Decided and Entered:July 9, 2026

CR-24-0773

Calendar Date: June 12, 2026

Before: Garry, P.J., Reynolds Fitzgerald, Ceresia, Mcshan And Ryba, JJ.

[*1]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Roger McDonough, J.), rendered April 25, 2023 in Albany County, convicting defendant upon her plea of guilty of the crime of assault in the second degree.

In October 2021, the City of Watervliet Police Department received a call regarding a nonresponsive infant. A subsequent investigation revealed that, over the course of several days, defendant, the child's mother, threw and dropped the infant on the floor, struck the infant's head against the ceiling and covered the infant's nose and mouth with a towel. As a result of the foregoing, defendant was charged in a six-count indictment with assault in the first degree, three counts of assault in the second degree, attempted strangulation in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. In satisfaction of the indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of assault in the second degree and agreed to waive her right to appeal both orally and in writing. As part of the plea agreement, defendant was promised a prison sentence of between five and seven years, to be followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Before continuing defendant on release following her guilty plea, Supreme Court administered Parker warnings admonishing defendant that it would not be bound by the sentencing commitment if she, among other things, failed to appear at sentencing. Thereafter, in January and April 2023, defendant twice failed to appear for sentencing due to alleged hospitalizations, and defendant was ultimately taken into custody pursuant to a bench warrant. At sentencing in April 2023, and consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, Supreme Court imposed a term of incarceration of seven years, to be followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.

We affirm. As an initial matter, to the extent that defendant claims that Supreme Court took into consideration her failures to appear for sentencing when it imposed a seven-year prison term and that the court therefore abused its discretion in imposing what amounted to an enhanced sentence, such claim is without merit. Defendant's sentence was within the permissible sentencing range that was promised to her as part of her plea agreement and was therefore not an enhanced sentence. The court also expressly stated that it, albeit "reluctant[ly]," "agree[d] to go along with [the] plea bargain" when proceeding to sentence defendant. In any event, any contention that Supreme Court impermissibly imposed an enhanced sentence is unpreserved (see People v El-Begearmi, 236 AD3d 1203, 1204 [3d Dept 2025]; compare People v Lane, 233 AD3d 1207, 1210 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 945 [2025]). Moreover, "[i]nasmuch as [Supreme] Court advised defendant of the specific conditions that she had to abide by and the consequences of violating the plea conditions, [any] challenge to the severity of the [alleged] enhanced sentence [would be] precluded by her unchallenged appeal waiver" (People v El-Begearmi[*2], 236 AD3d at 1204; see People v Copp, 194 AD3d 1194, 1195 [3d Dept 2021]; People v Golden, 171 AD3d 1357, 1358 [3d Dept 2019]). Finally, defendant's challenge to the severity of the sentence imposed, which was consistent with the favorable and negotiated plea agreement, is precluded by the unchallenged waiver of her right to appeal (see People v Aboueida, 248 AD3d 1507, 1507 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Tatro, 246 AD3d 1159, 1159 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Chan, 214 AD3d 1071, 1073 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 927 [2023]).

Garry, P.J., Reynolds Fitzgerald, Ceresia, McShan and Ryba, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.