People v Williams
2026 NY Slip Op 04440
July 15, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law ยง 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
The People of the State of New York, respondent,
v
Cory D. Williams, appellant.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on July 15, 2026
2022-04683, (Ind. No. 24/20)
Colleen D. Duffy, J.P.
Angela G. Iannacci
Paul Wooten
James P. McCormack, JJ.
Thomas R. Villecco, New York, NY, for appellant.
David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Goshen, NY (Andrew R. Kass and Robert H. Middlemiss of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Hyun Chin Kim, J.), rendered March 18, 2022, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Orange County, for a new trial.
The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
After jury voir dire, during the peremptory challenge phase of jury selection, the People struck a Hispanic prospective juror in the first round and then moved to strike two more Hispanic prospective jurors in the second round. The defendant challenged the People's use of a peremptory challenge pursuant to Batson v Kentucky (476 US 79) with respect to the challenge to strike the third Hispanic prospective juror. The defendant contended that the People's prior use of a peremptory challenge to a Hispanic prospective juror in the first round of jury selection and the People's challenges to the two prospective Hispanic jurors in the second round were racially motivated. The defendant pointed out that the People moved to strike the only three Hispanic prospective jurors. In response to the defendant's challenge, the County Court required the defendant to articulate an additional reason as to why the defendant contended that the People's exercise of its peremptory challenge was racially motivated. Defense counsel essentially reiterated his contentions. Thereafter, following the People's articulation of a race-neutral reason for their exercise of each of the three challenges, the court denied the defendant's Batson challenge on the ground that the defendant did not carry his prima facie burden. The court failed to reach step three of Batson wherein the burden shifts to the defendant to argue a basis as to why the reasons proffered by the People were pretextual. The defendant appeals.
The defendant's contentions on appeal regarding the Batson challenge are unpreserved for appellate review. Nonetheless, we reach the issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see CPL 470.15[6]).
"[T]he United States Supreme Court formulated a three-step test to assess whether [*2]peremptory challenges have been used to exclude potential jurors on the basis of race, gender, or other protected categories" (People v Vera, 222 AD3d 1003, 1004; see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US at 96). "At step one, the moving party must make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by 'showing that the facts and circumstances of the voir dire raise an inference that the other party excused one or more jurors for an impermissible reason.' If the moving party makes a prima facie showing, the inquiry proceeds to step two, and the burden shifts to the adversary to provide a facially neutral explanation for the challenge" (People v Vera, 222 AD3d at 1004-1005, quoting People v Smocum, 99 NY2d 418, 421). "This first step 'is not to be onerous,' and is satisfied 'by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred'" (People v Chery, 117 AD3d 962, 963, quoting People v Hurdle, 99 AD3d 943, 943). "Finally, at step three, once race-neutral reasons for the strike are provided, the inference of discrimination is overcome and the ultimate burden shifts back to the moving party to persuade the court that the reasons are merely a pretext for intentional discrimination" (People v Wright, 42 NY3d 708, 715 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Hall, 53 AD3d 552, 555).
Here, contrary to the determination of the County Court, the defendant satisfied step one of Batson (see People v Bridgeforth, 28 NY3d 567, 576; People v Gray, 68 AD3d 1131, 1132). Accordingly, at that point, the burden shifted to the People to proffer race-neutral explanations for exercising their peremptory challenges to eliminate those prospective jurors (see People v Vera, 222 AD3d at 1004-1005). Thereafter, the court failed to allow the defendant to challenge whether the reasons proffered, although facially neutral, were pretextual and not genuine reasons for the challenges (see People v Wright, 42 NY3d 708; People v Hall, 53 AD3d at 555).
Accordingly, the County Court's erroneous determination with respect to the defendant's Batson challenge to the prospective jurors at issue requires reversal and a new trial.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contention.
DUFFY, J.P., IANNACCI, WOOTEN and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court