Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 15, 2026

2025-01813, (Index No. 523618/22)

Mark C. Dillon, J.P.

Valerie Brathwaite Nelson

Carl J. Landicino

Susan Quirk, JJ.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Nail Peak, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), dated December 11, 2024. The order denied that defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Nail Peak, Inc., pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it is granted.

In August 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained while receiving nail care services at a salon operated by the defendant Nail Peak, Inc. (hereinafter Nail Peak). In the original complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the injuries occurred on February 17, 2022. In August 2024, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint that contained substantially identical causes of action, but alleged a date of injury of February 17, 2021. Nail Peak moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it as time-barred. In an order dated December 11, 2024, the Supreme Court denied Nail Peak's motion. Nail Peak appeals.

"[O]n a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant 'bears the initial burden of

[establishing], prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired'" (Schearer v Fitzgerald, 217 AD3d 980, 981, quoting Kogut v Village of Chestnut Ridge, 214 AD3d 777, 778). "The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations is tolled or is otherwise inapplicable, or whether the action was actually commenced within the applicable limitations period" (Kaul v Brooklyn Friends Sch., 220 AD3d 939, 941 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Griffin v Perrotti, 121 AD3d 1041, 1042).

"Pursuant to CPLR 214(5), an action to recover damages for personal injuries is generally subject to a three-year statute of limitations" (Ruiz v Sanchez, 219 AD3d 1363, 1363). "A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading" (CPLR 203[f]). "The relation-back doctrine permits a plaintiff to interpose a [*2]claim or cause of action which would otherwise be time-barred, where the allegations of the original complaint gave notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proven and the cause of action would have been timely interposed if asserted in the original complaint" (Moezinia v Ashkenazi, 136 AD3d 990, 992). When determining whether a defendant has been placed on notice of the transactions or occurrences underlying a new claim for purposes of CPLR 203(f) and the relation-back doctrine, one "should not . . . look[ ] beyond the four corners of the original pleading" (34-06 73, LLC v Seneca Ins. Co., 39 NY3d 44, 51).

Here, Nail Peak met its initial burden of demonstrating that the statute of limitations on the causes of action to recover damages for personal injuries had expired prior to the filing of the amended complaint (see Randolph v Fox, 230 AD3d 1173, 1174). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was inapplicable or the action was timely commenced (see id.). The causes of action to recover damages for personal injuries, as alleged in the original complaint, were based upon an injury date in February 2022, while those causes of action, as alleged in the amended complaint, were based upon an injury date in February 2021. As the allegations in the original complaint did not provide Nail Peak with notice of the need to defend against the allegations in the amended complaint, the relation-back doctrine is unavailable (see CPLR 203[f]; 34-06 73, LLC v Seneca Ins. Co., 39 NY3d at 51; Randolph v Fox, 230 AD3d at 1174).

The plaintiff's contention that Nail Peak's motion was not timely made is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, thus, is not properly before this Court, as it does not present pure questions of law appearing on the face of the record which could not have been avoided if raised at the proper juncture (see R & B Design Concepts, Inc. v Wenger Constr. Co., Inc., 153 AD3d 864, 864).

Accordingly, we reverse the order and grant Nail Peak's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it.

DILLON, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court