Decided and Entered:July 16, 2026

CR-24-0146

Calendar Date: May 12, 2026

Before: Garry, P.J., Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald, Powers And Corcoran, JJ.

[*1]

Corcoran, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Joseph Cawley, J.), rendered November 6, 2023, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and the traffic infraction of leaving the scene of an incident without reporting.

While on patrol in July 2022, a police officer observed a speeding vehicle and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. The vehicle did not stop and, shortly thereafter, was found crashed and unoccupied. Responding officers searched the unoccupied vehicle and recovered a duffle bag on the driver's seat containing a loaded firearm and a wallet with identification cards bearing defendant's name and photograph. Officers located defendant a short distance from the crash site. Defendant was subsequently charged by indictment with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and leaving the scene of an incident without reporting. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant, as a second violent felony offender, to a determinate prison term of seven years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision, on the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, together with lesser concurrent terms on the remaining convictions. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

Defendant first contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence because there was insufficient proof linking him to the vehicle or the firearm. Accordingly, we must "determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonable and, if not, then [we] must weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence. When conducting this review, this Court considers the evidence in a neutral light and defers to the jury's credibility assessments" (People v Moore, 223 AD3d 1085, 1086-1087 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 41 NY3d 1003 [2024]). "To be satisfied that the jury was justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a circumstantial evidence case, [this Court] must satisfy itself that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" (People v Baque, 43 NY3d 26, 30 [2024] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

As relevant here, "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when . . . such person possesses any loaded firearm[*2]" outside of their home or place of business (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). The weapon must be operable, a fact not at issue here, and a "[l]oaded firearm" includes "any firearm loaded with ammunition or any firearm which is possessed by one who, at the same time, possesses a quantity of ammunition which may be used to discharge such firearm" (Penal Law § 265.00 [15]).

As charged here, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when that person commits criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree as defined in Penal Law § 265.01 (1) and has previously been convicted of any crime (see Penal Law § 265.02 [1]). A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when he or she possesses any firearm (see Penal Law § 265.01 [1]). Possession may be actual or constructive (see Penal Law § 10.00 [8]); the latter requires proof that defendant "exercised dominion and control over the car where the weapon was located" (People v Moore, 223 AD3d at 1093 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Kendricks, 226 AD3d 1150, 1151 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 41 NY3d 1003 [2024]; People v Watts, 215 AD3d 1170, 1171-1172 [3d Dept 2023]; People v Colter, 206 AD3d 1371, 1373 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1149 [2022]). Constructive possession may be established by circumstantial evidence (see People v Moore, 223 AD3d at 1092; People v Colter, 206 AD3d at 1373).

A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree when, as relevant here, he or she "intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act" (Penal Law § 195.05 [1]). Finally, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 (1) (a) prohibits a driver from leaving the scene of a property damage accident without reporting it.

The People presented trial testimony from the pursuing police officer, responding officers and a firearms examiner. Patrolman Bradley Kurst testified that, at approximately 3:30 a.m. on July 23, 2022, he observed a gray sedan traveling 78 miles per hour in a 30 mile-per-hour zone and attempted to initiate a traffic stop by activating his lights and siren. Due to the vehicle's speed, he could not see the license plate or determine how many people were inside. Kurst further testified that, aside from one vehicle that pulled over during his pursuit of the sedan, no other vehicles were on the road. When he saw the sedan approach a nearby exit, he discontinued his pursuit and informed dispatch by radio about the driver's failure to comply. Approximately 10 seconds later, he observed dust kicked up in the area of the exit ramp and saw that the vehicle had crashed into a guardrail.

Officer Daniel Gavin testified that, when he arrived at the scene, the crashed [*3]vehicle's engine was still running. The vehicle was unoccupied, the airbag was deployed and he did not observe anyone in the immediate vicinity. Gavin searched the vehicle and recovered a black duffle bag from the driver's seat. Inside the bag, he found a loaded handgun and a wallet containing identification cards bearing defendant's name and photograph. A second wallet containing the identification of the vehicle's registered owner was located on the passenger seat. Gavin relayed defendant's name and date of birth to dispatch over his radio.

Deputy Jerad Hand heard the dispatch call concerning the unoccupied crashed vehicle, which also broadcast defendant's name. He drove in the direction the vehicle was last traveling before it crashed near an embankment close to the highway exit, where a steep slope led to a creek surrounded by high grass. Hand already knew defendant and, while searching that area approximately 8 to 10 minutes after hearing Gavin's radio transmission, he observed defendant walking away from the grass and creek. Defendant was wet and covered in mud, grass and debris. No one else was nearby. Defendant attempted to hide his face when Hand tried to speak to him. Hand communicated his location over his radio and confirmed that he was present with defendant.

Gavin responded and recognized defendant from the identification cards found in the crashed vehicle. He testified that defendant was soaking wet, covered in mud with fresh abrasions and grass on his body, face and hair. Gavin further identified defendant from photographs retrieved from his vehicle's computer. When he called defendant by his first name, defendant responded "yup." Gavin then placed defendant under arrest and recovered from his person a New York State identification card bearing defendant's photograph, name and date of birth. The People established that the firearm discovered in the car was operable and that defendant did not possess a pistol permit. Defendant did not testify or present any evidence at trial.

A different verdict would not have been unreasonable because no witness observed defendant operating the vehicle and the People presented no forensic evidence, such as fingerprints or DNA, directly linking defendant to either the vehicle or the firearm. Moreover, the vehicle was registered to another individual, whose identification was found on the front seat, and defendant was not observed in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle when it was discovered (see People v Colter, 206 AD3d at 1375; People v Ruffin, 191 AD3d 1174, 1178 [2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 960 [2021]). Nevertheless, when viewing the evidence in a neutral light and according deference to the jury's credibility determinations, we are satisfied that the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence. The proof established that defendant was located minutes after the crash near the vehicle in an area accessible by traversing brush and a creek. His appearance, including his wet and debris-covered [*4]clothing, was consistent with having recently walked through that terrain. The jury could reasonably infer from this circumstantial evidence that defendant had recently exited the vehicle and fled the scene. Further, identification bearing defendant's name and photograph was recovered from the same bag as the firearm. "The jury also could infer that the [roadside] was not defendant's home or his place of business" (People v Colter, 206 AD3d at 1375). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see People v Moore, 223 AD3d at 1093; People v Colter, 206 AD3d at 1375; People v Rawlinson, 170 AD3d 1425, 1428 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1107 [2019]; People v Oliver, 135 AD3d 1188, 1191 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1003 [2016]).

Defendant further contends that County Court erred in failing to grant his request to represent himself at trial. A defendant has a constitutional right to proceed pro se and may invoke that right provided: "(1) the request is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues" (People v Lewis, 44 NY3d 350, 358 [2025] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]); see People v Atutis, 222 AD3d 1106, 1106 [3d Dept 2023]; People v Vasquez, 210 AD3d 1302, 1303 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 1080 [2023]). "In order to be considered unequivocal, the defendant's request must be clearly and unconditionally presented to the trial court and reflect a purposeful decision to relinquish the benefit of counsel and proceed singularly" (People v Atutis, 222 AD3d at 1106-1107 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

By letter dated June 30, 2023, defendant requested that County Court conduct "an inquiry over the nature of [his] disagreement with counsel, and whether the attorney could still provide zealous representation," and "[i]f the court deems this request to lack merit, it is the defendant's decision to represent and proceed in propria persona." Here, defendant's request to represent himself was neither clear nor unequivocal; instead, it reflected dissatisfaction with counsel rather than a "standalone request to proceed pro se" (People v Lewis, 44 NY3d at 359). Accordingly, County Court did not err in denying defendant's request, nor was the court obligated to conduct a further inquiry (see People

v Atutis, 222 AD3d at 1107).

Next, defendant contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of certain tangible evidence and identification testimony. We disagree. To prevail on such a claim, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel "failed to provide meaningful representation and thus deprived defendant of a fair trial" (People v Ferrer, 248 AD3d 1507, 1510 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "The onus is on defendant to demonstrate the absence of [*5]strategic or other legitimate explanations for the alleged deficiencies of counsel" (id. [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citations omitted]). "As relevant here, the failure to request a suppression hearing, standing alone, does not establish that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance, particularly in the absence of any basis upon which to conclude that a defendant had a colorable claim or that counsel's actions were not premised upon a legitimate strategy" (People v Reichel, 211 AD3d 1090, 1091 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 39 NY3d 1113 [2023]; see People v Agueda, 202 AD3d 1153, 1155-1156 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1031 [2022]). "[A] defendant is not denied effective assistance of trial counsel merely because counsel does not make a motion that has little or no chance of success" (People v Johnson, 201 AD3d 1208, 1209 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citation omitted]).

Defendant faults counsel for failing to challenge a perceived Fourth Amendment violation without identifying any particular basis for suppression. However, the record reflects that, at the conclusion of the Huntley hearing, defense counsel explained to County Court that defendant was dissatisfied with his failure to request a Mapp hearing seeking to suppress items recovered from the crashed sedan; counsel did not believe this motion was appropriate given his intention to argue at trial that defendant was never present in the vehicle. Counsel sought and received additional time to research the issue but ultimately declined to supplement the suppression motion on that basis.^FN1

Any effort to suppress items found in the vehicle was unlikely to succeed in any event. To have standing to challenge a search, a defendant must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area where the evidence was seized (see People v Leach, 21 NY3d 969, 971 [2013]; People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 108 [1996]). "[A] defendant seeking to challenge a search and seizure cannot rest upon the fact that the People have charged him with constructive possession of contraband, but must demonstrate that the search violated a personal legitimate expectation of privacy" (People v Darby, 206 AD3d 1165, 1169 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 38 NY3d 1149 [2022]). Property is deemed abandoned when an individual voluntarily relinquishes any expectation of privacy in it (see People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d at 110). Where a defendant flees the scene of a crashed vehicle, such conduct constitutes abandonment of the vehicle and its contents, thereby negating any claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy (see People v Cooper, 236 AD3d 1471, 1472 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 43 NY3d 1007 [2025]; People v Shabazz, 231 AD3d 968, 968 [2d Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 932 [2025]; People v Ethridge, 175 AD3d 552, 553 [2d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1016 [2019]).

Here, there is no dispute [*6]that the crashed vehicle was unoccupied when police conducted the search yielding defendant's identification and the firearm. Accordingly, suppression on grounds that police violated defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy would have been unwarranted here, and we are unpersuaded that counsel's decision to forgo a Mapp hearing rendered his representation ineffective. Moreover, counsel articulated sound strategy for not challenging the search, when doing so would have required defendant to assert standing and thereby undermine his defense at trial.

Defendant also claims that counsel should have sought a Dunaway hearing. Although not thoroughly explained in his appellate brief, defendant argued in his pro se omnibus motion that police lacked the requisite level of suspicion to detain or arrest him. We again find that such a motion would have had little chance of success (see People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 726 [3d Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]). "Probable cause [to arrest] does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the suspected individual, . . . [which] must be judged under the totality of the circumstances" (De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 759 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Warren, 160 AD3d 1132, 1133 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1154 [2018]). Considering the totality of the circumstances explained above, police had probable cause to arrest defendant based upon a reasonable belief that he committed the charged offenses (see People v Williams, 146 AD3d 410, 411 [1st Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 954 [2017]; People v Smith, 140 AD3d 1396, 1398 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 936 [2016]; People v Carr, 99 AD3d 1173, 1175 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1010 [2013]). Finally, although defendant faults counsel for not seeking a Wade hearing, there is no record evidence of a "police-arranged confrontation[ ] between . . . defendant and an eyewitness" (People v Dixon, 85 NY2d 218, 222 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]) and, therefore, there was no basis for such a hearing.

Defendant's additional claims of ineffective assistance, including that counsel failed to conduct a sufficient cross-examination at the Huntley hearing or to adequately challenge police conduct, are either conclusory or unsupported. The record reflects that counsel actively participated in the Huntley hearing, conducted rigorous cross-examination, and mounted a consistent and cogent defense at trial that defendant never occupied the crashed vehicle and had no connection to the firearm. Viewing the evidence, the circumstances of this case and counsel's representation in totality, we conclude that defendant received meaningful representation. Defendant's remaining contentions, to the extent not specifically addressed herein, have been examined [*7]and found to be without merit.

Garry, P.J., Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Powers, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.