). Thereafter, Schurz moved to dismiss, which application the foreclosure court denied, noting that "the action was timely commenced against the mortgagor" and Schurz, as the successor-in-interest to the prior owners-mortgagors, was "properly joined" (10/30/19 Order [NYSCEF Doc. 32]). However, upon learning that prior owner Federoff had died on November 6, 2016, the court vacated its orders dated January 26, 2017, November 27, 2018, and October 30, 2019 for lack of jurisdiction; and dismissed the action as against Schurz, which it found was not properly joined (4/6/21 Order [NYSCEF Doc. 34]).
On July 16, 2021, U.S. Bank moved to discontinue the mortgage foreclosure action but withdrew their motion. Despite the notice of withdrawal, the court discontinued the action (DiCicco Aff. ¶¶ 28-29 [NYSCEF Doc. 23]; 9/27/21 Order [NYSCEF Doc. 35]).
Thereafter, by order dated August 4, 2023, the foreclosure court denied U.S. Bank's application to vacate the April 6, 2021 order; vacated the September 27, 2021 order which erroneously discontinued the action; and restored the action to the active calendar (8/4/23 Order [NYSCEF Doc. 36]). Now, pending before the foreclosure court is a motion by U.S. Bank to vacate the April 6, 2021 order and to substitute Schurz as defendant in place of the prior owners (see Index No. 381092/2008E, Mot. Seq. 012).FN3
Cross-Motion to Dismiss
In support of its cross-motion, defendant U.S. Bank argues that the pending mortgage foreclosure action warrants dismissal of this action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), and that [*3]arguments as to the enforceability of the mortgage must be resolved in the mortgage foreclosure action. U.S. Bank also argues that the complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) because plaintiff failed to plead the elements of a quiet title claim and the statute of limitations to foreclose has not expired.
Plaintiff argues in opposition that its claim to discharge the mortgage is sufficiently pled, and no dismissal or stay of this action is warranted under CPLR 3211(a)(4) because plaintiff is not a party to the mortgage foreclosure action and the relief sought in each action is not the same. Plaintiff opines that a timely-commenced foreclosure action against the prior owners does not equate to a timely action against plaintiff, and that the pendency of the foreclosure action does not preclude plaintiff from maintaining this quiet title action or provide a basis to stay it. Plaintiff also contends that the statute of limitations has expired, barring defendant from commencing an action against plaintiff to enforce the mortgage.
Under CPLR 3211(a)(4), "[t]he court has broad discretion to dismiss an action on the ground that another action is pending between the same parties arising out of the same subject matter or series of alleged wrongs, and it is inconsequential that different legal theories or claims [are] set forth in the two actions" (Shah v RBC Capital Markets LLC, 115 AD3d 444, 444-45 [1st Dept 2014]; Stewart Tit. Ins. Co. v Wingate, Kearney & Cullen, 145 AD3d 462, 463 [1st Dept 2016]). While the court need not dismiss an action on this ground, it may do so "as justice requires" (CPLR 3211[a][4]).
"When considering whether to dismiss a later filed action, courts will determine whether there is a 'sufficient identity' of parties" (Syncora Guar. Inc. v J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, 110 AD3d 87, 96 [1st Dept 2013], citing White Light Productions, Inc. v On the Scene Productions, Inc., 231 AD2d 90, 93-94 [1st Dept 1997]). "Substantial, not complete, identity of parties is all that is required" (Syncora Guar. Inc. v J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, 110 AD3d 87, 96 [1st Dept 2013]). "Generally, a substantial identity of parties is present when at least one plaintiff and one defendant is common in each action" (Morgulas v J. Yudell Realty, Inc., 161 AD2d 211, 213, 554 N.Y.S.2d 597 [1st Dept 1990][emphasis added]). "An action should be dismissed where an identity of parties and causes of action in two simultaneously pending actions raises the danger of conflicting rulings relating to the same matter" (Finch Prop. Holdings I, LLP v Blumenfeld, 234 AD3d 521, 523-24 [1st Dept 2025]).
The Court finds that dismissal of this action is appropriate under CPLR 3211(a)(4). There is a substantial identity of issues, given that the claims in both this quiet title action and the mortgage foreclosure action concern the enforceability of the same mortgage, and there is a clear danger that a ruling in this action could conflict with a ruling in the mortgage foreclosure action. While plaintiff Schurz is not currently a party to the mortgage foreclosure action, there is substantial identity of the parties to both actions, as Schurz is the successor-in-interest to the prior owners. Moreover, currently pending before the foreclosure court is U.S. Bank's motion to substitute Schurz as a party to the foreclosure action (see e.g. Nurlybayev v SmileDirectClub, Inc., 205 AD3d 455, 456 [1st Dept 2022][substantial identity of parties where plaintiff was not a party to the prior actions, but was a potential member of the class, and defendants overlapped]; see also GMF 157 LP v Inspirit Dev. and Constr., LLC, 235 AD3d 493 [1st Dept 2025][substantial identity of parties which "are or were" parties to the pending action]).
Additionally, plaintiff's ability to maintain this quiet title action is undermined by caselaw precluding quiet title actions when there is a timely, pending mortgage foreclosure action (see 1900 Capital Tr. III v Guaman, 215 AD3d 564 [1st Dept 2023]; Merino v Wells [*4]Fargo Bank, N.A., 195 AD3d 489 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 919 [2022]; c.f. 630 6A LLC v U.A. Bank Tr. N.A., 234 AD3d 566, 567-568 [1st Dept 2025]). While defendant challenges the timeliness of the mortgage foreclosure action and whether it may be a proper party thereto, those questions should be addressed to the foreclosure court, including on the pending motion to substitute Schurz as successor-in-interest to the prior owners.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) and the Court need not reach the remainder of the parties' arguments.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its claims is DENIED, and defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice, subject to further proceedings in the mortgage foreclosure action; and it is further
ORDERED that within 10 days of entry of this order, defendant shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon plaintiff; and it is further
ORDERED that defendant shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry on the County Clerk's Office who shall enter judgment accordingly; and it is further
ORDERED that such service upon the County Clerk's Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the "E-Filing" page on the court's website).
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
DATE 12/29/25
ASHLEE CRAWFORD, J.S.C.
Footnotes
see 1999 Deed (ACRIS Records, Liber/Reel: 1665, Page: 2279).
(Board of Mgrs of White Beach Condo. and Marina v Danielle Federoff, et al., Index No. 309154/2012).
The Court notes there also is an active action to foreclose a condominium common charge lien against the property, pending in Bronx Supreme Court (Board of Managers of White Beach Condo. v. Schurz Beach, LLC, Index No. 803327/2023E).