Janati-Atrie v HP, Inc.

Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on July 1, 2025

Index No. CV-023234-23/NY

Wendy Changyong Li, J.

I. Recitation of the papers considered in the review of this

Motion as required by CPLR 2219(a)

Upon reading Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Formal Complaint ("Motion #4"), Plaintiff opposition ("Opposition"), and Defendant's reply ("Reply"), together with all supporting documents, Motion #4 is decided as follows.

II. Background

On October 31, 2023, Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendant by filing a summons and endorsed complaint ("Endorsed Complaint") seeking recovery of money damages in the amount of $50,000 with interest. Plaintiff alleged that in the summer of 2022 and [*2]August and September of 2023, Plaintiff requested Defendant to repair her computer (see Endorsed Complaint). Plaintiff further contended that "[Defendant] accepted to repair [the computer] free of charge" but that the computer returned to Plaintiff was different from the one she provided to Defendant, as a result of which, Plaintiff suffered "emotional disturbances" (id.). The Endorsed Complaint alleged the following causes of action: damage caused to person (health); damage to property (other than automobile); failure to provide repairs; failure to provide proper service for goods ordered; failure to return property; failure to pay for services rendered; breach of contract; loss of property; loss of time from work; and loss of use of property (id.).

On December 12, 2023, Defendant filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Endorsed Complaint ("Motion #1"). Thereafter, Defendant failed to appear for the court appearance scheduled on January 29, 2024, resulting in the denial of Defendant's Motion #1. On March 5, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to vacate the denial of Defendant's Motion #1 ("Motion #2"). A decision and order rendered by a prior court on April 9, 2024, granted Motion #2 to the extent of restoring Motion #1 to the calendar, and denied Motion #1 for Defendant's failure to reference the correct court and date for the hearing on the motion in its Notice of Motion.

On April 24, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Endorsed Complaint ("Motion #3"), which was subsequently granted to the extent of directing Plaintiff to serve and file a formal complaint, and otherwise denied as per the decision ("Decision #3") and order of another court rendered on August 5, 2024.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Decision #3, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint on September 4, 2024 ("Formal Complaint"). On January 21, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Formal Complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) and (7) ("Motion #4"). Plaintiff opposed, and Defendant replied. Motion #4 was submitted and subsequently assigned to this Court for a determination.

III. Discussion

1) Dismissal on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2), a party is permitted to move for dismissal on the grounds that "the court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause of action" (CPLR 3211[a][2]).

CCA 202 states, in pertinent part:

"The [Civil Court] shall have jurisdiction of actions and proceedings for the recovery of money, actions and proceedings for the recovery of chattels and actions and proceedings for the foreclosure of liens on personal property where the amount sought to be recovered or the value of the property does not exceed $50,000" [Emphasis added] (see also NY CLS Const Art VI 15[b]).

Here, Defendant averred that this Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the [*3]instant action as Plaintiff purported to recover money damages exceeding the monetary jurisdictional limit of the court in seeking "$1,045 in costs for the computer, over $50,000 in lost wages from [Plaintiff's] yoga teaching, $31,200 in lost time litigating the case, and an unspecified amount of storage costs for the defective computer" (see Motion #4, Memorandum of Law, p. 6). However, the Court notes that while Plaintiff did indeed claim to have suffered damages beyond the monetary jurisdictional limit of the court, her "intention . . . [was] to only demonstrate that [her] endured economic loss [was] . . . beyond what [she] [was] asking for" (see Formal Complaint, p. 6). The Formal Complaint stated that Plaintiff intended to "hold [Defendant] liable to pay $50,000 worth of damages" (id., p. 1). Plaintiff further affirmed in her Opposition that she wanted to seek damages of $50,000 (see Opposition, p. 5). As such, Plaintiff did not purport to recover money damages exceeding $50,000, and thus, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action. Accordingly, the branch of Motion #4 to dismiss Plaintiff's Formal Complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) is denied.

2) Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87, 638 N.E.2d 511, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972 [1994]). The court is to "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every possible inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (see Leon, 84 NY2d 83, 87, 638 N.E.2d 511, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972 [1994]; see also Amaro v Gani Realty Corp., 60 AD3d 491, 492-493, 876 NYS2d 1 [1st Dept 2009]).

In assessing a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), "a court may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint and 'the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one'" (see Leon, 84 NY2d 83, 87, 638 N.E.2d 511, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972 [1994] citing Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., Inc., 40 NY2d 633, 635-636, 357 N.E.2d 970, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314 [1976]) and quoting Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275, 372 N.E.2d 17, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182 [1977]). Plaintiff may not be penalized for failure to make an evidentiary showing in support of a complaint that state a claim on its face (see Rovello, 40 NY2d 633, 635, 357 N.E.2d 970, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314 [1976]).

In the Formal Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that "[she] was paying [Defendant] for [t]echnical support on [a] monthly basis" (see Formal Complaint, p. 1). Plaintiff made further references of such "technical support" service, stating that she "would cancel [her] subscription" upon thinking that her computer was "functioning well", then subsequently "reactivate [her] technical support with [Defendant] in order to get assistance" (id. p. 2). Moreover, Plaintiff claimed that "Defendant accepted to repair [her computer] free of charge", pursuant to which Plaintiff sent her computer to Defendant for repair (id., p. 2). Plaintiff also argued that the computer returned to Plaintiff after being "repaired" was different from the one she had sent to Defendant, as there was a discrepancy between the serial numbers of the computers (id., p. 3). Additionally, Plaintiff claimed that she experienced "severe headaches" and "daily agony, frustration, exasperating the level of [her] stress and despair" as a direct result of her experience [*4]with Defendant (id., p. 2), and that she had lost wages from her yoga teaching by having a nonfunctioning computer (id., p. 6).

As such, it appears that the essence of Plaintiff's claims is that (1) there was a monthly "subscription" service for technical support offered by Defendant; (2) Plaintiff had subscribed to such service; (3) Defendant had failed to provide adequate service with respect to the repair of Plaintiff's nonperforming computer as Plaintiff's computer was allegedly not returned; and (4) as a consequence, Plaintiff suffered direct loss as to the computer itself and other damages with respect to loss of wages from Plaintiff's yoga teaching and damage to Plaintiff's health due to "emotional disturbances".

Despite Plaintiff's failure to cite specific contract provisions in relation to the aforementioned service or to claim Defendant's breach of such provision, nevertheless, taking into consideration that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, and affording Plaintiff a liberal construction of her Formal Complaint, construing the facts as alleged in the Formal Complaint as true and according Plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference in a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (see Leon, 84 NY2d 83, 87, 638 N.E.2d 511, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972 [1994]), the Court finds that the facts as alleged in the Formal Complaint were sufficient to suggest a potential cause of action for "failure to provide repairs", or namely, for breach of contract.

As Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the Court is limited to an examination of Plaintiff's pleadings to determine whether they state a cause of action (see Miglino v Bally Total Fitness of Greater NY, Inc., 20 NY3d 342, 351, 985 N.E.2d 128, 961 N.Y.S.2d 364 [2013]). At this stage, it is not the role of the Court to come to a conclusion on such a matter, for "[w]hether [Plaintiff] can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" (see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19, 832 N.E.2d 26, 799 N.Y.S.2d 170 [2005]). In addition, Defendant is not left without any other remedies after it joins the action.

Moreover, the Court notes that public policy favors resolution of disputes on the merits (see e.g. Genesis R. v City of New York 162 AD3d 471, 75 N.Y.S.3d 33 [1st Dept 2018] citing Harwood v Chaliha, 291 AD2d 234, 737 N.Y.S.2d 359 [1st Dept 2002]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Losner, 145 AD3d 935 [2nd Dept 2016]; I.J. Handa, P.C. v Imperato, 159 AD2d 484, 485 [2nd Dept 1990]).

The Court remains unpersuaded by Defendant's heavy reliance on the economic loss doctrine in contending that the dismissal of the instant action in its entirety is warranted, as the matter at hand does not appear to concern the failure of Plaintiff's computer to perform its intended purpose, but rather Defendant's failure to provide technical support services in breach of its contractual obligations that ultimately resulted in the alleged loss of Plaintiff's computer (see generally 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 96 NY2d 280, 750 N.E.2d 1097, 727 N.Y.S.2d 49 [2001]; Blackrock Balanced Capital Portfolio (FI) v U.S. Bank N.A., 165 AD3d 526, 86 N.Y.S.3d 484 [1st Dept 2018]). However, the Court finds that the dismissal of the cause of action for "damage caused to person (health)" is warranted because Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action on its face. In addition, it appears that there was no legal [*5]duty independent of the alleged contract at issue that was violated (see 17 Vista Fee Assoc. v Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. of Am., 259 AD2d 75, 693 N.Y.S.2d 554 [1st Dept 1999] ["A simple breach of contract does not give rise to a tort claim unless a legal duty independent of the contract has been violated"] [Internal citations omitted]).

Here, Plaintiff's cause of action for "damage caused to person (health)" appears to be for either intentional infliction or negligent infliction of emotional distress pursuant to Plaintiff's claims of having experienced "emotional disturbances", "severe headaches", "damage . . . upon [Plaintiff's] health [and] state of mind on different levels" and "daily agony, frustration, exasperating the level of [her] stress and despair" (see Formal Complaint, p. 2; Endorsed Complaint).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress must be with respect to a conduct that "has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" (see Murphy v Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 303, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 [1983] [Internal quotation omitted]). Likewise, "extreme and outrageous conduct" is an essential element of a cause of action alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress (see Brown v New York Design Ctr., Inc., 215 AD3d 1, 7, 185 N.Y.S.3d 97 [1st Dept 2023] [Internal citation omitted]). For the matter at hand, the facts as alleged by Plaintiff regarding Defendant's conduct fall far short of such strict standard as although the alleged loss of Plaintiff's computer was distressing to her, it was not sufficiently "extreme or outrageous" so as to support Plaintiff's claim.

Furthermore, this Court grants the dismissal of the cause of action for "failure to pay for services rendered" as the instant action concerns Defendant's alleged failure to provide technical support services, and not its failure to pay for services rendered by Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the branch of Motion #4 to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is granted to the extent of dismissing the cause of action for "damage caused to person (health)" and "failure to pay for services rendered". The remaining branch of Motion #4 to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is otherwise denied.

IV. Order

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED that the branch of Motion #4, Defendant's Motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Formal Complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Motion #4, Defendant's Motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Formal Complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is GRANTED in part to dismiss the cause of action for "damage caused to person (health)" and "failure to pay for services rendered"; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Motion #4, Defendant's Motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Formal Complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is otherwise DENIED.

This constitutes the DECISION and ORDER of the Court.

Dated: July 1, 2025

County of New York

Hon. Wendy Changyong Li

Judge of the Civil Court