Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 13, 2026

2026-05343

Cheryl E. Chambers, J.P.

Linda Christopher

Helen Voutsinas

Carl J. Landicino, JJ.

[*1]

DECISION & JUDGMENT

Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application to release Earin Sistrunk pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) or, in the alternative, to set reasonable bail upon Queens County Indictment No. 73107/2025.

ADJUDGED that the writ is sustained, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, to set reasonable bail or to release Earin Sistrunk on his own recognizance, and to fix such other terms and conditions upon the release of Earin Sistrunk as may seem to it to be just and proper.

"Where, as here, a defendant is being held in custody on a felony, the defendant is subject to release if the People are not ready for trial within 'ninety days from the commencement of his or her commitment'" (People ex rel. Hereth v Franchi, 214 AD3d 932, 933, quoting CPL 30.30[2][a]). "When making a motion pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) to be released on bail or his or her own recognizance, a defendant who has been committed to the custody of the sheriff has the initial burden of demonstrating, by sworn allegations of fact, that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time set forth in the statute. Once a defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time has elapsed without a declaration of readiness by the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay" (People ex rel. Nieves v Molina, 207 AD3d 797, 798 [citation omitted]; see People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 348-349; People ex rel. Ferro v Brann, 197 AD3d 787, 787). The People also bear the burden of "ensur[ing], in the first instance, that the record of the proceedings . . . is sufficiently clear to enable the court considering the . . . CPL 30.30 motion to make an informed decision as to whether the People should be charged with any delay" (People ex rel. Nieves v Molina, 207 AD3d at 798 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216). "After the People identify the exclusions on which they intend to rely[,] . . . the defense must identify any legal or factual impediments to the use of these exclusions" (People v Henderson, 120 AD3d 1258, 1258 [internal quotation marks omitted], affd 28 NY3d 63).

Here, in an oral application to the Supreme Court pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) made on April 23, 2026, the same date on which an order was issued invalidating the People's December 4, 2025, certificate of compliance, the petitioner demonstrated that more than 90 days had elapsed [*2]from the commencement of the defendant's confinement to the date of the application. Although the People contend that they filed a supplemental certificate of compliance and restatement of readiness within the speedy trial time limit, the record reflects that more than 60 items of automatic discovery were still outstanding as of the date of the defendant's application, consisting primarily of documents that would tend to impeach the credibility of testifying prosecution witnesses (see id. § 245.20[1][k][iv]; People v Coley, 240 AD3d 122, 135). On this record, the People failed to demonstrate that they exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the supplemental certificate of compliance (see People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 216; People v Coley, 240 AD3d at 138). Accordingly, since more than 90 days of delay in bringing the defendant to trial on the indictment is chargeable to the People, CPL 30.30(2)(a) requires that he be released on bail which he is capable of meeting, or upon his own recognizance, and upon such other conditions as may seem just and proper (see People ex rel. Lazzaro v Molina, 221 AD3d 849, 851; People ex rel. Fast v Molina, 219 AD3d 1384, 1386).

CHAMBERS, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VOUTSINAS and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court