16011, LLC v Bank of Am., N.A.
2026 NY Slip Op 04269
July 8, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law ยง 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
16011, LLC, appellant,
v
Bank of America, National Association, defendant, US Bank National Association, etc., respondent.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on July 8, 2026
2024-11446, (Index No. 613447/22)
Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.
Paul Wooten
Deborah A. Dowling
James P. McCormack, JJ.
Matthew Tannenbaum (McKinley Law, P.C., Lloyd Harber, NY [Shannon McKinley], of counsel), for appellant.
Friedman Vartolo LLP, Garden City, NY (Stephen J. Vargas of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to certain real property and for related declaratory relief, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Philippe Solages, Jr., J.), entered July 11, 2024. The order granted the motion of the defendant US Bank National Association for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it and, in effect, for declarations in its favor.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, making appropriate declarations in accordance herewith.
In June 2014, the defendant Bank of America, National Association (hereinafter Bank of America) commenced an action (hereinafter the bank foreclosure action) against, among others, nonparty Wallace Morris to foreclose a mortgage on a condominium unit located in Elmont (hereinafter the property). Bank of America also filed a notice of pendency against the property.
In June 2016, nonparty Board of Managers of Carriage Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc., commenced an action (hereinafter the board foreclosure action) to foreclose a lien it held upon the property for nonpayment of common charges. By referee's deed dated February 4, 2019, a referee in the board foreclosure action conveyed title to the property to the plaintiff, subject to the mortgage. On January 28, 2020, a third notice of pendency was filed in the bank foreclosure action. In January 2021, the mortgage was assigned to the defendant US Bank National Association (hereinafter US Bank). On February 1, 2022, the plaintiff recorded the referee's deed. On July 13, 2022, a judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered in the bank foreclosure action.
In October 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to the property and for related declaratory relief. The plaintiff alleged that it had [*2]unencumbered title to the property and sought a judgment declaring, inter alia, that the judgment of foreclosure and sale entered in the bank foreclosure action did not extinguish its interest in the property. US Bank moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it and, in effect, for declarations in its favor. In an order entered July 11, 2024, the Supreme Court granted US Bank's motion. The plaintiff appeals.
"Pursuant to CPLR 6501, the filing of a notice of pendency provides constructive notice of an action in which the judgment demanded may affect the title to real property. The statute further provides that a person whose conveyance is recorded after the filing of a notice of pendency is bound by all proceedings taken in the action after such filing to the same extent as if he or she were a party" (Bank of Am., N.A. v Burton, 233 AD3d 644, 645 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 6501[a]; Novastar Mtge., Inc. v Mendoza, 26 AD3d 479, 479).
Here, US Bank demonstrated, prima facie, that the referee's deed conveying title to the property to the plaintiff was recorded after the third notice of pendency was filed. Therefore, the plaintiff had constructive notice of the bank foreclosure action, was bound by all proceedings taken therein as if it were a party, and was not a necessary party to that action (see Bank of Am., N.A. v Burton, 233 AD3d at 645; 534 K, LLC v Flagstar Bank, FSB, 187 AD3d 971, 972). Further, the plaintiff's interest in the property was effectively foreclosed upon entry of the judgment of foreclosure and sale in the bank foreclosure action (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Pape, 178 AD3d 683, 684; Novastar Mtge., Inc. v Mendoza, 26 AD3d at 480). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions as to the order entered July 11, 2024, are without merit.
The plaintiff's contentions regarding an order entered November 1, 2023, are not properly before this Court, as the plaintiff withdrew its appeal from that order (see Constructamax, Inc. v Dodge Chamberlin Luzine Weber, Assoc. Architects, LLP, 157 AD3d 852, 853).
Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the judgment of foreclosure and sale entered July 13, 2022, extinguished the plaintiff's interest in the property (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334; Waller v Town of Brookhaven, 223 AD3d 767, 769).
IANNACCI, J.P., WOOTEN, DOWLING and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court