Reka F. v Roland F.
2025 NY Slip Op 52242(U)
November 26, 2025
Supreme Court, Rockland County
Rachel E. Tanguay, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Reka F., Plaintiff,
v
Roland F., Defendant.
Supreme Court, Rockland County
Decided on November 26, 2025
Index No. 032132/2022
Plaintiff Pro Se; Defendant, Robert S. Lewis, Esq.
Rachel E. Tanguay, J.
[*1]The following papers, NYSCEF documents numbered 60-96, were considered in connection with Defendant'sFN1 motion (Motion #12) seeking an order (i) directing Plaintiff "to immediately pay past due Child Support Arrears TBD" and (ii) directing Plaintiff to pay monthly child support ordered; Plaintiff's cross-motion (Motion #14) that requests (i) reinstatement of child support payments as set forth in the parties' Settlement Agreement of $3,000 per monthFN2; Plaintiff's motion (Motion #15) seeking an order: (i) directing Defendant to pay $45,000 in basic child support arrears retroactive to September 2023 and (ii) directing Defendant to pay Plaintiff $3,000 per month in basic child support commencing May 1, 2025; and Plaintiff's Order to Show Caused (Motion #16) seeking an order directing Defendant to pay child support arrears from July 28, 2023 through August 28, 2025 totaling $111,000.00. All motions are fully submitted and the Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties and all referenced exhibits.
Upon the foregoing papers, the Court now rules as follows:
Procedural History
The parties were previously married with a Judgment of Divorce (JOD) having been entered by this Court on September 14, 2021. The parties share one child, B.F., born XX/XX/2005 and who is now 20 years old. At the time of the divorce, Plaintiff was the primary physical custodian of the child, who was a minor. Defendant was obligated under the terms of the parties' JOD to pay her, inter alia, $3,000 per month as and for basic child support.
Almost immediately subsequent to the parties' divorce, on October 18, 2021, Defendant filed a petition in Family Court seeking a downward modification of child support; this petition was dismissed because Defendant claimed a reduction of income during the pandemic, prior to the signing of the JOD. On February 15, 2022, DefendantFN3 filed a motion (Motion #4) seeking to modify his child support obligation, claiming a decrease in income. On April 25, 2022, Defendant filed a family offense petition against Plaintiff claiming that the child had been living with him since April 7, 2022 after the Plaintiff and the child had a physical altercation, and that on April 20, 2022 Plaintiff effectively lured the child out of Defendant's home by saying the parties agreed the child should return to Plaintiff, but that the child had begged Defendant to pick him up. The Family Court issued a temporary order of protection on behalf of the Defendant and the child. On May 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion (Motion #5) seeking contempt against Defendant for his alleged willful failure to abide by the terms of the parties' JOD including but not limited to Plaintiff's order of physical custody, seeking an upward modification of child support, an increase in spousal maintenance and counsel fees. On May 4, 2022, Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause (Motion #6) seeking to suspend his child support obligation to Plaintiff, terminating his child support obligation to Plaintiff, and seeking overpayments of child support held by the Support Collection Unit. He also sought immediate suspension of his child support obligation to Plaintiff via temporary restraining order. A review of the file reveals that the Order to Show Cause was never conformed or signed. The parties appeared before the Court (Eisenpress, J.-ret.) on May 17, 2022, June 14, 2022, July 5, 2022, and July 26, 2022.FN4 On May 17, 2022, the Court stated, "I'm going to suspend child support for the month of April and May until — and June until we hear back from the AFC." T 5/17/22 at 8:17-19. That transcript was not so-ordered. On June 14, 2022, the primary focus of the appearance was to discuss the AFC's position on custody and access, that the child wanted no contact or communication with the Plaintiff. There were cursory references to child support and arrears, but no concrete figures were discussed or agreed to. On June 29, 2022, Defendant filed a petition to modify custody in the Family Court, which was transferred into the Integrated Domestic Violence Court and heard with the pending post-judgment matrimonial applications. On July 5, 2022, the AFC's position had changed in that the child wanted communication with his mother. There was no discussion about finances at all. The Court is able to discern from the case management system that trial [*2]dates were set for September 30, 2022 on the two pending motions.FN5 On August 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a family offense petition against the Defendant in Family Court and a temporary order of protection was issued.
Defendant annexed to Motion #12 an exhibit that he purports to be a "stipulation" placed on the record before the Court on September 13, 2022, and attaches a copy of the transcript which was not so-ordered from that day. The Court case management system reflects that Motions 5, 6 and 7 were "settled" on September 13, 2022. However, a review of that transcript reveals that the prior Jurist determined the modification of custody application following a Lincoln hearing with the child, and directed the parties to submit an order with the terms placed on the record. While there was substantial discussion about arrears and support figures, there was no agreement as to those issues and the Judge told the parties (Plaintiff was pro se at that time and Defendant was represented by counsel), "[Y]ou need to figure that out. It's not that complicated, so just do it, and figure it out." T 9/13/25 at 26:25-27:1 (brackets added). The Court further stated that it would "put [the case] on for a control for October 13th for submission of the order, and also I would like a letter indicating what's been resolved with respect to the financials and what remains outstanding, and, if need be, I will bring you back in for a conference on that." Id. at 28:13-18 (brackets added).
No orders or status letters were submitted on or before October 13, 2022. Counsel for Defendant uploaded a status letter to NYSCEF (Doc. 7) on November 21, 2022 detailing what issues remained open. In that letter, she states that counsel had previously agreed that Plaintiff would pay Defendant temporary basic child support of $1,111.70, and that this agreement was confirmed via email on July 26, 2022. Counsel further averred that this obligation should be recited in the final stipulation because Plaintiff did not "complain or disagree to pay the amount set forth". While the letter mentions that this figure was placed on the record on September 13, 2022, which it was, the Court had directed the submission of an order based upon the terms placed on the record; the transcript was never so-ordered. Counsel for Defendant submitted a proposed order of modified custody on October 28, 2022 which omitted any language relating to the parties' financial/support obligations or arrears owed. On January 20, 2023, the Court signed the proposed order, which granted Defendant sole legal and physical custody of the child, set a dog visitation schedule, and essentially added in civil restraints, as the parties had withdrawn their family offense petitions and the temporary order of protections had been vacated.
The Court convened a conference on February 14, 2023. Both parties were represented by counsel and they discussed the support obligations and arrears with the Court, as well as some outstanding equitable distribution issues such as life insurance and tax refunds. During that appearance, as reflected in a transcript that also was not so-ordered, counsel for Plaintiff stated to the Court, "You suspended the child support for April, May and June." T 2/14/23 at 10:24-25. The only other document contained in the file supporting a possible suspension is an unsigned Order to Show Cause on Motion #6 filed in May 2022 seeking that relief by temporary [*3]restraining order.FN6 At the end of the conference, no settlement was reached and the Court set a control date of March 21, 2023 as a "stip or appear" date. Thereafter, Plaintiff's attorney sought to be relieved as counsel and she was once again pro se.
On June 13, 2023, Plaintiff appeared pro se and Defendant appeared with counsel. Counsel indicated that Plaintiff still would not agree to the numbers proposed by Defendant for settlement. Plaintiff confirmed that support arrears, the tax refund and QDRO all remained unresolved. When there was a discussion about child support and maintenance and the arrears, the Court stated, "I thought that was done." T 6/13/23 at 18:14. Defendant's counsel replied that "in terms of the unpaid spousal support, that was addressed in the transcript. In terms of the tax refund, that was addressed in the transcript. I don't know what's left . . ." Id. at 18:17-20 (ellipses added).FN7 Defendant's counsel said she would be submitting a written order relating to the child support obligation; however, the Court does not see that this was done or that such an order was signed. The Court placed language on the record that the parties would divide the cost of QDRO preparation, that the parties agree to pay for the child's college pro rata with a SUNY cap, and that:
[w]ith respect to everything else, the parties have agreed that they're going to walk away. So Mr. F. is waiving his right to record any sums that are due to him other than what I just put on the record, the QDRO, right, any sums due to him prior to today's date. And Ms. F. is waiving any sums due to her prior to today's date with exception of the outstanding maintenance payments for May and June, which one has been mailed and one is coming in the next few days.
Id. at 37:6-14 (brackets and emphases added). The parties agreed and the Court conducted a voir dire. The Court directed counsel to submit the support order by July 3, 2023 on notice of settlement. The Order that was supposed to be submitted in July but no proposed orders were uploaded to NYSCEF.
Plaintiff retained counsel in December 2023 who contacted the Court to indicate that there was still non-compliance by Defendant in finalizing the QDRO and asked for the Court to so-order the June 13, 2023 transcript. The transcript was so-ordered by the Court on December 12, 2023. (NYSCEF Doc. 14). The QDRO issue was resolved and an order signed on February 7, 2024. Thereafter, counsel who had been representing the Defendant sought to be relieved.
On May 2, 2024, Defendant filed a petition in Family Court seeking child support from Plaintiff. On May 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a petition in Family Court seeking child support from Defendant. Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause identical to the current Motion #12 which was signed by the Court on June 11, 2024. Plaintiff substituted counsel and her new attorney opposed that motion. No reply papers were submitted and the Court is unable to discern how that [*4]motion was disposed, as there is no written Decision and Order on that motion, nor is there a so-ordered stipulation or so-ordered transcript resolving the motion. The Court convened a conference on July 12, 2024 where Plaintiff was represented by new counsel and Defendant was pro se; a copy of the transcript from that proceeding was appended to Plaintiff's Motion #14. (NYSCEF Doc. 79). Plaintiff's attorney stated to the Court,
[T]wice the parties and counsel were before Your Honor and Your Honor said, okay, now the calculations are going to change, submit a new order, work out a new amount of child support now that the maintenance is ceasing, that was never done. It was never done. And the reason it was never done is because Mr. F. never submitted any financial information.
T 7/12/24 at 4:19-21 (brackets added). The Court insisted that "[t]here was a calculation done." Id. at 11:15 (brackets added.) Plaintiff's counsel disagreed and said, "Nothing was ever formalized, Judge." Id. at 11:18 (emphasis added). Defendant stated that the numbers agreed to were in the September 13, 2022 transcript, one that was never so-ordered or reduced to written order. Plaintiff's attorney explained to the Court that "we have the added issue that the child is with my client . . ." Id. at 12:19-20 (ellipses added). Plaintiff contended that "95 percent of the time" the child was residing with her. Id. at 22:3-4. Plaintiff's counsel argued, "it's a factual issue, where is the child residing at this juncture, I believe. I think it's an evidentiary issue as to where the child is primarily residence at this point, frankly and that would have to be shown through a hearing . . . ." Id. 23:4-248 (ellipses added). The Court ruled from the bench on Motion #10, stating, "My ruling on the Order to Show Cause is what I just said. Calculate that number [Plaintiff's child support obligation]. I calculate it at 680. . . . You should take a look at her tax returns, take that number, deduct Social Security, multiply that by 17 percent and divide by 12 and that's her monthly child support number." Id. at 24:11-18. However, since that appearance more than fifteen (15) months ago, neither the Court's ruling nor the child support figure were reduced to writing and presented to the Court for signature.
On December 12, 2024, Motion #12 was filed by Order to Show Cause by Defendant. Motion #13 was duplicative of Motion #12 so the Court declined to sign that Order to Show Cause. Plaintiff opposed Motion #12 and purportedly cross-moved for relief by filing Motion #14 on February 1, 2025, and this is the first time that Plaintiff filed an application seeking to enforce the prior support obligation set forth in the parties' JOD requiring Defendant to pay Plaintiff $3,000 per month. This Court (Tanguay, J.) convened a conference with the parties on February 4, 2025 to explain that there was a new judge on the case and to understand the status of the parties' alleged pending resolution. They both fought over where the child was staying most of the time, with Defendant claiming it did not matter because he had custody. The Court explained to both pro se litigants that the custody order for this child no longer controls the situation, given that the child is over 18 but under 21. When Plaintiff said she was seeking child support arrears, the Court advised that her application did not request that relief so she would need to amend her motion papers.
Instead of filing an amended Notice of Motion, on March 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a new "cross-motion" (Motion #15) seeking child support arrears back to September 2023 and again seeking reinstatement of the $3,000 per month child support obligation set by the JOD. On August 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed yet again an application (Motion #16) seeking the same relief as in Motions #14 and #15 to reinstate the $3,000 per month, but also seeking support arrears dated [*5]back to July 28, 2023 of $111,000. She sought relief via temporary restraining order for Defendant to pay her $3,000 per month in child support pending the hearing and determination of the motion, which the Court signed on August 28, 2025.
Legal Analysis
To begin, the Court will deem both Motions #15 and #16 as an amended Motion #14, since it appears that the was intent of Plaintiff who, as a pro se litigant, unclear about how to do that. She continued to ask for the same original relief in Motions #15 and #16 that she had requested in Motion #14, but added in new prayers for relief with each motion, as well as a request for temporary restraining order relief.
The procedural history of this case is extremely complex, as many lengthy conferences were held before the Court where the parties were left with the unfortunate impression that they had reached settlements and that the transcripts they provide are "stipulations". However, while some transcripts were prepared, all but one were not "so-ordered" by the Court, nor were any orders written and signed reflecting many of the terms discussed on the record.FN8 This creates a significant problem for the parties, who thought they had orders in place that they do not. The Appellate Division has held that:
CPLR 2219 (a) provides that in resolving motions, orders issued by the courts shall meet the following six basic criteria: First, an order must be in the form of a writing. A written determination by a court removes any possibility of the parties later disputing the substance of what the court decided. Second, an order determining a motion made upon supporting papers shall be signed with the judge's signature or initials by the judge who made it. Third, the judge's signature or initials must be dated. The dating of an order assures that it was executed after the submission of all relevant papers and memorializes the administrative history of the action. Fourth, a written order must identify the court from which it was issued. This requirement is necessary to identify the proper appellate court to which any appeal lies, and for an appellate court to know whether a filed appeal has been properly and jurisdictionally directed to the correct court or judicial department. The requirement also assures that the court's determination is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the identified trial court. Fifth, an order must recite the papers reviewed in determining the motion. This requirement assures the parties that all papers that have been submitted for consideration have, in fact, been reviewed and considered by the court. The requirement that the court recite the papers reviewed fulfills the purpose of defining the scope of the record on appeal. Further, if an order reveals that not all of the known submitted papers have been considered by the court, an aggrieved party is alerted to the error and can potentially seek reargument of the motion on the ground that the court misapprehended the relevant facts or seek resettlement of the record for an appeal. Sixth and finally, an order determining a motion shall give the determination or direction in such detail as the judge deems proper.
Charalabidis v. Elnagar, 188 AD3d 44, 47-49 (2d Dept. 2020)(internal quotation marks and [*6]citations omitted)(emphases added). Even once those steps are followed, "[t]he order is not enforceable or appealable until its filing has been accomplished." Id. at 50 (brackets added). See also CPLR § 2220. It is undeniable that "orders of support, must be reduced to writing, signed, or initialed by the Judge, state the court of which he is the Judge, and the date and place of signature. The order must then be filed or entered in the proper clerk's office and a copy served with notice of entry thereon upon the other party or counsel." Parsons v. Parsons, 82 Misc 2d 454, 457-458 (Fam. Ct. Monroe Co. 1975).
The only valid, so-ordered transcript submitted to the Court in connection with the parties' respective claims about support and arrears is the one from June 13, 2023 which was "so-ordered" in December 2023. As stated, all of the other transcripts that both parties seem to think constitute valid agreements or court orders are neither. Even in transcripts where a Judge decides substantive issues, those constitute "decisions" and only become subject to enforcement and appeal once reduced to a written order; moreover, colloquy on the record by a Judge does not automatically become an order.
There is a signed modification of custody order that was issued following the September 13, 2022 appearance where the Court appears to have taken only testimony from the child in camera and ruled on the merits of the application without conducting a full evidentiary hearing, granting Defendant sole legal and physical custody the child. However, there is not one single signed or initialed court order setting the child support obligation that Plaintiff was to pay to the Defendant, despite references to that amount in court transcripts and correspondence to the Court. That June 13, 2023 transcript briefly touches on support issues, but does not recite the Court's directive as to what support obligations and arrears both parties were responsible to pay. Plaintiff brought up the support and the Court said, "I thought that was done. I thought we had a child support number and a maintenance number and we're doing an offset." T 6/13/24 at 18:14-16. Defendant's attorney even concedes later in the appearance that "the child support was never reduced to an order." Id. at 32:2-3. She offered to prepare one and the Court gave her a deadline of July 3, 2023 to do so. The file is devoid of any submitted proposed orders on support, and there is no signed Order awarding child support to Defendant, payable by Plaintiff. This will render Defendant's pending application to set arrears as well as his request for the Court to compel Plaintiff to pay ordered monthly child support fatal, as there is no court order that can be enforced upon which to set arrears and to direct compliance.
The Court notes that any attempt to reduce prior decisions made on the record to an order at this juncture would be unworkable, as those decisions are now stale. Since entry of the last order in this case on December 12, 2023, which ordered a transcript from June 13, 2023, it appears that the facts and circumstances of the case have changed. It was following that June 13, 2023 appearance that Plaintiff alleged that the child is residing primarily with her when not boarding at school, a salient fact that needed to be determined before a support obligation can be set. Further, the Court cannot ascertain the respective incomes of the parties based on the existing record to calculate support. An evidentiary hearing would need to take place to resolve questions of fact about the child's residence and the parties' income and financial circumstances.FN9
To whatever extent any of the colloquy or decisions made on the record between June 13, 2023 and the present would possibly be considered to be orders, despite the prevailing law to the contrary, this Court vacates those orders in the interest of justice.FN10 See CPLR 5015; Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 790 N.E.2d 1156, 760 N.Y.S.2d 727 (2003)(holding, "In addition to the grounds set forth in section 5015(a), a court may vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice"). The June 13, 2023 so-ordered transcripts has both parties waiving all financial claims as to support arrears. As stated, since entry of that order, Plaintiff alleges that there has been a significant change in facts of the case that would directly impact child support calculations and obligations.
The last final order of support was the one contained in the parties' JOD, directing Defendant to pay Plaintiff $3,000 per month in basic child support along with the parties' respective pro rata obligations, and this Court signed a temporary restraining order requiring those payments to resume effective August 28, 2025. That temporary obligation will continue until the Court can convene an evidentiary hearing to resolve relevant questions of fact regarding the child's actual primary residence away from college and the parties' respective incomes and financial positions retroactive to June 13, 2023. Once the Court resolves those questions of fact, it will apply the prevailing law set forth in Goldstein v. Goldstein, 166 AD3d 729 (2d Dept. 2018). In Goldstein, the mother had custody of the child, but the child went to go live with the father. In the parties' separation agreement incorporated but not merged with their divorce decree, the parties had agreed that the child's permanent residence away from the mother for more than three months would result in the child being emancipated for purposes of child support, enabling the other parent to seek support. Here, the parties have similar language in their Separation Agreement, that if the child "ceases to permanently reside with the parent who is herein designated as the `custodial parent' or `residential custodian'", then the support obligation terminates to that custodian. Separation Agreement dated October 25, 2019 at page 31, Article 25. Defendant was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child prior to him reaching the age of majority, even though no child support obligation was ever legally ordered thereafter. Thus, if the child is permanently still residing with Defendant, his obligation to Plaintiff would cease and he would be entitled to receive support. Conversely, if the child is now permanently residing with Plaintiff, she would maintain her current court-ordered support, [*7]subject to the parties' current incomes as they agreed in their Separation Agreement to recalculate support either every three (3) years or upon a change of fifteen (15%) percent in either of their respective gross incomes. Id. at 30.
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Defendant's motion (Motion #12) seeking an order setting child support arrears and compelling payment of the Plaintiff's child support obligation is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion (Motion #15 and #16) are deemed an amended motion of Motions #14 and is hereby GRANTED to the extent that the Court will hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the primary residence of the child since June 13, 2023 and to determine the parties' respective incomes and financial circumstances since 2023, in order to decide whether Plaintiff is entitled to the relief she has sought. The in-person hearing is hereby scheduled for January 21, 2026 at 2:00 p.m.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court on Motions.
Dated: November 26, 2025
New City, New York
HON. RACHEL E. TANGUAY
Justice of the Supreme Court
Footnotes
Defendant listed himself as the Plaintiff in his motion and in the matrimonial caption, despite the caption connected with this Index No. listing him as Defendant. The parties, who have spent a lot of time litigating in Family Court, appear to be confusing post-judgment applications in Supreme Court, where the caption remains the same, with petitions filed in Family Court, where the party filing the petition is the Petitioner but can also be a Respondent in other petitions. The parties are cautioned to use the proper caption and to refer to themselves properly going forward: Ms. F.is the Plaintiff and Mr. F. is the Defendant.
This request was made at the conclusion of the Defendant's affirmation opposing Plaintiff's Motion #12, with no separate Notice of Motion as required by the CPLR.
Who filed a motion through counsel listed himself as the Plaintiff in the caption. This is perhaps adding to the parties' confusion about who is Plaintiff and who is Defendant.
There were no transcripts of these proceedings in the paper or NYSCEF file, so this Jurist asked the court reporter staff to prepare transcripts to piece together what happened. Nonetheless, none of these transcripts have been so-ordered.
It is unclear why the case was advanced to September 13, 2022 for an in camera with the child in lieu of holding a full hearing on September 30, 2022.
That motion was filed while the case was still a "paper case" so there is no electronic record of a signed OTSC, and the Court cannot locate a signed copy evidencing that this TRO was in effect.
The Court is unclear as to what transcript counsel was referred to, as the transcript from September 13, 2022 did not resolve all of those issues, and the only terms from that discussion on the record that was reduced to a written order on January 20, 2023 related to custody.
The parties each had legal representation at various stages of the post-judgment proceedings so it's a mystery to this Court how no attorney over the course of a few years presented the Court with an order reflecting the terms placed on the record.
The Court notes that the Plaintiff appended a letter purported to be written by the parties' son as an exhibit to Motion #14 (NYSSCEF Doc. 74) in which he claims to live with her. Such a letter would not be admissible at a hearing, but the Court sincerely hopes that both parties endeavor to present testimony and evidence without having to call their son to testify. While he may be an adult, he is still the parties' child and calling him to the stand in open Court to testify in connection with a financial dispute his parents are having could have serious and life-long repercussions on the relationship he has with his parents.
Pursuant to CPLR § 2221, for leave to appeal from, or to stay, vacate or modify, an order shall be made, on notice, to the judge who signed the order, unless he or she is for any reason unable to hear it." CPLR § 2221 (emphasis added). The Court notes that, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 21, the prior Jurist would have to be the one to vacate any prior order she made. However, Judge Tanguay had been informed in January 2025 that Judge Eisenpress was no longer "available" within the meaning of the statute to preside over any matters pending in Rockland County and that Judge Tanguay was to assume Judge Eisenpress' former Rockland County inventory in its entirety going forward, including motions to renew and reargue, and motions to vacate.